




CHALLENGES FOR THE DEMOCRATISATION PROCESS IN TANZANIA

Moving towards consolidation 50 years
after independence?

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Challenges for the democratisation process in Tanzania

Moving towards consolidation 50 years after independence?

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Moving towards consolidation 50 years after independence?

Jonas Ewald



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*To Susanne, my dear wife, and our beloved children Klara and Teodor,
who have almost had the dissertation as the fifth member of the family
during their childhood. Thank you for your love and patience!*

*And to all the men and women in Tanzania
who are struggling to develop democracy
despite harsh conditions and huge challenges*

Abstract

Key words: Peace and development research, democracy, democratisation, role of opposition, opposition parties, ruling party, elections, civil society, media, trade unions, parliament, poverty reduction, substantial democracy, liberal democracy, interface between political and economic reforms, political change, public sector reforms, local government reforms, decision-making, aid, international development cooperation, accountability, role of donors, democratic culture, relations between the executive, representative and judiciary, iron-triangle, Tanzania, Zanzibar, Sub Saharan Africa.

Tanzania has been independent in 2011 for 50 years. While most neighbouring states have gone through violent conflicts, Tanzania has managed to implement extensive reforms without armed political conflicts. Hence, Tanzania is an interesting case for Peace and Development research.

This thesis analyses the political development in Tanzania since the introduction of the multiparty system in 1992, with a focus on the challenges for the democratisation process in connection with the 2000 and 2005 elections. The question of to what extent Tanzania has moved towards a consolidation of democracy, is analysed through an analysis of nine different institutions of importance for democratisation, grouped in four spheres, the state, the political, civil and economic society. Focus is on the development of the political society, and the role of the opposition in particular. The analysis is based on secondary and primary material collected in the period September 2000 to April 2010.

The main conclusion is that even if the institutions of liberal democracy have gradually developed, in practice single-party rule has continued, manifested in the 2005 election when the CCM won 92% of the seats in the parliament. Despite an impressive economic growth, poverty remains deep and has not been substantially reduced. On a theoretical level this brings the old debate between liberal and substantive democracy back to the fore. Neither the economic nor the political reforms have apparently brought about a transformation of the political and economic system resulting in the poor majority gaining substantially more political influence and improved economic conditions. Hence, it is argued that the interface between the economic, political and administrative reforms has not been sufficiently considered in the liberal democratic tradition. Liberal democracy is necessary for a democratic development, but not sufficient for democracy to be consolidated. For that a substantive democratic development is necessary.

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Preface and acknowledgements

Writing this dissertation has been a long and winding journey between important activities like raising a family and less important things like building up the Centre for Africa Studies, at Göteborg University, building up and running internationalisation programmes like the capacity building programme with the Centre for Conflict Management at the National University of Rwanda, doing a number of other research undertakings in Rwanda and Tanzania, and comprehensive teaching.

Like all narratives this one has a long pre-history. Once upon a time I thought I should become an agronomist. Being active in the Africa Groups and the “green-movement”, my interest arose from the debate on the disadvantages of the “green revolution”. I wanted to develop food crops with high protein and calorie yields without fertilisers in an organic production system that could maintain soil fertility. In 1979/80 I went to Africa with the ambition—besides experiencing the “great adventure”—to study agricultural projects. I travelled cross-country the whole way from what was then Salisbury to Göteborg. This trip took almost a year to complete and made me deeply interested in Africa. It also forced me to pass through three civil wars: the just concluded liberalisation war in Zimbabwe and the ongoing wars in Uganda and Sudan, as that was the only way to go by land back to Sweden. Being stuck in Uganda and Southern Sudan for several months, seeing the destructiveness of war in all its horrifying aspects, illustrated in a disquieting way the war-experiences I had been told of by my German-born father and his parents during my childhood. My father’s and my grandparents’ grim experiences of two world wars have had a much larger impact on me than I had realised. This together with the hands-on experience of the destructiveness of war in poor countries later on brought me to the department for Peace and Development Research. Without peace little development will take place, and without development there is a risk that conflicts will escalate into war.

Africa has since that trip been a part of my life. I became fascinated by the vibrant culture at all levels of the different societies. The warm, kind atmosphere and the ever present joke and big laugh were and are intriguing. I became so enchanted with the culture that I could not resist sharing some of its qualities through playing East African dance music myself. Almost ten years of playing the saxophone with Mama Malumma, including two tours in Tanzania, gave an inroad into another Tanzania than the gloomy macro-economic indicators suggested. In 1989 I was given the opportunity to do a minor field study in Tanzania and have since then returned to East Africa almost every year in different capacities. My licentiate thesis focused on the economic impact of the structural adjustment programmes on the local level in Tanzania and was

based on extensive fieldwork in Geita and Arumeru districts. It was presented in 1997. However, after being part of a team studying the Swedish support to peace-monitoring in the most violence-prone areas in South Africa in connection with the elections of 1994, together with Håkan Thörn, I became more interested in democratisation and peace-building issues. I had the opportunity to follow the first steps towards multiparty democracy in Tanzania and the elections in 1995, which made me start on a new PhD thesis subject rather than continue with the licentiate thesis.

This text has been written now and then over a long period, using small units of time split up by teaching-duties, course-development and institutionbuilding. And there were a number of detours with various studies on Tanzania and Rwanda. The most relevant one for this work was the participation in a team coordinated by David Booth from ODI to evaluate the Swedish country assistance programme to Tanzania for the years 1995 to 2000, where my part was to focus on the support to democratisation and culture together with the late Professor Andrew Kiondo from the University of Dar es Salaam (UDSM). This gave invaluable input and networks that have benefited the work of thesis, at the national level.

Another study that supplemented my work on this thesis, was an interdisciplinary three year programme to study the effects of the introduction of cost-sharing on children's rights to health and education, the first larger project coordinated by the Centre for Africa Studies, in collaboration with IDS at UDSM. I coordinated the programme, together with two colleagues and friends who have been supportive and inspiring over the years, Lotta Mellander and Anders Närman, a good friend and colleague who unfortunately passed away much too early. We carried out extensive field studies in different districts in Tanzania that also contributed to my understanding of the local conditions, not the least for the democratisation process, together with Ass. Professor Ibrahim Shao and Robert Mhamba at IDS, UDSM. We spent innumerable nights out in the bush debating and discussing the political developments in Tanzania and the day's "catch" during the field studies. I also coordinated a team that was commissioned to make two strategic conflict analyses, one for Lake Victoria and the other for the Great Lakes Region. These two studies greatly enhanced my understanding of the regional political and economic dynamics, setting the stage for national democratisation processes, not the least in Tanzania.

For this thesis I had the opportunity to do extensive field studies in connection with the "grassroots elections" in 1999, field studies before and during the elections of 2000 with follow ups in 2001, 2003. And there was a new round of field studies in connection with the election in 2005, with follow ups in 2006 and 2007. The last field visit for this study took place in April 2010. The aim at the outset was to study the interface

between economic and political reforms, with a multilevel analysis approach, which turned out to be too large to manage, for me. As with most PhDs you end up doing much less than you planned—and it might still be too much.

Acknowledgements

Many people have been, on a more or less voluntary basis, involved in the long delivery of this text. I am above all grateful to the activists in various political parties, civil society organisations and officials in various departments at national as well as the local level in Pangani and Kinondoni districts who took time and shared their experiences, knowledge and explained some of the realities of Tanzanian political life for me, despite the fact that I kept returning, asking questions about almost everything. I am deeply grateful! They include *Vitongoji* and *Mtaa* leaders, village leaders, ward and district staff; the political parties, MPs, councillors and MP- and councillor-candidates for the various parties in the two districts. I am also grateful for the time various officials and representatives at the national headquarters for the political parties took to give their views on the ongoing political process.

At the time of my first visit I was affiliated to the Department of Political Science at UDSM. The late Ass. Professor Andrew Kiondo generously contributed with his insights into the political situation of Tanzania. I am indebted to him for several years of discussions on all possible dimensions of the democratisation process. He sadly passed away prematurely. Professor M.L. Baregu has not only enlightened my understanding of the politics of the opposition, but also become a good friend over the years. I have also learnt a lot from long discussions with Ass. Professors Daudifen Mukangara, Laurean Ndumbaro and Mohammad Bakari. Despite a heavy workload, Professor S.S. Mushi took time to discuss and elaborate on my questions. On later visits I was affiliated to the IDS where Ass. Professor Ibrahim Shao not only was very helpful, but also became a good friend, not the least through our spending time in the field together. The late Professor H. Othman, and Professors H. M. Mlawa, M. Mbilinye, S. Ngware also provided valuable information as well as commenting on my ideas from the field studies on many occasions, as did Professor Chris Maina Peter at the Faculty of Law. All this help is greatly appreciated.

I had invaluable assistance from field assistants Ave Maria Semakafu, Juanita Magongo, Jocelyn Mkilima and Mrisho Malipula and others in the first phase up to 2005. Juanita did a fantastic job keeping all the pieces together. During the hectic field studies in 2005-2007, Reuben Shigela not only was an invaluable pilot into the intellectual as well physical landscape of the political parties in Tanzania, but a very

good friend. Zephaniah Kambele assisted me in this and other projects. And so did William Kapynyema. Thank you so much! A great many other people in Tanzania have offered time to discuss proposals and contribute valuable information, ideas and contacts. Thank you all!

One of the most important people for this study's completion is my friend and colleague Robert Mhamba, IDS, UDSM. We met during my MFS studies in 1989, and have continued to be friends since then. Thank you for all your help over the years!

The staff at the Swedish Embassy/Sida office in Dar es Salaam always took time to exchange information and briefings. I am grateful for the time the ambassadors Sten Rylander, Staffan Herrström and Thorvald Åkesson took to include me in their well-filled agendas. Bertil Odén and Jörgen Levin as economists at the Embassy gave insights in macro-economic management. Helena Ingelstam and Ulrika Lång generously shared information about the support to the democratisation process. I also appreciate the invitations to hold seminars to present my findings and get feedback. Jan Lindström always liked to debate poverty and gender issues in Tanzania, as well as sharing some sailing experiences. Thank you all.

At Padrigu, Björn Hettne not only created an inspiring environment, but has also been supervising my work together with Joakim Öjendal, who after Björn's retirement became the main supervisor. Thank you both! Particularly Joakim who has been putting up with me during the last few years! Svante Karlsson and Helena Lindholm-Schulz carried out a very constructive third (and last) reading of the manuscript; I hope I at least followed some of the proposals.... Hans Abrahamsson, Anders Nilsson and Peter Magnusson have all contributed in different ways to this study. Fredrik Söderbaum has always been at hand for consultation on intellectual as well as practical issues. Without the friendship, jokes and encouragement from Maria Stern, Bent Jørgensen and Svante Karlsson I would have been unable to finish this work. Together with my friends from Rwanda Alice Urusaro Karekezi, Christopher Kayumba, Theogene Bangwanubusa and Ezechiel Sentama I not only discussed East African politics, but also kept a piece of Africa alive in the cold winter in Gothenburg. Thank you to you all and other friends at Padrigu/School of Global Studies!

I am of course grateful Sida/Sarec and the University of Göteborg who funded the field work, and to Peace and Development Studies at Linné University for giving me space to conclude the work these last hectic months. In the very last production phase Elaine Almén did an efficient language check, and Helena Jansson saved my last week by doing the attractive layout of the thesis under extreme pressure. Thanks to you!

The most enjoyable part of this process has been that I acquired a new member of the family in the middle of my life, Lennart Wohlgemuth. You have been immensely

supportive during the low tides of the process as well as the high! Thank you for your efforts and for reading and commenting! And for our inspiring discussions, field trips and teaching experiences!

Lastly to Susanne, the most important person in my life, together with our children Klara and Teodor, I am now even more indebted. The support you provided during the period when this material was brought together and I was torn apart between the joy of playing with Klara and Teodor (or doing other more responsible parental things) and the task of concluding the thesis was immense. My advice (and without any doubt also Susanne's) to Klara and Teodor is: Never marry somebody who intends write a thesis! (It is worse than doing it yourself.)

Despite all the inputs and assistance from many people, I am in the end alone responsible for all the shortcomings and omissions in the completed work.

List of Acronyms

AA-SAP	African Alternative to Structural Adjustment Programme	EC	European Commission
ADB	African Development Bank	ECA	United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
ASDS	Agricultural Sector Development Strategy	ECOSOC	United Nations Economic and Social Council
ASP	Afro-Shirazi Party	EDF	European Development Fund
AU	Africa Union	EIB	European Investment Bank
BAKWATA	Baraza la Waislamu Tanzania (The National Muslim Council of Tanzania)	ELCT	Evangelical Lutheran Church of Tanzania
BoT	Bank of Tanzania	EPA	External Payment Account
CAG	Controller and Auditor General	EPA	Economic Partnership Agreement
CCM	Chama Cha Mapinduzi	ERP	Economic Recovery Programme
CG	Consultative Group (Paris Club meeting)	ESAP	Economic and Social Action Program (The second SAP 1989, used synonymously with ESRP)
CHADEMA	Chama cha Maendeleo na Demokrasia (Party for Democracy and Development, Tanzania)	ESDP	Education Sector Development Plan
CHRGG	Commission for Human Rights and Good Governance	ESRF	Economic and Social Research Foundation
CIS	Commodity Import Support	ESRP	Economic and Social Recovery Programme
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa	EU	European Union
CSP	Country Strategy Paper	F.o.b	Free on board
CUF	Civic United Front	FORD	Forum for Restoration of Democracy
DAC	Development Assistance Committee	GBS	General Budget Support
DAO	District Agricultural Office	GDP	Gross Domestic Product
DAWASA	Dar es Salaam Water Supply and Sewerage Company	GNP	Gross National Product
DC	District Commissioner	GoT	Government of Tanzania
DDD	District Development Director	GWG	Governance Working Group
DED	District Executive Director	HIPCs	Heavily Indebted Poor Countries
DEO	District Education Officer	HIV/AIDS	Human Immunodeficiency Virus/ Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome
DFID	Department for International Development (UK)	IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
DP	Democratic Party	ICT	Information and Communication Technology
DPP	Director of Public Prosecution	IDA	International Development Association
DPS	Development Partners	IFI	International Financial Institution
DSE	Dar es Salaam Stock Exchange	IFMS	Integrated Financial Management System
DSM	Dar es Salaam		
DTV	Dar es Salaam Television		
EAC	East African Community		

IMF	International Monetary Fund	NEMC	National Environment Management Council
IPI	International Press Institute	NESP	National Economic Survival Plan
JAS	Joint Assistance Strategy	NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
LAAC	Local Authorities Accounts Committee	NIP	National Indicative Programme
LGA	Local Government Authority	NLD	National League for Democracy
LGCBP	Local Governance Capacity Building Programme	NMG	Nation Media Group Ltd
LGRP	Local Government Reform Programme	NPES	National Poverty Eradication Strategy
LHRC	Legal and Human Rights Centre	NRA	National Reconstruction Alliance
MAFS	Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security	NSAs	Non-State Actors
MAKINI	Demokrasia Makini	NSGRP	National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty (MKUKUTA)
MALD	Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock Development	ODA	Official Development Assistance
MDA	Ministry, Department and Agency	OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
MDB	Market Development Bureau	OGL	Open General Licence
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals	OIC	Organisation of Islamic Conference
MKUKUTA	Mkakati wa Kukuza na Kupunguza Umasikini Tanzania (NSGRP)	PAC	Public Accounts Committee
MKURABITA	Mpango Wa Kurasimisha Rasilimali na Biashara Za Wanyonge—Tanzania (Property and Business Formalisation Programme)	PAF	Performance Assessment Framework
MoEC	Ministry of Education and Culture	PCCB	Prevention and Combating of Corruption Bureau
MoF	Ministry of Finance	PCE	Permanent Commission of Enquiry
MP	Member of Parliament	PCSs	Primary Cooperative Societies
MSME	Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises	PEDP	Primary Education Development Programme
MTEF	Medium-term Expenditure Framework	PER	Public Expenditure Review
NAI	Nordic Africa Institute	PF	Partnership Framework
NAO	National Audit Office	PFM	Public Financial Reform
NBC	National Bank of Commerce	PFP	Policy Framework Paper
NBC	National Business Council	PONA	Popular National Party
NCCR-		PO-PP	President's Office – Planning and Privatisation
Mageuzi	National Convention for Construction and Reform-Mageuzi	PO-RALG	President's Office – Regional Administration & Local Government
NCPI	National Consumer Price Index	PPT-	
NDC	National Development Cooperation	Maendeleo	Progressive Party of Tanzania-Maendeleo
NEC	National Executive Committee (of CCM)	PRBS	Poverty Reduction Budget Support
		PRS	Poverty Reduction Strategy
		PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
		PSRC	Presidential Parastatal Sector Reform Commission

PTA	Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern Africa	UMD	Union for Multiparty Democracy
RC	Regional Commissioner	UPDP	United People's Democratic Party
RDS	Rural Development Strategy	UPE	Universal Primary Education
REPOA	Research on Poverty Alleviation	URT	United Republic of Tanzania
RSP	Regional Strategy Paper	UWT	CCM Women Wing
SACCOs	Savings and Credit Co-operative Societies	VC	Village Chairman
SADC	Southern African Development Community	VEO	Village Executive Officer
SAP	Structural Adjustment Programme	VETA	Vocational Education and Training Act
SAU	Sauti ya Umma	VPO	Vice President's Office
SBS	Sector Budget Support	WB	World Bank
SDA	Social Dimension of Adjustment	WDC	Ward Development Committee
SECAL	Sector Adjustment Loan	WEO	Ward Executive Officer
SEDP	Secondary Education Development Plan		
SIDO	Small Industries Development Organisation		
SSA	Sub-Saharan Africa		
T.o.T	Terms of Trade		
TANGO	Tanzania Association of NGOs		
TACOSODE	Tanzania Council for Social Development		
TA	Technical Assistance		
TADEA	Tanzania Democratic Alliance		
TAG	Tanzania Advisory Group		
TAMWA	Tanzania Media Women's Association		
TANESCO	Tanzania Electric Supply Company		
TANU	Tanganyika African National Union		
TAS	Tanzania Assistance Strategy		
TASAF	Tanzania Social Action Fund		
TDV	Tanzania Development Vision 2025		
TFTU	Tanzania Federation of Trade Unions		
TGNP	Tanzania Gender Network Programme		
TLP	Tanzania Labour Party		
TNBC	Tanzania National Business Council		
TRA	Tanzania Revenue Authority		
UDP	United Democratic Party		
UDSM	University of Dar es Salaam		

I think democracy should aim at raising and improving the economic situation of the people in Tanzania. Democracy is useless to me if our living conditions remain backward.

Household interview, poor household Kinondoni District
November 2000

1

Introduction

Democracy and poverty reduction have been two of the most used concepts in the development discourse since the late eighties. “Democracy” is regarded as both a value in itself, and since the mid-nineties, as the best mechanism for achieving “development” and poverty reduction. This thesis aims at exploring the challenges for the consolidation of a substantive democratisation process in Tanzania, in connection with the elections in 2000 and 2005, as it is perceived by various stake-holders.

My personal interest for a long time has been to explore the assumed and taken for granted mutually reinforcing relationship between neo-liberal economic and administrative reforms and the democratisation process. This interest has been inspired by the debate between the proponents of Liberal democracy and Substantive democracy, and the old debate on whether political rights or social and economic rights are the most fundamental. That is, whether the *form* or the *substance/outcome* of the democratic process defines if a country is democratic or not. This discussion has also been central in the post-colonial development debate in Africa, and in Tanzania. In an effort to narrow down the debate, this thesis focuses on the challenges for the democratisation process within the political sphere, and explores to what extent democracy has been consolidated in Tanzania.¹

¹ The study is based on interviews with various stakeholders at national level. Interviews and field studies in two districts, Kinondoni in Dar es Salaam and Pangani a poor rural district, also inform the study. The materials from the local field studies are only touched upon in this text. However, the input from these two local field studies has greatly benefited my understanding and analysis of the process at the national level.

1.1 The ambiguous “transition” to democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa

A large number of countries in Africa made the transition to “multi-party democracy”, after the “third wave of democracy” started to sweep across the continent in 1989 (Hydén and Bratton, 1992; Bratton and van de Walle, 1997; Diamond, 1997; 1999; Cowen and Laakso, 2002). The number of countries holding competitive legislative elections quadrupled between 1990 and 2005 (Lindberg, 2006). The reason behind the rapid change to multiparty democracy was a combination of external and internal factors (Diamond and Plattner, 1999; 2000; Bratton and van de Walle, 1997; Rakner, 2001; Sandbrook, 2000; Widner, 1994). Democracy and democratisation have since 1989 been promoted and endorsed by the international development cooperation community as an effective strategy for enhancing good governance, economic growth and poverty reduction—as well as post-conflict development. The usual difference in perspectives between the World Bank, UN organizations, bilateral donors and NGOs, and private sector investors, appeared somehow to have vanished in the unanimous endorsement of “democracy” as a development strategy (Craig and Porter, 2006). At the same time internal pressure mounted against the first and second generation of post-colonial rule in Africa that had resulted in various degrees of stagnated economic development and authoritarian rule. Democracy became not only a goal in itself, but was regarded as a fundamental instrument to bring about transformation of societies, institutions and cultures to break the structures that uphold poverty and create development.

However, the development towards democracy has met a number of challenges and problems. The rapid rate of positive change towards (liberal) democracy has declined in recent years, and even backlashed in a number of states in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) (Joseph, 2008; 2003; Basedau et al., 2007; Bogaards, 2009; Diamond, 2003; Erdmann, 2011; Menocal et al., 2008). Authoritarian forms of rule continue, or even increase, but within a framework of formal democracy with regular elections. The simplistic notion of “transition” from authoritarian to (liberal) democratic rule in stages along the lines of earlier modernisation theory, was challenged by the rapidly growing literature, both in and outside Africa, pointing at its strong ideological foundation in liberalism and modernisation theory, an ideology named “transitology” in the literature (Olukoshi, 1998; Lumumba-Kasongo, 2006; Musoni, 2003; Nasong’o, 2007). The simplistic “transitology” or “transition” paradigm was also questioned by western researchers within the liberal paradigm (Carothers, 2002). According to Herbst (2008), the inevitable question is:

whether democratization has reached a high point and will follow the life cycle of previous regime changes in Africa (including the collapse of post-independence democracies and the collapse of one-party rule) and start to recede or if regu-

larly scheduled elections—albeit of continuing variable quality—and the other institutions of democracy have now become institutionalized so that the form of democracy will be a permanent part of the African landscape (Herbst, 2008).

“Democracy” is in itself a highly contested, ideologically and emotionally charged concept. It became even more contested during the cold war when the specific form of western liberal democracy was actively used as a “low-cost” foreign policy tool by Western governments, to promote western interests, not the least in Latin America and the East bloc, but also in Africa, as e.g., Leftwich (2000) and Abrahamsen (2000) pointed out, which tainted democracy as a concept as being biased towards a specific form of society and development based on Western experience—and institutions. But “democracy” also became one of the major themes in emerging criticism against authoritarian governments in Africa, from internal as well as external sources.

Typically, parallel processes of economic reforms have accompanied the democratisation process. Neo-liberal inspired market reforms have been undertaken since the mid-eighties in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) in an effort to transform the state-led to market-led economies (Bratton and van de Walle, 1997; Widner, 1994). The design of these reforms and the effects on economic, social and political development have been heatedly debated from various perspectives, both by researchers from Africa (Ake (1996); Ake (2000); Gibbon and Olukoshi (1996); Mkandawire and Soludo (1999); Mkandawire (2006); Obi (2008); Olukoshi (1998); Onimonde (2004)) and from the Western world (Abrahamsen, 2000); Andreasson (2010); Mohan (2000); Sahn et al. (1997); Sandbrook (2000); van der Geest (1994). At the same time, Africa had a negative per capita growth for the whole period 1974-1999, falling from an already low level. While absolute poverty decreased for the world at large, it increased in Africa (Economic Commission for Africa, 2005; 2008). This negative economic development appears, however, to have come to an end in the first years of the millennium, at least up to when the financial crisis hit the continent in 2008. At the same time, several societies on the African continent have experienced major crises of violent conflict, civil war and genocide, and the elected governments have often had difficulty to achieve peaceful regulation of difference and contestation. Sub-Saharan Africa has provided examples of social order disintegrating, sometimes to the point of what is described as ‘state failure’ or ‘state collapse’ (Kaarsholm, 2006; Zartman, 1995) notably Rwanda, Somalia, Sierra Leone, Liberia, DRC and Sudan, highlighting the connections between peace/security and development (Abrahamsson et al., 2001; Duffield, 2001; 2007).

The challenges young democracies in Africa are facing, and the fragility they harbour, are well illustrated by the violent political developments in Ivory Coast and Kenya, countries that have been regarded as relatively more “stable” and “developed”

in their respective regions. In Kenya in 2007 the contestation of the, allegedly, rigged presidential election developed into widespread violence and destruction. In Ivory Coast, a devastating civil war started with a military coup in 1999 and the attempt by the junta to rig the elections in 2000 (Tran and Weaver, 2008; McCrummen, 2008; Kanina, 2007:1231). In the November 2010 election, the first presidential election in 10 years and aimed to be the culmination of the peace process, again, the incumbent president manipulated the election result. The Kenyan and Ivorian elections are not exceptions. The Kenyan experiences connect to, e.g., the Nigerian election in April 2007 or the Uganda election in April 1980, rigged by the incumbent President Milton Obote and which sparked off the civil war that ended with Museveni taking power in 1986, a process claiming 300 000 lives, and civil war in the North still going on in 2010. Other examples are the Rwandan election/introduction of a multiparty system in 1992 that contributed to an escalation of the power struggle and was thus part of the complex problem that resulted in the genocide, civil war (with more than one million killed) and the conflict in DRC (with more than four million dead) (Ewald et al., 2004; Lemarchand, 2009; Prunier, 2001; 2009; Melvern, 2000; 2009).

These examples highlight the challenge of pursuing a democratisation process in a context of deep poverty—with large expectations but weak institutions, including the state, the political and the civil society. This occurs not infrequently in combination with a ruling elite that cling to power rather than respect democratic processes, and use the state to build up not only personal wealth but also clientelist networks—and in time of crisis mobilise support from the masses by resorting to identity politics (Gyimah-Boadi, 2004; Bratton and van de Walle, 1997; Chabal and Daloz, 1999; Chabal and Daloz, 2006; Hydén, 2006; 1967; Abrahamsson et al., 2001; Nilsson, 1999). The Kenyan example illustrates the close connection between economic development and the consolidation of democracy—and vice versa, the need for democratic consolidation for a sustainable economic development.

The relationship between economic liberalisation and democratic development as mutually reinforcing processes provides the theoretical and ideological underpinning of the reform efforts, and almost becomes a truism within international development cooperation and mainstream development theories. This thesis wishes to investigate how this assumed relationship is manifested in Tanzania, with a focus on the democratisation process.

Tanzania is an interesting example, and maybe an exception in the region. It is a country that appears to have managed to develop a reasonable degree of political stability and nationhood, in a context where most neighbours are or have been ravaged by conflicts. In that way, Tanzania might provide an interesting example of the possibili-

ties to create a future beyond crises and conflicts on the African continent, an issue not the least interesting for peace and development research. The question is if Tanzanian society can maintain its image as an interesting example in a time with dramatic changes which are increasing the rift between those who are included in the growth and political process and those who are excluded.

1.2 The context to democratization in Africa

In the international arena, the focus on economic growth and establishment of a market economy of the first generations of neo-liberal structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) in the 1980s, was strongly criticised for neither achieving growth nor development, not the least by African researchers (e.g., Olukoshi, 1998a; Mkandawire and Olukoshi 1995; Mkandawire and Soludo 1999; Mkandawire (2001, 2006); (Cheru, 1995; 2002; 2006) and Onimonde, 2004). Failure of the first generation of the highly ideologically spirited SAPs and the end of the cold war, opened up for less rigid debates on policies for economic development, democratisation and discussions around the interconnection between political and economic rights.

The discourse gradually changed into human development and poverty reduction in the 1990s. This interconnection was well illustrated and demonstrated by Amartya Sen when he established the linkages between human rights and development through a multidimensional approach to poverty and a conception of ‘development as freedom’, and argued that “Democracy was a Universal Value” (Sen, 1999a; 1999b)

The integration of respect for human rights into the development and anti-poverty agenda, was manifested in international declarations such as the UN World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna 1993. The trend was further manifested at the World Summit for Social Development in Copenhagen in 1995, a summit in a series of international conferences through which the UN renewed its global social agenda in the post-cold war era (Craig and Porter, 2006). At the UN Millennium Summit in September 2000, the intentions were reformulated and reiterated in the UN Millennium Declaration, adopted by 189 heads of state, pledging to “free our fellow men, women and children from the abject and dehumanizing condition of abject poverty” (Ghai, 2000; United Nations, 2000; UNRISD, 2000b; 2000a). The declaration was rooted in shared commitment to human rights and social justice and backed the Millennium Development Goals (UNDP, 2005). The change of the policy agenda towards human development and pro-poor growth was reflected as well in the themes of the World Bank’s annual World Development Reports e.g., the 1990 report on *Poverty*; the 1997 report *The State in a Changing World*, the 2000/2001 *Attacking Poverty*; and the 2006 report on *Equity*

and Development. Even if there has been an unusual agreement among international actors, CSOs and governments on the pro-poor and human rights based agenda, the MDGs have been criticised from a mainstream perspective for lacking a focus on growth (e.g., Collier 2007), and from a radical perspective for not analysing the roots of poverty and for prescribing just slightly reformulated neo-liberal policies (Amin, 2006).

One of the more important changes was that democracy became regarded as a prerequisite for development, rather than economic development being the necessary precondition for democratisation. Good governance requires well working institutions and rule of law. Hence, reforms of the public sector and the justice system and local government were a necessary supplement to the (liberal) economic reforms. To maintain good governance, democratisation was necessary. Thus, democratic governance became an integrated part of economic reforms. The general directions of the economic reforms remained largely the same: to establish a viable market economy, but supplemented and facilitated by well-governed central and local governments. With the human rights-based development perspective followed a greater emphasis on participation, which in itself necessarily do not bring about more democracy (Hickey and Mohan, 2004).

In the underlying theories to the neo-liberal reform programme democratisation, market-institutional reforms and liberalisation were assumed to be mutually reinforcing (World Bank, 1994; 1999; 2000). Democratic governance is supposed to lead to a lean, effective and accountable state. The quality of governance has, since the World Bank report of 1989 “Sub Saharan Africa from crisis to sustained growth”, been recognised as one of the corner stones for development in Africa. The question arises however, whether the three processes of democratisation, economic reforms and the reforms of the public sector are mutually reinforcing in an unproblematic and harmonious way. What does the interface between these processes look like at the national level, and in particular, at the local level? These questions have been critically analysed by radical authors like Leftwich (1996); (1998; 2000; Abrahamsen, 2000); Olukoshi (1998); Amin (2006); Ayers (2006) who argue that the democracy and good governance agenda is western (neo-liberal) discourse aimed to control and dominate African societies’ development and maintain western hegemony, and that the assumed mutual relationship between democracy and economic growth needs to be critically assessed and not taken for granted.

Since the end of the Cold War, two central foreign policy goals have risen to the top of the agenda of Western governments and development agencies. On the one hand, the reduction of poverty has increasingly dominated development thinking. Pro-poor economic growth, it is argued, is essential for these goals to be met. Moreover, it is also widely held that such growth and development is essential for reducing political instability, insecurity and conflict by expanding the

arc of stakeholders in developing economies and deepening economic and political ties between countries. But democratization, on the other hand, remains a policy priority, not only for the usual moral reasons, but also because of the now widely accepted thesis that consolidated democracies are both more stable and also less likely to engage in conflict with each other. The problem, however, is that whatever the merits or limitations of these goals may be, there are also very complicated and potentially compromising structural tensions between the institutions required for stable and consolidated democracy and those required for rapid, effective and sustained growth and development (Leftwich 2000).

The superficial democratic institutional forms that are promoted, aim to strengthen SAPs and external actors rather than the domestic constituencies and the poor, resulting in fragile democracies unable to respond to the needs of the poor. Mkandawire (2001) argues that as the policies to a large extent are conditioned from the donors, a “*choiceless democracy*” will develop that strengthens the elites, rather than the poor.

The interconnection between economic reforms and political development in Africa has been analysed from different perspectives, by among others, March and Olsen (1995), Olukoshi and Laakso (1996), Bates (1988, 2001), Sandbrook (2000), Bratton and van de Walle (1997), van de Walle (2001), Ottaway (1997), Marina and Theresa (1999), Ottaway (2003) Mkandawire (2006); Mkandawire and Olukoshi (1995).

In the literature on public sector reforms e.g., Bangura, (2000) has analysed the conflict between the managerial New Public Management approach, underlying the ongoing reform in the public sector, and a participative democracy, and pointed at a number of inherent tensions:

They [multilateral financial agencies] seek to transform the state into a market-friendly, lean, managerial, decentralized and customer-oriented institution. However, the core elements of reforms are sometimes contradictory as different social forces drive them in different contexts. There are tensions between, on the one hand, concerns for market efficiency and deregulation, and issues of accountability and equity, on the other (Bangura 2000).

Hence, even if democracy came to be central in the development discourse, focus was most often on the institutional prerequisites for good governance, rather than on how to strengthen the mechanism of accountability through political parties, and the practical, legal and structural constraints facing the political parties.

At the same time democracy assistance and promotion became a rapidly expanding subfield within international development cooperation, with the aim to promote politi-

cal change from authoritarian to more democratic forms of government. The challenge was to find forms of support that were effective (Burnell, 2000; Burnell and Calvert, 2005; Burnell, 2006). The challenges for the democratisation process in most African countries also led to the need to develop methods for how to evaluate democracy support.

1.3 Research design: problem, questions and approaches


The objective of this study is to explore challenges for the democratisation process in Tanzania. The research problem asked is to what extent Tanzania is moving towards a consolidation of democracy. The research problem is generated from the general theories on [liberal] democratisation c.f. Diamond (1999) and Dahl (2001) and will be dealt with through analysing the major institutions of democracy in Tanzania, with a focus on the political society at the national level. The research problem will be inquired into with the help of an analytical framework that makes a distinction between four “spheres” of importance for democratic development: the state/state capacity; the civil society, the political society and the economic society. The theoretical motivation behind the choice of the four spheres is based on the substantive democracy approach argument that there is a need to go beyond “free and fair” elections and the formal structures in the political society and look not only into the quality of the democratisation process as such (Beetham, 2004; Diamond and Morlino, 2005), but also the outcome and interaction between various spheres of the society (Cohen et al., 1995). A second argument is that a number of studies have been done within each sphere, but not much has been written on how the development/changes within each sphere contribute to, or impede, a consolidation of democracy. It is taken for as a given that reforms of the state capacity/good governance reforms concur with a consolidation of democracy. Reforms of the state and its capacity are of course necessary, but are they sufficient for consolidation of democracy? Likewise, the establishment of a multiparty system is necessary for a multiparty democracy to develop, but is it sufficient? In order to be able to answer these questions I have chosen to take a broad approach, as consolidation of democracy is linked to various sectors. The four research questions that have guided the study are:

- To what extent have the reforms of the state and its capacity contributed to a consolidation of democracy?
- To what extent has a civil society emerged that can contribute to a consolidation of democracy?
- To what extent has a political society emerged that can contribute to a consolidation of democracy?
- To what extent have the reforms of the economic society contributed to a consolidation of democracy?

The political society is defined as the political parties or other organisations aiming and competing to control the state, regional and local government. The civil society is defined as the sphere in between the market, the state and the political society, not aiming to control the state, but aiming to influence political, administrative and economic processes. The economic society refers to the market and its actors and associations (Cohen & Arato 1995:10ff). The focus is on the political society, notably the political parties and their relationship to the executive, motivated by the fact that if there is a multi-party system, there must be functioning opposition parties.

In each “sphere” I have selected a few “key institutions” for the democratisation process, emerging from the theory of liberal democracy. Altogether eight key institutions for the democratisation process will be analysed, with the elections in 2000 and 2005 as foci. In order to access the development within each of the institutions, two to four key “indicators” for each institution was selected. The justification for choosing the specific institutions is elaborated theoretically in chapter 2. A simplified analytical framework is presented in figure 1. The complete analytical framework is presented in chapter 2.3 and 2.4.

Figure 1 Analytical framework, simplified



Within the **sphere “state/state capacity sphere”** I will analyse two institutions: “The balance between the executive, the representative and the judiciary” and “Good and democratic governance”. The indicators used for the first institution will be the “Ability of the representative to hold the executive accountable”; “Independence of the judiciary” and “Autonomy of the executive and representative vis-à-vis donors”. For the institution “Good and democratic governance” I will use the indicators “Autonomy of the administration versus the executive”; “Governance reforms”; “Corruption” and “Respect for human rights”.

The argument for the selection of the specific indicators is related to the theories on democracy and democratisation where an important component in democracy and democratisation is to develop institutions and practices that improve the various spheres’ role in strengthening horizontal and vertical accountability. Horizontal accountability refers to institutional oversight, checks and balances within the state, for instance between the different branches of government at national or local level. Vertical accountability refers to power relations between the state and its citizens (O’Donnell, 1999). Political parties hence have the potential to contribute horizontal accountability, via the parliaments and councils, and to vertical accountability via its internal structures. The associations in civil and economic society play, according to the theory, an important role in strengthening vertical accountability. The definition of the concepts and the selection of indicators in the various spheres are theoretically motivated in chapter 2.3.2.

The political society sphere will be analysed through two institutions, “Institutionalisation of a viable multiparty system” and “Free and fair elections”. The indicators used when analysing the institution “Institutionalisation of a viable multiparty system” are: “Relationship between the ruling party and the state”; “Balance between the ruling party and the opposition”; “External constraints for the political parties” and “Internal constraints for the political parties” which assessed together will indicate the relative degree of institutionalisation of a multiparty system. The institution “Free and fair elections” will be analysed with the indicators “Registration and turnout”; “Election campaigns” and “Elections and counting”.

Within the **civil society sphere** I will analyse three institutions: “Independent media”; “Strengthened CSOs” and “Democratic culture”. The media sphere will be analysed with the indicators “Structure of the media sector”; “External constraints for media” and “Internal constraints for media”. “Strengthened CSOs” will be analysed with the indicators “Structure of the CSO sector”; “External constraints for CSOs” and “Internal constraints for CSOs”. The institution of democratic culture will be analysed with the help of two indicators “Democratic values and procedures” and “Access

to information for citizens, political parties and civil society”.

The **economic society sphere** will mainly be assessed through three outcomes, economic and sector growth, poverty and income distribution.

Each sphere will be explored in the following manner. First we outline the major formal and informal structures and institutions in each sphere. This is done through an analysis based on a combination of available secondary and “grey” material, and interviews with key actors within each sector. Next we explore the views and perceptions of different actors on what the major challenges and constraints are for the consolidation of democracy, within each sphere. We triangulate the different views with opinions from various actors in the field, and with findings in the literature. Hence data will be supplied through investigating perceptions of stakeholders in the political parties, civil society organisations, media, government officials and researchers—as well as assessment of available secondary sources and “grey” materials.² The methodology of the study is further discussed in chapter 3.

1.4 Delimitations

The focus of the study is on aspects of the democratisation process in Tanzania. Focus is on the political parties and their views, contrasted with views from the government, media, civil society and researchers. The study of the democratisation process in turn focuses on the elections of 2000 and 2005 and people’s and political parties’ perception of and participation in the election process. The study is thus not a study on the procedural aspects of the democratisation process as such. The elections are rather used as a focal point for studying the broader processes and institutions of democratisation. The study does not aim to assess the economic reforms or public sector reforms per se, but rather the perceived impact of administrative and economic reforms on the democratisation process by informants at the national level. The exploration of the civil society sphere is limited to the study of the media and various types of civil society associations, and, hence, does not go into the broader aspects of civil society. Likewise, the economic society is narrowed down to just one aspect, inclusive economic development. Hence we do not analyse the economic society with all its actors and processes, but look into the outcome of the changes in terms of an inclusive economic develop-

2 Grey literature (or gray literature in AE) refers to unpublished documents from governmental agencies at various levels, research organisations, political parties, NGOs and private actors. Examples of grey literature include technical reports from government agencies or scientific research groups, working papers from research groups or committees, white papers, or preprints, reports and policy documents (O’Laughlin, 2007: 107). The methodological problems with grey literature are discussed in chapter 3, on page 56.

ment and its implication for a consolidation of democracy. Further, the study does not intend to analyse underlying social structures, power relations or cultural perceptions that, of course, are of major importance for a deeper understanding of the democratisation process. The study aims to explore eight different institutions that play a role in the democratisation process, but focus is on the opportunities and challenges for political parties. Finally, the study and its conclusions are to a large extent based on different actors' perceptions, and do as such not necessarily directly uncover the "reality".

1.5 Relevance

The questions raised above are relevant for peace and development studies. Firstly, the optimism concerning a rapid transition from authoritarian to democratic states through multi-party elections from the early nineties in Africa, had turned into pessimism by end of the nineties. In the literature on the first and second elections after the introduction of multiparty systems in the early nineties, a number of issues were discussed (Bratton and van de Walle, 1997). In summary, few states appeared to have moved to a consolidation of democracy. In the majority of the states, the democratisation process had either stagnated or turned back towards authoritarianism. Five states had fallen apart as a result of internal conflicts and 12-15 others had been involved in violent conflicts affecting larger or smaller parts of the societies which led to strengthening of authoritarian forms of governance. During the nineties a highly politicised discourse on what type of democratisation processes was desirable was exported to Africa, via aid conditions and advice (Abrahamsen, 2000). The liberal democratic model, focusing on procedural aspects of democracy was emphasised, de-emphasising for instance economic and social rights and in that way embedding future challenges for the consolidation process. With its focus on the procedural side of "democracy", rather than the substantive side—seeing procedures as ends rather than as means—a foundation was not laid for a functioning democracy (Törnquist, 2006; Harriss et al., 2004). Instead of substantive democratic processes we have seen a consolidation, of what I have called, "electionalism", that is the ability to organise and carry through reasonably free and fair elections. In several African countries in the region we can observe how various forms of authoritarian rule have developed during the last 10 years, even if most of the institutions of democracy have been established. This points at the need to acquire a better understanding of the conditions and challenges that exist for a substantial democracy to be consolidated.

Secondly, even if their views differ on what "democracy" is and how it should be defined, the vast majority of theoretical schools agree that one of the more fundamen-

tal institutions in a democracy is a reasonably well functioning multiparty system. This includes formal and informal structures that are conducive for well functioning parties, external as well as internal to the parties. Hence it is relevant to explore if there are formal and informal structures that are a challenge for developing opposition parties.

The economic situation in most African countries south of the Sahara is still precarious. Even if a recovery now appears to be taking place in several countries, the poverty is so extremely deep that it will take a long time to bring about change. It is generally hoped that democratisation can bring about pro-poor growth. A better understanding of how democracy affects the economic development, and in particular pro-poor economic development is thus highly relevant.

In addition, the Swedish government policies as well as the EU policies (The European Consensus on Development, 2006) emphasize poverty reduction and democratic development as goals for Swedish and EU development co-operation. Democratic governance is both one of the official Swedish aid objectives and a part of Sweden's Global Policy for Development and the "partnership" policy with Africa (Swedish Government 1998; 2008; 2008; 2009). According to the Global Policy for Development, two fundamental perspectives guide the design of Sweden's development policy:

The perspective of poor people on development means that the starting-point for poverty reduction and the promotion of equitable and sustainable global development shall be the needs, circumstances, interests and priorities of poor women, men and children.

A human rights perspective puts human rights, democracy, gender equality and the rights of the child in the centre. Fundamental principles of the rights perspective are non-discrimination, participation, openness and transparency along with the principles of responsibility and accountability. The perspectives complement and support each other and partially overlap (Swedish Government 2008).

Democracy and human rights are also one of the three thematic issues that are given priority in development cooperation in the Swedish government's "The new development assistance policy" from 2009 (Swedish Government, 2008; 2010)

1.5.1 And what is the relevance of Tanzania?

Tanzania is interesting as a case study from many points of views, not the least from the peace and development studies perspective. It has managed to maintain a relatively peaceful development, apart from the development in Zanzibar, in a region marked by conflicts. Tanzania also experimented with democratic forms of governance, but within the framework of a single-party system. Competitive elections were held to parliament

and within the party from independence and onwards, even if the power remained at the top (Joseph, 1999: 20). Tanzania has also a special place in Nordic development co-operation history, as one of the major partners in development since the sixties.

Tanzania is one of the better performers in Africa with respect to democratic governance. Two aspects of Tanzania's transition to democracy stand out in an African context: firstly the change from the relatively successful institutionalisation of a socialist economic order bolstered by a constitutionally embedded one party system, to a liberal democratic society, i.e. a comparatively long leap; and secondly that this transformation took place without the ruling party losing power to the opposition. Unlike other African countries, this democratisation under guidance of a strong ruling party has not led to political polarization and allegations that the democratisation process is stalling (like Cameroon, Kenya, Senegal and Zimbabwe) or has been interrupted by military rule or war (like Ghana, Nigeria) or civil war like (Mozambique or DRC) (Hydén, Olowu and Okoth-Ogendo 1999).

What distinguishes the Tanzanian democratisation process (if successful or not we will discuss below), according to Hydén, is that it is a result primarily of the persuasive power of Julius Nyerere and the gradual institutionalisation of new values within the ruling elite. The international community, rather than opposition parties or civil society, reinforced this "top-down" democratisation. In that respect it differs from the patterns identified by Bratton and van de Walle (1997), who argued that the transitions typically originated in society rather than among the elites in power, or were triggered by divisions within an authoritarian elite as argued by Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter (1986).

Two points can be made, according to Hydén, 1) Democratisation in societies where neo-patrimonialism prevails can only take place "*if the ruling elite can be induced to go along in an incremental manner without feeling threatened by incipient changes*" and 2) "*that the liberal values inherent in a democratic transition must accommodate other competing values in societies without a liberal tradition*". Civic peace and social harmony are especially important in culturally plural societies and may constitute prerequisites for a successful regime transition (Hydén et al. 1999; Hydén 1999:152). The challenge for African transition processes is to wed liberal values to other values in order to provide a "homespun" process of democratisation.

But what happens if the elite gradually turn their back on liberal values, in order to maintain political power and influence? Are there countervailing forces that could keep the elite accountable?

With the help of the substantive democratic theory framework I will analyse to what extent the institutional development has led to a consolidation and substantive

democracy. The main challenge is if the transition to democratic elections and economic growth has also brought about or will bring about a transformation to a substantive democratic society that in the long run can result in a substantive outcome in terms of poverty reduction and broad based growth. The issue this thesis aims to explore is to what extent this appears to have been accomplished, in the form of a consolidation of democracy, in Tanzania.

1.6 Structure of the thesis

The thesis is structured in 9 chapters. The first part (chapters 1-4) presents the theoretical points of departure (chapter 2), the methodology (chapter 3) and gives a brief historical background and regional and national context to the ongoing economic, administrative and political reforms in Tanzania (chapter 4). In the second part (chapters 5-8), the four spheres are analysed and the field studies are accounted for. Chapter five analyses the reforms of the *state and its capacity* in relation to consolidation of democracy, through the indicators of the balance between the executive, the representative and legislative branches of government, governance and corruption. In chapter six *the civil society* sphere is analysed, with a focus on media, CSOs, the human rights situation, the culture of democracy and the economic development is also analysed. Chapter seven analyses the *political society*, the political parties and the major challenges they are facing. Chapter eight brings together the analysis of the different institutions of democracy in an analysis of the elections of 2000 and 2005, which is used as a test of the extent to which Tanzania could be said to be moving towards a consolidation of democracy in terms of *free and fair elections*. In the concluding chapter nine, I conclude that neglecting to make interdisciplinary development theory-inspired analyses of the interface between the three major bundles of reforms has laid the foundation for what appears to be a backlash against the democratisation process in Tanzania. In a post-script the 2010 elections are analysed.

*Freedom is meaningless if people cannot
put food in their stomach.*

Nelson Mandela

2

Theoretical framework: Democracy, democratisation and development

The aim with this chapter is to show what concepts and theoretical frameworks are used in this thesis in order to answer the research question to what extent Tanzania is moving towards a consolidation of democracy. The chapter briefly points at how democracy, democratisation, development and related concepts are defined and used in this thesis in order to explore the challenges for the democratisation process in Tanzania. The first section describes the general debate on democratisation and economic development as a point of departure, and the following sections the more specific theoretical perspectives that have been used in the thesis. Hence, we start with the broader theoretical context to the debate on the democratisation process and its linkages to economic development in Africa, and then narrow this down to the theoretical framework and concepts used to frame the empirical questions and analyse the empirical material, at the end of the chapter.

The debates on the role of democracy in development, on poverty reduction and on the interrelation between these two issues have been important components within the field of development studies, and in social science, for decades (Haynes, 2005; Haynes, 2008; Rudebeck et al., 1996; Apter, 1987; Brett, 2009; Chabal and Daloz, 1999; Cowen and Shenton, 1996; Diamond, 2000; Martinussen, 1997; Nederveen Pieterse, 2001; Sen, 1999; Sørensen, 1991; Törnquist, 1999). The standpoints on what role democracy plays for development, and vice versa, as well as the strategies for how to promote democra-

cy, have shifted over time (Carothers, 1999; Carothers et al., 2007). Hettne (2008) has analysed these changes and categorised a number of discourses, each built up around prevailing international power structures. In the sixties, development and modernisation were perceived as creating the necessary economic, social and structural change for democratic political development. Without these economic and social changes, a democratic development was unlikely to take place. If a democracy was established it would not be sustainable as the necessary structural conditions were not at hand, in terms of capacity, institutions and resources. In the seventies the main theoretical debates were related to how to accomplish structural change and social development, rather than democracy. With the neo-liberal turn in the eighties, focus shifted to how to dismantle the state and provide the foundation for a market driven economic development. From the end of the eighties, the theories of development gradually changed and incorporated political development. From the early nineties democracy became perceived not as a value in itself and an outcome of the development process, but as a *prerequisite* for development. Democracy and democratisation became perceived as necessary for development—an almost 180 degree turn in the theories on development regarding the relationship between democracy and development compared with the 1960s. This is the theoretical context of this thesis, which we will shed light on in this chapter.

2.1 The theoretical debate on democratisation in Africa

In Africa, as described in the introduction, the transformation of African states in crisis to “market-democracies” replaced the neo-liberal agenda and its focus on minimizing the neopatrimonial state, in the late 1980s (Olukoshi and Laakso, 1996; Sandbrook, 2000; Widner, 1994; Bratton, 1998; van de Walle, 2001). Liberal democracy is supposed to promote political liberties and human rights, as well as facilitate rapid economic development through a leaner state characterised by “good governance”, “accountability”, and “transparency” (World Bank 1989; 1993; 1997; 2000). A disputed issue is which actors, policies, and institutions are able to affect the political and economic liberalisation process in order to enable a transformation into a “deep” democratic, socially acceptable, and sustained development process that encompasses the whole of society—and not only the elites (Ake, 2000; Obi, 2008; Mkandawire, 2006).

The context of the arguments is the large body of literature discussing the prerequisite for democratic and economic development in Africa. From a more liberal standpoint authors like Bratton and van de Walle (1997), van de Walle (2001), Chabal (1994) argue that one of the more important institutions that could explain the lack of economic development and continued authoritarian governance in multiparty structures, was the emergence of neo-patrimonialism from independence and onwards. Neo-

patrimonialism still characterizes most African societies, according to this theory. The problem thus rests within the state and society itself, rather than in the international/global system. Furthermore, the donor supported structural adjustment programmes strengthened the status quo rather than promoted reforms (Bayart et al., 1999; Chabal and Daloz, 1999). The best way to change this situation was to liberalise the economy, and to democratise the political system. In order to establish a liberal market democracy, further liberal reforms of the state and the societies are necessary.

This standpoint has been strongly criticised, not the least by African social scientists, often with a critical perspective, for being paternalistic and stereotyping African societies, on the one hand, and underestimating or disregarding the international context for development in Africa, on the other (Olukoshi 1998a, Mkandawire and Soludo 1999, Mkandawire 1998; 2001; 2006, Mkandawire and Olukoshi 1995). It is also argued that the above presented theory has limited empirical foundation in Africa and is based only on a handful of the 54 states in Africa with their diverging history, economy, political and social conditions, and is an example of the type of “arm-chair” empiricism that rather than contributing to better understanding of the complex realities on the ground, contributes to misunderstanding. Abstract theorising with the help of theories and ideologies and interests emerging from a completely different context does not deepen understanding. Consequently, problem formulation, analysis and policy prescription do not deal with the challenges that Africa has and is facing, resulting in state and market failure. To cite one of the arguments by an African scholar:

Africanist Africa is defined as a body of knowledge about Africa produced, dominated and transmitted by largely white scholars (plus a small cohort of conservative black intellectuals) who have assumed the expert status on Africa. Their knowledge emphasises a warped image of Africa often re-fracted through the modernisation gaze. It perceives and explains African experiences by analogy, emphasising what Africa ought to be, not what it actually is. This knowledge is Afro-pessimist in orientation, and is more concerned to serve Euro-American foreign policy interests in Africa than the welfare of and social struggles waged by Africans against the abuses of the neo-colonialism and a local comprador ruling class (Murunga, 2008).

Radical authors have, consequently, argued that democracy and good governance are part of a western (neo-liberal) discourse aimed to control and dominate African societies’ development in order to maintain western hegemony (Abrahamsen, 2000). The superficial democratic institutional reforms that are promoted, it is argued, aim to strengthen external actors’ interests rather than the domestic constituencies and the

poor, resulting in fragile democracies unable to respond to the needs of the poor. This is also a position developed by Thandika Mkandawire (1998), where he argues that this approach leads to a “choiceless” democracy and a “democracy of tears”.

Claude Ake, late professor of political science, from Nigeria, analysed the democratisation process in Africa and argues that democratisation has the potential to promote a “second independence” from indigenous post-colonial leadership, but that the minimalist western liberal model with its focus on multiparty elections is at odds with a deeper social democracy that demands material betterment, equality and concrete rights (Ake 2000). He argued that without a substantive democracy, democratisation would result in a mere “democratisation of disempowerment” (Ake 1993). Ake argues for the need to analyse the *outcome* of the democratisation process also in terms of improved living standards for the majority. Thus his theoretical standpoint has deep roots in Africa’s post independence history, as e.g., illustrated by a speech by Julius Nyerere in 1960, one year before Tanzania’s independence:

In my opinion there are two basic essentials of democracy. The first of these is the freedom and well being of the individual. The second is the method by which a government of a country is chosen; the method must ensure that the government is freely chosen by the people. If you have a country where the system of government respects and upholds the freedom of the individual and well being of that individual, I would say here is one essential of democracy. And I do not care whether it is one party or twenty parties, provided the government of that country can be replaced without assassination, if the people go to the ballot box freely and regularly and re-elect their government, or replace it with another, then as far as I am concerned, the two basic essentials of democracy are there, whether you have one party of twenty. Julius Nyerere, Speech February 1960 (Nyerere 2000).

It could of course be argued that this standpoint could, and has, been used to legitimate a system of governance that gradually became less and less democratic. Gyimah-Boadi et al. (2004) assess the quality of the democratic reforms in Africa and analyses the internal structures and institutions that promote or undermine a democratic development, pointing at a need for institutional reforms. In a recent critical assessment of the neo-liberal reform agenda it is argued that the form and substance of democracy are two different things and that Western-derived institutional forms are not necessarily the most appropriate nor the most practical in the current African context (Lumumba-Kasongo, 2006). Consequently, there is a need for rooting democratic norms in African political cultures (Mentan, 2009).

This argument is partly contradicted by Bratton et al. (2005), that conclude that the popular support for (liberal) democracy in Africa is widespread, but shallow. Their

conclusion is derived from an assessment based on almost 10 years of research on continent—wide opinion polls.

The debate on the role of and relative balance between the state, the market, and civil society and what types of institutions are necessary in order to create growth with equity and democratic society has a long history in social science and development studies (Ake, 1996; Hadenius, 2006; Leftwich, 1996; Törnquist, 1999; Haynes, 2001; Cunningham, 2002). With the failure of the first generations of neo-liberal structural adjustment programmes, the international financial institutions focussed again on the role of the state and that of politics in the development process. The sphere of politics was initially “brought back in” in a rather instrumental way as “good governance”, with a focus on the technocratic role of the “state” in relation to the market and the importance of initiating institutional reforms that would enhance its efficiency, rather than on democracy and political reform. Through better governance, accountability, and a more transparent decision-making process, the state should create an enabling environment for different economic actors and thus reduce transaction costs and promote economic growth. The debate on “democracy” rarely went beyond the minimalist liberal—and state-centric—concept, even if the World Bank already in 1989 raised the issue of democracy not only as a target but also a prerequisite for development (World Bank, 1989; Narayan, 2000).

The discourse has now changed. If “market” was the catchword of the eighties and early nineties, “the role of the state” and “good governance” the phrase of the nineties, then “democracy”, “accountability” “transparency” and “participation” are now included as necessary instruments to bring about “development”. The new mainstream argument is that an effective state is vital for development, and a decentralised democracy crucial to obtain it. This position termed the “Post-Washington consensus” by Stiglitz (1998), at that time still senior vice president at the World Bank, was made in a self-critical assessment of the first generations of structural adjustment programmes (Stiglitz, 1998; 2002; World Bank, 2000; 1993). Hence democracy became regarded as a value in itself, and a tool for accomplishing “development”.

What connects most of these authors is an effort to bring together an analysis of economic and political factors. With this change, “governance”, “democracy” and “development” have been pulled out from a technical matter of procedures, forms and institutions to be, again, part of—and analysed as—a *political process*. That is, bringing power back into the analysis of political and economic development—and of democracy (Leftwich, 2010; Leftwich, 2005).

The concepts and the appropriate strategies to accomplish democracy and development are, hence, disputed and related to different theoretical frameworks. There

exists, however, a broad agreement within the field of democratic theory that the basic features and institutions of liberal democracy are a minimum requirement for the development of democracy. It is *necessary* to have power sharing between the different arms of government, free and fair elections, functioning representative bodies at various levels, respect for political rights, a dynamic multiparty system and a culture of democracy. But this is not *sufficient* for the establishment of a broader substantive democracy, for that to happen poor people's capability to participate must be strengthened and effective mechanisms for control of power must be in place. This is also the point of departure for this thesis' analytical framework.

There is a large body of literature studying elections, their driving force and which debates their relative shortcomings and democratising effects in Africa, like for instance Cowen and Laakso (2002). A critique of "electionalism"—that is, the focus on the procedures and forms of democracy, rather than its outcomes—has pointed at that even if elections might be considered as an important part of the democratisation process, elections in themselves cannot be equated with democracy. This critique of elections have in turn been criticised for underestimating the importance of elections in the democratisation process. In a study covering all elections in Africa 1989-2003, (Lindberg, 2006) concludes that elections are more than just formal procedures. Democracy and elections foster expansion and deepening of democratic values and thus expand and solidify civil liberties in societies. Hence elections are a fundamental part of the democratisation process, according to him.

In the following section, I will briefly discuss the theoretical context to the concepts of democracy, democratisation, the political, civil and economic society and the way they are used in this study, in order to explore to what extent Tanzania is moving towards a consolidation of democracy.

2.2 Definitions of Democracy, Civil, Political and Economic Society

Democracy, democratisation, civil society, development and related concepts have a long history in social science. The meaning—and relevance—of the concepts have been widely discussed again and again, not the least after the "velvet revolutions" in Eastern and Central Europe and the end of the cold war in 1989, seemingly leaving few alternatives to liberal democracy. The political development in Latin America has also had a large impact on the theories on democracy, in particular in the North American branch, where authors like O'Donnell, G., J. J. Linz, M. F. Plattner, and S. Mainwaring have contributed to develop the theories of democratic transitions in various ways, based on the Latin American experience. A number of these theories and

concepts have later been applied in the analysis of the African democratisation process, e.g., by L. Diamond, M. Bratton, J. Herbs and van de Walle. One of the critiques against these “transition theories”, or “transitology”, has been that they are not founded in the African empirical reality and hence have less explanatory power, and that there is a need for theories that are based on the complex African reality (Chabal and Daloz, Onimonde, Abrahamsen, Joseph).

2.2.1 *Democracy and democratisation*

The literature on democracy is enormous and the definitions of the concept are almost as wide as the concept itself.¹ David Collier and Steven Levitsky identified 550 subtypes of democracy in a review of 150 studies (Diamond and Plattner, 1999):7. Joseph, 2003, in a review of a number of studies on the democratisation process in Africa notes that different studies on African democracy had used the prefix “hybrid”, “façade”, “semi”, “quasi”, “real”, “popular”, “no-party”, “participatory”, “limited”, “liberal”, “nonliberal”, “illiberal”, “incomplete”, “delegative”, “pseudo”, “metamorphic”, “ambiguous”, and “oriental”, among others to categorise various forms of democracy in Africa. Held, in his seminal work on theories of democracy, identifies 10 different models of democracy. Each model is based on specific values, ideologies, theories and definitions. Even if a simple definition of democracy, like “*rule of the people*” is used, a number of complex issues need to be considered (Held, 2006; Held et al., 1999).

We do not need to reiterate that analysis here, but take Held’s point that the difference between the models of democracy is based on:

- *Who* is considered to be the people (men/women, rich/poor, age groups, identities, citizenship, religion);
- *What kind of participation is envisaged for the people* (direct versus representative participation, elite versus popular participation);
- *What conditions* are assumed to be conducive to participation?
- *How broadly* or narrowly is the scope of rule to be construed? (What is the appropriate field of democratic activity?) If “rule” is to cover “the political”, what is meant by this? Does it cover 1) law and order (2) relations between states? (3) economy? (4) the domestic or private sphere?
- Must the rule of the people be obeyed?
- Under what circumstances, if any, are democracies entitled to resort to coercion against their own people or against those outside the sphere of legitimate rule? (Held 2006)

¹ Google Scholar gives for instance 930,000 hits on “democracy”, “democracy and Africa” gives 678,000 hits (May 15 2009).

Different theories of democracy give different answers on these questions, and hence the way democracy is defined and conceptualised has direct impact on how to analyse democracy and democratisation. The main dividing line has been between, on the one, hand representative versus direct democracy that is elite versus various degrees of popular participation and, on the other, whether democratic rule should include only the political sphere, like liberal democracy, or also include other sectors of the society, thus not only political rights, but also the economic and social rights, like in the substantive democracy tradition.

2.2.2 *Formal/Procedural versus substantive and maximalist definitions of democracy*

One dividing line in democratisation theory is that between the minimalist or the formal or procedural conception of democracy, and the substantive conception of democracy. Broadly speaking, formal or procedural democracy involves establishing rules, procedures and institutions for elections in a representative democracy. The minimalist definition of democracy has its roots in Joseph Schumpeter's classic elitist conception of democracy. In a relatively recent book, Seymour Lipset and Jason Lakin slightly modify the minimalist definition of democracy to:

An institutional arrangement in which all adult individuals have the power to vote, through free and fair competitive elections, for their chief executive and national legislature. (Lipset and Lakin, 2004: 19)

The argument for the minimalist definition is that it makes the concept of democracy more clear and easier to operationalize. In particular it is important, according to Lipset and Lakin, as well as Bratton 1997, not to confuse democracy as an institutional order with the substantive outcome of the procedures. Democracy, in this definition, is about freedom for all adults to choose leaders in a competitive process.

A problem with the minimalist theory of democracy is that it does not explain why no elected elites should implement policies that serve their interests, rather than those of the citizens (Nef and Reiter, 2009). A liberal critic of this "procedural" definition of democracy has included that the model does not incorporate freedom of speech and freedom of association. Dahl summarises the foundation for liberal democracy in seven points, expanding the minimalist definition with key political rights, in the by now classic work *Democracy and its Critics* Dahl (1989: 221):

- *Elected officials.* Control over government decisions about policy is constitutionally vested in elected officials;

- *Free and fair elections.* Elected officials are chosen in frequent and fairly conducted elections in which coercion is comparatively uncommon;
- *Inclusive suffrage.* Practically all adults have the right to vote in the election;
- *Right to run for office.* Practically all adults have the right to run for elective offices in the government, though age limits may be higher for holding Office than for the suffrage;
- *Freedom of expression.* Citizens have a right to express themselves without the danger of severe punishment on political matters broadly defined, including criticism of officials, the government, the regime, the socioeconomic order, and the prevailing ideology;
- *Alternative information.* Citizens have a right to seek out alternative sources of information. Moreover, alternative sources of information exist and are protected by laws;
- *Associational autonomy.* To achieve their various rights, including those listed above, citizens also have a right to form relatively independent associations and organizations, including independent political parties and interest groups (Landa and Kapstein, 2001).

Even this expanded theoretical approach, *electoral democracy*, has been criticised for focusing too much on the elections and the procedural, formal process of democracy. In the literature it has been pointed out that elections per se are not necessarily either democratic or relevant for democratisation—if the various procedures from selecting candidates, conducting election campaigns, and access to resources, media and information are controlled by powerful elites (Nef and Reiter, 2009).

The “fallacy of electionalism” to explain and understand the driving forces of democratisation led to a debate on the need to expand the concept of democracy and democratisation. Diamond (1999) broadens the definition of democracy and develops the concept of liberal democracy further, to what has become the mainstream theory of democracy. According to Diamond (1999), liberal democracy requires three further elements, in addition to electoral democracy: 1) Absence of reserved domains of power for the military or other actors not accountable to the electorate; 2) In addition to vertical accountability (secured mainly by elections), horizontal accountability of officeholders to one another to constrain executive power and the deliberative process; 3) Political and civil pluralism, individual and group freedom, in order for contending interests and values to be expressed and compete through on-going articulation and representation beyond elections. “Rule of law” is necessary for freedom and pluralism to be secured, “*in which legal rules are applied fairly, consistently, and predictably across*

equivalent cases, irrespective of the class, status, or power of those subject to the rules, under a true rule of law, all citizens have political and legal equality, and the state and its agents are themselves subject to the law” (Diamond 1999:11).

Specifically, liberal democracy has the following 10 components, according to Diamond 1999 (list slightly shortened):

1. Control of the state and its key decisions and allocations lies, in fact as well as in constitutional theory, with elected officials;
2. Executive power is constrained, constitutionally and in fact, by the autonomous power of other government institutions; such as an independent judiciary, parliament, and other mechanisms of horizontal accountability;
3. Electoral outcome are uncertain, with a significant opposition vote and the presumption of party alternation in government, but no group that adheres to constitutional principles is denied the right to form a party and contest elections;
4. Cultural, ethnic, religious and other minority groups (as well as historically disadvantaged majorities) are not prohibited (legally or in practice) from expressing their interests in the political process;
5. Citizens have multiple channels for expression and representation of their interests and values, including diverse, independent associations and movements, which they have the freedom to form and join.
6. There are alternative sources of information (including independent media) to which citizens have (politically) unfettered access.
7. Individuals also have substantial freedom of belief, opinion, discussion, speech, publication, assembly, demonstration, and petition.
8. Citizens are politically equal under the law (even though they are invariably unequal in their political resources).
9. Individual and group liberties are effectively protected by an independent, non-discriminatory judiciary, whose decisions are enforced and respected by other centres of power.
10. The rule of law protects citizens from unjustified detention, exile, terror, torture, and undue interference in their personal lives not only by the state but also by organized non-state or anti-state forces.

These ten conditions imply an eleventh: if political authority is to be constrained and balanced, individual and minority rights protected, and a rule of law assured, democracy requires a constitution that is supreme. Liberal democracies in particular are and have to be constitutional democracies, according to Diamond (1999:12). It is also from the list above that the different spheres and indicators used in this study have been selected.

The main criticism against liberal democracy has been voiced by representatives of the substantive democracy theory, finding the liberal democracy theory too narrow in its concentration on the political institutions of democracy. The focus of the liberal democracy model is still on contestation, or the electoral process itself. This makes the definition of democracy too narrow to be useful, in particular in a developing country context (Ake 2000, Leftwich 1995). For a long time, the international community has also tended to place tremendous faith in the determinative importance of elections and what they can achieve for the democratisation process—there is an implicit assumption that ‘elections will be not just a foundation stone but a key generator over time of further democratic reforms’ (Carothers 2002).

A broader definition of democracy is concerned not only with the procedures of democracy but with the quality of democracy, in terms of participation and outcomes (Beetham 2002). The substantive theories point out that power structures within and between elites are not taken enough account of in the liberal theory model. If the real power in the representative body is held by a small elite, “liberal democracy” could give a veil of legitimacy to an oligarchy, rather than to create a system of governance representing a popular democracy. Issues of redistribution and empowerment of poor and other non-elites are not incorporated in the theory. The substantive theoretical approach wishes to broaden the democracy concept to look more to the actual outcomes in terms of participation and poverty alleviation, rather than limit democracy to its minimalist and formalist side (Ake 2000, Olukoshi 1996, Mkandawire 2007: Törnquist 1999; Gaventa 2006). Political equality is directly related to economic and social equality (Rueschemeyer, 2004; Nef, 2010). In particular the substantive democracy theorists point at the need to analyse the relationship between economic reforms and political development Leftwich (2002; 2010), which to a large extent is taken for granted, and not problematised in the mainstream literature Lumumba-Kasongo (2006), or excluded in the analysis (Sørensen, 2008).

Liberal democracy is built on the liberal notion of freedom of the individual against the state, and hence is oriented towards the civil and politic rights and freedoms, rather than equality and the social and economic rights, of all citizens (Giannone, 2010). A more radical critique against liberal democracy comes from the so-called democratic

socialists who argue for a wider definition of democracy that includes that the whole economy and society should be run democratically to meet the needs of the whole community, not to make profits for a few. In this maximalist definition, democracy is a system of government where the political power rests with the nation's population either directly or through elected representatives—a government of the people, for the people, by the people in the classic formulation—with the purpose to build a just society where the interests of all the people are cared for. This relates not only to the rich but also to the poor, men and women, minorities as well as the majority. Democracy should be about the ordering of society to bring about justice for all. To achieve a more just and democratic society, structures of government and economy must be transformed so that ordinary people can participate in the decisions that affect their lives and economic and social democracy be achieved. In this view, democracy and socialism go hand in hand. The Marxists, socialists and left-wing anarchists, criticise liberal democracy for being undemocratic and an integral part of the capitalist system. Liberal democracy, or bourgeois democracy, is class-based where the ruling class dominates and reproduces its power within the political and economic sphere, in a way that facilitates economic exploitation of the majority. It is hence neither democratic nor participatory and tends to uphold the status quo rather than promotes transformation (Mouffe, 2005); Mouffe (1992); (Rosanvallon, 2008; Shivji, 1991); Shivji (2006); (Saul, 1997).

Even if the Marxist critique of liberal democracy has its merits, the core of liberal democracy today is rather well established in all theoretical camps, either as it is (liberal tradition) or as a minimum requirement for democracy (in the radical tradition). In this thesis I have, hence, chosen a compromise between liberal democracy theories and a more maximalist approach advocated by the substantive democracy theorists. When I explore the developments of the institutions of democracy I therefore add to the more traditional ones—corruption, human rights and inclusive economic development as well.

2.2.3 *Democracy and Democratisation is a process*

Democratisation is the process in which democracy is established. This process is never ending and in continuous development, both in well and newly established democracies (Sklar and Falola, 2001). It demands patient renewals and a continuous search for the balance between conflicting social interest groups and priorities.

In the earlier “transitology” theory, liberal democratisation was thought of as a variant of the modernisation theories of the 1960s, where development unfolds in stages (like in Walter Rostow’s five stages for economic development, from a traditional to modern society). In the transitology tradition, (liberal) democratisation was theorised

as a transition from authoritarian rule to democracy in four phases (Huntington 1991): 1) political liberalisation, 2) collapse of authoritarian regime, 3) democratic transition, and 4) democratization consolidation. The first phase relates to the process of liberalisation and reform of authoritarian regime the second the stage when the authoritarian regime collapses, the third, democratic transition phase, is the change to formal democracy most often initiated by a multi party “watershed election”, and the last phase when the institutions and perceptions of democracy are embedded within the society (Haynes 2001, 2008).

Consolidation of democracy is the process in which both the elite and masses embrace democratic principles in attitude and behaviour. According to Diamond (1999) the consolidation of democracy is linked to three key dimensions:

- the democracy needs to be deepened and made more authentic
- the political institutions of democracy must become more coherent, capable and autonomous, so all major political players are willing to commit to and be bound by their rules and norms
- democracy needs to effectively address society’s most pressing problems and (...) provide the liberty, accountability and responsiveness that citizens expect from democracy and the order that they expect from any government (Diamond 1999:20).

That is, in the classic formulation by Linz and Stephan (1997), that “democracy is the only game in town, even in the face of severe economic and political crises, and the overwhelming majority of the people believe that any further political change must emerge from within the parameters of democratic procedures”. This means three things: Behaviourally, no group is seriously engaged in secession or regime change. Attitudinally, most people accept that democracy is the best form of government (so not only does nobody try to change the regime, nobody particularly wants to). Constitutionally, democracy is consolidated when all the major organs of the state act according to the democratic institutions. This means more than elections. There need to be five institutions (assuming, first of all, that there is a state, without a state, no democracy): freedoms necessary for development of civil society (not just group memberships), relatively “autonomous and valued political society” (parties, elections, legislatures, etc.), rule of law (i.e. laws apply to leaders too), usable bureaucracy (i.e. state capacity), and “institutionalized economic society” to mediate between the state and the market (Linz and Stepan, 1997: 17ff).

In the first “transitology” theories, the four stages were thought of as a more or less linear process. After empirical studies it became apparent that there were neither

linear nor inevitable transitions from one stage to another, rather the stages were considered to overlap and it was apparent that the process could be reversed. In Carothers' famous article from 2002, he declares "the end of the transition paradigm" (Carothers, 2002). According to Carothers the concept of 'transition to democracy' was founded on five assumptions: 1) Any country moving away from authoritarianism is moving towards democracy. 2) Democratisation is a natural process proceeding in stages. It is possible to place a country on a continuum of democratic development. 3) Elections are important in two ways: for forming a foundation of political choice and for serving as a basis for continuing reform that produces responsible and responsive politicians. 4) Economic and political development do not necessarily depend on each other. Democracy does not require certain economic pre-conditions. 5) Democratic transition is built on the existence of coherent and functioning states. Redesign of state institutions might be necessary, but a modification of an already functioning state might be necessary. Building a democracy and a more effective state are complimentary processes.

But, according to Carothers (2002), these core assumptions of the transition democracy paradigm are not proving true. 1) Abandonment of authoritarianism can lead to different political changes, not all of which are democratic; 2) nations continue to deal with fundamental problems, despite talk of stages; 3) good elections can exist with bad politics; the virtuous cycle does not always work out; and 4) the economic assumptions of democracy have not proved true—poverty is highly corrosive for democracy, and an independent civil society and media are hard to establish in impoverished societies; 5) democracy-building in the ideal case should be about distributing power, but in state-building it is about assembling power and people often blame the weakness of the state for failures.

Carothers' critique of the transition paradigm sparked a debate where, for instance, Guillermo O'Donnell (2009) argued that the scholarly literature on democratic transitions is subtler than Carothers' description. A new literature has emerged dealing with the challenges and conditions for consolidation and de-consolidation of democracy.

I will in this study use the concept of consolidation of democracy as defined by Linz and Diamond above.

2.3 The institutions of democracy and accountability—selection of institutions and indicators

In this section I theorise the various key institutions of democracy and motivate, explain and define how they are understood and used in this thesis in relation to the research

question “to what extent Tanzania is moving towards a consolidation of democracy”. I will with this also explain how I have chosen the institutions and indicators used in this study within respective sphere, and how they link to the research question.

In their seminal critical review on the debates on the civil society Cohen et al. (1995) differentiate between the state, the political society, civil society and the economic society. I find the distinction useful and will use it in the thesis. The distinction between political, civil and economic society refers to three different spheres within the society. The political society is the political parties or other organisations aiming and competing to control the state, regional and local government. The civil society is the sphere between the market, the state and the political society, not aiming to control the state, but aiming at influencing political, administrative and economic processes. The economic society refers to the market and its actors and associations (Cohen & Arato 1995:10ff). The civil society, including media, contributes to vertical accountability, as a counterpart to the electoral process. Electoral competition has been acknowledged to be insufficient for accountability since the origins of constitutional democracy. Until recently, however, the role of civil society actors in promoting electoral democracy has received much more attention than their role in promoting institutional checks and balances (Schedler, 1999b: 340).

For analytical purpose I have chosen to use these four spheres, “the state”, “the political-society”, “the civil-society” and “the economic society”. In each sphere I will identify a few key institutions and the indicators used to shed light on the democratisation process within each specific institution. In the following section, 2.4, I will describe how the institutions are related in the analytical framework of the thesis and which indicators will be used in the study. The methods and sources used will be discussed in chapter 3.

As is described in chapter 1, the over-all research question will be analysed in a broad sense in line with a substantive rather than a minimalistic definition of democratization. “Democracy” is understood as a complex system—and process - of institutions, actors, culture and ideas. In democratic theory the concept of accountability has become perceived as one of the cornerstones of a well-functioning democratic system. Political accountability exists when political leaders are obliged to answer to the public for their actions and decisions. Political accountability serves the dual purpose to check the power of political leaders and prevent them ruling in an arbitrary or abusive manner, and helps to ensure that governments operate effectively and efficiently. In representative democracies, the level of accountability of elected representatives to their constituents is regarded as a key indicator of the quality of democracy actually enjoyed by a society (O’Donnell, et al., 2004: 33; Diamond and Morlino, 2005: xiii).

In the literature on democratisation an analytical distinction is made between *vertical* and *horizontal* dimensions of political accountability. Vertical accountability refers to power relations between the state and its citizens, and horizontal accountability refers to institutional oversight, checks and balances within the state, for instance between the different branches of government (O'Donnell, 1999). Horizontal accountability includes that administrative agencies (ministries, departments, boards, etc.) are answerable to ministers (the government) and the legislature through various mechanisms and institutions like regulatory bodies, auditors, commissions, and ombudsmen. Horizontal accountability is not limited to the relations within the state at national level; it also includes the relations between various institutions on regional and local government level. Horizontal political accountability as a concept is used at times interchangeably with administrative accountability, which is misleading as administrative accountability is another form of accountability and not the same as political accountability (Smith 2007). Administrative accountability is the internal rules, norms and mechanisms to hold civil servants within the administration of government accountable. Departments or ministries' behaviour is confined by rules and regulations; civil servants are subordinates in a hierarchy and accountable to superiors. Strengthening administrative accountability is hence not necessarily the same as strengthening of political accountability. It could even undermine political accountability.

In recent years, attention to actors outside these formal institutions has been growing. Enrique Peruzzotti and Catalina Smulavitz (2006) develop the concept of *social accountability* to include mass media and Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) in the theoretical discussion of accountability enhancement. Based on their definition, social accountability refers to acts by CSO activists and journalists that use accountability institutions or mobilize accountability stakeholders to call people's agents to account.

2.3.1 *Sphere 1: The state, horizontal accountability and governance*

In the Anglo-Saxon tradition in democracy studies the balance and separation of powers between the executive, the legislative/representative and the judiciary is a fundamental principle in a democratic society, based on Montesquieu's doctrine of the separation of powers. In a presidential system, the executive is relatively stronger than in a parliamentary system. In the literature, parliamentary systems are generally regarded as potentially more democratic than presidential systems. In presidential systems, those with a relatively weaker presidency are more democratic than those with more powers vested in the presidency (Lakin and Lipset 2004). Weaker presidencies or parliamentary systems tend to facilitate a stronger multiparty system (Mainwaring).

The representative

Parliament is a key institution in a democracy, checking and balancing the executive. On a local level, the council plays a similar role. In democratic theory, the parliament plays a key role in the democratic system as it contributes to both horizontal and vertical accountability. Judicial authorities, the legislature and special agencies of the executive are horizontal accountability institutions because they ensure checks and balances between state institutions, in contrast to vertical ones that allow people to call elected representatives to account.

The role, function and power of the parliament differs between parliamentary and presidential systems, there are, however, also differences within parliamentary and presidential systems, as pointed out by Smith in his seminal overview of (west) European political systems (Smith, 1989; Bratton and van de Walle, 1997; van de Walle, 2001). Despite the variations between different political system, the parliament plays four core functions in a modern democracy, according to Barkan (2009: 7):

- An institutional mechanism through which the society realizes *representative* governance. The legislative is the institutional arena where representatives of competing interests articulate and strive to advance their respective objectives in the policymaking process.
- Parliament *legislates*, ideally in a broad sense, contributing to the making of public policy by crafting legislation in partnership with or independent of the executive, and with input from civil society.
- Parliament exercises *oversight* of the executive branch to ensure that policies agreed upon are implemented by the state. Effective oversight requires transparency about the substance of governmental operations.
- Legislators perform the function of *constituency services*, i.e., visits to the constituencies, and involvement in small and medium sized development projects.

In local governments the representative organs play a similar role, but have far fewer legislative functions.

In the theoretical discourse on democracy, good governance and development a common standpoint is that decentralisation not only will bring about better governance but also deepen democracy and bring about poverty reduction.

Decentralisation brings government closer to the governed both spatially and institutionally and hence, according to the theory, government will be more knowledgeable about and responsive to the needs of the people. Decentralised government opens up political arenas for new actors and is supposed to generate greater participation

and empowerment. Greater political participation by ordinary citizens increases their 'voice' and hence (it is hoped) the relevance and effectiveness of government's policy. A core belief is that decentralisation will promote democratisation and enhancement of participation at the 'community' level and hence make governments more responsive to the needs of the poor (majority) and more likely to conceive and implement pro-poor policies (Smith, 2007).

Insofar as the majority of the population in developing countries is both poor and excluded from elite politics, any scheme that appears to offer greater political participation to ordinary citizens seems likely to increase their 'voice' and hence (it is hoped) the relevance and effectiveness of government's policy (Crook and Manor, 1998).

Crook (2001) argued that the degree of responsiveness to the poor and the extent to which there is any impact on poverty are determined primarily by the politics of local–central relations and the general regime context, particularly the commitment of the central political authorities to poverty reduction.

Today there exists a large degree of agreement on that decentralisation and devolution of power promote democratic development. For liberal or neo-liberal theories, decentralisation is a means to reduce the negative influence of a too large, centralised and neo-patrimonial state (Bratton and van de Walle, 1997). For radical theorists and activists decentralisation is a means of bringing power close to the grassroots, away from the elites that control the state and to pave the way for another development (Friedmann, 1992). Decentralisation and empowerment is a step towards a more localised development, rather than depending on globalisation (Hines, 2001).

The executive

The executive consists of the president, the government, and the administration at national level and corresponding institutions at sub-national level. The executive makes decisions and implements policies, with the help of the administration, within the framework created by the representative branch of government. Within the executive, various mechanisms and institutions perform administrative accountability. A key question is which actors and institutions participate in decision-making, through which channels, with what information—and how transparent and predictable the decision-making processes are. A question that becomes ever more complicated in a context with a strong presence of international actors.

Most theories of democracy identify the strong executive, in particular the strong presidencies in most African states, the "Big Man Rule", as a challenge for democratisation (van Cranenburgh, 2008).

Another issue is that there are a number of delicate balances between executive ca-

capacity to govern, governability, and democratisation, as for instance Diamond 1996 has pointed at. Which embeds the issue of the executive in the vast literature on theories on the state, and not the least the development state (White, 1998b; 1998a; Robinson and White, 1998; Ottaway, 2002; Mkandawire, 2001; Leftwich, 1998). Various forms of political and societal power and how they are exercised comprise another vast body of theories of relevance in this context (Poulantzas, 1978; Poggi, 2001; Mkandawire, 2006; Jessop, 2007; Hydén, 2008).

The judiciary

Independence of the judiciary constitutes one of the cornerstones of democracy and good governance, in liberal democratic theory. It involves two principles: (a) judicial power must exist as a power separate from, and independent of, executive and legislative power, and (b) judicial power must repose in the judiciary as a separate organ of government, composed of persons different from, and independent of those who compose the executive and legislature (Ndulu, 2008). An independent judiciary hence plays a key role in the checks and balances of the executive and the legislative power.

Independence of the judiciary in rule of law includes protecting and promoting the rights of judges in the higher courts and magistrates. Judicial independence and judicial accountability are closely related. Judges and the judiciary must be protected from influence from powerful actors. In return, society can expect judges to accept fair and temperate criticism of judgments and to maintain appropriate standards of ethical behaviour. The main pillars of judicial independence are institutional and financial autonomy (Ndulu, 2009). Independence of the judiciary includes the right to free and fair trials, for any party, which includes having any grievances heard before an impartial judge who is isolated from partisan political (or economic) influence (Widner, 2001).

In democracy theory, in particular the North American branch, issues related to the judiciary are of critical importance for democracy. In liberal democratic theory the separation and balance of power is a founding principle. The role of the judiciary is to be an independent watchdog against abuses of executive or legislative authority. The judiciary insures that the other branches exercise their authority within the law and protects the rights of citizens against arbitrary exercise of power. These principles have long been the foundation of liberal democracy. Rule of law hence means that no individual, president or private citizen, stands above the law. Democratic governments exercise authority by way of the law and are themselves subject to the law. All actors must obey the law and be held accountable if they violate it. For democracy to be consolidated, the law must be equally, fairly and consistently enforced. Under the rule of law, a system of strong, independent courts should have the power and authority,

resources, and the prestige to hold government officials, even top leaders, accountable to the nation's laws and regulations. For this reason, judges should be well trained, professional, independent, and impartial. To serve their necessary role in the legal and political system, judges must be committed to the principles of democracy. Rule of law is supposed to protect fundamental political, social, and economic rights.

Good governance and democracy not necessarily compatible

In a context of weak capacity of the state at central and local level, it is necessary to improve its capacity. This includes the capacity to formulate, decide upon and implement (development) policies. In order to improve the capacity of the state and executive, and to make it more accountable, good governance is necessary, according to the vast body of literature and theories generated around the concepts of governance, good governance and democratic governance. An important theoretical distinction is to point out, as Mainwaring does, that “good governance”, “democratic governance” and “quality of democracy” are not the same thing. The three concepts tend to be used interchangeably. However, good governance is not the same as democratic governance, and the quality of democracy is again something different. It is not necessarily so, that good governance and democracy are mutually reinforcing, according to the substantive theory tradition. The relationship between good governance and democracy is complex and to a certain extent pulling in opposite directions. Good governance aim to strengthen the governing capability of the state and local governments, which in turn increases the power and capacity of the executive and state/local government institution. Democracy and democratisation aim to diffuse and spread power, and increase the citizens' participation in decision-making and their capacity to hold the government accountable (Gaventa 2006, Goetz 2005, Rakner 2007). Hence, strengthening the state-capacity might undermine democracy, and vice-versa, a strengthening of democracy might undermine the state-capacity.

Corruption—an indicator of governance and democracy

In a context with weak state and accountability mechanisms, elites can undermine good governance and democracy and use their position for private rather than public gain. Corruption is a sign of lack of good governance and has direct links to democracy and democratisation. There are a number of theories on corruption within the democratic development literature. In the theories of neo-patrimonialism, lack of good governance, transparency and democracy give authoritarian rulers opportunities to maintain power through patronage (Bratton and van de Walle, 1997). Hence democracy is undermined. Lack of democracy in turn, facilitates corruption. Corruption

also reduces people's trust in public institutions and the legitimacy of the government, and undermines values like social trust and tolerance. Corruption fuels social conflicts and gender inequality. Hence, the sources of, as well as the strategies to fight, corruption are highly political, in a wider sense (Rose-Ackerman, 1999; Bayart et al., 1999; Carothers, 2006; Frimpong and Jacques, 1999; Lambsdorff, 2007; Levy and Kpundeh, 2004; Mbaku, 2007).

Corruption is a challenge and an indicator of good (bad) governance, (lack of) democracy and development. Corruption is a sign of weak institutions, lack of resources to use existing institutions and regulations and political will to address corruption, and hence illuminate power structures in the society (Chabal and Daloz, 1999). In the wide literature on economic development and corruption, the negative effects of corruption on economic development are highlighted. Corruption undermines the most effective allocation of resources, according to the market principles, in the mainstream perspective, generating economic distortions and inefficiency. Embezzlement of public funds or ill-directed use of resources tends to effect the poorest hardest, as the most powerful use their opportunities to influence resource flows to their own advantage, rather than to that of the society. Corruption also results in the inefficient provision of services within the public sector (Cooksey, 2006). The negative effects of corruption are so great that the World Bank even perceives corruption as one of the major impediments for development:

The Bank has identified corruption as among the greatest obstacles to economic and social development. It undermines development by distorting the rule of law and weakening the institutional foundation on which economic growth depends. The harmful effects of corruption are especially severe on the poor, who are hardest hit by economic decline, are most reliant on the provision of public services, and are least capable of paying the extra costs associated with bribery, fraud, and the misappropriation of economic privileges. Corruption sabotages policies and programs that aim to reduce poverty, so attacking corruption is critical to the achievement of the Bank's overarching mission of poverty reduction.

In the first generations of neo-liberal economic theory the remedy for corruption was to limit the size of the state, to privatise and to decentralise. But as Lambsdorff et al. (2005: 3):3), the founder of International Transparency, points out, there is no evidence for the private sector as such being less corrupt than the government, or that a downsized government would be less corrupt than a larger government. In the same way, decentralisation can lead to weak local government that is captured by strong local players and hence could be even more corrupt than a centralised state (Lambsdorff, 2005:6).

The negative political effects of corruption are well summarised in the UN convention against corruption, where the first preamble reads:

The States Parties to this Convention are concerned about the seriousness of problems and threats posed by corruption to the stability and security of societies, undermining the institutions and values of democracy, ethical values and justice and jeopardizing sustainable development and the rule of law (United Nations, 2003).

Hence, for the analysis in this thesis, corruption is closely intertwined with the political development and the democratisation process. Corruption is with that understood as one of the institutions that it is necessary to include in the process of building a democratic society. Even if corruption is a complex and elusive phenomenon, we will use the concept of corruption in the following standard definition “the extent to which power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as ‘capture’ of the state by elites and private interests” (World Bank, 2007: 3).

2.3.2 Sphere 2, the political society: Political parties and the role of the opposition

The political parties are the cornerstones of the political society. Parties, and in particular an effective opposition, are indispensable for democratic consolidation. It could be difficult to define what a political party is and how it is distinguished from other organisations and pressure groups in the society. In the distinction made above between the civil and political society, a dividing line is made between those organisations that aim to influence decision-makers or the public opinion, and the political parties that aim to get into government. I will use the definition by Ware (1996) that a political party as an institution with two specific characteristics which a) seeks influence in a state, often by attempting to occupy positions in the government, and b) usually consists of more than a single interest in the society and so to some degree attempts to aggregate interest.

Hence, the constraint and challenges the political parties face are different from those of CSOs, as the parties directly compete with other parties, not the least the ruling party, for direct power over the society.

In the theory of (multi party) democracy political parties are supposed to play a number of vital roles for democratic development. The function of the parties in a democracy is to be a vehicle for aggregation of interest, representation and governance. In a pluralist democracy the opposition parties hold the ruling party accountable. Political parties perform three major functions, 1) to channel communication from the state to

the public; 2) the expressive function—to channel communication from the public to the state; 3) the integrative function—to channel communications among different groups within civil society, according to Lipset and Lakin 2004:64ff.). According to Tordoff (2002: 119-136) the political parties, in Africa, have seven functions: the integrative function, the legitimising function, the policy function, the mobilisation and reconciliation function, the patronage function and the political communication function. The communication and information function includes perspectives on the role of the state and the market, citizen preferences, inadequacies of current policies, criticism of the current government and formulation of alternative policies. The legitimising function includes providing ideologies, leadership or opportunities for political participation. In addition the political parties act as a medium for political recruitment and thus create opportunities for upwards social mobility (Randall 1988, cited in Salih 2003).

The political parties are products of the historical circumstances that contributed to their emergence and mirror social, economic and political relations in society. Hence the trajectory of the political parties in Africa is very different from those of the parties in the Western Europe, and needs to be taken into account (Salih 2003). The European party system was established on the social cleavages of class, culture, religion and geography, where class has been the most ubiquitous (Lipset and Lakin 2004:69, referring to Stein and Rokkan). Fragile nation building in most African states has made it challenging to form political parties based on religion, geography or identity as this was perceived to threaten the nation building process. Class has not had the same potential as in Europe, as most African states have had relatively low social differentiation in combination with the fact that the small elite often controlled both the political and economic society. Another foundation of parties is the ideology and the alternative political platforms derived from the ideology.

Political parties in Africa meet a number of challenges, both in terms of internal capacity, outreach, mobilisation and weak institutionalisation and in terms of external constraint in the form of ruling party dominance and prohibitive legislations (Salih 2002, Olukoshi 1998).

The mere presence of political parties does not necessarily indicate more democratic forms of governance. The multiparty system's democratising role depend on to what degree the parties manage to fulfil the roles spelled out above, not the least whose interests are represented. If the various political parties only represent different fractions of the ruling elite(s) the existence of a multiparty system might have little bearing on the consolidation of a substantive democracy.

An effective opposition is absolutely indispensable to the emergence and consoli-

dation of a stable democratic order, in liberal democratic theory. In order to be effective, a number of structural and practical conditions must be at hand. The degree of institutionalisation of the parties is crucial for the parties' capacity to be democratising. The opposition parties need to be distinct from and autonomous of the ruling party. The rules of the political system have to be such that they allow freedom of organisation by the parties on a level playing field and in a framework that allows the rotation of power based on the free choice of the electorate. The opposition parties should, in the interval between one election and the next, serve as the formal, institutionalised watchdog within and outside parliament, to keep the ruling party in check. At election time, the opposition will provide the electorate with choice, politically and ideologically (Olukoshi 1998, Wiseman 1996, Randall 1998, Salih 2001, Salih 2002, Diamond 1999).

Hence we will in this study inquire into the political parties' ability to play the role assigned to them in democratic theory, which will include the parties' internal organisation, structures, political program, social base and internal challenges, and the external constraints, as perceived by the parties, that is, how level the playing field is. This will be done in chapters 6 and 7.

Free and fair elections

The second institution to be studied in the sphere "the political sphere" is the indicator "free and fair elections". As discussed above elections are a crucial part of liberal as well as substantive democracy, but definitely not the same as democracy. "Free" refers to that the political rights are respected, and "fair" to that the levelness of the playing-field must be reasonably even. If incumbents could manipulate the election process, the elections only give a façade of democracy and hence it is important to make a distinction between nominal democracy and substantive democracy also when elections are studied (Trebilcock and Chitalkar, 2009). The indicators we will use here is on the one hand the "free and fairness" of the election campaigns and the election process, including the institutional framework for the elections.

2.3.3 Sphere 3, the civil society: media, human rights and vertical accountability

The idea of civil society has always been fraught with ambiguity, and used in many different and contradictory ways, as Hunt (1999) points out: "*the meaning of the term is as contested as the social and political institutions it purports to describe*". The idea of civil society has a long history in western sciences, connected to the various ideologies with varying views of the relationship between the economic, political and civil society and the society. In the context of authoritarian states—in former Eastern Europe or

in Africa—the concept is used more or less synonymously with pluralism, in a simple dichotomy; the society against the totalitarian state; the protection of the social life against the abuses of the authoritarian state, including a platform of more or less organised activities outside the domain of the state. This also includes societal, political and economic activities, privatising of the functions of the government etc. For Hegel, it was the space between the affective bonds of the family and the state, where individuals formed associations - thus incorporating the market. This definition fits well in the neo-liberal analysis (Harrison, 2010). However, with the market incorporated in the concept it encompasses institutions, associations and corporations with widely diverging character and interest. On the other hand a definition of the civil society that does not incorporate the political parties in one way or another can be too narrow, leaving out the political parties from the analysis. A position where, interestingly enough more radical social movement oriented researchers and actors joined forces with the neo-liberal perspective that political parties are closer to the state powers than to civil society.

In the theory of liberal democracy, the civil society (CS) plays a crucial role for the development, deepening and consolidation of democracy. In liberal theory the CS contributes to limit the power of the state and increase the (democratic) control of the state by society. Diamond (1999) defines the civil society in the following way:

Civil Society is the realm of organized social life that is open, voluntary, self-generating, at least partially self-supporting, autonomous from the state, and bound by a legal order of shared rules. (...) it involves citizens acting collectively in a public sphere to express their interest, passions, preferences and ideas, exchange information, to achieve collective goals, to make demands on the state, to improve the structure and functioning of the state and to hold state officials accountable. (...) it excludes the parochial society; individual and family life and inward looking group activities (...) and excludes the economic society (...) and is distinct from the political society (...) whose primer aim is to win control of the state (...) (Diamond 1999).

In this way, according to liberal theory and the good governance literature, a strong civil society, democracy and good governance are mutually reinforcing. The civil society is a keystone for a strengthening of the state, by contributing to the state's enhanced accountability, responsiveness, inclusiveness, effectiveness and legitimacy (Diamond 1999:239-255). In order to fulfil this role the civil society needs to be autonomous in financing, activities and legal standing, both in relation to the state and the international society. At the same time it cannot only be in opposition to the state but must also find ways to engage in a constructive dialogue (Diamond 1999:253).

A critique of the liberal democracy perspective from a Civil Society perspective has pointed at its state and elite centeredness and argued for a bottom up and “deepening” of the democracy perspective (UNDP 2002, Gaventa 2006). In the liberal democracy perspective, citizens expressed their preferences through electoral politics, and the candidates they elected made representative policies and held the state accountable. Consequently, strengthening state mechanisms such as political checks and balances, administrative rules and procedures, auditing requirements, and formal law enforcement agencies like courts and the police has been in focus. These state-based accountability methods have met limited success, according to the deepening of democracy perspective, and there is a need to shift to strengthening the ‘voice’, or capacity, of ordinary citizens (especially poor citizens) to directly participate in policy-making processes. Increased voice will have little impact if the state is not responsive and accountable to the needs and interests of its people. Empowerment of poor people and communities is necessary in order to give poor and marginalised citizens a say in the decisions that affect their lives, as is strengthening accountability mechanisms that enable the state to respond to these demands (Friedman 1992, Chambers 2002, Goetz 2005).

The neo-Marxist tradition has a different view of the civil society. The neo-liberal state-civil society ideal type is too simplistic and risks obscuring the manner in which the state and civil society mutually constitute each other. The civil society is heterogenous and based on different interests, and hence not necessarily democratising (Beckman, Mohanty, Mukherji et al. 1998:p.4-5). The civil society has an emancipatory and revolutionary potential. For Gramsci the civil society was wedged inbetween the class-structured economy and the state, controlled by the bourgeoisie. Civil society is the realm in which the existing social order is grounded, not in the (economic) base as other Marxists at the time argues. Civil society can thus be the realm in which a new social order can be founded (Cox and Schechter 2002). Gramsci argued that the property-owning class was most vulnerable within the cultural institutions of civil society—which otherwise was used to create and reproduce the dominating classes’ hegemony among the subordinated classes and groups (Keane 1998). Through “a war of position”, empowered sub-ordinated classes could undermine the bourgeoisie and capture the civil society. Successive enlargement of a communist civil society would then gradually undermine the foundation of the bourgeoisie class and state power. Civil society, in this tradition, does not only consist of autonomous groups, it is also the “the realm of contesting ideas in which the intersubjectivity of meanings upon which peoples sense of “reality” is based can become formed and new concepts of the natural order of society can emerge” (Cox 2000:102). Hence, the civil society can be the realm where the existing order can be challenged in a “bottom-up” process and provide foundation for an

alternative (world) order. This “bottom-up” process is counter—acted by a “top-down” process, where state and corporate interests try to influence the civil society to maintain the social and political status quo. In the process, dominant hegemonic forces make efforts to penetrate and co-opt elements of popular movements. Non-governmental organisations’ potential for resistance can be undermined by subsidies or participation in dialogues with the state.

As emerges from above there is a huge literature on the civil society, with diverse standpoints on its role and function. It is outside the scope of this thesis to further review that debate here. For the purpose of this study, I will not go deep into the analysis of the broader civil society, but simply use NGOs as a term for an organisation working outside the state apparatuses, not to be confused with the civil society in a wider sense. Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) are part of the civil society but do not by themselves constitute the civil society, and in line with Diamond’s argumentation above, an NGO is only part of the civil society when it pursues the public interest.

Media

In democratisation theory, the role of a free press is crucial for democratisation, and for accountability. The press can play the role of watchdog of the political and economic society, provide information to the citizen, political parties and the civil society, as well as contribute to education and the development of a democratic culture. In order for the media to do that, there must exist a regulatory framework allowing for press freedom, access to information as well as monitoring of the power holders. In addition, there need to be media companies/institutions with capacity and organisation to fulfil their role (Diamond 1999; Randall 1998; Hydén, Leslie and Ogundimu 2002; Nyamnjoh 2005; Kumar 2006).

Media are, however, not necessarily a part of the civil society, as most media are privately owned and hence straddle the civil and economic society.

Access to information—and epistemic communities

Access to information is crucial for participation in the political process, both for political parties, organisations, media and citizens, and hence I have selected that as an indicator. For Nyamnjoh, the free flow of information is central to the realization of democracy, which is to empower citizens as active agents in decisions, which affect their individual and collective well-being (Kelsall 2003; Kelsall and Mercer 2003; Englund and Nyamnjoh 2004). Hence, how political parties, media and NGO actors view access to information is an issue that we will inquire into.

What “information” is and what it means is defined by the types of frameworks

that are used for problem formulation and policy formulation. Haas, in a study on international policy coordination, uses the concept “epistemic community” to analyse how decision-making could be understood on a variety of issues related to international political economy, security and environment (Haas, 1992). According to Haas (p. 3) an epistemic community could be defined as:

a network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area. Although an epistemic community may consist of professionals from a variety of disciplines and backgrounds, they have (1) a shared set of normative and principled beliefs, which provide a value based rationale for the social action of community members; (2) shared causal beliefs, which are derived from their analysis of practices leading or contributing to a central set of problems in their domain and which then serve as the basis for elucidating the multiple linkages between possible policy actions and desired outcomes; (3) shared notions of validity - that is, intersubjective, internally defined criteria for weighing and validating knowledge in the domain of their expertise; and (4) a common policy enterprise-that is, a set of common practices associated with a set of problems at which their professional competence is directed, presumably out of the conviction that human welfare will be enhanced as a consequence.

The concept is useful for describing the type of relations that gradually came to characterize the relations between the civil servants in the ministry of finance, the civil servants in the donor community and the executive.

Human rights

Respect for political and civil rights is a foundation for the democratisation process, and an indicator on how far the democratisation process has developed. If people are to have any influence or control over public decision-making and decision-makers, they must be free to communicate and associate with one another, to receive accurate information and express divergent opinions, to enjoy freedom of movement, and to be free from arbitrary arrest and imprisonment (Beetham 2004). In a similar vein, respect for social, economic and cultural rights indicates the level of consolidation of a substantive democracy (Ake 2000, Leftwich 2005).

Democracy and the political culture

For democracy to be established, the formal structures of democracy are necessary, but not sufficient. For consolidation of democracy, as elaborated briefly above, it is neces-

sary that a democratic culture is established in the society, from the top executive to the household level. It includes the government structures at all levels, as well as in political parties and civil society organisations (Diamond 1999).

How does the discussion above on the civil society, human rights and democratic culture link to the questions raised in this thesis? I will simply inquire into the relative number of NGOs at national level and in the field locations, their capacity, challenges they are facing, their relative autonomy to the state and market; and how they perceive their access to information and policy process—in order to be able to pursue their role as civil society organisations. The media, access to information, human rights, CSOs will be analysed in chapter 6. Political culture is incorporated in the analysis in chapters 6 and 7, on the political parties and 8, on the elections.

2.3.4 Sphere 4, the economic society: The relationship between democratisation, economic liberalisation and poverty reduction

The relationship between the processes of democratisation and economic liberalisation has been one of the major questions in the debate on development, and has produced a large body of literature with diverse theoretical and methodological standpoints, not the least through Western political philosophers like Locke, Hobbes, Adam Smith, J S Mill, Marx, Weber and Schumpeter, that in various ways have contributed to the platform for the contemporary debate. In the 1960s, modernisation theory assumed that economic growth and political development were mutually reinforcing and imminent processes (Huntington, 1968); (Rist, 2002/2008; Hettne, 1995). From a liberal perspective, e.g., Lipset (1960: 406) argued for the close interrelation between economic growth and democracy. To him a basic condition for democracy to evolve and be sustained was modernization and economic development involving industrialization, urbanization, high educational standards, and a steady increase in the overall wealth of the society. The stability of a given democratic system depended in turn not only on the systems' efficiency in modernization but also upon the effectiveness and *legitimacy* of the political systems. Lipset was thus arguing for socioeconomic development as a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for the establishment and/or maintenance of a democratic political system. Effectiveness and the legitimacy of the system were as important as socioeconomic development (Arat, 1988). In 1965, Huntington highlighted the conflict between economic growth and political stability and attempted, along with others, to bring the analysis of the two together in one large model. He argued that economic growth without development of political institutions threatens political stability Huntington (1965:406), a point that later has been developed within peace and development theory, and an insight I will use in the analysis in this thesis.

The connection between economic and a broader political development was a cornerstone in the structural change theories, from liberal (Myrdal, 1968; Lewis, 1969) to the more radical dependency school and world system analysis (Frank, 1967; Frank and Gills, 1993; Wallerstein, 1974; 1980; 1989). The radical effort to build large system theories began to decay in the late 1970s. During the 1980s, economic issues were largely studied in isolation within the discipline of economics and democratisation mainly within the discipline of political science. Efforts have since been made to theoretically integrate the interface at a middle range theoretical level. Within the field of economics, for example, institutions have been brought in as an important intermediary between economic, social, and political processes (Bates, 1989; North, 1990; Hodgson, 2006; Stewart, 1995). Within political science, most research until recently was quite state-centric and oriented towards the formal and procedural side of the transition to and consolidation of democracy (note by for example, Diamond et al., 1988; Udogu, 1997; Olukoshi and Laakso, 1996; Rudebeck et al., 1996) or on the role that strategic elites have or should have (Hydén (1998) Shin, 1994), where experiences from Latin America in the 1980s, were used a platform. However, within the discourse of the New Political Economy, a number of themes that were on the research agenda during the 1960s were brought back in again. Summarising these contradictions, (Dahl, 2000) concluded that: *the exact nature of the relationship among socioeconomic modernization, democratization, and the creation of a democratic culture is almost as puzzling today as it was a quarter-century ago* (Dahl, 2000: 35).

However, with the lack of success of the liberal economic reforms, the interconnection between economic reforms and political development in Africa has been brought back to the fore and analysed from different perspectives (by among others March and Olsen 1995, Olukoshi and Laakso, 1996; Bates, 1988; Bates 2001; Sandbrook 2000; Bratton and van de Walle 1997; van de Walle, 2001; Ottaway 1997; Marina and Theresa 1999; Ottaway 2003; (Diamond, 2000).

Even if the perspectives differ depending on which ideology the different theories depart from, there is a rapidly expanding literature that points at the need to analyse political and economic development as a coherent whole, rather than as disparate sectors, if we are to be able to understand the preconditions for a deepening of a sustainable democratic development. Economic development provides opportunities and resources, but also changes power structures. Political development also provides changing power structures and economic opportunities.

Liberal democracy does, however, not necessarily bring about economic equality. In a recent article Timmons (2010) argues that there is no statistical evidence for a direct systematic relationship between democracy/civil liberties and aggregate measures of

economic inequality. Timmons' conclusion, based on a statistical analysis of the World Income Distribution Data Base 2007, is "Whether, and how, democracy decreases economic inequality remains an open question" (Timmons, 2010:741). Timmons' conclusion hence appears to support the argument of the substantive democracy theory tradition, where broad-based economic development and poverty reduction could be viewed as an indicator on the substantive outcome of the democratisation process.

Economic development and poverty reduction is also important for the legitimacy of the democratisation process in society (Andreasson, 2010). If poverty is not reduced among the majority of the population by popularly elected governments, it might undermine not only the legitimacy of the democratisation process as such, but also lead to "voter apathy" and frustration, which could be politicised by non-democratic political forces. In the same vein, economic development for a few and increasing gaps between the haves and have-nots are likely to undermine the democratisation process. In the wide literature on the connection between conflicts, economic development and democratisation, frustration gaps and deprivation are crucial for our understanding of different sources of conflicts—as well as how conflicts could be managed.

Hence *inclusive economic development* is an important part of this thesis' analytical framework. Even if the focus of the thesis is on the political development, the economic development provides an important part of the democratisation process. Lack of poverty reduction and increasing income gaps are used and understood as an indicator on how the majority has managed to influence policy making in order to bring about a change that benefits not only the political and economic elites, but also the majority of the population. Economic development and poverty reduction is also understood along the lines of argumentation above, as important for legitimacy and sustainability of the democratisation process.

2.4 Analytical framework—and organisation of the thesis

As emerges from the foregoing I will analyse the research question "to what extent Tanzania is moving towards a consolidation of democracy", with the help of Cohen and Aratos theoretical model, with the distinction between the four "spheres", the state, the political, the civil and the economic society. I will then analyse a selected number of institutions within each sphere, with the help of a number of indicators emerging from the theoretical discussion above. Focus is on the political society.

The selection of spheres, institutions and indicators is theoretically motivated in the foregoing two sections in this chapter, 2.2 and 2.3.

Within *the state sphere* I will analyse two institutions: "The balance between the

executive, the representative and the judiciary” and “Good and democratic governance”. The indicators used for the institution “Balance between the executive, the representative and the judiciary” will be “Ability of the representative to hold the executive accountable”; “Autonomy of the executive and representative vis-à-vis donors”; and “Independence of the judiciary”. For the institution “Good and democratic governance” I will use the indicators “Autonomy of the administration versus the executive”; “Governance reforms”; “Corruption” and “Respect for human rights”. This is done in chapter 5. The selection of indicators is theoretically motivated in section 2.3.1 above.

Within *the civil society sphere* I will analyse three institutions: “Independent media”; “Strengthened NGOs” and “Democratic culture”. The media sphere is analysed with the indicators “Structure of the media sector”; “External constraints for media” and “Internal constraints for media”. “Strengthened NGOs” sphere is analysed with the indicators “Structure of the NGO sector”; “External constraints for NGOs” and “Internal constraints for NGOs”. The institution of democratic culture is analysed with the help of two indicators “Democratic values and procedures” and “Citizen, Political Parties and Civil Society access to information”. The selection of the institutions and indicators is theoretically motivated above in section 2.3.3.

Within *the economic society*, the institution analysed will be “Inclusive economic development”, where I will use the indicators “Economic and sector growth”; “Income distribution”, and the trend in “Poverty reduction” in order to assess to what extent an inclusive economic growth has taken place. The civil and economic society is analysed in chapter 6. The selection of inclusive economic development as an institution and the indicators are theoretically motivated in section 2.3.4 above.

As the focus of the study is on the *political society*, the analysis of this sphere is subdivided in two chapters. In chapter seven we analyse one major institution: “Institutionalisation of a viable multiparty system”. In chapter 8 we bring together the different threads of analysis of the democratisation processes in the analysis of the institution “Free and fair elections”. The indicators I have used when analysing the institution “Institutionalisation of a viable multiparty system” are: “Relationship between the ruling party and the state”; “Balance between the ruling party and the opposition”; “External constraints for the political parties”; “Internal constraints for the political parties” which assessed together will indicate the relative degree of institutionalisation of a multiparty system. This is done in chapter seven. The elections from 1995 to 2005 are analysed in chapter eight. Here we use the three main indicators “Registration and turnout”; “Election campaigns” and “Election and counting”. The selection of indicators on the political society is theoretically motivated above in section 2.3.2.


The institutions will be analysed from a substantive democracy theoretical per-

spective. That is, we will not only look at the forms of respective institutions, but also include trying to assess the quality of the outcomes of the democratisation process based on the outcome in terms of participation and an institutionalised multiparty system on the one hand, and inclusive economic development, as discussed above in section 2.3.4.

This analytical framework is presented in Figure 1 below. In the figure we find five columns: the research problem to the left; the key “spheres”, the state, the political, civil and economic society; the selected institutions in each sphere; and the key indicators for each institution, and to the far right the analysis/assessment categories. I have also written in the figure in which chapter the issues are addressed. In the last chapter we will go back to this figure and make an assessment, based on findings from secondary and primary sources, whether the development of each indicator has developed towards consolidation, following the definition by Linz and Stephan 1997 above, that “Behaviourally, no group is seriously engaged in secession or regime change. Attitudinally, most people accept that democracy is the best form of government (so not only does nobody try to change the regime, nobody particularly wants to). Constitutionally, democracy is consolidated when all the major organs of the state act according to the democratic institutions”, indicates that the development has become so established that it is unlikely that there should be a backlash. However, as stated and experienced in many contexts, democracy is not static, it is a process that needs to be vitalised, maintained—and expanded, again and again. The *forms* of democracy are important, but it is the *content, quality and outcome* of the democratic process that are essential. The *forms are necessary* for democracy to develop, but not *sufficient* for a democracy to be consolidated. For that participation, change of attitudes and evenly spread capacity for all citizens, CSOs and political parties to participate freely and fairly on a relatively level playing field in an open and transparent process are essential.

The analytical framework is a heuristic device rather than a formal model. I will not be able to measure the development within each “sphere”, but I will use the perceptions collected in a large number of semi-structured interviews, reading of evaluations, governmental material, other research etc. to compile what appears to be a reasonable assessment, based on the available material and my own limited understanding of the complex and rapidly changing context.

Figure 2 Analytical Framework of the research problem “to what extent Tanzania is moving towards a consolidation of democracy”. Spheres, institutions, indicators—and in which chapter the analysis appears.



Each of the empirical chapters 5-9 is organised along the lines of the analytical framework presented in figure 2. In the next chapter I will discuss which methods and materials have been used in order to assess the development of the various indicator.

2.5 Sum up

We have noted a number of tensions within the liberal democratic theory approach, and the assumed mutual strengthening of democratic reforms, good governance and economic reforms. The study will use a substantive democracy theory approach to access to what extent Tanzania is moving towards a consolidation of democracy. Hence, the democracy definition used in the thesis is an expansion of the procedural/minimalist and liberal definition of democracy, and includes not only the *forms* of democracy but also the *substantive content* and *outcome* of the democratic process. I will use Linz and Stephan's definition of consolidation of democracy referred to above, that *constitutionally*, democracy is consolidated when all the major organs of the state act according to the democratic institutions. This means more than elections. There need to be five institutions (assuming, first of all, that there is a state, without a state, no democracy): freedoms necessary for development of civil society (not just group memberships), a relatively "autonomous and valued political society" (parties, elections, legislatures, etc.), rule of law (i.e. laws apply to leaders too), usable bureaucracy (i.e. state capacity), and an "institutionalized economic society" to mediate between the state and the market (Linz and Stepan, 1997: 17ff). For practical and theoretical reasons I have made an analytical frame consisting of four major spheres, the state, the civil, the political and the economic society. Each sphere is then subdivided in a number of key institutions, nine altogether. The institutions in turn are subdivided into a few indicators per institution. These indicators will be assessed by the use of material from primary and secondary sources. The methods for collection and analysis will be discussed in the following chapter.

The political society is in the focus of the study. The findings and analyses of the political society are hence done in two chapters, one on the political parties (Chapter 7) and one on the elections (Chapter 8). The state and civil society are analysed in one chapter each, Chapters 5 and 6, respectively. The economic development is not in the focus of the study, but considered in this study to be an important outcome of democratic process. It is analysed in the last section of chapter 6. In the concluding Chapter 9, the findings from chapters 5-8 are brought together, analysed and an overall assessment of the democratisation process is carried out.

3 Methodology

This chapter presents the methodological considerations and the type of methodology that were used in the study, in order to meet one of the major challenges in explorative and qualitative studies—how to validate the analysis. The first section describes some of my meta-theoretical and methodological points of departure, and the following sections the more specific methods and strategies that have been used.

3.1 Methodological points of departure

I have used an explorative/descriptive analysis—rather than a theory-testing approach—as discussed by Esaiasson (2002) and Bernard (2006). The main reason for this choice was that I was interested to analyse the outcome of the democratisation process and economic reforms, through how various stakeholders *perceived* the process. A second reason was at the time of the conception of this study, comparatively little research had been done on what actually was happening “on the ground” in countries like Tanzania, 10 years after—market economy and liberal democracy had been introduced. It was very difficult to get access to second-hand materials as well as studies done by Tanzanian researchers. Most of the literature dealt with “armchair empiricism”, or was based on theories with little foundation in the African context, as pointed out by among others Hydén (1999); Abrahamsen (2000); Gibbon and Olukoshi (1996); Olukoshi (1998); The Citizen (2010:113). I use the concept of explorative research in the way Vogt (1999:105) defines it, as cited in Stebbins (2001):

Social science exploration is a broad-ranging, purposive, systematic, prearranged undertaking designed to maximize the discovery of generalizations leading to description and understanding of an area of social or psychological life. Such exploration is, depending on the standpoint taken, a distinctive way of conducting science—a scientific process—a special methodological approach (as contrasted with confirmation), and a pervasive personal orientation of the explorer. The emergent generalizations are many and varied; they include the descriptive facts, folk concepts, cultural artefacts, structural arrangements, social processes, and beliefs and belief systems normally found there.

That does, of course, not mean that I did not have various theories or pre-conceived ideas that have guided the study. Rather than using a purely deductive or inductive strategy, I came to use an abductive approach, as discussed by Alvesson and Sköldberg (1992/2008) which involves starting with a broad but not well elaborated theoretical framework, and at the same time collecting information, analysing and revising the framework and the methods in an iterative process back and forth between the theory, concepts, purpose, research questions, methods and data.

The methodology I have used in this study has a “light” constructivist touch. It is based on a relativist ontology, where realities are perceived to be multiple and socially constructed. Social facts do not exist by themselves but are constructed. Truth is the best informed (amount and quality of information) and most sophisticated (power with which the information is understood and used) construction on which there is consensus (Guba and Lincoln, 1989; Alvesson and Deetz, 2001). Hence, in that perspective social facts do not exist by themselves, but are always part of the more or less conscious pre-understanding of the researcher—and prevailing power structures of various kinds. What I mean with a “light” constructivist touch is that I share the meta-theoretical points of departure of social constructivists, but I do not do any discourse analysis, in this study.

It should be stressed that what I have done is to identify a wide array of *actors’ perspectives* on and *perceptions* of various aspects of the political development in Tanzania, and it is these different perceptions that are used to interpret to what extent Tanzania is moving towards a consolidation of democracy. The perceptions from various actors are triangulated with each other, and with available secondary sources and grey materials, in order to validate as reliable an account as possible.

For data collection I have used mainly a qualitative methodology. The methodology was inspired by on the one hand Guba and Lincoln (1989), and their elaboration of the social constructivist approach, McCracken (1988) for his discussion on methods, strategy and analysis, Yin (2003) for his elaboration on case study methods, Stebbins

(2001) for his discussions on explorative research in social science and De Vaus (2001), for discussions on research design.

The approach and the specific methods I have been using were to a large extent inspired by Chambers (1983: 1995 and 1997); Mikkelsen (1995); Thomas et al. (1998); Thomas and Mohan (2007) and their emphasis on how to avoid the shallow, “over-theorised”, reductionist approach that has characterised research on developing countries resulting in policy advice without firm anchorage in the “realities” on the ground and therefore with limited outcome. Chambers has elaborated in an inspiring and convincing way the dissatisfaction with—the reductionism of formal surveys, shallowness of theoretically driven academic research without empirical foundation in the realities claimed to be studied, and the biases of typical field visits to conveniently situated “road side” locations or interviews with various elites. This is a research approach that tends to use the developing country reality to verify an abstract theory derived from societies with very different structures, values, history and power structures. A critique which is further elaborated by for example the various authors in Thomas and Mohan (2007). Even if I find that critique relevant, refreshing and inspiring and did my best to use that approach, I must admit that I did not manage to reach that objective. But it is a perspective that I have tried to use through out the study.

For inspiration and technical advice on how to use different research methods and in particular how to conduct interviews Bernard (2006) and Silverman (2004) have been valuable sources. At a later stage Wolcott (2001) and de Vaus (2001) gave inspiration on research design and how to analyse the different sources of information.

I have used a combination of ethnographic methods, respondent interviews with households, focus group interviews, observation and semi—structured informant interviews with actors at various levels in the Tanzanian society, and collection of available “grey”¹ and secondary materials.

The “grey materials”, which in a way are used as primary material as they are not easily available, include research reports made by Tanzanian researchers and not published, all types of administrative documents, including policy documents, evaluation reports, local government reports, political parties’ programmes—as well as unpublished reports from various international agencies, etc. Other types of grey materials that have been used are archival records, including national statistics, records of votes and budgets, speeches by government representatives, members of parliament and representatives of political parties, notes and records at the Swedish Embassy. Secondary sources include published or commercially available material in the form of journals,

1 “Grey material” is unpublished documents from various governmental and non-governmental organisations (O’Laughlin, 2007:107).

academic books and newspaper articles.

Semi-structured interviews have been the most used tool to get information from various actors. Three main types of interviews have been conducted. I have divided them into “Actor”, “Key informant” and “Focus group” interviews, as shown in Figure 2. At times of course these categories will overlap.


A fourth type of interview/source is “Informal discussions” (Bernard 2007:211ff). This turned out to be one of the most valuable sources of information. Many of the issues in focus of this study are very difficult to get information about as they are related to the power struggle over control of, and access to, the few resources available. In a country where resources are scarce it might be even tougher to get sensitive information than in more well-endowed countries. Politicised or sensitive information is also more difficult to get access to in a country/context where the tradition of access to information and free media are not well established. Informal discussions on many occasions turned out to be very useful to get contextual understanding or to corroborate information from other sources. But there are a number of methodological challenges that are difficult to manage. It could be difficult to distinguish between what are “facts”, opinions, merely hearsay, lack of information, misunderstanding, anecdotes, prejudices, rumours, slander, etc., as discussed for instance by O’Laughlin (2007). However, through informal discussions with different types of actors one gets a little better understanding of various actors’ attitudes, perspectives and perceptions—and maybe also about the real power structures/power—mongering behind the formal front. Another important side effect of informal discussions is that they help to build up trust and rapport—both in terms of personal relations, and in terms of knowledge. This understanding could be used to ask better-informed follow-up questions in formal interviews, as well as to make a little better-informed interpretation of the answers given—or not given. The method used was to have the research questions, or a special set of research questions depending on the situation. Informal discussions were also used to “test” the validity of observations, arguments and conclusions.

In this type of explorative study, validation of the conclusions drawn is a major challenge. The strategy I have used is to triangulate information from the multiple sources mentioned above to validate and construct the analysis. I found Yin’s (2003:99) definition of triangulation clear and useful: “...to collect information from multiple sources aimed at corroborating the same fact or phenomenon.” As emerges from the previous paragraph, triangulation was done mainly on the data level and to a lesser extent on the method level. Information collected from the different types of sources was then used to construct the narrative of the thesis.

As emerges from Figure 3 below, I have used nine different types of sources of in-

formation in this study, in order to get the different pieces in the jigsaw puzzle that would enable us to shed some light on the research question “To what extent is Tanzania moving towards a consolidation of democracy?”.

Figure 3 The nine various sources used to get information to be able to shed light on the research question “to what extent Tanzania is moving towards a consolidation of democracy?”



The challenges were both to develop the necessary skills for various data collection strategies, design and most of all conduct the field studies—and to bring together and analyse the different types of information. The quality of the data in the “grey materials” also turned out to be a great challenge. Reports and policy documents were

difficult to get access to and, for natural reasons in one of the poorest countries in the world, not always based on thorough data collection or rigorous methods of collection or analysis. However, the greatest challenge was to find data of relevance for the questions asked in this study. The strategy used to manage these challenges has been to try to “Maintain a Chain of Evidence” (Yin 2003:105). That is to as large an extent as possible show in a systematic way how and from where the input in the analysis comes from, in order to make it possible for the reader to assess the validity of the claims made, as discussed below in section 3.2 on methods.

3.2 The design, methodology and sources

Even if the research question and focus change in the course of the study from focusing on the interface between the economic, administrative and democratic reforms to narrowing down on the democratisation process, the issues that I have had the ambition to understand have remained the same. From the beginning one case study was done at national level and two case studies at local level. Tanzania is a large country, with huge variation between different areas. The areas selected for the case study were supposed to illustrate the differences and similarities between one “less developed areas” and one of the most “modern” areas in the country, following the principle of purposive sampling (Mikkelsen 1995; Silverman 2000). The areas selected for the case studies were one in the most urbanised area in Tanzania, Kinondoni District in Dar es Salaam, and one in a poor rural area, Pangani District in Tanga Region, but of course without any claims of having a representative selection of districts. In particular the southern and dry inland districts have an even more “backward” orientation than Pangani. In the present thesis I use the material from the local field studies to inform my understanding of the development on a more general level.

In the national case study, which is in focus in this thesis, interviews were conducted with key administrators/decision makers in different ministries, including ministers, members of parliament, donor representatives from bilateral and multilateral agencies, NGOs (trade unions, professional associations, human rights NGOs, media associations), representatives/functionaries and candidates for the political parties at national and local level, the National Electoral Commission, journalists and academic. The identification and selection of key informants started with mapping of the territory to be investigated followed by purposive sampling of key informants in the respective institutions studied. Later on further key informants were added through the “snow balling” method (Bernard, 2006: 195). An example of the type of inventory made appears in the appendix.

About 50 interviews were done at the national level in 2000-2002 and another 70 in 2005-2006. A brief follow up with four of the political parties (CCM, CUF, CHADEMA and NCCR-Mageuzi) and eight key informants from CSO, the university and the donor community was done in April 2010. The timespan between the different interviews enabled me to analyse the interviews, read and develop my understanding a little bit further and then come back with better informed questions. In that way I was able to follow the development during the course of the study relatively closely for the years 1999-2006, with an update in 2010. It could also be a weakness as some of the information/material provided in interviews in 2000 of course might be out-dated in 2010. I have tried to manage this challenge through clearly writing which date a specific interview was carried out, and making an effort to follow up issues in subsequent interviews.

The interviews were conducted with a semi-structured approach. I developed a fairly detailed check list on the issues in focus of the study, based on the different institutions and indicators presented in the analytical framework (figure 1) in the last chapter. I used roughly the same checklist for all interviews, but adapted to the type of interview I was doing. In that way I got information/perceptions from various actors, informants and institutions on the issues at stake in the study (see figure 2 and figure 3). With more sources, reading and interviews better questions could be asked. A process well described as an abductive approach, or a classic hermeneutic circle of learning.

Several key actors, like representatives from the political parties and members of parliament, intellectuals, NGO representatives, journalists and informants from aid organisations/diplomatic representations were interviewed several times over the years. The personal relationship, trust and opportunity to do new interviews contributed to a little better understanding from my side, and the opportunity to improve follow up studies/questions, corroborate information and conclusions. Having the opportunity to return now and then over the years also made the informal discussions to become more interesting, for both participants. This contextual knowledge is not used directly in this study as a source, but is of course an important framework for my understanding and analysis.

To select informants was an elaborate process. Inspired by the social constructivist approach, as discussed above, the ambition was to get various key actors' perception on the issues studied. In the case study areas, most political leaders from the competing parties were interviewed, most of the rallies monitored, and administrators at different levels, NGOs, and other agents with insight in the democratisation process were also interviewed.

In all, about 120+ stakeholder interviews were conducted. Roughly, the author,

with the help of an interpreter when necessary, did three quarters of the interviews. The remaining quarter of the interviews were done by research assistants based on a structured interview manual. The interviews done by research assistants were almost confined to the local level in Pangani and Kinondoni. Party programmes, posters, official documents like budgets, planning documents, policy papers, reform documents, evaluations, reports etc. where collected were available.

The printed media were monitored by a research assistant who made newspaper clippings of major events in connection with the elections of 2000 and 2005. I also used the monitoring of the media that Tanzania Media Council did. In recent years the availability of media via internet has increased. Major Tanzanian newspapers are now available on internet, which make it easier to follow the political development from abroad—at least to a certain extent.

We monitored the conduct of the whole election campaign, the organisation of the election, and the elections of 2000 and 2005.² In order to accomplish this, three research teams were established. It should be noted that interviews with political parties, as well as election officials and a selected number of key informants were held both before and after the elections in 2000 and 2005, in order to follow up different actors' perceptions of the outcome and procedures of the elections. The monitoring of rallies was done together with research assistants. The assistants had to follow a structured protocol when observing rallies and take note of what was said. For practical reasons it was not possible to monitor the election in both Kinondoni and Pangani at the same time as the travelling time from Pangani to Kinondoni was 10-14 hours, due to the rains. However we spent two weeks doing interviews and observing the rallies in Kinondoni before leaving for three weeks in Pangani. We returned to Kinondoni a week after the election and did most of the household interviews as well as follow-up interviews with key informants.

In each district, roughly 60 household interviews were conducted (i.e., around 120 in total in 2000-2001, and an additional 20 household interviews in Kinondoni district in December 2005) with the help of a semi-structured, comprehensive questionnaire covering household economics, networks, resource bases, perception of economic change, perception of social trust and cohesiveness, perception of the democratisation process, and other householder perceptions. Each interview lasted two to five hours and was conducted by the author with an interpreter; four research assistants did additional household interviews. The households were selected with the purpose to obtain a sample with households from three wealth strata. Wealth criteria were developed together with key informants and selected households according to the principles proposed by Mikkelsen 1995.

2 I was also following the election in 1995, but as part of another study.

In Kinondoni district, that has about 1.1 million inhabitants, two out of the 34 wards were selected for the case study. One of the wards was situated in the poorest area of the district, Magomeni, and one in a “middle class” area, Sinza. In each ward, four “streets” were selected together with ward and district staff in order to get a wide coverage of the situation in the ward. In each street, individual and focus group interviews were conducted with street government leadership. Seven to nine households were interviewed in each street. In addition three to five focus group interviews were conducted with young girls, women, boys, and men, respectively. The focus group interviews aimed to crosscheck, supplement, deepen and substantiate the information from the household and key informant interviews.

We followed the election process and observed election rallies of the different parties, with a focus on the rallies in the wards selected for the study.

At the Kinondoni municipal level, key informant interviews were conducted with district officials, political parties, MPs and MP candidates. At ward and street level key informant interviews were conducted with all political parties active in streets/wards where the field study was conducted, councillors and councillor candidates, street leaders as well as religious leaders, school health and administrative staff and possible NGOs/CBOs active in the location. Shorter follow up studies were made in 2002 and 2003. In connection with the election in 2005 around 20 key informant and household interviews were conducted and the election campaign was observed in Kinondoni district. In May 2006 follow up interviews were done at national level and in Kinondoni district with political parties, media, civil society and key informants. A brief follow up was done in March 2007 with discussions with stakeholders at national level. The last follow up for this study was done in April 2009, where key informants from major political parties, CSOs, researchers and donors were interviewed.

In Pangani District the administration at district level, the district’s political leaders, the political parties, the MP, the religious leaders, the NGOs and a number of prominent citizens were interviewed. Three locations for case studies were selected, one distant rural village in the forest without access to roads; one fishing village down along the coast; and three wards in Pangani town. In all three locations roughly 20 household interviews were conducted. In addition three-four focus group interviews and interviews with all political parties, councillors and councillor candidates, religious leaders, school teachers and other administrative staff at ward and village level, witch doctors, and focus group interviews with village governments were conducted.

Participation in and observation of village/street activities during the election campaigns, and election monitoring were carried out in Pangani. During the election day and night in 2000 and during the counting, three teams were established that monitored the

process in all three locations in Pangani. Follow up studies were made in 2002 and 2003.

In addition, interviews were conducted at regional level both in Dar es Salaam and Tanga region with administrators (including election administrators), regional political leadership, NGOs and observers and activists.

The field studies have been conducted in several phases, and within different projects. Most relevant for this thesis is 1) A pilot field study done in connection with the elections to village and street governments in December 1999; 2) Information collected in connection with an evaluation of the Swedish Country Programme to Tanzania for 1995–2000 in April/May 2000, where my role was among other things to follow up the Swedish support to the democratisation process and governance reforms (Booth et al. 2001); 3) Four-months fieldwork in connection with the elections to local government, parliament, and president September–December 2000; 4) Supplementary fieldtrips in August 1999, February 2000, March, June and November 2001, June and August 2002, and 2003; 5) The field study for the thesis was then followed up with field studies in 2005, 2006, 2007 and lastly a brief follow up in April 2010. The study is also informed by a number of studies in connection with another research project “A Matter of Choice? User fees in health care and Education”, Ewald et al. (2002 and 2003) on the effects of the introduction of user fees in health and education. For that study, we carried out six different field studies in Pangani, Rombo and Geita District in the period 1999–2003. My licentiate thesis (Ewald 1998) focused on the effects of the economic reform programme on different types of households for the period 1989–1997 in Geita and Arumeru Districts. The information and analysis from the licentiate thesis are used as an input in the discussions on economic and political change in this work.

As I have been fortunate enough to have been given the chance to visit the field a number of times over a period of seven years, the material also allows for (some) comparison of the developments over time. As I had the opportunity to come back and put similar questions to governmental agencies, political parties, CSOs, researchers and other stakeholders it gave an opportunity to follow up on the development on the various issues from earlier field studies. I visited and met political parties’ activists, where some remained in position and others had lost out in an internal power struggle and/or changed political party, which gave different perceptions on what was taking place.

In this thesis we present mainly the material from the study at the national level. It turned out that there was too much material to include the detailed information from the local levels in one study. The information from the two “local” field studies, however, is an important source for contextual understanding of the political process at the national level. Various aspects of information from the “local” level are incorporated in the analysis of the various institutions, rather than being presented as cases in

themselves - for instance the challenges opposition parties are facing, elections or the relationship between executive and representative functions central and local governments.


3.3 Methods for analysing and interpreting the materials


There are many different types of information from various types of actors used in this study, which is a challenge in itself from a methodological point of view. As was presented above, we have used nine different types of sources of information. The way I have used the different sources to build the narrative of the thesis is quite straightforward. The assessment of different sources of information has been done in a fairly similar way. Firstly we have done a critical evaluation of the sources. This follows the standard procedure of assessing the quality and validity of the answers given, depending on the source of information. Apart from the general assessment of the interviewed person's or the written source's ability and capacity to give accurate answers, the eventual bias that could be connected to the information depending on the institutional affiliation of an actor/written source, the prevailing power structures, the sensitivity of the question asked and so on I have been assessed (O'Laughlin, 2007). This proved to be more cumbersome than expected, as it is quite difficult to know if a statement is made or written because of the intention to give a particular version of an issue, self-censorship, fear and/or lack of adequate information, or is even outright lies as Bernard (2006: 199) warns us.

We have then used the information from the different sources to validate and triangulate information. The relative weight that is given to information from the different sources depends on which sphere/institution or variable we are analysing. For instance, in the sphere that is in focus in this study, the political society, we have done far more interviews with direct actors than in the three other spheres. At the same time all available secondary and grey materials etc. that we have managed to get our hands on have been used as input in the analysis. In figure 4 below I try to show how the analytical framework presented in the last chapter can be combined with the nine different sources of information. To the left we have the sphere, institution and variables to be analysed. To the right (on next page), we have the sources of information. If we take the example of the variable "Balance between the Executive, Representative and Judiciary", that variable is theoretically motivated in the theoretical framework and linked to the research problem "To what extent is Tanzania moving towards consolidation of democracy?". If we place that variable in the middle of the jigsaw in figure 4 it illustrates how I have linked the different sources together. In the first phase a mapping

of available secondary sources was done, read and from that a number of strategies and questions developed. In the next step key informant interviews were done to enrich my understanding of the issue—and to enable me to formulate more precise questions to be put to directly involved actors. In line with the social constructivist approach I made an inventory of relevant actors and further sources of information including key informants in various sectors that could have strategic information on the issue.

Figure 4 Example of how different sources of information are compiled/ triangulated in order to validate findings





In the case of the balance between the three branches of government a number of decision makers in the executive were interviewed (in order to get various perspectives from within the executive, interviews were done with a few current ministers, and former ministers). Actors in the administration were interviewed as well. First the view of the executive was covered, supplemented with available grey materials, including official documents. Then members of parliament and the judiciary were interviewed, to get their views on the issues. With this an inside view of the process had been established. These views were then supplemented with various stakeholders outside the process. In the following step stakeholders outside the government were interviewed, including opposition parties, NGOs, researchers and journalists. One of the key actors with insight in the government in a country like Tanzania where 50% of the state budget is financed from abroad, are the donors who consequently were consulted on the issues.

As most people in Tanzania, Ministers, MPs senior civil servants and officials in political parties, NGOs and donors are extremely busy and have more important things to do than being interviewed by researchers. So the numbers and time spent with these key actors had to be limited, not the least in order not to undermine more important activities. Hence secondary and grey materials are more important sources of information than in the case of the political society.

Observation was an important part of collection of information. Even if participatory observation was not used as an elaborated method in this study, it was an important source of information and understanding. One learns a lot about prevailing administrative and power structures by for instance going through the process to manage to get an appointment with a senior official or politician. Visiting different governmental, political party, NGO and donor offices is very instructive, both for observing resources at hand, the organisational structure, the building and sitting in the waiting room and observing who is coming and going. A few direct observations were made, like observing political meetings, election campaigns and the election. We also had the opportunity to observe full council meetings in Kinondoni, village assembly meetings in Pangani, street council meetings in Kinondoni and a parliamentary session. To try locate a local political party office, a rally in a ward or the home of one of the smaller opposition parties councillor candidates in the labyrinths of small houses, paths and valleys in the poorest parts of the slums in areas like Magomeni in Kinondoni is also an important observation. I think I learnt more from all those visits to local areas about development challenges than I have done through 30 years of reading academic books about development theory in my convenient office at my home university in Sweden. Of course a combination is the best, I believe. And I have been fortunate to be able to choose when I shall leave the slums and enter my office, a choice those I met do not have. It was impressive to meet individuals and societies that are struggling to make things change, in a very difficult context. Unfortunately I have not really been able to incorporate all those things learnt in this thesis.

As all the institutions and variables were included in the interviews with all actors, we got perceptions of the issues from various sources.

The material collected through the interviews enabled us to do a detailed analysis on how the economic changes have unfolded and how the administrative reforms, including the decentralisation reform, were articulated all the way down to the households. That information was then used in order to shed light on the unfolding of the democratisation process, via an analysis of the general context of the multiparty reform; the organisational structure; weaknesses and policies among the political parties; the election process as a whole, from the nomination of party candidates measuring

the internal democracy in the parties, election campaigns and the election itself, and lastly also on how the economic, administrative and political reforms were perceived at household level, discussing economic change, social stratification, social trust, knowledge and participation in the democratisation process.

3.4 Reflections on the quality and validity of the empirical material

It was much more difficult than anticipated to get secondary literature and sources to use as a background for the study. In a poor country like Tanzania, all kinds of resources are scarce, of course, including resources at national and local government level to collect and process data, keep public records etc. It was difficult to get to know what information was available at all, where it was located and how to get access to it. This is a well-known phenomenon for people that have experience of fieldwork in Africa, as Göran Hydén, one of the more senior researchers on African politics states:

The problem begins at the level of data collection. What kind of information is available? How reliable is it? These are questions that most scholars in our information-rich age never have to—or bother to—address. Data available from formal institutions in developed societies are usually taken for granted. They are trusted to be objective descriptors of reality. Scholarship on Africa can never start from such a premise. Much of what happen in African economies and societies is not captured in national statistics. Even information gathered for such purposes is fraught with methodological weaknesses (Yeats 1990; van de Walle 2001). For instance, sampling is very difficult in situations where civil administration data are non-existent or only partially developed (Hydén 2006:11).

To collect field material in this type of context is extremely time-consuming, frustrating and tiresome, not the least because of my own limited pre-understanding and rudimentary knowledge of Kiswahili. A large part the work had to be devoted to collecting basic information on the conditions and issues in focus in the study. This also meant that less time than planned could be spent on collection of the primary material, as well as more time having to be spent on describing the situation. In addition, Tanzania, like most countries in the world except i.e. the Nordic countries, does not have a principle of public access to official records. It was until recently even illegal to be in possession of governmental information if it was not clearly stated that it was for public use. I was, however, mostly well received by various public and non-public actors, who shared their limited time and views.

In the same way I met many challenges in the gathering of primary material, both

from a practical and from a methodological point of view. Practically, it takes a lot of time to manage poor infrastructure and vast distances, as well as learning to understand how formal and informal structures, institutions and procedures work. Some of the issues I was interested in were, of course, politically sensitive. At times, this might have limited the exchange of views and information. A Tanzanian researcher, M. Bakari, who has done research in Zanzibar on similar issues, made the observation that:

There was a high degree of suspicion and fear of government reprisals in case one expressed his opinion in defiance of the regime in power. This was pronounced among government employees who could lose their jobs, and businesspersons whose trade license could be withdrawn or were vulnerable to other negative sanctions that could be imposed by the regime (Bakari 2001:6).

Even if the situation on the mainland is much less politically tense than in Zanzibar, I at times met similar constraints, particularly in Pangani, a small rural community where “everybody seems to know everybody” and which has a history related to the development in Zanzibar.

It was not unusual that “politically correct” information or statements were given in the interviews with public servants and representatives of the political parties. That is information or statements that follow the official policies, rather than how the situation really was on the ground. I tried to tackle this problem through building up relations and meeting key stakeholders several times over the years. In addition, of course, the information was corroborated with the help of information from different sources.

As with all interview situations they were directly or indirectly influenced by the interviewee and the interview situation. Even if I used a semi-structured form of interview, the answers might have been influenced by the way the study was presented/ framed and the questions were formulated and posed. Interference could be in the form of raised expectations from those that I interviewed. I often found that, for instance, members of and representatives for the political opposition gave detailed, indignant and agitated accounts of various unsatisfactory states of (government) affairs and different forms of violations of political, civil and economic rights. It might be that the presence of a foreign listener created hope of conveying a message to a wider audience, and encouraged the interviewees to overstate challenges or wrong—doings by government (or vice versa from officials), as well as overstating the parties’/candidates’ or the government achievements or needs. The reverse situation could happen in key informant interviews, e.g., with district officials who might hold back information that could put the district administration or government in unfavourable light or provide a

rosy image of the situation, including the efficiency of government/local government/party/NGO and the effects of eventual implementation of activities/policies.

I at times found that I was considered “neutral” and gave the opportunity to those interviewed to express what he/she/they felt was the truth that needed to be communicated to a wider audience.

One of the major challenges for me is/was the language issue. Tanzania is a Kiswahili speaking country. All university-educated people in Tanzania speak English in addition, in one form or another. This means most senior officials in central and local government, as well as most senior officials in political parties and civil society organisations. Even if the teaching language in secondary schools is supposed to be English, and thus all secondary school leavers are supposed to speak English well, it is not always like that. The largest challenge was that most of the household interviews had to be done with the help of interpreters or field assistants, as well as all focus groups interviews and all observations of for instance election rallies. Some of the key informant interviews at village/street, ward and district level had to be interpreted as well. In quite a few cases depth and nuances in the information key informant interviews also at the national level with e.g., political party activist or even a few MPs were hampered by my lack of capacity to speak Kiswahili, in combination with the informant’s not so well spoken English. Many written documents are only available in Kiswahili and had to be summarised or interpreted, like political party programs.

The use of interpreter/field assistant opens up for several methodological and practical challenges. The interview situation becomes much longer, for both the respondent and the interviewer. It hinders a more freely floating conversation and follow up questions and it might distort or limit information. In the translation process key meanings, concepts or statements can be misunderstood, twisted or even lost. The translation chain started at times from my Swedish, to my non-native English and then to the interpreter’s non-native English to Swahili and at times even to one of the 124 local languages, and then back again. My rudimentary knowledge of Swahili is far from enough to speak freely, but allowed me after some time, to broadly follow the unfolding of the interview. I also realised at the start that I had too little time, experience and resources to run such a broad and large field study. One of the major challenges for the validity of the information gathered was that that the two-day introduction workshop on the objectives and framework of the study was too short to enable the field assistants to get sufficiently clear instructions and knowledge of the aim and scope of the study. This was partly compensated for when we worked intensively in the field together.

The opportunity to make several fieldstudies over the years on the one hand is advantageous as it give time to deepen ones understanding of the issues studied, build

contextual knowledge, network—and get a sense of change. On the other hand it also raise a number of methodological challenges how use information that derive from interviews, observations, document, experiences—and analysis, that is gathered at various occasions over the years. Things develop fast in Tanzania, as elsewhere, which means that what was on the political agenda, or issues, in 2000 might be a non-issues in 2010. The way I have tried to manage these challenges is that I have, as described above, made an effort to on the one hand triangulate information from various sources, to be explicit from which date a specific citation springs from, to write to what extent the issue raised is specific for a certain time period and to what extent there has been a change.

4

Statism and development from above— Tanzanian development 1961-2010 A brief context

The aim of this chapter is to show that the present situation in Tanzania is an intensification of economic, political and social challenges with deep roots in history. The chapter will not give an exhaustive review of Tanzania's complex pre- and post-colonial history. That is well documented in the literature.¹ The objective is to highlight some of the structural, institutional and political legacies that provide the platform, both in terms of constraints and opportunities, for the political and economic reforms in the late nineties and the first years of the 2000s, and as such give input to the analysis that follows in the subsequent chapter of the extent to which the reforms have contributed to a consolidation of democracy in Tanzania. This chapter hence addresses some of the issues in the lively debates within the field of democracy theory, as discussed in chapter 2, on to what extent it is possible to establish a viable democracy in a context such as Tanzania, one of the poorest countries in the world.

Tanzania is an interesting country to study for social scientists, and for peace and development studies in particular. It has managed to develop a relatively high degree of statehood and national identity, without any major conflicts, with the important ex-

¹ See e.g., Iliffe 1979, Koponen 1988, Coulson 1979, 1982, Pratt 1976, Havnevik 1993, Hydén 1972, 1980, Baregu 1994, Kiondo 1992, Kiondo et al. 1992, 1994, Cliffe 1967, 1972, Freyhold 1979, Maliyamkono and Bagachwa 1990, 1995, Mukandala and Haroub 1994, Mushi and Mukandala 1997a, Mwansasu and Pratt 1979, Ndulu et al. 2002, Shivji 1976, Shivji 1986, Shivji 1992, Shivji 2006, 1977, Roberts 1968, Rweyamamu 1973, Samoff 1979, Stein et al. 1992, Ström 1995.

ception of Zanzibar, despite the fact that the real per capita income fell from 1974-1999. The country has also tried both socialist and liberal inspired development strategies, which open up for interesting discussions on opportunities as well as limitations with different types of strategies. All three generations of development strategies—“the neo-colonial” of the early independence period, “the socialistic” of the seventies and “the neoliberal export oriented” of the eighties and nineties—have failed to deliver expected results. Nyerere labelled the first era as “growth without development” (Nyerere, 1968: 344). The second era might consequently be labelled “Development without growth” and the third up to 1995 as “Neither growth nor development”. With the failure of the neo-liberal model of the eighties, paradoxically, a renewed interest in some of the objectives and strategies of the “socialistic” model is coming back again—within a new framework based on a critical analysis of the negative effect of “statism” and with the challenges of the globalisation process of the 1990s as a starting point. From 2001/2002 up to the financial crisis hitting the country in late 2008, positive real GDP per capita growth was recorded for the first time since 1974, as well as an improvement of indicators for social development.

It could be noted that the so-called socialist era formally only covered some 15 years, from the Arusha Declaration of 1967 to 1982, when the home grown National Economic and Survival Programme (NESP) was implemented. The neoliberal and liberal reforms have been guiding the strategies of the country for almost 25 years, from 1986.

The first section of the chapter gives a brief overview of some of the fundamental structural realities, the economic landscape, that have to be kept in mind when reflecting on the feasibility—and effects—of various development strategies/policies. The main argument is that Tanzania is characterised by extreme poverty and limitation of all kinds of resources, with the challenges this brings about for economic, administrative and political development. The second section gives an overview of the post-colonial development up to the late nineties, the starting point for this study, up to today.

4.1 Colonial Heritage: A Fragmented Economic and Social Structure

The social and economic structure inherited at independence in 1961 was shaped by 70 years of colonialism, which in turn had reshaped the “pre-colonial” structures. The economy was organised to respond to the needs of the colonial rulers and the world economy (Iliffe, 1979; Kimambo, 1990). The result was a fragmented economy with deep structural dependence on external relations, especially with Kenya and Uganda where the British had a longer colonial history, and consequently concentrated their efforts on agricultural industrial development (Coulson, 1982; Shivji, 1976). The three

East African countries were connected through an economic community with common infrastructure and currency.

Agricultural production totally dominated the economy. The rudimentary infrastructure that existed was developed with the aim to support the export-oriented raw material producing enclaves, which had just been integrated in the national economy. Competition from mass-produced imports had undermined the traditional production based on craft skills. Consequently, the level of industrial development in Tanganyika was extremely low at the time of independence. Neither an African commercial class nor an educated African elite had been allowed to emerge, who could engage in industrial/agricultural development and take on senior positions in the administration (Hydén, 1972; Coulson, 1982; Kahama et al., 1986).² The level of foreign investment was low, as foreign capital preferred the more developed Kenya with its larger domestic markets and a more differentiated infrastructure. Tanzania had become a periphery within the periphery (Pratt, 1976; Skarstein and Wangwe, 1986; Havnevik, 1993).

Extreme poverty, weak structures and scarcity of manpower thus characterized Tanzania at independence. This resource scarcity is important to bear in mind when analysing the post-colonial development—and what it is possible to achieve with existing human and financial resources.

Tanganyika achieved independence in 1961, after a short and relatively peaceful struggle. It was among the first countries to achieve independence in the region. The political party which led the struggle for independence, Tanganyika African National Union (TANU), was formed as late as 1954, but managed to mobilise a large number of active members in the rural areas in a short time. Very few other political organisations existed in the country when the multiparty system was established for the first time in Tanganyika's history a few years before independence.

Despite the short experience of political parties and civil society organisations, a relatively flourishing political culture developed in the years around independence, due to national unity, political mobilisation and Kiswahili as the common language (Kiondo, 1995b). However, the inherited colonial state and bureaucratic apparatus was cast in a completely different tradition. It was strongly centralised, lacked participation from below and held an arrogant and elitist position vis-à-vis the great majority of the population. At independence, the challenge for TANU was not only to re-define its role from that of an opposition party to a ruling party but it also:

2 Out of the 4,378 employed by the government in 1961 only 16.5% or 547 persons were Africans (Hydén 1972:90). Out of the 299 administrative officers only seven were Tanganyikan. Just 1% of African primary schoolchildren entered secondary school at independence, while 50% of the white and Asian primary school children did so. There were 403 registered doctors in 1960, but only 12 were Africans etc. (Coulson 1982:120, Kahama 1986:24).

(...) had the task of transforming the bureaucratic centralised machinery of the colonial state into a national state whose institutions and structures could at least claim to be representing the peasants and workers who had supported the struggle for independence (Bienfeld and Godfrey, 1982: 296).

At the same time the economic structures inherited from the colonial era had to be transformed and made more inclusive. To transform the inherited political, economic and social structures proved to be a great challenge for a newly established government—and the ruling political party.

4.2 The Tanzanian post-colonial development model—Statism and constrained participation from below

The development and the breakdown of the post-colonial model can be divided into seven major phases³: 1) 1961–67 *Towards modernisation*, the post-colonial state was consolidated and there were efforts to modernise the economy; 2) 1967–72/73, *The era of the Arusha Declaration* when the post-colonial state attempted to meet the aspirations and demands from the social base of the nationalist movement model through nationalisation of a large part of the economy and major social reforms; 3) 1973–78/79, *The development of authoritarian and statist model*; 4) *The breakdown of the statist model* 1979–83/84, a period when the state was challenged both from inside and outside. The social and economic crises in the country eroded the legitimacy of the Tanzania state from “below”. Through the deep external and internal imbalances resulting from the economic crises, the donor community spearheaded by IMF, challenged the state authority from “above” and the result was 5) *The era of structural adjustment* 1983/84–1992. After six years of tough negotiations, starting from 1979, Tanzania was on track for Structural Adjustment in 1986, when the first standby agreement was reached with the IMF. 6) *Multiparty system without economic growth* and loose efforts to implement neo-liberal reforms 1992–2000; 7) *Multiparty system, economic growth and improved implementation of reforms* 2000–2010, towards consolidation of democracy and liberal reforms?

It is phase seven, the last phase above, which is in the focus of this study. The analysis of that phase will be done in subsequent chapters. In the following sections in this chapter I will make a brief analysis of the development in the six first phases—and with that, hopefully, shed some light on the structural context of the democratisation process in the last phase.

3 As with all division of historic periods, the exact years and the headlining could be discussed.

4.2.1 *Phase 1: Towards Modernisation: 1961-1967*

Poverty reduction, equality and democratic governance were in focus from the first years of post-colonial development strategies, even if the concepts used were slightly different from the contemporary discourse. Nyerere's famous formulation from 1958 was that TANU had to wage a war on what he considered the three major enemies to the people, inherited from colonialism—poverty, ignorance, and disease (Pratt, 1976; Mbelle et al., 2002)—a statement that Nyerere was repeatedly reiterating, and which was written into the Arusha Declaration in 1967. The foundation of the policy was, according to Nyerere and TANU, equality, human respect, freedom and unity (Nyerere, 1967; Legum and Mmari, 1995). The Anglo-Saxon version of democracy and market economy was regarded as an antithesis of the united and egalitarian society that the newly independent nation aspired, and believed to be necessary, to create (Mwapachu, 2005). For Nyerere democracy and socialism were two sides of the same coin and mutually reinforcing.

The great political challenge was to build a nation and transform the colonial state apparatuses to meet the aspirations of the masses that had supported the anti-colonial struggle. Economic development was regarded as a necessity for the nation-building project. Since the trust in market forces was limited after the colonial experience, the technical agency to accomplish this development was the state and the social actors—the modernising elites. The theoretical framework used for analysis and policy recommendation was the mainly North American modernisation theories. This was clearly displayed in the first two development plans (1961-64 and 1964-69) which were launched at a time when the western industrial countries displayed a supreme confidence, based on their experience of a “never ending period of growth” (Coulson, 1982; Shivji, 1976; Havnevik).

The combination of an expanding and prospering world economy—and the American Alliance for Progress promises of aid for embarking on the “right” modernising path—made it relatively convincing for a newly independent country to adopt a market and open door oriented development strategy. The World Bank made the blueprint for the newly independent country's first development strategy (Coulson, 1982: 120ff; Skarstein and Wangwe, 1986).⁴ It was largely an “orthodox” strategy, a continuation of the strategy from the colonial time, but with larger investment in social

4 The report “The Economic Development of Tanganyika” was produced by the World Bank in 1960 on behalf of the colonial government. The following year the United States Agency for International Development financed a study on the industrial sector carried out by Arthur D. Little consultants (Coulson 1982:120 ff. and Skarstein/Wangwe 1986).

services: the state should build the infrastructure and the private sector should take the responsibility for investments. The industrial sector was regarded as subordinated to the agricultural sector and its development should take place through foreign investments. Through promotion of import substitution, a number of consumer goods producing industries were established, among them a textile mill, a tyre factory and a radio assembly industry. These industries were established by the former suppliers. In the agricultural sector, the policies were oriented towards stimulating the “progressive peasants”, a villagisation programme, development of cash-crops, changing the economic attitudes towards modernisation and commercialisation.⁵ Exports should be the engine of growth. Sisal in particular was predicted to have a bright future. In line with the general theory, it was assumed that the result of the modernisation process and the increasing wealth would “trickle down” to other sectors of the economy. The panacea was a greater and deeper integration in the worldmarket and uprooting the backwardness of the “traditional sector” through the introduction of market relations and export-crops in the rural subsistence economies (Kahama et al., 1986; Skarstein and Wangwe, 1986; Rweyamamu, 1973).

The strategy failed, however, to break the structural weaknesses in the Tanzanian economy and to attract foreign capital, during the few years it was implemented. Tanzania could not competitively produce any goods other than a few traditional primary products, neither for the world market nor for the domestic market. The average annual growth-rate in the economy was around 6% 1961-66; the trade surplus was maintained mainly through an increased production of cash crops and the industry increased its part of the GNP to 8.6%.

Tanzania's vulnerability due to the changes in the worldeconomy became obvious, when the terms of trade deteriorated in the middle of the decade. The situation led Nyerere to define the first seven years of independence as “*growth without development*” (Nyerere, 1968). Primarily, the strategy failed to transfer political and economic power to the people. The workers protested and the government responded by suppressing the trade unions. A mutiny in the army was combated with the help of British marines in 1964 (Pratt). In order to break with the inherited political and economic dependency structures and to transform the society towards a nation-state characterised by equality and social justice, the ideas of a socialistic development model grew stronger in the tiny political elite—and among fractions of the population (Mwansasu and Pratt, 1979)

5 Termed the “transformation approach” in the World Bank reports. This modernisation theory included introduction of “modern methods” of farming through expansion of extension service, co-operatives, community development and resettlement of dispersed peasants in villages (where they could be reached by the extension service etc.).

(Coulson, 1982; Baregu, 1994; Hydén, 1967). This development was strengthened by the emerging deep diplomatic dispute between Tanzania and her three major donors, Germany, Britain and the USA, over Tanzania's policy of non-alignment, support to the anti-Smith forces in Rhodesia and the union with Zanzibar after the revolution (Pratt, 1976; Coulson, 1982). The possibility of developing a socialist strategy was, however, partly a result of the balance of political forces in Tanzania at that time.

But it was also a question of balance of power between TANU (which through the legislation in 1965 became the only party), the government and the state bureaucracy (Kahama et al., 1986: 32).

It is important to consider the development in Sub Saharan Africa at large at the time, as well as in the region, in order to understand the policies that were developed in the sixties. In that context, it was understandable that the TANU congress in January 1963 focused on unity and nation building. At the meeting, it was decided in principle that Tanganyika should become a democratic one-party state.

Despite Nyerere's, and TANU's, basis in theories and policies of democracy and participation (Kweka, 1995; McHenry, 1994), a predominance of authoritarianism over democracy developed (Baregu, 1994). The small civil society that existed was gradually undermined. Through a politicisation of government institutions, the division between the party, the government and the state apparatuses became unclear (Kiondo, 1989). At the same time:

(...) there were manifestations of a growing divide between the TANU leaders and the bureaucracy on the one hand and the social base of the nationalist movement, poor peasants and workers on the other. The demands and aspirations of these groups for independence had not been met (Havnevik, 1993: 41).

4.2.2 *Phase 2: The era of the Arusha Declaration 1967-73: De-linking, participation and rural development—Development from above*

Since the early sixties, Nyerere had successively developed a socialistic analysis of the Tanzanian conditions in a number of pamphlets.⁶ With changing external conditions, and little development, Nyerere, and the narrow political elite, became convinced of the necessity of a Tanzanian socialist development strategy, based on rural development, self-reliance, "Tanzanian values" and hard work (Brown and Brown, 1995). Tanzania gradually approached the "Socialist bloc". Co-operation was initiated with East Germany, China and Korea. In 1967, the "Tanzanian model" was articulated in the

6 E.g. Socialism and Rural development, 1964.

Arusha Declaration (and further elaborated upon in other documents up to 1974).⁷ The principal goals of the declaration were “socialism” and “self-reliance”. Self-reliance had two main aspects: the rejection of foreign aid and investment as principal means for the national economic development and the call for individual commitment to hard work. It was an attempt to shift away from the belief that money was the key to development. Tanzania should rely on her own resources. Based on the principles of equality, dignity, political participation, free expression, control over natural resources, a fair return for labour and the government participation in economic development, a number of principal objectives emerged (Kahama et al., 1986: 31):

1. Public ownership of the major means of production;
2. Self-reliance and elimination of exploitation;
3. The establishment of democracy and the pursuit of equality;
4. The establishment of agricultural socialist production in Ujamaa villages;
5. The establishment of the party as a supreme representative of the people;
6. The extension of welfare services to the rural areas.

With the nationalisation of all major means of production in 1967 and 1968, the state sector expanded. The state controlled the economy, and the party gained a leading role in the state. In doing so, the same elite controlled both the state apparatus and the party (Kiondo, 1989; Baregu, 1994).

The state itself became the major actor in the class formation of the Tanzanian society: through the nationalisation an emerging class of bureaucrats, the bureaucratic bourgeoisie, acquired an economic basis in the augmented state-sector—with strongly vested interest in maintaining and expanding the state-sphere (Shivji, 1976). At the same time TANU was weak, both as an organisation and in terms of ideology and capacity to implement.

The already very weak challenges from the political opposition, the civil society or media were systematically eliminated, and the economy became state-led without competition from any other actors or forces than those controlled by the elite. If the relationship between the government and the party had been unclear before, a clear separation of powers and responsibilities between the party and other organs of the state was now established—where the party was issuing policy directives and the government was supposed to implement them (through the state bureaucracy). In a similar pattern the parliament became subordinated to the party.

7 “Education for self-reliance” 1967, an attempt to reform the educational system so that it would provide useful training for the mass population and not for just a few that would proceed to the secondary schools and university. “Socialism and rural development” 1967, which elaborated the perspectives from the Arusha Declaration. “TANU Guidelines” 1971, “Decentralisation” 1972.

4.2.3 Phase 3: *The development of the statist and authoritarian model 1973-1979*

With the development described above, the base for a statist model had been established.⁸ State intervention was not confined to the economic sphere. The civil society organisations (such as trade unions, peasant organisations and woman's organisations) were successively incorporated within the state apparatus (Coulson, 1982; Kiondo, 1989; Havnevik et al., 1988; Havnevik, 1993). The flourishing civil society that emerged during the years *preceding* independence as a result became drastically pruned from 1964 and onwards (Kiondo, 1995b: 110). The combination of the nationalisation of a large part of the private sector, monopolisation of the democratic system and the incorporation of the civil society in the state-apparatus made the state elite almost independent from all types of checks and balances. The people were thus excluded from control of the government. They could neither make their voice heard through a democratic process nor check the government activities in the sphere of production through market forces. Despite this, however, the Tanzanian statist project won support from the international community.

In an early study on the socialistic development strategy in Tanzania (Mwansasu and Pratt, 1979) the authors explained the paradox of interest and support for Tanzania in socialist aspirations, by the lack of studies on the consequences of the pursued policies on the one hand, and overlooking of its negative consequences, on the other.

4.2.4 Phase 4: *The breakdown of the statist model 1979-1983/84*

The rapid changes taking place in the worldeconomy and in the region in the seventies drastically altered the conditions for the Tanzanian development model. The recession in the worldeconomy brought about decreasing demand and declining raw material prices and drastically deteriorated terms of trade,⁹ with rising oil prices (1974/75 and 1978/79). Combined with the winding up of the East African Community (1977),¹⁰

8 The concepts statist and statism originate from the debate on the socialistic states in general and are widely applied to the debate on the post-colonial states in Africa. Chazan et al. (1988:36) define it as "the concentration of political, economic and social activity around the state". Holmquist (1983:23) uses the definition to "connote state policy that puts an expanding array of economic activity under central government control while diminishing avenues of popular participation" (from Kiondo 1989). Neo-patrimonialism is a concept that came to be used slightly later in the debate by for instance Bratton and Van der Walle 1997 or Chabal in different writings.

9 R. Green shows that a given volume of Tanzanian exports could just buy between 1/2 and 2/3 in 1980 of what it was possible to purchase in 1966. Bienefeld 1982:37 (except for the brief coffee boom in 1976/77).

10 Tanzania had to establish new structures for civil aviation, telecommunication, harbour administration, railways, higher education and a central service for post and telegraphs.

drought (1974 and 1975) and the war with Uganda (1978-80),¹¹ these external shocks represented a heavy burden on a country lacking administrative, technical and economic resources (Bienfield and Godfrey, 1982) Malima 1986 (Green, 1980; Green, 1986; Kahama et al., 1986). In addition, Tanzania played a significant and costly role in the independence struggles in Southern Africa.¹²

The combination of the increased volume of imports and the dramatic fall in the volume and prices of Tanzania's exports, created a serious balance of payment deficit towards the end of the seventies. When the dollar and real interest rates started to soar in 1980, the debt-trap closed its grip firmly around Tanzania.

Parallel with and partly as a consequence of the changes in the external economic conditions, there was a dramatic change in the external *political* conditions. The political gains made by the Third World in the sixties and seventies were almost completely lost during the early 1980s.

The internal shocks: the role of the industrial and agricultural policy in the creation of the crisis

During the second five-year plan (1969-74), a shift was made away from the de-emphasising of the industrial sector to a "backward linkages import substitution" strategy. The aim was to "*institute structural change for sustained growth*", with a link between large-scale industrial development, small-scale industries and decentralisation.¹³ Two new industrial strategies were developed in order to realise these new goals: the Basic Industrial Strategy (BIS) and a Small Scale Industrial Strategy. These strategies were later established through the third five-year plan (1976-1981). The principal objective of BIS was to establish a heavy national industry based on domestic resources, to satisfy domestic demand under the period 1975-1995. The purpose was to shift from the traditional pattern of production, where Tanzanian resources were used for simple

11 The cost for the war was estimated to be 500 million dollars, which corresponded to the annual export income for the whole country. Most of these costs materialised from decreased imports, resulting in shortages of both inputs and consumer goods (Coulson 1982). In May 2009 Tanzania was considering sending a bill to Uganda for the war (IPP 9th May 2009).

12 As the operations were secret no official figures exist, but the Tanzanian involvement in the region was extensive, including training camps, military equipment and military operations. Tanzanian soldiers were still in Mozambique in 1993. Business Times 24/6 1993 estimates that the cost could have been up to 20% of Tanzania's GNP in the late seventies.

13 Advised by among others R. Rweyemamu and Clive Thomas, a Caribbean economist and charismatic thinker within the Dependency school, which had a major intellectual stronghold at the University of Dar es Salaam in the seventies. Thomas wrote an influential book while in Dar es Salaam "Dependence and Transformation" (1973) which came to exercise a large influence on the formulations of development strategies in the freedom fighting movements in Southern Africa. See also Kahama 1986.

consumer goods, while industrial input and capital were imported. The aim was to concentrate on industries that could satisfy the basic needs of the people. With a heavy industry producing inputs and machinery for the lighter industry and the agricultural sector—combined with a more appropriate small scale industry in the villages— a more integrated national economy would be built up.

The implementation of the BIS resulted in large investment in the industrial sector at the expense of other sectors of the economy. These huge investments did, however, not generate significant increases in production. Problems like lack of all kinds of resources, lack of educated staff, excessive bureaucracy, inefficiency etc. were aggravated by the organisational structure of the parastatal sector in Tanzania (Kahama et al., 1986: 77; Coulson, 1982).

A large share of these investments was financed by foreign aid and funds at low real interest rates in the early seventies. The tendency to promote new industrial projects, rather than rehabilitating existing ones gave the donors great influence.

The increasingly over-valued shilling from late 1970s and onwards strengthened this bias towards import intensive projects and production processes. The concentration of resources on new investments at the same time as export incomes stagnated created a situation of permanent lack of foreign currency, and thereby an inability to sustain maintenance and productivity in all economic sectors.¹⁴ The industrial policy resulted in a built-in import dependence with a declining industrial output at an average of 17% per year and in a capacity utilisation of just 20% (Ndulu, 1987). The industrial sector thus generated a balance of payments deficit. As a result, the country became even more vulnerable to external changes.

The agriculture policy resulted in declining agricultural output, especially for export crops. The agriculture sector received only around 10%/year of total government investment between 1972/73 to 1980/81 (*ibid*: 38). But the largest impact on the level of agricultural production was the repeated institutional and organisational changes, symbolised by the Ujamaa villagisation with its compulsory movements of hundreds of thousands of people in the large campaigns of 1973-74 (Freyhold, 1979). The state could neither facilitate the promised provision of social services nor improve economic and agricultural support services. Besides the resentment created by the use of forced villagisation, many villages were moved to locations which were unfavourably situated in relation to productive land and the concentration of the population. In combination with changes in the cultivation pattern, these projects created ecological stress in

¹⁴ According to World Bank estimates the cost of imported inputs (excluding oil) as a share of gross total input cost (at domestic prices) has increased from 22.9% in 1973 to 52.5% in 1984 (World Bank 1987, vol. I:10).

many areas. These policies were accompanied by a squeeze influenced by the pursued agricultural price (sharply declining real prices) and marketing policies (the creation of inefficient and increasingly mismanaged marketing organisations).

The Crisis of the Statist Model

The external changes combined with the internal policies resulted in an economic crisis: the GNP per capita growth was negative between 1980 and 1986 and a great deal of the production system and the infrastructure could not be maintained. The public sector was the only sector in the economy that had positive growth. With no growth in the productive sector, it was not possible to pay for and maintain the investments in the social sector. The growing budget deficit, combined with the government's fiscal and monetary policies, resulted in inflation. With declining export and growing import bills, the external balance of payments deficit began to grow.

To maintain imports and public investments Tanzania borrowed money in foreign exchange. The result was a rapidly growing foreign debt. In 1988, the services on loans had increased to 87% of the export income (Odén, 1987; Larsson, 1988).

Starting from a policy of self-reliance, Tanzania in the early eighties had become one of the most aid dependent countries in the world. This dependence culminated in 1992, when foreign aid constituted 50.5% of GDP.

The Role of Aid in the Creation of the Crisis and Dependency

Aid agencies from the West, Soviet Union and China have been strongly involved in the post-independence Tanzanian development, supporting the different policies of the country. This ranges from the World Bank's blueprint for the newly independent country's first five-year plan, to the large support for the different policies of *Ujamaa*—including villagisation and the reorganisation of the peasant co-operatives into state-led co-operatives in the early seventies.¹⁵ Aid is a double-edged blessing—with the substantial amount of aid that Tanzania was receiving the donor countries directly as well as indirectly had a major influence in policy formulation and implementation. Havnevik, 1988:127 points out that foreign aid contributed to deepening the balance of payments deficit through supporting the industrial strategy, which created huge deficits in the current account, and large-scale import intensive projects with little capacity to earn foreign exchange. 70% of the increase in foreign aid after 1973 is furthermore estimated to have had just a compensatory function for the declining agricultural surplus.

15 E.g., IBRD facilitated large resources to agricultural development during the period when the villagisation programmes were carried out, even if it recommended block or individual farming instead of communal farming, c.f., Freyholt 1979.

The Agony of the Statist Model: Stalemate Economy, Growing External Imbalances—Negotiations with the IMF

With the economy in deadlock and with rapidly growing external imbalances in the economy, Tanzania turned to the IMF in 1979 to apply for extended fund facilities. While IMF emphasised the domestic policy mistakes, the government believed that external factors, in particular the collapse of commodity prices and oil shock were responsible for the crisis (Kiondo, 1989; Campbell and Stein, 1992) Wangwe, 1988). In 1980 an agreement over a standby facility was reached. However, Tanzania could not fulfil the conditions and the credit was frozen. A sharp conflict emerged between the IMF and the Tanzanian government. Nyerere, the symbol of Tanzania's post-colonial development, led the struggle.

4.2.5 Phase 5: The era of Structural Adjustment 1983/84-1992: Liberal market reforms without growth

While the Tanzanian government and the IMF negotiated, the economic crisis deepened and while waiting for a new agreement other aid agencies withheld further assistance. The IMF/IBRD reduced their aid from 98 million USD, to 28 million USD under the negotiating process from 1982-1985, in order to press Tanzania to accept their conditionality. Likewise bilateral donors pressed for a change, Sweden, e.g., reduced its aid effort with almost 40% during the period.

The dramatic decline in the economic conditions had of course a severe impact on the social conditions. Not only were realwages and incomes for peasants drastically reduced but also social services, infrastructure and the supply of consumer goods deteriorated rapidly.¹⁶ The legitimacy for the statist development eroded, in pace with the state's reduced ability to provide free social services—and ultimately development—to the people. Not only the business community but salary earners in the town, public workers in the countryside etc. started to be discontented. As the statist development model had closed most arenas for popular participation outside the state and/or party controlled organisations the discontent never became officially articulated (Kiondo, 1989). However, a number of efforts were conducted within the party and government in order to formulate policies to curb the crises and to meet the conditions from the donors. In the process, the Minister of Finance at the time, Edward Mtei, resigned in protest (Mtei, 2009; Lipumba and Whalley, 1989; Lipumba, 1995; Helleiner et al., 1995).

¹⁶ Rural income per household was estimated to have declined with 48% between 1977-1983 (Collier et al. 1986).

Gradually the government complied with the IMF conditionality under intensive, and painful, internal policy evaluation and discussion, not only between the government, the party, the state bureaucracy (including foreign experts in for example ministries and international organisations) but with different social groups in the society as well. The external pressure gradually increased as the donor community to a larger extent started to line up behind the IMF conditionalities as a prerequisite for further commitment. Nyerere accepted that he had come to the end of the road and stepped down from the presidency after which an agreement could be reached. In 1985, Mwinyi was elected as the new president, while Nyerere retained chairmanship of the party.

In 1986, the government approved an Economic Recovery Programme. The programme contained all the usual IMF conditions, but was to some extent adjusted to the Tanzanian situation. It included a large devaluation; limits on foreign debt and budget deficit as well as for the government's bank-borrowing; import liberalisation and reforms in the marketing and distribution systems; market promoting measures such as reduction in prices and wage regulation; reduction of trade barriers and increased interest rates. The donor community welcomed the ERP and the flow of aid opened up again. A new era began in Tanzania. The statist model had to give way to a development strategy based on the market. New social forces were released and a dynamic struggle between the "new" and the "old" set off.

Implementation and Effects of the ERP and SAP

Liberalisation and privatisation were successively introduced. Yet the old elites were the ones to implement these new policies. The Tanzanian government had reluctantly set out on a new course. The effects of the programs are difficult to assess as it is difficult to discern: a) the effect of the previous policies, and b) to what degree the program as such has been implemented, and c) what the result would have been without adjustment. However, even with this in mind the result of the first ERP was very bleak. The growth/capita was 4.1% 1986-1989 (against the target of 5.5%). Considering that the aid flows almost doubled, better weather conditions and that a large part of the informal sector now was incorporated in the national accounts, this is an extremely weak figure (see table x in appendix).

A general critique directed towards this first generation of ERP's was that they were under-funded and that the burden of adjustment was carried on the backs of the most vulnerable in the societies. In the extensive international debate that followed, the IBRD and IMF listened to some of this critique. The second generation of SAP introduced in Tanzania therefore bore the "human face of adjustment". As in the first, attention was given to the agricultural sector. Despite heavy devaluations, austerity

measures, government reforms, and increased aid, the growth/capita fell to 3.6%, the budget and balance of payments deficit increased in 1990-93.

The third generation SAP was approved in July 1993. A number of IFI or donor sponsored assessments of ERP I and ERP II were positive to the achievements made so far. Tanzania had turned from a deterrent example of state led development to a showcase for the success of Structural Adjustment. However, had the underlying economic structure really changed? And to what extent did the Tanzanian government own and implement the proposed policies? In January 1994, the government had already spent the money for the whole budget year and a deep crisis surfaced. The donor society was struck by aid fatigue. In April 1994, the Nordic ambassadors in Dar es Salaam told the government that further aid to Tanzania might be out of the question if the government did not drastically speed up the process of structural adjustment.¹⁷ In November 1994, 10 major donors decided to withhold the balance of payments support until an investigation of the large-scale tax evasion had been conducted. This embargo remained in force until November 1996, when IMF approved a new ESAF credit.¹⁸ The IMF approval opened up both for renewed bilateral aid and debt rescheduling—and the fourth SAP program 1996-1999, which in line with the development all over Africa was termed Poverty Reduction Strategy Program (PRSP). This will be further developed below.

Despite three generations of SAP, the economy of Tanzania was still in a deep crisis. The country was simultaneously going through a dramatic transformation from state-capitalism to a bazaar economy or a “smash and grab capitalism” and a dismantling of the statist model. New elites were emerging while the old were clinging to power. Rapid social stratification was developing, while few new income opportunities were created for the broad masses of the people. A *de-industrialisation* was taking place, having begun well before 1986, the pace however accelerated as a result of the liberalisation. The consumers were gaining from cheaper consumer goods, but at the same time, the basis for a long-term development was being hollowed out.

¹⁷ Business Times April 1994.

¹⁸ It was approved on 8 November 1996, 234 million USD were pledged under a three year period. The ESAF is a 10 year, concessional credit carrying 0.5 % interest and 5.5 years grace period and disbursed every six months under the conditions that agreed economic bench marks are followed. Since IMF in this way has approved the quality of the Tanzanian government, the World Bank is preparing a 100 million USD Structural Adjustment Credit and bi-lateral donors resuming their support. Debt negotiations are scheduled in the first half of 1997, the first since 1992. During 1996 30% of the recurrent expenditures in the budget had to be spent on debt service. More than the total amount spent for health and education. Business Times 22/11 1996.

4.2.6 *Phase 6: Multiparty system without economic growth 1992-2000*

As we now approach the time period in the focus of this thesis, we will present a little more elaborated background to the political reforms in the period 1992-2000. The last phase is briefly outlined as the analysis of that phase is the thesis.

Certain economic and political structures, institutions and practices have their roots back in the colonial era and the struggle for independence, as noted above. In the political sphere, this includes the strong presidency, which resembles the pivotal position held by the colonial governor, the centralised and hierarchical bureaucracy and the weak parliament (Baregu, 1997). Anti-colonial nationalism and unity was one of the overarching ideologies in the independence struggle, and post-independence development. A multiparty system was considered risking undermining the fragile nation and fragile national unity, as it might strengthen and politicise ethnic and religious and other sub-national identities (Msekwa, 2006), in similarity with most other African states at the time (Tordoff, 1995). Political leaders and independence movements were regarded as benevolent, at least by themselves, and hence opposition and critique against the leaders were regarded as a threat towards the nation-building process and national unity. The political culture inherited from colonialism was a top-down type of administration. Apart from the three years from 1958 to 1961, no real experience of a multiparty system existed in Tanzania. However, relatively democratic elections were held every five years from 1965 (in 1970, 1975, 1980, 1985 and 1990) within the one-party framework. Electoral competition was between individuals within a single-party and not between parties. In addition, space for political participation had opened up at workplaces and in residential areas. This has been used as an argument for Tanzania having been a democratic one-party state (Msekwa 2006:10). This view has been criticised by several Tanzanian researchers, for instance Max Mmuya and Amon Chaligha 1992 point at the limited political space for contestation when the party held supreme control in all sectors of society. To stand in an election membership in the party was necessary. This also meant that a great number of those who were critical towards the pursued policies became alienated.

But things started to change. The continued deep economic crisis, associated with the single party system, in combination with the constitutional debates on the relationship between the mainland and Zanzibar in 1983, opened up for a critical debate on the single party system, as well as human rights and democracy in general. Popular discontent with economic hardship and inefficient state led industries, parastatals in various sectors as well as marketing boards eroded the support for the one-party system and state-led economy. Pressures on the government from the donor community to introduce liberal reforms of the economic and the political system increased. The ruling

party chairman Nyerere realised that there was a need to revitalise the party in order to maintain its legitimacy. A series of debates were initiated in 1986 and 1987. People were encouraged to criticise the party in public, which opened up for a public debate on the shortcomings of the current development model. All this further eroded the legitimacy of the political monopoly held by CCM.

The changes in the neighbouring countries and Africa at large, and the collapse of USSR and the communist states in Eastern Europe, further undermined the legitimacy of the single party state in Tanzania. The first generation of political leaders that to a large extent had controlled the party, the state and the economic activities, were challenged both from sidelined elites and from a new generation, educated and influenced by regional and international debates on democracy and human rights. The parallel economy in Tanzania had also created an emerging economic elite, who had an interest opening up the economic and political space. Hence, the pressure from internal economic, social and political processes in combination with external pressure and changes in the international system brought about a pressure for change. The third wave of democratisation swept in over Tanzania when the Berlin wall fell in the autumn of 1989. Students protested and the university was closed for a year. Nyerere, one of the chief architects of the Tanzanian development model not only as party chairman and as president up to 1985, but also as an ideologue, gradually changed his view.

In 1991, after the election in October 1990, a “Presidential Commission on Single or Multiparty system in Tanzania” was appointed under the chairmanship of Chief Justice Nyalali. It was given a broad mandate to openly and critically collect views on the advantages and disadvantages of a single and multiparty system—in particular how it could affect political and national security, as well as unity, peace and concord among all Tanzanians - and to analyse, advise and recommend constitutional changes (URT 1992:14-15).

The commission consulted 36,299 people on their views. A number of critical themes were taken up. But the general outcome of the consultation was that even if people were critical of the way the party was running the government and controlling the society, the majority still argued for maintaining a reformed single party system. The commission however, recommend the government to consider abolishing the single party system and introducing a multiparty system. It further recommended to set up a special organ to supervise the change; to appoint an electoral commission; to appoint a constitutional commission to draft a new constitution and to conduct the first multiparty elections in the 1993 local government elections, and the 1995 general elections.

Hence, pressure from political forces inside the country in combination with pressure from the international community paved the way for the introduction of the mul-

tiparty system in 1992. The enthusiasm for organising political parties was great and in 1993 there were 51 loosely organised political parties, that later merged with stronger parties or vanished. In May 1994 35 had attained the legal requirements for temporary registration as parties and in the end 13 qualified to be registered parties (Mmuya 1994).

The first multiparty election at the national level was held in 1995. Benjamin Mkapa was elected president in the first multiparty election in 1995, and was re-elected in 2000. Nyerere remained a major force behind the scenes, up to his death in 1999. The point to make here is that a number of the prerequisites for a democratic development that have been discussed in the theoretical literature on democratisation were absent in Tanzania when the multiparty system was introduced, in similarity with most other African states. Instead Tanzania was characterised by a weak but centralised state; a strong party; absent or weak opposition; weak civil society; rudimentary media and a single party culture. In addition, the economic base was very narrow, human capital in the form of education scarce, and the social structure consisted of a few elites, a very small middle class, a very small working class and a great majority of mainly self-sufficient peasants. Hence, democracy to a lesser extent was driven from social movements and interest from “below”. It was introduced and pushed forward by various elites, with party chairman and former president Nyerere at the helm, in a process that Hydén has called a “top-down democratisation” (Hydén 1999). Rakner and van de Walle (2009) calls a similar process in Zambia a “backward democratisation”, in a process where the democratisation process is thought to create the conditions and structures which in the earlier modernisation literature, such as Almond and Verba (1958), Lipset (1960), Huntington (1965), Easton (1968), were considered to be the prerequisites for a democratic development. Democracy became with that a tool or instrument to create the foundation for economic development, rather than the opposite—that a certain economic, political and educational level was necessary for democracy to develop.

4.2.7 Phase 6: Multiparty system and economic growth 2001-2010—The political and economic development

Although this review is meant to cover the period up to 1995, the starting point for this study, we will here make a very short summary of the political and economic developments in the period up to 2010, to have the framework for the coming more detailed analysis.

The process of political liberalisation began in 1992 when the constitution was changed and opposition parties were allowed, after some years of pressure from within and outside the country (Baregu, 1994; Kiondo, 1995a; Mmuya and Chaligha, 1992; Mmuya and Chaligha, 1996; Mukandala, 1995; REDET, 1999). In 1993 and 1994 mul-

tiparty elections to village, street and local government were held. The first multiparty election at the national level was held in 1995. Although with a number of limitations, it was considered to be relatively free, but not fair (Ewald, 1996; Mushi and Mukandala, 1997; TEMCO, 1997). In December 1999, elections were held to village and street assemblies, the “grassroot” level (Shivji, 1999; Mushi, 2001). In October 2000 elections were held to local government and national assemblies and to the presidency. Elections to village and street authorities were again held in October 2004. In October and December 2005 the latest elections to local government, parliament and the presidency took place. In October 2009 village and street elections were held and the next general election is scheduled for October 2010.

The elections in 2000 and 2005 were regarded as relatively free, but not fully fair (TEMCO, 2001; EISA, 2005; The Guardian, 2006). The election in Zanzibar was more problematic both in 2000 and 2005 (Commonwealth Observer Group, 2005; Bakari, 2001; Maliyamkono, 2000; Msambichaka et al., 1995; Commonwealth Observer Group, 2001).

The liberal international foundation *Freedom House* has defined Tanzania’s democracy as “partly free” since 1995 up to August 2010, when this was written, with slightly improved ratings in 1999 and 2003 (2006b; 2010; Freedom House, 2000; 2006a). A number of challenges remain, however, to be handled in order for the democratisation process to move towards consolidation, not the least the challenges that emerged from the reforms and development within the economic and administrative sectors.

Economic development

The debate over reforms continued into the midnineties. The liberal reforms were slowly or not fully or dedicatedly implemented, according to the donor community. With the election of Mkapa in 1995 the reform process speeded up and the new government managed to accomplish a successful structural adjustment programme. According to the IMF and the World Bank gradually the “basics became right”, that is the macro economy in balance and inflation went below 5 percent. The economy as whole, however, continued to be in crisis up to the end of the nineties, with decreasing income per capita. From the late 1990s gradually a change started to take place. The sectors of mining, tourism, construction, communication as well as new industries generated a comparatively rapid real GDP growth/capita (Bank of Tanzania 2002-2006, World Bank (WDI) 2000-2010). Sectors that have a comparatively limited spread-effect in an economy as Tanzania.

Tanzania was among the first countries to qualify for a reduction of its debts via the HIPIC framework from the year 2000. Between 2000 and 2006, the GDP growth

rate has been around 5% per annum. In 2005 the GDP growth was 6.8% (URT 2005; URT 2006; URT 2006). This makes Tanzania one of the better among reforming African countries. The government has been rewarded with increased aid flows from major donors, including Sweden. Aid per capita has increased from 29.1 USD in 1999 to 46.4 USD in 2004 and 68.1 USD in 2007.

Despite all the gains at the macro level, poverty remains widespread and deep. Never had so many Tanzanians lived in poverty as in 2007, according to the latest Household Budget Survey (HBS) (TAKWIMU 2009). At the same time a wealthy but small urban elite has emerged, and a small middle class. The income gap has increased—or become conspicuously visible.

The economic development is further analysed in Chapter 6.4.

4.3 Development in Zanzibar—and its implication for the political development in the whole of Tanzania

Zanzibar's more turbulent and conflict-ridden political dynamics have a large impact on the general political discourse and development in Tanzania, and are intertwined with the political development on the mainland. The political situation in Zanzibar is in itself so complex that it would be difficult to encompass it within this study. Hence, in this study I focus on the political development on the mainland. Nevertheless, it is necessary to have a basic understanding of the dynamics in Zanzibar in order to understand the political development on the mainland, as the political discourse on the mainland is highly influenced by the development on Zanzibar. The political dynamics in Zanzibar are rooted in its pre-colonial history, the three generations of colonial history of the Portuguese, the Omani sultanate and later the British, the independence struggle, the revolution and the more or less imposed union with the mainland.

Even if Zanzibar is situated just 30 km outside the mainland, it has a very different history, social and economic structure. It had very few links to the mainland before independence (Sheriff 1991). Zanzibar was early on part of the expanding Indian Ocean trade network and was gradually “colonised” by the “*Shirazi*”, Persian Arab traders from today's Fars Province in Iran, from around 200 AC. From the 8-900th centuries trading people from the Arab peninsula expanded southwards and established a string of trading stations along the coasts of East Africa and Zanzibar (Gilbert, 2004), (Chami, 2009). People from the mainland most likely came later. Inter-marriages and migration from the mainland created the Swahili people *Shirazi*, with roots from the Persian traders and the mainland. This early history is, however, highly controversial. The Portuguese colonised Zanzibar in the 16th century. After almost 100 years of occu-

pation, the Omani Sultanate managed to oust the Portuguese from the Arab peninsula, with the support of the expanding British empire that now wished to secure its routes to India. Ivory, minerals and mangrove poles were the major items traded, and slaves (Gilbert, 2004).

Zanzibar became so important for the Omani Sultan that the capital of Oman was moved to Zanzibar in the 1820s. With the successful efforts to reduce the Atlantic slave trade, the east African slave trade expanded, with Zanzibar as the major outlet. An estimated 50, 000 slaves was landed each year in Zanzibar at the peak in the 1840s and the trade continued to the 1890s (Lyne, 1905; Sheriff, 1987).

Arabs and to a lesser extent Indians, established plantations from the 1820s and onwards, mainly cloves, rice and coconuts, and gradually cleared and claimed most available fertile land, that hitherto had been commons. The plantations were to a large extent worked by slaves from the mainland. The Shirazi, the majority population, was never enslaved (Maamiry, 1988; Sheriff and Ferguson, 1991). Zanzibar is characterised by the social tensions emerging from its past as a slave based plantation economy controlled by a small “Arab” or “Arabised” elite with close connection to the Sultanate of Oman, where the slaves to a large extent came from up-country Tanganyika or beyond. With the British came, like on the mainland, immigrants from South Asia (Mukangara, 2000). Zanzibar was a metropolis of the region and attracted traders, adventures and workers from many parts of the region, and from the rest of the world. The Zanzibar society became a mixture of ethnicities, backgrounds and aspirations (Sheriff 1987). Zanzibar town was by far the largest city along the coast between Alexandria and Durban, and the entry point for trade, explorers and missionaries to East Africa and its interior (Gilbert, 2004).

Slavery was finally abolished first in 1897 (Lyne, 1905: 157), but the underlying economic and social structures did not change very much. In particular, land distribution was not changed. Emancipated slaves continued to work as farm labourers or squatted on unused land, claimed by the Arabs. The Arab elite controlled the large estates and farms, main trading activities and administration—in competition with rising South Asian traders. After slavery was abolished, labour migration from the mainland increased, contributing to the complex social structure. The British controlled all major administrative posts. The Sultanate was more symbolic than a real political power (Sheriff and Ferguson 1991).

The colonial government enforced racial division, along the lines of the race ideology in Europe at the time. Administration, public service, education and political representation were divided along “racial” lines, with the few Europeans at the top, Arabs, Indians, Shirazi and the Africans at the lower end. Higher-ranking jobs in the public

sector and the police were reserved for Arabs or Indians, blue-collar work for Africans. Identities were further strengthened by the identity card system, based on race, and censuses dividing the population along racial lines. The British administration carried out a census in 1948 dividing the population in different “race categories” (see below), where the “African” share of the population on both islands was 56.2%, the “Shirazi” 19.5% and the “Arab” 16.9% and Indian 5.8%. The difference between Pemba and Unguja emerges as well, with the larger “Arab” population on Pemba.

The social stratification did not only go along “racial” lines, even if that was one important structural feature of the Zanzibar society. All “Arabs” were not rich landowners, and all “Africans” were not poor peasants. In particular, the “Shirazi” group was stratified, with a large group of better off peasants on Pemba.

The British encouraged formation of associations along ethnic lines, which later on became the foundation for the new political parties. In that way, politicisation of identities was strengthened. Different Arab associations merged and formed the Zanzibar National Party (ZNP). Arab landlords formed the party in 1955, but also had African members from the better off Shirazi group, particular on Pemba. Its main program was the right to vote for adults, abolishment of representation by race in the legislative council, and immediate independence for the Sultanate (Sheriff 1994). The African associations and the Shirazi associations merged in 1957 and formed the Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP), with Sheikh Abeid Amani Karume as chairman. Its members were Africans from Zanzibar and the mainland, mainly peasants, workers and squatters. ASP emphasised the same three policies as mentioned above, but also land reform, Africanisation of the civil service and education system. ASP had a distinct racial touch in its policies, directed against the perceived “Arab” dominance, while ZNP pursued a non-racial policy (Bakari 2001).

At the Constitutional Conference in London in 1962, preparing for independence, Karume expressed the desire for a unity government. In the election of 1963, for the assembly that should take over power from the British, the ASP got 54.3% of the votes cast, but only 13 of the seats, while the ZNP/ZPPP got the majority with 18 seats (ZNP 12 and ZPPP 6 seats) (Mukangara 2000), even if they only got 44.6% of the votes. A radical fraction within ZNP broke away and formed the socialist UMMA party in early 1963, under the leadership of the dynamic and charismatic Abdulrahman Mohamed Babu.

Britain gave Zanzibar independence in December 1963, as a constitutional monarchy and with a ZNP/ZPPP government. For the ASP and UMMA, it was perceived as an “Arab” independence. Eviction of squatters continued and the new government also proposed to repatriate mainland workers (URT 1992), furthering frustration among

“Africans”. A violent revolution, with many dead and others fleeing the country, took place a month later, in January 1964, against the Zanzibar Sultanate. A “revolutionary government” was established, with the aims to abolish discrimination based on religion, race, gender and country of origin; to unite Zanzibar into one nation and establish a socialist state (URT 1992:37 (Lofchie, 1963; Lofchie, 1965; Okello, 1967; Clayton, 1981; Mapuri, 1996; Maliyamkono, 2000; Petterson, 2002).

The revolution with the bloodshed and following nationalisation and expropriation deepened the rift between those who lost power, relatives and properties and those who gained them. A fundamental split in the population had been established.¹⁹

The western block in the then cold war, as well as the mainland, feared that the eastern bloc and China would use Zanzibar as a springboard for advancement on the continent (Hunter 2010), to establish a “Cuba of East Africa”, or that Babu’s better organised revolutionary fractions would manage to radicalise the more moderate Tanganyika. Just days after the revolution British, American and the more moderate political leaders on the mainland in East Africa pressured Karume to form a union with Tanganyika (Othman 2006).

The discussions on the union were held secretly with Nyerere and two of the ministers from the mainland, and Karume from ASP (Othman and Maina, 2006; Othman, 2006). Three months after the “revolution” a union was formed with Tanganyika and the United Republic of Tanzania was born, with its special two government structure, with two parliaments and two presidents. The terms and forms of the union were neither discussed in Zanzibar, nor on the mainland, which is another of the cornerstones of the conflict.

A republic, with a strong presidency and a one-party state was established in Zanzibar. The Revolutionary Council of ASP was the main decision-making body and replaced the assembly. All elections were carried out within the party. The political space for dissent was limited. Opposition was silenced, both within and outside the party. Fierce opponents “disappeared”. Intellectuals fled. An authoritarian development state was established. The smallness of Zanzibar made it easy to control and no civil society or media existed outside state control.

The new government nationalised land, and property was confiscated, in the name of Africanisation and building a more egalitarian society where poverty was to be uprooted. As most land and property was owned by Arabs, Indians or better off Shirazis, it created strong resentment against the ASP party and government within these groups, particularly on Pemba. With the help of China, state farms were established. DDR and

19 This turbulent period is described in a novel authored by one of the actors at that time Haj MM. (2001) *Sowing in the Wind. Zanzibar and Pemba before the revolution*, Zanzibar: Gallery Publications..

other east bloc countries supported the new government with building new townships in urban areas, schools, health facilities and infrastructure. The state invested in tourist facilities and a few industries. Private business was prohibited. Confiscation of private property continued up to the end of the 1970s.

The social situation improved for the poor majority, including free education and health service, a welfare system, better housing and transport facilities and land. The economy at large, however, gradually deteriorated. The agricultural production fell, both food and cash crops, not the least the clove production, the largest foreign exchange earner, which to a large extent took place on Pemba. From being a relatively well off economy in Africa, with the third highest GDP per capita in SSA 1963, after Ghana and South Africa, even if extremely unevenly distributed, it became one of the poorer, in terms of GDP per capita, in 1995 (Bakari 2000:127). Karume was murdered in 1974, by his brother – in-law. It is still unclear if there was a political motive behind the murder or if it was a family matter. External and internal pressure led to political and economic change from the late seventies. After ASP merged with TANU, the first common constitution for Tanzania was decided upon in 1977. With the new Zanzibar constitution of 1979 the first steps towards democratisation were taken. The first general elections to the legislative assembly were held in 1980, and the first general presidential election in 1981 when Aboud Jumbe was elected unopposed. The economy continued on its downward slope, popular discontent increased. The gradual diminution of the autonomy of Zanzibar continued to be a source of conflict in the union.

Civic United Front, CUF, became in 1991 the major opposition party. It is not a direct continuation of ZNP/ZPPP, an “Arab” party, a pre-colonial elite party or a “Pemba” party. Bakari 2001:167ff. makes a thorough analysis of the composition of CUF’s leadership and policies and concludes that CUF’s leadership does not consist of “Arabs”, but mostly Africans or Shirazis; to a large extent comes from Unguja or the mainland; that most of its leadership have their roots in CCM and that most leaders are too young to have been active in politics before independence.

As on the mainland, a multiparty system was introduced in 1992 and the first multiparty elections were held in 1995. The 1995 elections in Zanzibar were marked by irregularities. The CCM presidential candidate Salmin Amour was declared the winner with 50.2% of the votes against the CUF candidate Seif Sharif Hamad’s 49.8%. CUF accused CCM of having rigged the election. Election observers agreed with the claims by the leading opposition party on the islands, the Civic United Front (CUF) and did not recognize the election results. CUF organized a series of public protests and important donors to Zanzibar suspended their cooperation with Salmin’s government.

In the election of 2000, CCM chose Amani Abeid Karume, the son of the first

president, as its presidential candidate. In an election marred with irregularities and protest Karume was declared the winner with 67% of the votes against Hamad's 33 %. After the violent 2000 elections and the subsequent riots a peace agreement (Mwafaka) was reached in October 2001 between the ruling party, CCM, and the main opposition party, CUF. The Mwafaka includes provisions to appoint an independent Zanzibar Electoral Commission and the creation of a Joint Presidential Supervisory Commission (JPSC) comprised of five members of each party to implement the agreement.

In the 2005 election, again the elections in Zanzibar were alleged to be unfair and unfree. CCM's Karume was declared winner over Hamad with 53.2% respectively 46.1% of the votes.

In late 2009 CCM and CUF agreed to hold a referendum in Zanzibar on a Government of National Unity (GNU). In the elections held in July 2010 66% said yes, in an election which for first time in Zanzibar's turbulent history was both free and fair—and had a high turn out of voters. A new chapter might have opened in the history of Zanzibar. It might be symbolic for the dramatic development in the small island state, that it is the son of the first president Karume who at last changed the attitude of CCM to accept a coalition government, for the time settling the conflict.

4.4 Structural and historic themes that form the context in which democratisation is supposed to take place

To conclude this chapter, we can note that there are some essential facts that are necessary to bear in mind when discussing the opportunities and challenges for various democracy and development strategies—and their effects—in Tanzania.

Poverty is widespread and deep, and was so even far before the colonial period. Even if the economy has improved substantially from the turning point in 2001, the GNI per capita was still only 440 USD in 2008. This gave Tanzania ranking 127 of 178 countries in 2008 (WDI 2009). 97% of the population lived under the poverty headcount ratio at 2 USD a day (PPP) in 2000, the latest available figure (WDI 2011). This means that resources that are needed for development are extremely scarce, and have been so since independence. The scarcity and lack of capacity includes educated staff/human capital; infrastructure; communications; all kinds of institutions and productive facilities. Tanzania had a *negative per capita growth 1974-1999* (WDI 2009) – resulting in deepening of poverty, increased frustration, gaps, hollowing out the legitimacy of institutions, the ruling party and the state. For the few employed, disposable incomes fell to a level that could not sustain a family any more. With rapid economic development in a few sectors since 1999 and in a few urban areas the *rift in economic well-being* between the

rural and urban areas is widening, as well as within rural and urban areas. The majority of the poor people live in rural areas, and the majority of the poor are woman.

The *low productivity* within all sectors of the economy is a huge challenge for development and hence for democratisation. Low productivity in turn is a result of the policies pursued. Not the least the neglect of peasant agriculture and institutions supporting agricultural development has had negative impact on rural as well as industrial development (Havnevik and Hårsmar, 1999). Tanzania's GNI of 19.9 billion USD in 2008 was less than that of a medium sized town in Sweden. This indicates the limited size of the domestic market and resource base.

Lack of resources for education, health and training make *human resources a constraint* for political, social and economic development. It is not confined to problems related to availability and cost of skilled labour in the manufacturing, agricultural and administrative activities, but also for building political parties and civil society organisations.

Tanzania is a huge country, with relatively few inhabitants, with a surface of 945, 000 sq. km, it is twice as big as Sweden and 2.6 times the size of Germany. The vastness of the country creates a great challenge both to the democratisation process and for economic and administrative development, as well as for the development and maintenance of national cohesiveness. As the country only has around 46 million inhabitants in 2011 it means that relatively few, very poor, people have to shoulder the cost for infrastructural development and administration of that vast territory. A great challenge not the least for newly started political parties or CSOs. At independence the population was around 10 million people, and has increased four times to an estimated 46 million in 2011 (WDI 2011).

Even if urbanisation is fast, *the majority of the people live in the countryside*. At independence more than 95% of the population lived in the rural areas. Despite a feeling of rapid urbanisation, some 74% percent still lived in rural areas in Tanzania mainland in 2010 (WDI 2011). They depend heavily on subsistence farming and modern agriculture is still after years of investments only marginal. One quarter of the urban population is concentrated to the largest city, Dar es Salaam. Tanzania has a young population. In the Census of 2002, 44 percent of the population of the whole country was estimated to be under the age of 15 years and only 4 percent above 64 (Census 2002). Tanzania has a low overall population density of 39 persons/sq. km (Census 2002). A large part of the inland, however, is semi-arid and thus not suitable for agricultural production. The population is largely spread out along the peripheries of the country, along the coast, the fertile mountain slopes in the north and southwest and the shores of Lakes Victoria, Tanganyika and Malawi. Relatively few people live in the drier centre (see

Map 1.) This means that the meagre resources available for infrastructure of various kinds have to be stretched thinly over vast distances.

Only 30% of the country is estimated to receive enough rainfall to support intensive arable farming. The fertile highlands and a considerable part of the semi-arid areas are under strong population pressure and the problem of land and forest degradation is increasing (Bagachwa 1995, Msambichaka et al. 1995, Ndulu et al. 2002). The area around Lake Victoria, in particular the western side, is among the most densely populated in Africa, in similarity with the adjoining areas in Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda and Kenya.

The large size, however, is also an advantage. The country is relatively well endowed with natural resources, even if many of the resources are still to be discovered and the use of the established resources is poorly developed (URT 2011, URT 2010). Minerals like gold, diamonds gemstone and iron started to be exploited in the nineties. Forestry and fishing both in the big lakes and the sea are other important resources. There is furthermore an abundance of fertile land (Msambichaka et al. 1995).

Cultural variety and the potential to develop various identities. It is one of the least developed countries, and one of the least homogeneous nation-states in the world.²⁰ More than 124 different languages are spoken in the country, which has been a major challenge for the nation building process (Wangwe, 2005). However, introducing and sustaining Kiswahili as a lingua franca has largely overcome this challenge, as part of a successful strategy to manage ethnic, regional and religious identities (Omari, 1995; Chachage and Cassam, 2010). Kiswahili has now become the language used daily by the majority of the people, at the cost of a great number of smaller languages (Batibo, 2005).

Aid is important, but does not by far make up the only resource for development. Aid stood at 26 USD/capita and year in 2006, which should be compared with the total GNI of around 260 USD – or with the 138 USD/capita per year given to Israel. Net ODA received as percentage of GNI declined from 29% in 1990 to 11% in 2006, but has increased to 14% in 2009, as a result of the financial crisis (WDI 2011). On the other hand, roughly 45% of the state budget was financed by aid up to 2006, even if the share had gone down to 33% in 2009 (URT, 2010). This could provide a challenge for democratic decision-making, as the government needs to be accountable not only to its own citizens, but also to the donor community that provides a large share of the budget.

To conclude, we can note that few of the structural preconditions that earlier theories on democratisation, as discussed in chapter 2, stated as necessary for consolidation of democracy are at hand in Tanzania. The historic background in this chapter focused on the economic structures that developed in the post-colonial period, in order to pro-

20 Tanzania is the only country in Africa where all four major African languages branches are spoken (Iliffe 1979:8)

vide a better understanding of the pre-conditions for the democratisation process. The history of Tanzania gives us some hints how the structures and institutions that are still a challenge for the democratisation process, have emerged.

With this analysis of the historic and structural background we move over to the analysis of the research question, the extent to which Tanzania is moving towards a consolidation of democracy. This analysis is done in the next four chapters, chapter 5 analyses the state, chapter 6 the civil and economic society, chapter 7 the political parties and in chapter 8 the discussion in the previous chapters is focused to explain the outcome of the elections in 1995-2005.

5

Sphere 1. State/state capacity

The political institutions and challenges for democratisation within the state¹


In the following chapters I will discuss the four spheres presented in chapter two, 1) the state/state capacity; 2) the civil society; 3) the political society; and 4) the economic society in order to analyse the research question to what extent a development towards consolidation of democracy appears, based on *the perceptions* from various stakeholders interviewed, and supplemented with other primary and secondary information gathered during the field studies, as well as available literature.

In this chapter I will present and assess how two institutions *within* the state in Tanzania have developed over the past 18 years of multiparty reforms and developments, in order to identify major challenges for the democratisation process and the consolidation of democracy, along the lines presented in the analytical framework in figure 1 in chapter 2. The section of the analytical framework to be reviewed in this chapter appears in the figure 5. The assessment is based on how these processes were viewed by stakeholders within the political parties, CSOs, media, researchers and well-placed officials within the Tanzanian government and donor community. The findings are then compared with views found in the literature on the democratisation process in Tanzania.

¹ This section is based on a review of documents provided by the Government of Tanzania, Sida, secondary literature, consisting of reviews, research reports, and books – with both empirical and theoretical approaches. Interviews/discussion with staff at Sida Stockholm and the Embassy in Dar es Salaam have been triangulated with interviews with different actors in Tanzania, independent researchers in Tanzania and Sweden, ten members of parliament, and donor agency staff.

The current chapter discusses democratic institutions *within the state*, *i.e.*, the executive at central and local level, the parliament and local government councils and the judiciary. In the following chapter, I will discuss democratic institutions *outside* the state; *the civil society*, media, human rights, democratic culture. Next chapter will also include a brief section on the forth sphere, *the economic society* where corruption and economic development will be discussed. The aim with the section is to make a brief assessment if the economic reforms could be said to have contributed to an inclusive economic development, based on the three indicators economic and sector growth; poverty and income distribution and hence indicate to what extent political and administrative reform might have contributed to a more substantive democratisation, in terms of outcomes for the majority, as discussed in the chapter 2. Corruption is used as an indicator of good governance, as emerge from the figure 5. In the next chapter, chapter 7, I will focus on *the political society*, and analyse the political parties and the challenges they are facing. All this with the aim to understand to what extent Tanzania is moving towards a consolidation of democracy. Each chapter and section starts with a short presentation and description of major features of the respective state, policy and society, in order to be able to analyse their bearing on the democratisation process.

Figure 5 “Sphere” 1 in the analytical framework—State/state capacity



The theoretical underpinning to the selection of institutions, as discussed in chapter 2.3, is the tension identified in the theories on development and the theories on democratisation, between the need to strengthen the capacity of the state and good governance, on the one hand, and substantive democratisation, on the other (p.74 chapter 2). There is a delicate balance between state-building and democratisation, two processes that do not necessarily go together. To strengthen the capability of the state at central and local level to formulate, develop and implement policies for development of the society, is a cornerstone in the debate on how to establish an accountable, transparent and well governed “development state”, on the one hand but does state-building and good governance presuppose democracy, strengthen democracy or even undermine a consolidation of democracy, on the other? (Edigheji, 2010; Mkandawire, 2010). What I am interested in exploring in this chapter is to what extent the reforms aiming at good governance and democratisation are mutually reinforcing and promote a development towards consolidation of a substantive democracy. In this context, accountability has increasingly come to be used as a bridge between good governance and democracy. In liberal democratic theory, the horizontal accountability is exercised as a balance of power between the executive, the legislative and the judiciary, i.e., the different branches of government capacity to monitor each other’s performance. Vertical accountability is related to how members within a party hold their political leaders accountable, or how citizens through their representatives in the parliament can hold the executive accountable. The design and functions of horizontal accountability institutions have so far attracted most attention, not the least within the mainstream “good governance” discourse. Social accountability, how organisations in the civil society and citizens could hold the government accountable at various levels, Goetz and Jenkins (2005), will be discussed in the next chapter.

As discussed in chapter four, the power of the executive was strengthened during the single party era. A centralised state developed, where the party and government structures were conflated. The executive controlled the parliament, the judiciary, the associations and the media. The strong centralised executive power in combination with a strong political party in control of the state has been one of the major challenges for the democratisation process in Tanzania. This is a situation similar to most African states, irrespective of regime type and levels of democracy, as noted by van Cranenburgh (2008: 952) in her study on the institutional power of presidents in 30 African countries, where she concluded that there was very “*little difference in presidential power between democracies and non-democracies, and ‘minimal’ electoral democracies score higher on average than non-democracies and liberal democracies*”. There is a large body of literature discussing the challenges for the democratisation process, and the opposition, that this “big man

rule” tradition constitutes. In the mainstream literature, the Weber inspired analyses of “neo-patrimonial” rule, patron-client relations and the development of statism in combination with a weak civil society have been used as a major explanatory framework for both understanding the economic crisis and authoritarian rule (Bayart, 1993; Bratton and van de Walle, 1997; van de Walle, 2001; Hydén, 2006; Chabal, 1999; Chabal and Daloz, 1999). This perspective has been criticised by e.g., Olukoshi (1998); Mkandawire (2006) for stereotyping the African state and society, and neglecting power structures outside the state on the international arena that undermine efforts to accomplish economic and democratic development. Other, like e.g., Pitcher et al (2009: 125), have pointed out that “neopatrimonialism” in the mainstream literature uses the concept in various and contradicting ways, like a “*pathology, analogy, cause, effect—or a term for all of Africa’s troubles*”. Neopatrimonialism becomes a synonym for authoritarian rule, corruption, “bad governance”, violence, tribalism, or a weak state, and implicitly an inevitable stage in some linear progression where neopatrimonialism causes “backwardness,” or a “developmentally delayed” status. “*Often in the absence of detailed historical and ethnographic attention to particular times and places, ignoring variations in the interactions of power and accountability in specific context*”, deGrassi (2008) cited in Pitcher et al. (2009: 125). This uncritical use of neopatrimonialism has, according to e.g., Erdman and Engel (2007), precluded the development of a controversial and methodologically fruitful debate about the meaning and usefulness of ‘neopatrimonialism’ for understanding African politics.

What, however, is common is that in most theories on democratisation, radical as well as liberal, the relative balance between the executive, the representative and the judiciary, on the one hand, and the capacity and room for opposition parties, media and civil society organisation to hold the holders of power accountable, on the other, is fundamental for a democratic development. At the same time, an efficient executive is necessary for governing the country. A delicate balance between participation, democracy, accountability on the one hand, and efficient governance on the other.

What I will try to assess in this chapter is in what way the organisation of the executive might be a challenge for the representative, the judiciary, the opposition parties, and to what extent the different policies/reforms are supporting a consolidation of democracy. In an aid dependent country like Tanzania, the role of the international development partners and policies is crucial for understanding the democratic process and how policies are formulated and implemented. An additional challenge is how corruption and clientelist networks affect the consolidation of democracy. In order to address these issues, the chapter is subdivided in seven sections: 5.1) *The executive*, the policy framework and administrative structures in Tanzania; 5.2) *The representative*:

parliament and councils; 5.3) *Challenges* for the work of the parliament and councils—findings; 5.4) *The legal setting*: the constitution, the judiciary and human rights; 5.5) *Decision-making in an aid dependent country*—challenges for democratisation; 5.6) *Corruption and nepotism/clientele networks* and 5.7) *Conclusion*. Each section starts with a brief analysis of the current structures in order to have a clear view of the context, and thereafter views from the interviews and other sources are presented². What the chapter aim to is, on the one hand, to map and analyse some of the prevailing formal/official structures, actors and policies in order to better understand the complexity and frames in which the democratisation process take place, and, on the other, to get the perceptions from various actors to what extent the process is developing towards a consolidation of a substantive democracy, as well as what the main challenges are perceived to be. A difficulty in this process is of course to distinguish between the normative/wishful thinking on how a democracy should work, and what is possible to realise/expect in a vast country like Tanzania with limited resources. A great number of the challenges pointed at in this chapter are not specific for Tanzania, but appears in one form or another most developing—and developed countries. Democracy is a continuous process—and so are struggle for power and influence.

5.1 The executive, the policy framework and administrative structures in Tanzania

5.1.1 *The presidency, the prime minister and the cabinet*

Tanzania has a large and complex composition of the executive as it incorporates the self-governing Zanzibar and the mainland within a United Republic, as discussed in chapter 4. Tanzania hence has two parliaments and two presidents, one set up for the United Republic and one for Zanzibar, according to the Constitution article 4, and 33-46 (URT, 2005). In addition, Tanzania combines a presidential and parliamentary system. The president and vice president are directly elected, and cannot be members of the parliament, while the prime minister and cabinet ministers are appointed by the president from among members of the national assembly (ibid, article 51-55). The Tanzanian system of government can best be described as a hybrid between the British parliamentary and the American presidential system as pointed out by Msekwa (2006)³,

2 The acronyms of administrative structures, actors and policies resurface in the following chapters on the civil, economic and political society.

3 In the British system the prime minister appoints (and may dismiss) cabinet members and ministers, and co-ordinates the policies and activities of all government departments, and the staff of the civil service. All ministers must be members of parliament.

or a semi-presidential regime, according to a definition developed in the political science literature (Moestrup, 2011; Ottaway, 2003; Shugart, 2005). However, there is not a clear separation of powers between the executive and the legislative branch of government, like in the US system or like the French system, where the prime minister is the head of government and the president the head of state. In Tanzania, the president is both the head of state and government; and the commander-in-chief of the armed forces (ibid, article 33), like the president in the US. The president appoints and dissolves the cabinet, and presides over the cabinet meetings. The president is elected for five years and can hold office for a maximum of two terms (ibid, article 38). The vice president is responsible for union matters, and hence works closely with the president and government of Zanzibar (ibid, article 47). The president and vice-president must be members of a political party, nominated by the respective party and elected on a joint ticket. The president must in addition be a citizen by birth, have attained the age of 40 and be qualified to be a member of parliament (ibid, article 39).

The role of the prime minister is to be the government's leader in the national assembly and responsible for day-to-day functioning of the government (ibid, article 51-55). The cabinet is comprised of the vice president, prime minister, the president of Zanzibar, the union ministers, and the attorney general (AG). The AG does not have the right to vote (article 54-56). To give a sense of the size of the executive we can note that the new cabinet installed after the election in 2005 had 29 ministers and 31 deputy ministers (The Citizen, 20060105). After a reshuffle in 2008, a significantly smaller cabinet was installed, with 26 ministers and 21 deputy ministers.⁴

As we can see a lot of power is vested in the presidency, in similarity with other presidential systems, like USA, France and most African states. The question in this context is if the strong presidency undermines the ability of the other branches of the government to hold the executive accountable, as will be discussed in sections 5.2 and 5.3 below. Before we turn to the other branches of government ability to hold the executive accountable, a brief presentation of the major policies and the policy making process is done below.

4 As a comparison, U.K. has 30 members of the cabinet, out of which 24 are full members. There are in addition 60 departmental ministers, including ministers of state and parliamentary under secretaries U.K. Government. (2010) New Cabinet and departmental ministers-May 2010. Available at: http://www.direct.gov.uk/en/prod_dg/groups/dg_digitalassets/@dg/documents/digitalasset/dg_187701.htm#ministers., with a population of 62 million. The US cabinet is made up of 22 members, including the vice-president, 15 secretaries and five cabinet-rank members U.S. White House. (2011) The Cabinet. Available at: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/cabinet>., with a population of 300 million and of course the executives of the 50 federated states. Sweden has 24 ministers Swedish Government. (2011) Government and ministries. Available at: <http://www.sweden.gov.se/sb/d/576>. Kenya, on the other hand, had 93 members of the cabinet in 2008, including the vice-president, 40 ministers and 52 assistant ministers BBC. (20080417) Huge financial cost of Kenya cabinet. Adam Mynott .

5.1.2 Policy framework of the government—in relation to democratic governance

Policy and policymaking are one of the essences of the outcomes of the political process and hence the democratisation process. In this section I make a brief overview and analysis of major policies of the Tanzanian government, in order to have an understanding of the policy framework, on the one hand, and how the parliament and various actors in the civil and political society can participate in policy making and hold the government accountable, on the other. The civil society is discussed in chapter 6 and the political society in chapter 7. We will also briefly touch upon the role of the donors in the policymaking process in Tanzania and discuss some of the challenges that international development cooperation could provide for democratic decision-making and accountability.

If we move from the structures to the policy framework we find an interesting blend of policies and aims, which somehow raises the question what the long-term development objectives are—and how and by whom, the decisions on these and other policies are made. In the current constitution, amended in 2005, and valid when this was written in the spring 2011, it is stated that “*The United Republic is a democratic, secular and socialist state which adheres to multiparty democracy*” (article 3.1) and “*is a state which adheres to the principles of democracy and social justice*” (article 8), the aim of the constitution, it states, is to “*facilitate the building of the United Republic as a nation of equal and free individuals enjoying freedom, justice, fraternity and concord, through the pursuit of the policy of Socialism and Self Reliance which emphasizes the application of socialist principles while taking into account the conditions prevailing in the United Republic*” (article 9). This aim to build a socialist state is not well reflected in the economic policies of the country after 1986. The formulations in the constitution that Tanzania is a socialist state have also been strongly criticised by liberal leaning opposition parties for limiting the political space, e.g., by CHADEMA and CUF (PI: Ibrahim Lipumba, Chairman, CUF, February 2010, CHADEMA 2005), while radical leaning opposition parties criticise the government for not implementing the socialist development strategy prescribed in the constitution, like e.g., TLP and NCCR-Mageuzi (which is further discussed in chapter 7). We can also note that democracy and good governance are firmly stated in the constitution, with the various amendments from 1992 to 2005. There are, however, a number of drawback clauses, which will be discussed in section 5.4.1 below.

Overarching policy framework NDV 2025—who should be in the drivers seat?

The official overarching political framework in Tanzania is since 1999 the “National Development Vision 2025” (NDV 2025). It was developed as a response to the lack of long term visions of where the country should head, as a result of the more or less

imposed 3-year SAPs from 1986 and onwards URT (2011), as well as to replace the out-dated Arusha Declaration with a market oriented strategy and political pluralism (Wangwe and Charle, 2010: 20). The background to NDV 2025 was the deep mutual distrust that developed between the donor community and the Tanzanian government culminating in the mid-nineties, as discussed in chapter 4. According to the donors, the Tanzanian government had lost its momentum and its sense of direction, lacked commitments for structural reforms and democratisation, and was unable to exercise fiscal control because of declining administrative capacity and increasing corruption (Odén and Tinnes, 2003; The Independent Monitoring Group, 2002; Helleiner, 2002; Helleiner et al., 1995). At the same time the Government of Tanzania saw aid donors as “inappropriately intrusive and demanding, and unable or unwilling to deliver on promises” (Helleiner et al., 1995). An “Independent Monitoring Group” of experts was created to investigate what had gone wrong and what might be done to rectify the situation⁵. The major recommendations were that the donor community must simplify and coordinate its activities, and that the government should on its part be committed to implement necessary structural, administrative and democratic reforms, and deal with corruption (Helleiner et al., 1995). According to the Helleiner report’s recommendations, the Tanzanian government had to be allowed to be in the driver’s seat and take on the ownership to develop its policies, in the short, medium and long term. In order to improve effective utilisation of foreign aid and mobilise domestic resources the national leadership needed to articulate a broad based development vision, in consultation with the wider public and the civil society (Helleiner et al., 1995). As a result of the report two processes started, one that developed the coordination framework of the donors, that led to the Tanzanian Assistance Strategy (TAS), that will be discussed in section 5.5, and the other to the initiation of various processes to develop Tanzanian owned development policies (Wangwe, 2002; The Independent Monitoring Group, 2002). A committee of experts was appointed in 1995 under the coordination of the Planning Commission at the President’s office, to develop a National Development vision. The aim was to create a long term and nationally owned development strat-

5 The membership of the group was to be agreed by the Government of Tanzania, and the donors. None of the members was supposed to be linked to the donors or the government. The first team consisted of five respected economists, out of which two were from Tanzania. The first group was chaired by Professor G.K. Helleiner, and hence the report is named the Helleiner report. The other members were professors Benno J. Ndulo, Nguyuru Lipumba, Tony Killick, and Knud Erik Svendsen. It can be noted Professor Ndulo later became Lead Sector Specialist with the Macroeconomic Division of the World Bank for Eastern Africa from the Tanzania Country Office and was appointed Governor of the Central Bank of Tanzania in 2008. Professor Lipumba joined the opposition and was elected chairman and presidential candidate for the Civic United Front from the election of 2000 and onwards.

egy, through extensive consultations and people's participation in the formulation of challenges, the long term vision and the way to get there, and hence to strengthen Tanzanian ownership of the policymaking process (PI: Samuel Wangwe October 2005).⁶ The degree of consultations and ownership of the process will be discussed further in chapter 6.

The NDV 2025 was approved by the parliament in 1999. The aim of NDV 2025 was/is that Tanzania should be a middle income country by 2025, with a high level of human development, free from poverty in an environment of peace, security and unity; good governance and rule of law; a well educated and learning society; and a competitive, sustainable economy with shared benefits (NDV 2025:3). Four major impediments for socio-economic development were identified: donor dependence and a dependent and defeatist development mind-set; weak and low capacity for economic management; failures in good governance and in the organisation of production; and ineffective implementation (NDV 2025: 7). In order to realise the development vision three main attributes are fundamental: development mind-set and competitiveness; democratisation and popular participation; and development of a framework for monitoring, evaluation and review. If we briefly analyse some aspects of the vision in relation to our foci in this study, we can note that there is a heavy emphasis on morale, discipline and hard work, in line with the previous vision, the Arusha Declaration from 1967. Moreover, that it is the government/leadership that has to sensitise and educate the population. Even if the vision emphasises the need for *people's participation*, *people-centred* and *people-driven* development, it still appears to be a top-down driven development. Democracy, democratisation and popular participation have an important role, as one of the three fundamental attributes for realising the vision objectives of better governance and accountability—but also as a value in themselves (NDV 2025 p 28).

The National Poverty Eradication Strategy—MKUKUTA

In parallel with the development of the NDV 2025, a National Poverty Eradication Strategy (NPES) was developed as a medium term policy to implement the objectives of the NDV. The NDV 2025 and the NPES and its objectives were supposed to be the framework of the first Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) 2000-2003. However, the HIPIC initiative by IMF forced the Ministry of Finance to develop the PRS outside the framework of the NDV and NPES in order to satisfy IMF's conditions for debt relief (Wangwe and Charle, 2010). Aid has since 2000 been focused on assisting the implementation of the PRSP (Ronsholt, 2002; Odén and Tinnes, 2003). Hence the

6 I participated in one of the public consultations on the NDV, in May 1998. It was an open and lively debate with many participants.

various generations of PRSPs are one of the core policies, and it is a challenge for the democratisation process if national stakeholders do not have direct influence over the formulation of the policy.

The second poverty reduction strategy 2003-2005 and the follow up strategy, the “National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty” 2005-2010, with the acronym MKUKUTA in Kiswahili were, however, aligned to the NDV 2025. The MKUKUTA is the main medium term policy in Tanzania, and it is as well an operationalization of the implementation of the Millennium Development Goals at country level (URT 2010:3). The strategy is organized around three clusters: 1) Growth and reduction of income poverty; 2) Improved quality of life and social well-being, and 3) Governance and accountability, in line with national visions. All policies of the government are supposed to be aligned to their respective clusters in the MKUKUTA e.g., sector policies within health, education, infrastructure and so on (URT 2005). With the MKUKUTA and the TAS from 2002, the Tanzanian ownership of the policy-making process has been strengthened. Yet several respondents questioned to what extent the way the policies in MKUKUTA were developed represented a more democratic ownership of the process.

Policymaking, coordination and monitoring, the NDV and MKUKUTA

The formal structure for policy making and coordination is the President’s Office, through the Planning Commission (PO-PC), that was responsible for the development of Vision 2025 and for guidance of the national economy. The President’s Office is central to the design and planning of development frameworks, including MKUKUTA. However, all national policies, sectoral strategies, programmes, and projects are approved by the parliament. The MPs are also supposed to play a critical planning, budgeting and top decision-making role within the local government authorities (see below) (Juma Akukweti, Minister for Parliamentary Affairs, in the Prime Minister’s Office, 6 June 2006; Daudifen Mukangara, Professor, PS, UDSM, May 2006, April 2007, Cleopa Msuya, former Prime Minister and Minister of Finance, (CCM) 5 April 2006).

The Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs (MOFEA) monitors and evaluates implementation of development policies and provides advice on necessary improvements to the approved plans, including MKUKUTA. According to MOFEA the planning process starts with MOFEA asking the ministries and local government authorities to identify priority areas, the means to implement them, and to develop their strategic plans/priority activities, the objectives and targets of sectoral policies, MKUKUTA, TDV 2025 and MDGs, in a broader context (PI: C. Msuya, former Minister of Finance, April 2007). The data and information is used in the planning

process to establish national needs assessments in the broad context of national and sectoral policies, strategies, programmes and actions. The planning process is with annual and bi-annual MKUKUTA-based review reports, including the Public Expenditure Reviews (PERs), MKUKUTA Monitoring System, Annual Implementation, and the MDGs performance reports.

The MKUKUTA is also an umbrella for the sectoral reforms, and the reforms of the economic and administrative management (see below).

The coordination process between different executive organs is very complex and quite difficult to overview, as it involves all governmental activities and donors (this is discussed below under the heading of aid), which is a challenge for the democratisation process as it is difficult for various actors to get information, understand and get access to the process. What we can observe here is the central role of the presidency in policy formulation process and the prominent role of the Ministry of Finance and the various donors. We will discuss participation in the formulation of the MKUKUTA by NGOs in next chapter, and the opposition in chapter 7.

5.1.3 Administration, reforms of the public service and local government

An accountable and capable administration is a cornerstone for good governance and democratic development, as discussed in chapter 2. But there is, however, a tension between strengthening the capacity of the state/local government administration, the relative autonomy of the administration vis-à-vis the executive and the capacity of the representative, as well as civil society, to hold the executive accountable. A tension between state-building and democratisation, that we will discuss in this section.

A large number of reforms have been undertaken since the multiparty system was introduced in 1992 in order to make the state and local government administration more effective and accountable. Five of the “core” reform programmes directly address the central and local government/public sector, that is, several generations of Public Service Reforms (PSRP), Public Financial Management (PFMRP), the Local Government Reforms (LGR), the Legal Sector Reform (LSRP) and National Anti-Corruption Strategy and Action Plan (NACSAP). We discuss the PSRP and PFMRP in this section, LGR in 5.1.5 and NACSAP in 5.6. Each reform is comprehensive, complex and with numerous components aiming to improve capacity, transparency and accountability and aims to strengthen democratic governance and is hence of relevance if we shall try to access to what extent Tanzania is moving towards a consolidation of democracy. The reforms of the public sector at different levels are strongly influenced by the New Public Management Approach aimed at establishing a small, accountable, transparent, efficient, and less corrupt public sector (Bangura 2000, Therkildsen 2001).

The Public Service Reform Programme (PSRP) was launched in 2000.⁷ Problems identified in the public sector included lack of efficiency, capacity, transparency and a culture characterised by elitist, hierarchical, and patronising attitudes towards the citizens/customers. In addition, there were a lack of work ethics and lack of service-mindedness, in particular to poor people (PRSP 2000). Consequently, the vision of the first PSRP 2000-2010 was to improve the delivery of public services by creating a more effective and efficient public service, responsive to the needs of the citizens (PSRP 2000). The programme had four core areas: 1) A pay reform to raise and differentiate public sector salaries in order to increase motivation and reduce corruption; 2) Downsizing of the public sector through privatization to limit government inefficiencies; 3) Rationalization of the government bureaucracy and introduction of performance monitoring systems to reduce the size of the bureaucracy; 4) Decentralization of powers to local governments to increase efficiency of service delivery and effectiveness of developmental planning. The implementation of the program was, however, slow according to the various evaluations and interviews we have done, and the programme was extended to 2017 (PSRP 2010). In the evaluation of the PSRP, it was pointed out that in spite of the reforms being supposed to lead to downsizing of the bureaucracy, the number of ministries, departments and agencies (MDAs) and size of the bureaucracy have increased (Smith 2009).

The Public Financial Management Reform Program (PFMRP) is closely aligned to the PSRP, and aims at improving public financial management.⁸ The strategic goal is to achieve “*high economic growth, macro-economic stability and sustainable efficient delivery of public services*” by establishing effective financial management arrangements which minimise resource leakages and strengthen accountability. The PFMRP builds on the structural reforms of the mid-nineties which aimed to address the country’s severe economic and financial crisis by restoring macro-economic stability, fiscal control and discipline, and implementing a core budget and accounting system across all ministries (PFMRP 2008). The program is of core interest to the donors and a prerequisite for budget support, and has received substantive funding. According to interviews carried out and the evaluations of the program, it has been successful, even if all targets have not been reached.

On whether the reforms contribute to the consolidation of democracy, it can be noted that a number of structures and institutions that can enhance democratic governance have been established. At the same time, the reforms have increasingly placed the government decision-making processes outside parliamentary controls and public scrutiny. There is a lack of parliamentary oversight, and local governments still do not have the autonomy re-

⁷ A Civil Service Reform Program was launched in 1992.

⁸ The PFMRP began in 1998 and a phase III of the program was launched in November 2008.

quired, according to a number of interviewees (PI: Samuel S. Mushi, Professor, PS, UDSM, December 2005, May 2006 Samuel Ngware, Assistant Professor, Institute for Development Studies, Haroud Othman, Professor, Institute for Development Studies (late); Mwesiga Baregu, Professor, Political Science; Longenius Rutasitara, Professor, Economics).

A recent article argues that the reforms have been relatively successful in strengthening the executive:

Public service reform has been more effective in Tanzania than in most African countries. An important contribution to this relative success has been the growing capacity of the Government of Tanzania to design and lead complex reform programs such as the Public Service Reform Program. (...) Our specific focus is on the Public Service Management Department in the President's Office (PO-PSM), the unit designated to manage the PSRP and the emergence of its capacity to lead and energize the change process. A variety of factors have accounted for the effectiveness of the PO-PSM. We argue that three have been particularly important: its organizational positioning, its development of a range of required competencies and capabilities, and finally its sequencing of the reform activities of the PSRP (Morgan, Baser et al. 2010).

This strengthens the argument that the executive, in particular the ministry of finance, has become relatively stronger, while the opposition and civil society have difficulties to get access to information, agendas and have an influence (PI: Maria Shaba, Chairperson, TANGO, 29 May 2006, Hasa Mlawa, Professor, IDS, UDSM 2005-2007).

In our interviews, few in the opposition below the highest ranks were well informed about the current major reform processes, and even fewer on ward and household level. Without information it is of course difficult to participate in a democratic decision-making process. This argument is further strengthened by a recent evaluation of how the core reforms, where the PRSP, PFM, and LGR are the most important, are aligned with the MKUKUTA. The report has as one of its major findings:

While PSs and other senior government officials understand the reasons for the reforms and support them, officials below this level who are responsible for implementation do not; nor do the long-term beneficiaries, the people of Tanzania (URT/KPMG-DAIMA, 2010).

Implementation of the reforms has been slow. Sweden decided to freeze parts of its budget support to Tanzania in May 2010, partly because of the slow implementation of the above reforms (PI: Ulrika Lång, Embassy of Sweden, April 2010).

5.1.4 *Central government administration at regional and district level*

In the theoretical discourse on democracy, good governance, and development, a common standpoint is that decentralisation not only will bring about better governance but also deepen democracy and bring about poverty reduction. This is also the stated aim of the above-cited reforms. Debates on and various forms of decentralisation, deconcentration, and local government reforms have a long history in Tanzania, as discussed in chapter 4. What we would like to point at in the analysis in this section is the tensions between devolution and deconcentration; the overlapping between Central Government structures and Local Government structures, and the persisting intertwining between the ruling party's structure and the different levels in the administration, as discussed in the next chapter on political parties. This a challenge for the democratisation process at the local level, the opposition parties, as well as civil society and for citizens' participation at local level.

The sub-national level of administration in Tanzania is divided in two, and to a certain extent they are overlapping and conflicting structures, the Central Government structure, and the Local Government Authorities (LGAs). In the mainland part of Tanzania,⁹ there are three levels of Central Government administrative levels;¹⁰ the Regions, Districts, and Divisions.¹¹ The **Region** is headed by a Regional Commissioner, appointed by the President, and the head of the Civil Service is the Regional Administrative Secretary. Responsibilities have been transferred from the Regions to the Local Government Authorities, as part of the Local Government and Public Sector Reform Programmes. That is, from the Central Government to the new and strengthened LGAs. In the new organisation, the Regions are supposed to be more of facilitators and coordinators, rather than providers and charged with the role of policy interpretation, advising on coordination, monitoring, enforcement, and creation of an enabling environment for the LGAs to discharge their duties. The Regions are supposed to perform the two major roles of development and administration of the region. The development role centres on building the capacity of and backstopping the LGAs. The administrative role addresses the three major areas of; ensuring "peace and tranquillity" within their areas of jurisdiction; facilitating and assisting LGAs to undertake and discharge their responsibilities by providing an enabling environment; and, representing Central Government within the region. According to the LGR the vision is to strengthen the capability of the Regional Administration to offer a multi-skilled technical resource for supporting local

9 The administrative structure in Zanzibar is slightly different.

10 The division of the territory into administrative units is the prerogative of the President as stipulated under article 2(2) of the Constitution and guided by The Regions and Districts (Establishment Procedure) Act No. 12 of 1994.

11 In 2008, the mainland was divided into 21 Regions, 106 Districts and 516 Divisions.

development initiatives and linking Central Government Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs) as well as Development Partners to LGAs (URT, 2008).

At the **district level**, the Central Government Structure included the District Commissioner (DC) who is the principal assistant to the Regional Commissioner at that level, and the District Administrative Secretary (DAS) who is the head of the civil service. Until recently, the Central Government Structure included a Divisional Secretary (DS) that headed the Division, a sub-district level, which also was a political post and a tenet of the central administration within the local community. The DS is supposed to be transformed into a civil service post in the current reform phase.


The ruling party, the central government and the presidency have maintained a line of command all the way to the local level through different mechanisms. The President appoints all the political posts, i.e., the Regional and District Commissioner and the Divisional Secretary. As CCM is the ruling party and the President its chairman, the persons appointed are firmly established within CCM (Reuben Shigela, District Commissioner Lindi May 2006, April 2010). The RC, the DC, and DS thus are both the central government representatives and part of the ruling party, in the local community. The RC, DC, and DS are not only members of the CCM; they are part of the decision-making bodies of the party at various levels. This intertwining of party and state structure continues to be a great challenge for the opposition parties and the democratisation process and is perceived by the opposition to contribute to the un-level playing field for the political parties (PI: Samuel Ngware, UDSM; Brian Cooksey, REPOA/Tadreg).

At central government level, the LGAs are under the jurisdiction of the minister responsible for local government affairs. From the central government technocratic perspective, there is a delicate balance to strike between a “real” decentralisation and devolution, on the one hand, and maintaining (fiscal and administrative) control that so funds and powers devolved to local level are not misused, deliver improved social services and enhance participation etc., on the other. The new local government system is based on political devolution and decentralisation of functions and finance within the framework of a unitary state. The new LGAs are multi-sectoral units with a legal status operating on the basis of discretionary but general powers. The new LGAs are endowed with wide ranging powers and will be largely autonomous institutions, democratically governed and deriving their legitimacy from the services they provide to the people (Baker et al., 2002).

The relationship between the central, regional and local levels is summarised in Figure 6 below. As appear from the figure, the central government structure is extended and overlaps with the local government structure. In addition to the “line” from the central government to the local through the regional and the district commissioner, the

ministries at central level retain control over corresponding departments at local government level. The Ministries of Health, Education and Agriculture were in particular considered, from the LGAs’ point of view, to uphold a tight relationship to corresponding departments at the district/local government level (PI: District Officials in Kinondoni, Pangani and Rombo District 2001-2006, Lindi and Kinondoni 2006, 2007). If we add the organisational scheme for CCM, in chapter 7, we can note how CCM structures closely follow and partly overlap with the central and local government structures.

Figure 6 Regional and Local governance structure in Tanzania



5.1.5 Local Government Authorities—and the Local Government Reform

The current Local Government Reform Programme (LGRP) was initiated in 1996¹² and is one of the major reforms for enhancing accountability and creating structures that strengthen a democratic development. LGRP is an integral part of the broader structural reform.¹³ It is supposed to be a “decentralization by devolution policy” aiming at fiscal, administrative and political decentralization of service delivery and, changed central-local relations. The objective is to ensure that citizens at the grassroots level are involved in the planning and implementation of development programmes in their local areas. Through participatory planning and budgeting, the reforms envisage that development programmes will be relevant to local needs and engender a sense of ownership to facilitate implementation (URT, 2009; URT, 2008; URT, 2002a). This will, according to Ngware (2005), demand a qualitatively different mind-set of officials in central and local governments, politicians and involves a fundamentally new change in the way government conducts its business across Tanzania. The reform programme, like many others in Tanzania, is strongly supported by the donors, as perceived to have great potentials for economic, social and democratic development.

The LGAs are comprised of four levels: district; division; ward; village, sub-village (*vitongoji*).¹⁴ In urban areas the corresponding names are urban authorities, ward, and streets (*mtaa*). The Public Sector and Local Government Reforms Programme’s aim is to transfer a number of responsibilities from the Central Government and Regions to the Local Government Authorities.¹⁵ The village, district, and urban authorities are supposed to be responsible for planning, financing, and implementing development programmes within their areas of jurisdiction. Each authority has to suppress crime, maintain peace, good order and protect the public and private property; promote the social welfare and economic well-being of persons within its area of jurisdiction, control and improve agriculture, trade and industry, further and enhance health, education and social life of the people, and fight poverty, disease and ignorance. The local government authorities have the legislative power to make by-laws, which are applicable in their areas of jurisdiction.¹⁶ So on paper the role and powers of the local governments is substantive.

12 Local authorities were abolished in 1972 and replaced by a direct Central Government rule, and re-introduced in 1982 as discussed in chapter 4.

13 “Local Government Reform Agenda” (1996) and the “Policy Paper on Local Government Reform” (1998).

14 There are 106 rural and 26 urban LGAs, 10,371 registered villages, 57,076 vitongoji and 1,795 Mtaa.

15 Rural LGAs are called District Councils. Urban authorities are responsible for the administration and development of urban areas ranging from townships, municipalities, and the [only] two cities, Dar es Salaam and Mwanza.

16 According to the Local Government (District Authorities) Act of 1982 and Local Government (Urban Authorities) Act of 1982 and their amendments.

If we look at the structure of the local governments starting from below, the lowest level is the *vitongojis* (sub-villages) in rural areas, and the *mtaas* (street assemblies) in urban areas. Elections are held every five years to elect the *vitongoji* and *mtaa* chairmen. There is a slight difference between rural and urban areas in how the council at the lowest level is established. The *vitongoji* chairman appoints 5 *vitongoji* council members, while in urban areas the *mtaa* council is elected at the same time as the chairman is elected. The *mtaa* council is directly under the ward level, and hence replaces the village assembly in rural areas. This grassroots structure is supposed to manage local development issues, like security, mitigate minor conflicts, waste management etc. in the neighbourhoods, and to provide input to the planning process (interviews with *vitongoji* councils in various villages in Pangani district, *mtaa* councils in Kinondoni District). No staff are employed at this level. Eventual financing of activities has to be done through voluntary contributions. When interviewing and observing activities at the grassroots levels, we found huge differences between different *vitongojis* and *mtaas*. In the period just before the election in 1999, very few was active. During the election in 1999 there was quite substantial activity, both in rural areas in Pangani, and in Kinondoni. In the period up to the next election in 2004, the activities in the 20 or so *vitongojis* and *mtaas* that I observed, varied greatly.

At the *village level*, an element of direct democracy is practised. The structure is comprised of a *village assembly* consisting of all persons aged 18 and above, that are supposed to meet at least once a year to discuss common matters and elect members of various bodies. The corporate entity of a registered village is the *village council* comprising a chairperson elected by the village assembly, and sub-village chairpersons, head-teacher(s), health workers, and other official functions in the village, and a number of villagers. The council is subdivided in village committees for planning, finance, economic affairs, social services, security, forest protection, and water resources. Until 2002, no person was formally employed at the village level. The village executive secretary (VES) was paid from the revenues that were collected in the village. However, with more executive functions, as well as funds, being delegated to the villages and difficulties to recruit enough competent staff the VES has become a formal employee of the LGA.¹⁷

The village council's functions and roles include planning and coordinating activities, giving assistance and advice to the villagers engaged in agriculture, forestry, horticultural, industrial or any other activity, and encouraging village residents to undertake and participate in communal enterprises. The village assembly can adopt by-laws, but

¹⁷ According to the Local Government (District Authorities) Act of 1982 and Local Government (Urban Authorities) Act of 1982 and their amendments.

the by- laws have to be submitted to the district council for approval. Women must account for 25 % of the council members.

Ward is the administrative subdivision between the village and the districts. The ward reviews the village council's proposed projects in its jurisdiction and approves them for passage up the line to the District Development Committee. The administration at ward level is headed by a Ward Executive Secretary, and a few officers for education, health, and agriculture. The ward is steered by a Ward Development Committee (WDC) comprised of a councillor representing the ward in the District Development Council and chairpersons of all village councils within the ward. The WDC also includes member(s) of the district council, who ordinarily reside in the ward; officials and invitees from, for instance NGOs and other civic groups involved in the promotion of development in the ward. However, the invitees have no right to vote in the meetings. The WDC is responsible for developing general development plans for the ward and manages disasters and environment related activities within its ward.

The *district level* is the main site for local government administration in rural areas. The executive structure is headed by the District Executive Director, coordinating the various departments including personnel and administration; planning and finance; engineering or works; education and culture; trade and economic affairs; urban planning; health and social welfare; co-operative, agriculture and livestock development; and community development. The DED is appointed by the president and the heads of department by the responsible minister. With decentralisation the councils have got the mandate to "hire and fire" technical staff and teachers. Heads of departments and key technical staff—the technocrats—are usually well-educated, often with university education and not seldom a masters degree, and hence often are perceived, and perceive themselves, as a node of development in the rural areas (observations and interviews with district officials in Pangani, Rombo and Kinondoni).

The representative organ is the *district council* composed of members elected from each ward, the councillors; members of parliament representing constituencies within the area of the district council; three members appointed by the minister responsible for local government and one member representing the constituent village councils on a rotational basis. The number of women appointed to the council must be 'not less than one-third of ward representatives and the MPs combined'.

District councils, through the District Development Committee (DCC) supervise the implementation of all plans for economic, commercial, industrial, and social development in their respective areas. In addition, the council approves by-laws made by the village councils and co-ordinates plans, projects, and programmes for the villages within its area of jurisdiction. Apart from the DDC, there are committees for finance,

administration and planning; education, health and water; economic affairs, community development and the environment.

The district councils are empowered to pass by-laws applicable for the whole district. The council must give public notice to the local inhabitants of the district of its intention and provide a comment period to the inhabitants before passing the by-laws. After commenting, the by-laws are submitted to the regional officer who will comment and then submit the draft by-laws to the minister of local government affairs for his approval.

So, again, on paper, the local government has a well-elaborated structure for governance and democratic participation from the sub-village/street to the district level. However, the autonomy of the local governments is rather weak. The tax base in most local governments is very small and makes the local governments depend on transfers from the central government, that still largely determines local budget priorities.¹⁸ In addition, to access central government funds the LGAs have to fulfil a number of conditions aiming to reinforce good governance. The council has to have an approved annual plan and budget; submit final accounts for audit on time; have no adverse opinion audit certificate awarded to latest accounts of the council; and submit quarterly financial reports. Such requirements are seen as 'minimum safeguards' for handling funds, and aim to entrench accountability on the part of the staff and leaders of the councils. In the next section we bring out some of the findings on the local democracy, as perceived by a selected number of key informant interviews in Pangani and Kinondoni district (based on the case studies we did in Kinondoni and Pangani 2000-2005, with a follow-up study in Kinondoni 2006 and 2007).

5.1.6 Relationship between local government and council

At the local government level, we found similar challenges for the representatives to hold the executive accountable, as at the national level (see 5.2). Firstly, the councillors in general, even CCM councillors, often stated that it was difficult to get enough information, and in time to digest it before council meetings, or to organise meetings with villages/constituencies or within political parties. This strengthens the district officials' power position vis-à-vis the councils. In our interviews with village leadership, villagers and council members, we often heard statements like:

¹⁸ This share gradually declined from 21% in 2001/02 to almost 20% in 2002/03 and 15% in 2003/04. The sharp drop after FY 2003/04 followed the rationalisation of local taxes in 2003 and 2004, including the abolishment of the development levy, and the significant increase in central government grants to local government authorities (Fjeldstad et al. 2008). In 2006 only 7% of total local revenues was collected by the local government in Tanzania in 2006/07 (PMO-RALG 2008:4).

It is the district officials that have the real power. Most of us councillors do not have enough education or time to go through all materials when for example the budget is presented. Moreover we often get the budget proposal very late (Councillor Pangani District 2001).

Another challenge was that the councillors, in rural areas, usually have much less education than the local officials and have difficulties at times to manage to exercise their role to monitor the officials.¹⁹ As one councillor stated:

The local government officers are better educated than we are. They have often been to universities. They are well prepared when they come to the full council meetings and they know how to argue (PI: Councillor in Pangani 20020403).

In the Dar es Salaam constituency Kinondoni, this was less of a problem. Several of the councillors were very well educated, experienced, and felt that they could discuss with the officials on the same level without any great problem. However, we also got the opposite statement from some of the officials that found it hard at times to answer all the questions and expectations raised by councillors, or manage proposals made.

Even if a lot of reform effort has been made since 2001, similar statements were made in 2006 and 2007 in interviews with councillors in the two districts.

For the few opposition councillors that existed in the two councils the challenges were even greater. In addition to difficulties to get information and deal with the attitude from the officials, they found it difficult to have an influence in the council on the decisions made. Most of the time, the CCM councillors had already discussed the agenda at the CCM-branch meeting and agreed on the party line to be pursued in the full council. As the district commissioner both is appointed by the ruling party, and the central government representative in the local government, and member of the CCM branch, important exchanges of ideas between the CCM councillors and the views of the district administration take place at the CCM meetings. Hence, there is little room for debate within the council itself.

In a recent study evaluating the LGRP for the period 1998-2008 Tideman and Msami (2010) conclude that the LGRP has brought notable improvements. Financial resources at the local level have increased, mainly as a result of increased transfers from central government. LGA budgets more than doubled between 2003 and 2007, even if the proportion of money allocated to local governments as a share of total public

¹⁹ We can find similar challenges for the representatives even in Swedish local governments, but the degree of difference between the elected and the technocrats are much larger in a context where the peasants at best have a very rudimentary 6 years primary schoolexperience.

expenditure remained almost the same at around 18%. There have been improvements in human resource allocations and capacity. The proportion of public sector staff employed directly by LGAs has increased from 59% in 1999 to 67% in 2006. Capacity building efforts have had some measurable impact on planning, budgeting, and financial management.

Despite these positive results, Tideman and Msami (2010) note LGA control over local staff is limited as a result of a dual level of authority which allows central government to overrule local government in terms of staff allocation and management. In addition, laws governing LGAs and defining their roles and responsibilities are spread over several—occasionally contradictory—pieces of legislation, which assign the same roles to different levels of government, and allocate some key decision-making roles which affect LGAs to central government.

It appears that even if a lot of efforts have been made over the last few years to strengthen the accountability function of the full council vis-à-vis the local government administration, the representative full council is not yet able to exercise its role to hold the administration accountable. On the other hand, the district officials pointed at how much effort they made in order to reach the citizens and the council members. A common statement was that it was difficult to find the councillors fully engaged in their assignment, and they appear to be more interested in seating allowances than dedicated to working to develop their community (PI: district officials in Pangani and Kinondoni 2002, 2006).

If we relate the reforms to the issue of to what extent the reforms contribute to the consolidation of democracy we can note that a number of structures and institutions that can enhance democratic governance have been established. At the same time it can be noted the reforms by a number of actors perceived to have—whether by accident or design—increasingly placed the government decision-making processes outside parliamentary controls and public scrutiny. There is a lack of parliamentary oversight, and local governments still do not have the autonomy they need, according to a number of interviewees, at least up to 2005.

A great number of the respondents claimed that the mechanisms to hold Local Government Authorities accountable to the community are largely ineffective—formal democratic procedures are undermined by the limited capacity of elected representatives and the lack of realistic choice (PIs and group discussions: councillors and stakeholders in Kinondoni, Pangani, Rombo and Geita).

At local level, the civil society was generally very weak and rarely represents citizens' interests and there were no or very few media, in the rural districts I studied. Another viewpoint was that the political commitment to devolution of power was

ambiguous in the central government. Central government officials and donors was perceived as finding it difficult to “let go” and give LGAs real decision-making power, a view stated by both councillors and local government officials. Consequently, the effort to build local accountability is undermined—who will bother to exert accountability pressure on local government if all importance decisions are being made elsewhere? It also appeared to me that the practices and expectations of the role of local government act as a brake on reform. Citizens have low expectations of what local government can deliver, government officials do not prioritise responding to local needs and priorities, and there is little culture of citizens engaging with local government to make their voice heard.

5.2 The representative: parliament, its setup and capacity

As pointed out in the foregoing chapter on Tanzania’s political development, it was only between 1958 and 1964 some sort of (very shallow) multiparty system existed. With the establishment of a one-party democracy system, gradually the power of the parliament was circumscribed—and that of the presidency and the party strengthened. The number of not directly elected members increased. In the interim constitution guiding the country between 1964 and 1977, only 107 of the 204 MPs were directly elected. 62 were nominated by the president, 15 by the parliament and then the 20 regional commissioners were *ex officio* MPs. MPs were nominated by the president and the “mass-organisations” of the party, like the Youth and Parents associations, the Workers organisations, the Cooperatives and the women’s organisations. In addition, the number of *ex officio* members further increased. With the adoption of the party supremacy doctrine and the 1977 constitution, all functions of all state organs and all political activities were to be subordinated under the party. According to e.g., Baregu (1997:200) the outcome of this decision subordinated the Parliament to the CCM National Executive Committee (NEC) and turned the Parliament in praxis into a committee of the Party

In the 1977 constitution, 123 out of 229 MPs were appointed/nominated by the president, the party mass organisation or were *ex officio* members—and hence directly dependent on the party and its chairman, the president of the country, Julius Nyerere. Power was further centralised to the president and party and nominated MPs had little incentive to scrutinize the government and to make it more accountable. All important decisions were discussed and adopted by CCM’s NEC and then sent as a formality to parliament for “rubber-stamping” and hence give a flavour of legitimacy to the decisions taken within the party (Mukandala et al., 2004). This view is, however, con-

tested—as emerge from the interviews below an often aired opinion is that the political debate in the parliament was more vivid during the single-party era.

With the introduction of multi-party system a number of constitutional amendments have been made in order to strengthen the autonomy of the parliament vis-à-vis the executive and the ruling party. The National Assembly of Tanzania is constituted of one chamber, with members elected from various constituencies. The Speaker heads it, and is appointed by the president. Under the Constitution, women's representation is provided for as a special category, in order to increase the participation of women in national politics. Elections are supervised by the National Electoral Commission. Today Tanzania's parliament consists of 323 members made up of five different categories of members (figures in brackets for the number in the 2005 general election):

- 1) Members elected to represent constituencies across mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar (232).
- 2) Women's special seats (members whose number shall increase progressively starting with twenty per cent of the members in each subcategory, to be elected by the political parties that are represented in the National Assembly and on the basis of proportional representation amongst those parties) (75).
- 3) Five members elected by the Zanzibar House of Representatives from among its members
- 4) The Attorney General
- 5) A maximum of ten members appointed directly by the president.²⁰

The parliament comprises 17 standing committees and select committees.²¹ The Finance and Economic Affairs, and Public Accounts Committee (PAC), are regarded as the most important. The opposition parties are active in all committees. The PAC chair is, by convention, held by an MP from the opposition, in similarity with most Commonwealth countries. PACs are one of the more important instruments that parliaments can use to check governments' activities. The aim with giving the chairmanship of the PAC to the opposition is to balance the power between the government and the opposition and to strengthen parliamentary oversight.

²⁰ The information in this paragraph is condensed from the Tanzanian parliament homepage <http://www.parliament.go.tz> accessed 20100709.

²¹ The 17 committees are: Finance and Economic Affairs; Public Accounts; Social Services; Social Welfare & Community Development; Constitutional, Legal and Public Administration; Standing Orders; Parliamentary Privileges, Ethics and Powers; Energy and Minerals; HIV/AIDS Affairs; Infrastructure; Public Corporation Accounts; Miscellaneous Amendments; Land, Natural Resources and Environment; Agriculture, Livestock and Water; Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security; Industries and Trade; and Local Government Accounts.

What we can observe here is that there has been a change of the constitution that enable a more autonomous parliament, where in front of all the presidents right to nominate MPs has been dramatically reduced from almost 50% of the MPs before the multi-party system was introduced, to less than 5%.

So in what way have these changes of the formal rules of the game led to a strengthening of the work of the parliament and the balance between the representative and the executive?

5.3 Challenges for the work of the parliament—findings

After this review of the formal structures, we will now bring in some of the relevant findings and perceptions from the interviews and literature to what extent the new space opened up for the parliament as a result of the constitutional and political reforms also have lead to a strengthening of the parliaments ability to exercise its accountability function vis-à-vis the executive—an important aspect of the consolidation of the democratisation process.

Two issues that resurfaced as major constraints for the parliamentarians to use the space provided for in the constitution were access to information and resources/capacity to process information.

The parliamentarians pointed at that is to get information in time on various bills and proposals in order to prepare their views and anchor them in the respective party and constituency before decisions in the parliament. This is particularly challenging for the few opposition party members of parliament, as they have even less access to information than their colleagues in the ruling party (PI: Zitto Kabwe, MP, CHADEMA, June 2006; Wilfred M Lwakatare MP CUF, 2003). The following quotation from one of the interviews with parliamentarians illustrates this point:

In the committee, we get information, but most often not in time, the information is usually provided on the same day or sometimes one day before. Thus, we have very little time to digest the information, or do research and it is seldom possible to take the issue back to the party to discuss. (PI: Zitto Kabwe, MP, CHADEMA, Opposition spoke person for economic planning and financial affairs, June 2006)

Access to information includes not only “to get” information in time in order to be able to be an active participant, it also a matter of getting relevant as well as contextual, information—and have the opportunity and capacity to find/build eventual alternative views. Hence another challenge is to have enough resources, and capacity, to prepare

well-informed interventions and proposals. This is a challenge for all MPs, but again, a greater challenge for the opposition MPs as the opposition parties have less resources and capacity to support their MPs. A number of efforts have been made to strengthen the parliament since the multiparty system was introduced. A library has been built up, offices for the MPs have been equipped with computers and Internet connections, and a small research unit established. Yet it is difficult for the MPs to match the capacity of the executive, as the quotation below illustrates:

In the parliament, we have an office with computers and there is a library, but not here in Dar. When we are in session in Dodoma it is difficult to find time to go to the library. Any documents/reports we need we have to pay for from our own income. The government does not support us enough in conducting our activities. (PI: Mhe Mokiwa—Ilemela—MP CUF Women’s Special Seat, 4 June 2006)

In this quotation, we find two interesting views. The MP, from the opposition, finds it difficult to get the backstopping needed from the government. On the other hand, the MP has an office and library available in Dodoma, the formal capital. In practice, however, very few MPs stay in the capital outside sessions. Many stay in the economic capital Dar es Salaam and a few in their constituencies and hence cannot use the facilities in Dodoma.

The Parliamentarians get, however, quite a substantial salary, allowances, and funds to use in their work—and to maintain contact with their constituencies. The economic conditions for the MPs is highly debated. The MPs consider them inadequate, while quite a number of observers and voters claimed that the MPs had a quite generous package. The total monthly, tax-free, packages were, in 2007, 7 million Tsh (around 5,200 US\$).²² The economic advantage of being an MP also calls for mechanism to hold the MPs accountable to their constituencies and to use the funds to build party structures in order to be in contact with the citizens (PI: Zitto Kabwe, MP CHADEMA, May 2007).

5.3.1 *Internal work in the parliament*

The work of the parliament has been strengthened over the years, according to observers and interviews. In particular the work of the committees has improved, it was

²² It is always complicated to compare salaries. In Tanzania the monthly minimum salary was 65,000 Tsh (54 US\$) and a teachers salary ranged from 100,000 Tsh (83 US\$) to 300,000 (250 US\$), and the majority of peasants and self-employed much less. On the other hand the senior positions in the private companies, international NGO’s or international companies have wages in the range of the MPs. The cost for a (aspiring) middle-class or upper-class life in Tanzania is at world-market levels, as most goods consumed are imported, and health and education of “international quality” expensive, etc.

noted, which is crucial as it is in the committees government motions and proposals could be discussed in depth and views exchanged in a more open and less prestigious atmosphere than in the session. In addition the relationship between the ruling and opposition parties' MPs has improved, but mainly within the committees. When the parliament is in session, the party whip makes the discussions, and the relation between the CCM MPs and the few opposition MPs less open, as illustrated by the quotation below:

Out of session, we have good relationship: but inside the Parliament, it is different because MPs follow the party line. I am a member of the infrastructure committee; we are working nicely without any party frictions. (PI: Mhe Mokiwa—Ilemela—MP CUF Women's Special Seat, 4 June 2006)

The views on how well the parliament performs its democratising role in the multiparty era vary. One argument that came up in several interviews was that the parliament actually had a large influence during the one-party era. The introduction of the multiparty system meant that the political debates and discussions held in the one-party parliament have been moved to the NEC of the ruling party, where neither other political parties nor NGOs have access. In the parliament the party whip forces the MPs to follow the respective party line, rather than engaging in political debates in the assembly.

People outside Tanzania have claimed that our parliament was a rubberstamping organ before the multi-party system was introduced. However, it is not true, of course, now the parliament is less vigorous compared with the single party parliament. In our current parliament, if we [CCM] have serious issues to debate we call our party MPs to a party caucus and make consensus with the group of [CCM] MPs. What we just debate is how we can implement that manifesto. In addition, we have big debates within our party on all kinds of issues and with all kinds of opinions. MPs fiercely question ministers and the government, at times. The debate is very open. However, once we agree within our party nobody can challenge the party line from outside of the party system. Even opposition parties' MPs are instructed to follow a certain line of arguments including rejecting the bills, and these instructions are from their political parties. Moreover, MP party committee meets to agree on budget and pass it. Of course, MPs can advise the minister, and sometimes permanent secretaries are invited to give clarifications on certain issues in parliamentarians' committees. During the single party system, I was a chairperson of the finance committee of the parliament and we were strong. We scrutinised the budget and raised questions. That is why the media are not allowed in parliament committees, because the MPs can utter very

tough words at times. (PI: Juma Akukweti, Minister for Parliamentary Affairs, in the Prime Minister's Office, 6 June 2006)

A number of the weaknesses characterising the earlier parliaments prevailed in the 2005-2010 parliament. The Legal and Human Rights Centre established a committee to monitor the role of the parliament in 2007. In its first report, 2008, it concluded that:

The findings of the research disclosed that the ruling party i.e. CCM and the state in Tanzania are closely related organizationally to the extent that it is difficult to differentiate the two. The research revealed that the people who have been loyal to the party have continued to be in Parliament for a long time thus the element of party supremacy is still perpetuated in Parliament. This makes it difficult for the Parliament to be free because of the dominance of the CCM ruling party and the fear it puts into whoever tries to oppose its leaders from within, makes it difficult for members of parliament to speak freely when they are in the parliament's sessions. (Legal and Human Rights Centre, 2008)

On the other hand, there has been quite a dramatic change in the relations between the parliament and the executive after the 2005 election. Even if the opposition is small in number, it has managed to strengthen its influence, as emerges from various interviews done in 2006-2010. Among the more spectacular achievements is the exposure of various cases of misuse of public funds and grand corruption, with enormous amounts being embezzled in a number of cases. One case involved the misappropriation of USD 113 million through the external payments account of the Bank of Tanzania. In August 2007, Wilibrod Slaa a CHADEMA MP and deputy leader of the official opposition in the parliament, prepared a private motion requesting the parliament to establish a select committee to investigate allegation of misuse of public funds in three cases: 1) The Bank of Tanzania including stealing of 113 million dollars from the Central Bank External Payments Account; 2) the use of half a billion dollars in the construction of the Bank of Tanzania twin towers and its office in Zanzibar and providing tens of millions of dollars of guarantees to private companies' commercial debt that increased contingent liabilities of the Central Bank; 3) Bank of Tanzania providing commercial credit to Mwananchi Gold Company, a registered private company contrary to the Bank of Tanzania Act. The motion was planned to be tabled in parliament on August 7 2007. However, even if all parliamentary requirements were met, at the last minute, it was blocked by the Speaker and was not tabled (PIs: with Ibrahim Lipumba, CUF; Komu, CHADEMA). Even if the motion was blocked, it was a step forward for the opposition, and the parliament as such grand corruption in the executive was exposed, and publicly debated.

But it was when the opposition MPs and a number of CCM MPs who was dismayed of the ongoing embezzlements started to collaborate, that the parliament started to be able to hold the government accountable. Another case of grand corruption involved the procurement by the government owned Tanzania Electric Supply Company (TANESCO) of the construction and operation of a large power station of 100 MW in 2006, to ease the constant lack of electricity. The huge contract was awarded to a small and unknown company in the US, the Richmond Development Company. The CUF MP Habib Mnyaa, an engineer who had in the past worked for TANESCO, was the first to raise suspicions of a fraudulent contract awarded to Richmond, a company that did not have the capacity to implement a power generating project of this magnitude. He wanted to table a private motion for the formation of a parliamentary select committee to investigate the process that led TANESCO to award the contract to Richmond. One of the actors describes how the process developed:

MPs from CCM told him that if you table the motion, it would be blocked. They suggested that it should be sent as a recommendation of the Minerals and Energy Parliamentary Committee. And so they did. Then the speaker accepted the motion by the committee to be tabled in parliament. For the first time since the multiparty parliament started in 1995, a parliamentary Select Committee was established chaired by Hon. Dr. Harrison Mwakyembe and included Hon. Habib Mnyaa to investigate the Richmond saga. The Mwakyembe Committee Report showed that the selection of Richmond Development Company to implement a 100 MW emergency power generation project violated the Public Procurement Act and did not follow the legal advice provided by Public Procurement Regulatory Authority-PPRA. (PI: CUF Chairman Ibrahim Lipumba 2010)

I think we can observe three things in the quotation, one is that the parliamentary committees have started to play a much more important role in strengthening the parliamentary accountability role, another that the opposition has started to learn more about how to use the parliamentary committees to enhance the accountability function and, not the least, that CCM MPs who were critical of the way public funds were misused and the cabinet's reluctance to deal with them, decided to go against the party whip in parliament and join forces with the opposition. This was a significant shift in the way the parliament had worked hitherto from when the multiparty system was introduced and it also led to a significant shift of the relations between parliament and the government:

The Report was tabled in parliament and led to the resignation of the Prime Minister and two other ministers. After the resignation of the Prime Minister, the President had to dissolve the cabinet and select a new prime minister and cabinet. For the first time the parliament showed that it has powers to hold the government to account (PI: CUF Chairman Ibrahim Lipumba 2010).

Despite this strengthening, the power of the opposition in parliament to hold the government to account is however constrained by the parliamentary rules that have vested authority and powers to the speaker of the parliament. The speaker has to agree before a private motion of a member of parliament is brought up for discussion in parliament. As the president appoints the speaker, the chairman of the ruling party, the speaker is not perceived as an independent authority, according to respondents within the opposition (PI: Ibrahim Lipumba, Chairman, CUF, Febr 2010).

5.3.2 Horizontal accountability, the balance between the parliament and the executive

The relative balance between the executive and the representative, and hence the horizontal accountability axis, is clearly tilted in favour of the executive. From the interviews we carried out with MPs, political parties, media, civil society organisations and researchers, it was quite clear that the common view was that the executive is the strongest locus of power—and that the 1995-2000 parliament and 2001-2005 parliament were weak. This point is illustrated with a number of citations below. CUF's Deputy Secretary General and MP for Bukoba Urban stated, in 2001, that:

The parliament is not strong at all, for most of the members come from the ruling party. They have a tendency of accepting everything that is tabled by different ministers in their government. Whatever opposition does or opposes, never holds water for they are always overpowered by the parliamentarians from the ruling party who are the majority in the parliament. (PI: Wilfred M Lwakatare, Deputy Secretary General and MP for Bukoba Urban, 20010521)

The NCCR Secretary General stated a similar view in 2000:

The executive branch is the most powerful centre for making all the decisions in our country. The judiciary and the parliament are very weak organs. Nevertheless, the parliament is the weakest organ. It just rubber-stamps what is already decided by the executive branch. This is due to very few parliamentarians coming from the small opposition parties. The CCM parliamentarians are

so many in the parliament and they do not at all oppose what is tabled in the parliament by the ministers who are all coming from CCM, the ruling party. (PI: Mr. Bakome, Secretary General, NCCR-Mageuzi 12 Oct 2000)

The dominance of the executive over a weak parliament was also the view of the TLP leadership:

The executive branch is the most important power-making centre than any government branch. The ruling party has a very great influence in policy making. The parliament is just rubber-stamping what is already decided by the executive branch (PI: TLP Secretary General Mr. Jaffrey and Assistant Secretary General 17 Oct 2000).

A study conducted in 2005 on the parliament by Daudifan Mukangara, a professor in political science at the University of Dar es Salaam, confirmed what the opposition political parties claim:

... the presidency still wields immense and unchecked power. The traditional “imperial” president of the past and the failure to break the CCM’s rule have created a political culture and psyche among members of the executive who continue to think that the president’s power has not been reduced. This attitude is used to emasculate the other branches of government; while parliament and civil society, for their part, remain timid in their scrutiny of the executive (Mukangara, 2005).

Gradually a change took place in the period from 2000-2005 even if representatives of the opposition for the new parliament elected in 2005 perceived that the executive continues to dominate, as emerge from the two citations below:

The executive is dominating the Bunge [the parliament]. Particularly the Ministers. The executive take advantage of CCM having more MP in parliament to dominate the Parliament. In, addition, in almost all ministries there is a technical advisor from the CCM. (PI: Zitto Kabwe, MP CHADEMA, June 2006)

The executive is more powerful, because the ministers are MPs and they do not want to jeopardize their own government. Even if the Judiciary or Parliament can reject a government proposal they would not do so (...) To change this behaviour is very difficult as the ruling party is dominating the Parliament. (PI: Mrs Mhe Mokiwa—Ilemela—MP CUF Women’s Special Seat, 4 June 2006)

Chris Maina Peters, a professor of law and human rights activist stated that there still is a dominance of the executive, but that a change is taking place to the better:

The executive still have the upper hand in power relations. The parliament can impeach the PM and president but the way to organize an impeachment is very complicated and the president has the power to dissolve the parliament. There has, however, been a widening of political space making the executives more accountable. The electoral commission should have been amended to allow autonomy and fair management of the elections. I do not want it to turn into a single party system, I want multiparty to be improved and the current president is able articulate that even stronger then the opposition. (Chris Maina Peter 2006)

The development of the parliament-executive relations after the 2005 elections has, however, changed. The cooperation between the National Audit Office and the Parliamentary Oversight Committees (PAC), the Local Authorities Accounts Committee (LAAC) and the Public Corporation Accounts Committee has been weak, but has gradually improved (PI: Daudifen Mukangara, Professor, Political Science, UDSM, December 2005, May 2006, April 2007; Samuel S. Mushi, Professor, Political Science, UDSM, December 2005, May 2006). In the period 2005-2010, the parliament strengthened its position vis-à-vis the executive in a number of cases. The opposition played a pivotal role to advance a number of grand corruption issues. For the first time in Tanzania's (short) democratic history, a prime minister had to resign as a result of questions raised by the parliament in 2008. In addition, two ministers resigned. Media have reported frequently on the corruption issues, but so far, no court cases have been brought to a completion.

To conclude, we can notice that there has been a considerable improvement of the functions of the parliament, in particular during the 2005-2010 period, compared to the single-party era. However, the Parliament still lacks the teeth and capacity to fulfil its role to hold the executive accountable, according to the principles in a consolidated liberal democracy. The relatively few opposition MPs are facing a number of challenges, both in terms of capacity and access to information, in order to balance the overwhelming majority of members from the ruling party. Moreover, MPs within the ruling party are under a strong party whip in the chambers, which limits the political debate in the parliament.

A recent study on the parliament by Tsekpo and Hudson for ODI 2009 supports the argument that even if a lot of improvements have been made in recent years, the parliament is still weak compared to the executive and has limited capacity to exercise its presumed role to check the executive:

In Tanzania, a country that has a long history of one-party rule and executive dominance, it will take a sustained effort from Development Partners and from Parliament itself to build a Parliament that is an effective and independent player in the country's system of governance (Tsekpo and Hudson, 2009: VIII).

It should be noted that the material presented is based on the perceptions of a selected number of key-informants from the opposition, the ruling party, researchers and observers among NGOs, as well as in reports. There are of course a number of other pertinent issues—as well as positive developments. It does as such not necessarily represent the “reality”, but although points at some of the challenges the young democracy is facing.

5.4 The legal setting: the constitution, the judiciary and human rights

In this section we briefly describe and analyse some aspects of the legal system in Tanzania that have a bearing on the democratisation process, as put forward in interviews and in the literature.

5.4.1 On the constitution—the framework for the democratisation process

The Nyalali Commission in 1992 pointed at more than 40 laws that were a constraint for democratisation and the need for rewriting the constitution. The opposition had demanded a rewriting of the constitution since the start of the democratisation process. A white paper on a new constitution was worked out and a number of amendments were approved by the parliament in February 2000 after several years of consultative work within the community. This process strengthened the authority of the president and confirmed the structure of the union. The new amendments have been contested both by the civil society and the opposition that argues for the need for a new constitution, rather than continued rewriting and amendments to the old one-party constitution from 1977 (PI: TLHRC 2005, 2006, 2007 and Lipumba). A number of amendments have been made on the constitution since then, but a number of oppressive laws remain. Among the most contested are a number of provisions on public order that are used to limit the right to assembly and speech and the current Political Parties Act of 1992, including prohibiting coalition forming, party mergers and state funding for election costs (PI: Peters and Lipumba). Hence, according to the opposition and Human Rights Lawyers like Chris Maina Peters it is a need to rewrite the constitution:

(...) the current constitution does not represent the Tanzanians because it was prepared by the same groups who prepared the CCM constitution. In addition,

article 10 is deleted, without being replaced with another article. Moreover, there is reluctance in CCM, that if they allow the discussion on a new constitution, they fear that they will lose their position (PI: Chris Maina Peters 31 May 2006).

The ruling party for its part has continued to maintain that the current constitution is both legal, legitimate and fits the current socio-economic environment and so there is no need of writing a new constitution.

Another highly debated issues are the relationship between the mainland and Zanzibar—and the constitutional status and structure of the union, as discussed in chapter 4. The debate on the rewriting of the constitution has continued in the period 2005-2010 and gradually CCM has accepted that a process should start after the elections in 2010, but the process how this should be done is still hotly contested.

5.4.2 The judiciary and legal sector

The judicial hierarchy in Tanzania Mainland is organised in the Court of Appeal, High Court of Tanzania, Resident Magistrates Courts, District Courts, and Primary Courts. The 26 High Courts of Tanzania have three major divisions which deal with land, labour and commercial matters respectively. A special Constitutional Court makes decisions over matters concerning the interpretation of the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania, where the interpretation or its application is in dispute between the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania and the Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar. In the Court of Appeal and High Court, adjudicators are called judges. In all other courts, they are called magistrates. The president appoints judges after consultation with the Judicial Service Commission of Tanzania, 25 magistrates are appointed directly by the Commission (TLHRC 2010).

The judiciary in Tanzania is relatively independent of the executive, as Widner (2001) and (PI: Peter 2005/2006) points at. The legal system, however, is characterised by a patchwork of different amendments to the 1977 one-party constitution. Tanzania has a pluralist legal system based on (English) common law, colonial laws, customary law, and religious law, in similarity with most African countries. A challenge has been to merge different legal systems to a shared set of norms, without creating contradictions. Conflicts between customary law and common law have been most evident in cases related to inheritance and land issues, where often customary law suppresses women's rights. Tanzania has ratified most international conventions. They are still, however, not fully incorporated in the legal system. Tanzania shows high formal human rights commitment, as most main international human rights instruments have been ratified by the country. However, the commitment for broader human, economic

and social rights is low, to a large extent due to poverty, as well as lack of institutional capacity (PI: Peter 2005/2006) and (Peter and Juma, 1998).

Lack of resources reduces the ability of the judiciary and the legal system to operate effectively, resulting in limited capacity to enforce the laws. In cases where the law is enforced, the lack of availability of sufficient and educated staff with reasonable salaries opens up for arbitrariness and corruption in the court system at all levels. The scarcity of resources makes legal processes unpredictable and slow—which creates abuse of human rights in terms of extremely long periods in remand prisons and in terms of development constraints for commercial activities. Poor people's, not the least poor women's, rights and access to justice are limited as they have little knowledge of their rights and cannot afford legal assistance (PIs: with TLHRC, CSO, Lawyers in 2000, 2005/7) and Peter and Juma (1998).

Legal reforms have been underway since 1993 when the government appointed a high-level task force headed by Mark Bomani, former Attorney General of the URT, to identify challenges within the legal sector. The "Bomani Report's" core findings, published in 1996, were that the legal system was characterised by:²³

- Inordinate delays in resolving disputes and dispensing justice;
- Limited access to justice and legal services for the majority of the people;
- Corruption and other unethical conduct and practices in the legal system;
- Out-dated systems and lack of responsiveness to emerging social, political, economic and technological developments;
- Low levels of public trust in the legal system;
- Low levels of competence and poor morale amongst public sector legal personnel;
- Inadequate numbers of professionally trained personnel;
- Poor provision and maintenance of the work environment for most public institutions in the legal sector.

The Bomani Task Force elaborated a comprehensive reform programme covering the whole legal sector. The program was extensive and costly. The government decided to identify priority areas around which a small, more cost-effective programme would be designed. A Legal Sector Reform Programme (LSRP) came into place in 1999, after consultation with the NGOs, donors, and political parties. The aspiration and vision of the Medium Term Strategy was "Timely Justice for All" and it drew on the recommendations of the Task Force Report and had as objectives to achieve: i) speedy dispensation

23 The following paragraphs on the LSRP are based on Peter et al.'s 2008 report, and three personal interviews 2000 and 2005.

of justice; ii) affordability and access to justice for all social groups; iii) integrity and professionalism of legal officers; iv) independence of the judiciary; and v) a legal framework and jurisprudence of high standards responsive to social, political, economic and technological trends at both national and international levels. The shared mission of institutions in the sector was understood to be “the achievement of social justice and equality and rule of law through quality and accessible legal services”. In 2005 the objectives of the program were slightly amended to five strategic key result areas, aligned to the MKUKUTA: 1) strengthening and harmonising the national legal framework, 2) access to justice for the poor, 3) improving the observance of human rights, 4) enhancing the legal profession and 5) improving service delivery—with a total budget of 110 million USD.

The implementation process has, however, been extremely slow, due to programming, planning and budgeting, donors’ lack of confidence in the programme and lack of commitment from the government (PI: Peters, Sida, State Secretary Law in 2000 and 2005). The first review of the LSRP, completed in 2008, concludes that the LSRP has had a very slow start although there has been some progress in reforming the legal sector, for example by the establishment of a new National Prosecution Service and construction of new high court and primary court buildings. The main reason, according to the report is that the LSRP is a complex programme involving 6 ministries and more than 15 implementing agencies and that these agencies tend to have overlapping and often conflicting mandates. A number of factors are found to be part of this problem: 1) there is only partial ownership by the government of the LSRP, 2) the LSRP is not a part of the government’s planning process but is treated as a separate project, 3) there is no uniform understanding of what reform entails among the relevant stakeholders, 4) there is weak capacity in the Programme Coordination Office and in the Implementing Agencies and 5) there are inconsistencies across the core reforms being implemented in Tanzania in terms of salaries to civil servants which have caused lack of motivation for staff in the LSRP.

The main recommendations of the review are to strengthen national ownership of the LSRP, mainstream the LSRP into the government’s planning cycle, develop a common understanding of what reform entails and to strengthen the capacity of the Programme Coordination Office and the Implementing Agencies.

In the interviews we did with political parties, it was common to state distrust in the impartiality of the legal system.

On the question of the judiciary’s balancing role versus the legislative and executive branches of government, the interviews cited under the parliament above clearly indicate the problems.

5.4.3 *The human rights situation*

Respect for human rights, not the least civil rights, are a corner stone for the democratisation process. In this section we will briefly discuss the issue, with a foci on the civil rights. The economic rights are discussed in the following chapter.

On the mainland, civil rights are relatively well respected. There are however, a few cases of civil rights violations also on the mainland worth noting. Freedom of the press and association has been violated, in a few cases, as has the right to organise demonstrations and public meetings. Police use the pretext that order is disturbed to intervene, and in some cases with brutality, according to the opposition. Ibrahim Lipumba, CUF National Chairman and presidential candidate as well as many others with him was beaten up in public and arrested at a demonstration in Dar es Salaam 2001 against perceived irregularities in the 2000 election (PI: Ibrahim Lipumba, Chairman, CUF, October 2000, February 2003, May 2006 April 2007 February 2010; PI: Harod Sungusia, Senior Advocacy Officer, THLRC 31 May 2006; PI: Daudifen Mukangara, Professor, PS, UDSM, May 2006, April 2007).

In Zanzibar, violations of both human and civil rights occurred relatively frequently under the period of study. The situation deteriorated seriously during 2000 and 2001 when the opposition claimed irregularities in connection with the 2000 election in Zanzibar. The brutal killings, assaults, mass arrests, and other human rights abuses carried out by the security forces on 27 January 2001 against civilians exercising their constitutional right to peaceful assembly highlighted the tense political situation in Zanzibar. 22 people died during demonstrations in circumstances suggesting unlawful use of lethal force. Torture, including rape, and ill-treatment were widely reported. Hundreds of political prisoners, including prisoners of conscience, were detained (Amnesty International, 2002). CUF made an investigation and claimed that 67 people were killed (PI: Lipumba, see below)(Human Rights Watch, 2002).

Human Rights Watch's findings show that Tanzanian security forces and state officials were responsible for serious violations of domestic and international law. Security forces were responsible for extrajudicial executions and an excessive use of force resulting in killings and assaults of unarmed civilians, including those assisting the wounded. Other abuses included assaults on and denial of medical care to the wounded; torture and mistreatment, including rape and sexual abuse; arbitrary arrests and detentions without trial; looting and the destruction of property; and denial of free expression, assembly and association in forbidding a peaceful opposition demonstration in Zanzibar (HRW 2002).

The slowness of legal processes all over Tanzania and the conditions for prisoners continue to be a major challenges for human rights, as was already pointed out in the

1996 Bomani Task Force, and continued to be highlighted by both national and international human rights groups, e.g., TLHRC (2002-2005) and Amnesty International (2004-2010).

Another human rights issue that indirectly affects the democratisation process is the extra judicial use of force by the police force. Even if no political murders are reported, fear of police brutality might infringes on the citizens' right to express political views, organise demonstrations etc. It could also be noted that the death penalty was abolished in 2009.²⁴

In spite of the improved human rights situation on the mainland, the conditions in prisons are still of great concern as well as the long waiting time for trials (TLHRC 2010). This also contributes to undermine for instance the opposition's trust in the impartiality of the justice system. A recurrent theme in our interviews with the opposition was complaints over slowness and overly bureaucratic legal processes. The type of legal cases taken to court by the opposition was most often related to complaints over election results. Several parties were also involved in internal disputes that were taken to court. The party headquarters, and the contestants, spend a lot of time, money, and energy on legal processes.

The major challenges are, as viewed by an informed observer and activist:

The challenges for the courts and human rights activists are the congestion of cases in the courts. The reasons cited for this development are urbanization; increase in population and that too few courts have been built. People who commit crimes are not able to survive in prisons and those who are convicted are not able to pay the charges and penalties. The problems are individuals against the government, the rich against the poor. We have been complaining about government actions in relation to some of the clauses, and the government sometimes amend those clauses, but introduce other with the same intention (...) (PI: Chris Maina Peters 31 May 2006).

24 Tanzania retains the death penalty for treason and murder. According to official statistics, there were 387 prisoners under sentence of death in Tanzania in August 2004 (AI). In 2009, the figure was 292. Although no executions have been carried out since 1995, the provisions remain in the regulation, for instance 10 people have been condemned to death in 2009 and 2010 for murdering albinos. Human rights NGOs have pressed the government to abolish the death penalty (TLHRC and FIDH, 2005). The government started to consider abolishing the death penalty in 2007. A commission was set up to collect views of Tanzanians on the death penalty and in 2009 the Law Reform Commission of Tanzania submitted a report to the government suggesting its abolition Clottey (2007) (TLHRC 2010). The UN Human Rights Committee called on the Tanzanian Government in 2009 to seriously consider abolishing the death penalty and ensure that the rights of detainees on death row are not violated (UNHCHR, 2009).

There have been quite some developments as far as legislation, policies, reforms and establishment of new institutions that could promote in Human Rights and democratization in Tanzania. But a number of challenges remain:

The Commission for Human Rights was established in 2001, after a lot of efforts by CSO were made. Some of the clauses and articles today are better than before. The problem is the lack of good will in ministries to implement these changes. In the Judiciary, we have experienced consistency and good will of the courts in addressing problems facing public such as electoral law. The new president has already visited prisons, this is the first president doing so, and Kisanga told him that, there have been changes in prison and now prisoner's sleep on mattress. The president and prime minister seem to be quite senior politicians, but I am not sure if other bureaucrats could, implement the government policies. (PI: Chris Maina Peters 31 May 2006).

Despite the harsh critique from the opposition and the NGO's, it can be noted that there has been a strengthening of some of the institutions that oversees the executive, and hence have strengthen the horizontal accountability. In addition to the institutions discussed in the previous sections, a Commission for Human Rights and Good Governance (CHRAGG) become operational in 2002. CHRAGG is an independent government department, established as the national focal point institution for the promotion and protection of human rights and duties as well as good governance in Tanzania. It has the mandate to keep a check on the misuse of office and the abuse of power by elected and appointed officials, take action when human rights are not respected and even prosecute the offender when necessary (URT 2010).²⁵

5.5 Corruption & nepotism/clientele networks

Corruption is both an impediment for democratic development, and an important sign of bad governance and how power structures can be used for personal gains. High levels of known corruption might signal either that the democratisation process has moved ahead allowing media, opposition parties and CSOs to publicly debate corrupt behaviour in the ruling elite, or that actually both increased corruption and democratisation occur in parallel.

²⁵ CHRAGG was established under Article 129(1) of the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania of 1977 as amended by Act No. 3 of 2000. CHRAGG network with international, regional, and other national agencies and institutions in the areas of protection and promotion of human rights and administrative justice (URT 2010).

In both the theoretical and policy oriented literature on development, corruption is regarded as a major constraint for development as it undermines good governance and democracy in a number of ways. Othman (2001), a (late) distinguished professor at IDS at UDSM, states for instance that corruption involves the use of money to influence a person or a decision towards a certain direction. Access to sources of funding creates possibilities for buying power, patron-client networks, and increased influence. Corruption in elections and in legislative bodies reduces accountability and representation in policymaking; corruption in the judiciary undermines the rule of law; and corruption in public administration results in the unequal provision of services. More generally, corruption weakens government institutions by disregarding official procedures, siphoning off the resources needed for development, and selecting or promoting officials without regard to performance. At the same time, corruption undermines the legitimacy of government and such democratic values as trust and tolerance.

In Tanzania, corruption as in most African countries has permeated all sectors of society. With a weak justice system, it is possible for resourceful persons, companies, or political parties to buy their right through corrupt practices.

Corruption and the fight against corruption have been on the agenda since the struggle for independence in Tanzania. As Nyerere stated in his speech *Corruption as an Enemy of the People* to the (pre-independence) parliament on 17 May 1960:

There is another enemy, which we must add on the list of these enemies' poverty, disease, and ignorance (...). We can do something about poverty, (...) disease as long as honest men are carrying out their jobs. (...) But if our people cannot have absolute confidence in their Government, in the people to whom they have entrusted their welfare, how sir, are you going to wage this silly war against poverty, disease, and ignorance? (...) There is corruption. I think corruption must be treated with ruthlessness (...). I believe that corruption in a country should be treated in the same way as you treat treason. If people cannot have confidence in their own Government, if people feel that justice can be bought, then what hope are you leaving people? (Nyerere, 1967: 82)

After liberalisation of the economy in the mid-eighties, corruption increased. Pressure on the government from donors and the citizens made the government appoint a commission to investigate corruption. Chief Justice Warioba was entrusted to be commissioner, and hence the commission was named the "Warioba Commission". The government's white paper of 1996, based on the "*Warioba Report*", concluded, "*corruption pervades all levels of society, petty as well as grand*". The detailed investigation of the Warioba report revealed the extent of corruption sector by sector, including names, institutions, and the embezzled amount being clearly stated. Expectations were created that the Mkapa government would take a firm anti-corruption stand. The government

stated a policy of zero tolerance with corruption. Gradually a comprehensive body of regulations laws and oversight institutions aimed at preventing, investigating, and creating sanctions against corrupt practices have been established. These include establishment of the Prevention of Corruption Bureau, a Good Governance Coordination Unit, and the Ethics Inspectorate Department. In 1999, the government adopted a National Anti-Corruption Strategy and Action Plan, aimed at improving competence and changing attitudes in the public service as well as strengthening the legislative framework. Prevention of Corruption Bureau (PCB) was established in the President's Office, in order to be close to the executive. The PCB investigates and works to prevent corrupt practices and is open for the public to report suspected corruption. Campaigns are also undertaken to make the public more aware about corrupt practices.

The second Mkapa government (from 2000) re-confirmed the commitment to fight corruption. The government elected in 2005 has continued to put fight the against corruption as one of its major political objectives. Strong commitments are made by the Tanzanian legislative and executive to enhance the fight against corruption in addition to the comprehensive and extensive body of laws, regulations, and oversight institutions aimed at preventing, investigating and creating sanctions against corrupt practices. But little has happened in practice.

The critique against the PCB is massive from various sources, both within the opposition and among intellectuals in the wider civil society. Three types of critique are put forward: 1) The PCB should be an independent body with its own statutory power. Its location in the President's Office makes it difficult for PCB to investigate grand corruption. 2) The PCB does not have enough resources (both in terms of staff and competence) to make effective investigations, and work preventively. 3) The legal system is in itself corrupt. When the PCB manages to bring cases all the way to the court, the process often is delayed or sabotaged in the court. The evidence for this is that so far the only cases that have been brought to court and concluded are related to petty corruption (PIs: with Brian Cooksey, Lawyers, HR activists and researchers).

The "*State of Corruption in Tanzania. Annual Report 2002*" (ESRF and Front Against Corruption, 2002-) made a detailed investigation of the corruption for the period 1996-2001 and concluded that legal and institutional prerequisites for effective anti-corruption work were at hand and a slight improvement in the fight against corruption could be noted in the early 2000s, but with large variations between sectors. The most corrupt sectors were the health sector, the police, business licensing, the judiciary, the tax authorities, education, and public utilities. In 2006 Afrobarometer/REPOA (2006a) claimed that corruption had increased, while Transparency International (TI) contended that that it is decreasing, according to *State of the Public Service Report 2004*.

According to the same report, the key areas of accountability remained too weak to fight corruption effectively.

Tanzania's ranking on TI's corruption perception index (CPI) has improved from 2.2 (out of a clean score of 10) in 2001 to 2.9 in 2005, placing Tanzania as number 91 out of 163 ranked countries (Transparency International, 2000-2006). In the CPI, Tanzania is ahead of its neighbours Mozambique ranked as 99, Uganda as 105, Rwanda 121 and Kenya 142 (out of 163 countries see Table 1 below).

Since 2005 a number of large-scale corruption scandals have been widely exposed in the press, debated and pushed forward in the parliament as discussed in the section on the parliament. Either this could be taken as a sign of the increasing political space and capacity of the press and parliament to get access to information and make it public, or that corruption has increased. In TI's Corruption Perception Index Tanzania fell from 91 in 2005, to place 94 in 2007, and 126 in 2009 (out of 180 countries). Tanzania thus slipped down by 34 places in the ranking from 2007 to 2009 (Table 1). Possible reasons for the perception that corruption is increasing could be that there is the lack of transparency in the fight against corruption; slow and cumbersome conduct of corruption prosecution cases—with few cases being concluded (TI 2010).

Table 1 TI's Corruption Perception Index for East Africa 2000-2010

	2000 N=89		2003 N=130		2005 N=158		2007 N=179		2010 N=180	
	Rank	Score	Rank	Score	Rank	Score	Rank	Score	Rank	Score
Rwanda	—	—	—	—	83	3,1	111	2,2	66	4
Tanzania	76	2,5	92	2,5	88	2,9	94	3,2	116	2,7
Uganda	80	2,3	113	2,2	117	2,5	111	2,2	127	2,5
Kenya	85	2,2	122	1,9	144	2,1	150	2,1	154	2,1
Burundi	—	—	—	—	130	2,3	131	2,5	170	1,8

Source: Transparency International CPI report for each year, www.transparency.org accessed 20100816. Compiled by Jonas Ewald. Score varies between 0-10, where 10 mean no corruption. Note that the number of countries has increased from 2000 to 2010 and hence the ranking cannot be compared directly over the years. Move to below table.

Corrupt practices have involved different societal elites (PI: Cooksey, Baregu, Kiondo). The elite(s) in a poor country like Tanzania is comparatively small. The “thin” elite stretches across different sectors and influential families often have relatives or followers in both the public and the private sectors. Different elites are joined in complex networks of mutual dependence and favours. However, even if the elites are thin, the network and social structure of the elites is complex. No family, clan, or groups of families dominate all sectors today. The liberalisation of the economy has strengthened local Asian commercial groups as well as enabled new investors to establish themselves

in Tanzania, not seldom perceived with distrust or dismay by fractions of the “internal” elites. In this context, the issue of the need for “indigenisation” of economic activities have been brought back. The “indigenisation” argument is used both in populist mobilisation and as an argument in power struggles between rival businessmen (debate media 2009).

Various forms of corruption within the political parties are a hotly debated issue, not only in Tanzania. As Carothers (2008: 7) notes:

Political parties are often enmeshed in corruption, both in attempting to gain power and in exercising power once they have it. Efforts to find systemic methods to reduce corruption without addressing the party domain are incomplete. More generally, attempting to support positive political reform, including greater accountability, without engaging with political parties leaves out a key set of actors in the overall political process.

One example is *Takrima* “traditional hospitality”. In the first election act there was a clause accepting and defining *takrima* as a gift, given in good faith. Until 2006, politicians could invoke this clause and offer clothes, food, cash, and construction materials during campaigns. The opposition criticised the clause as the candidate/party with most resources used it to buy votes (interview NCCR, CUF and Peters). The high court banned *takrima* in 2006. In our interviews with various stakeholders there was a widespread claim of corruption in the primaries within the different parties, but particularly within CCM (PI: Harod Sungusia, Senior Advocacy Officer, THLRC 31 May 2006; PI: Ibrahim Lipumba, Chairman, CUF, February 2010; PI: Bakome, NCCR-Mageuzi, December 2005, June 2006; PI: Andrew Kiondo, Professor, PS, UDSM 1999, 2000, 2001; PI: Azaveli Feza Lwaitama, UDSM 2006; Laurean Ndumbaro; Brian Cooksey).

On the grand corruption level, the opposition claim that CCM uses corrupt methods to finance its activities (Lipumba, NCCR). The intertwining between state and party opens up for possibilities for that. However, the Kikwete government, elected in 2005, has taken a firmer stand against corruption. As stated above Tanzania has now a quite well developed institutional framework for anti-corruption. But still corruption is widespread and deep, according to several observers (PI: Brian Cooksey, Ibrahim Lipumba, and Chris Maina Peters) and TI.

A challenge in Tanzania, and other democratising countries, is that formal democratic processes generate demand for anti-corruption policies, but the lack of mechanisms for continuing participation by the public or political parties impedes the effectiveness of anti-corruption measures (Cooksey, 2006). It is undoubtedly of great value that formal democratic processes have allowed the public to express their demand for

anti-corruption initiatives, be it through elections, the media or other democratic institutions. However, if the political culture and governmental procedures do not allow the regular and self-initiated participation of non-state actors in anti-corruption policy making it will reduce the latter to “closed shops” with a limited basis of support and no external supervision or feedback (Mmuya and Hussmann, 2007).

The number of corruption cases taken to court increased from 58 in 2005 to 627 cases, out of which five were cases of grand corruption, in May 2010. At the same time, there have only been a mere 21 convictions, up to May 2010 (The Citizen 20100810). The number of corruption cases taken to court could be interpreted in different ways. The government argues that it is a clear indication of its seriousness on the issue, and the frequent reporting on corruption is an indicator on the freedom of the press. The opposition, on their part, argue that even if it is a step forward that so many and even senior officials can be taken to court on corruption issues, very few cases so far have resulted in a conviction. This might undermine people’s confidence in democracy and question whether the government and ruling party is sincere in its claim to fight corruption (PI: Lipumba 2010, Baregu 2010, NCCR 2010). I wind up this section on corruption with the conclusion from a recent report on corruption in Tanzania:

Fighting the scourge of corruption is one of the priority areas under President Kikwete’s administration. There is a general understanding at all levels that corruption is bad and therefore that it should be eradicated. However, despite these reform efforts, enforcement of anti-corruption laws and regulations remains limited and anti-corruption institutions suffer from a lack of resources, staff, and coordination. The general problem, it has been noted, is not the absence of anti-corruption statements and legislation, but the lack of political will to put them into effect (Santucci and Njuguna, 2009).

After this analysis some aspects of the tensions between good governance reforms and democratisation we turn the indicator “autonomy of the executive and the representative vis-à-vis the donors”.

5.6 Decision-making in an aid dependent country—challenges for democratisation

Decision-making, governance and accountability are even more complicated in a country like Tanzania where international development cooperation is such an important source of funding, for both the state budget and various projects outside the state budget. On the one hand, the funds are needed and appreciated not only by govern-

ment, but parliament, NGO's, universities and range of other actors that are financed by aid money. On the other hand, the donors have their interest, polices, "best practices experience", and legitimate need to account for how taxpayers and others money are spent. What we like to discuss in this section is the tensions between the effort to strengthen democratic structures and accountability mechanism, and international development cooperation. Noting that a large part of aid aim to promote democracy in a broad sense, through various means, mechanisms, sectors and actors.

**Box 1 The four level dialogue structure between URT and donors
2008—A complex challenge**

1) The Sector and Thematic Areas Working Groups represent the lowest level in the new Dialogue Structure. All Sectors and Thematic Areas follow the clusters of the MKUKUTA, based on policies and strategies for a particular sector/thematic area. Sectors include: Agriculture, education, water, health, industry and trade, infrastructure, energy and minerals, whilst Thematic Areas cover governance, domestic accountability, public service reform, HIV/AIDS, anti-corruption reforms and gender.

2) Four Cluster Working Groups (CWGs) work to maintain dialogue between government, development partners and domestic stakeholders on all issues relating to MKUKUTA clusters and macro-economic and financial management. SWGs provide an important forum for the General Budget Support (GBS) dialogue. Each of the four existing clusters builds on a number of Sectors and Thematic Areas, e.g. Cluster 1 (Growth and Income Poverty) builds on Agriculture, Industry and Trade, Energy and Minerals, Natural Resources and Tourism, Lands and Human Settlement and Infrastructure Sectors in addition to the Employment Thematic Area.

3) The MKUKUTA-PER main group maintains dialogue between the government, development partners and domestic stakeholders on the national MKUKUTA implementation and budget/Public Expenditure Review process with General Budget Support (GBS) and the Joint Assistance Strategy for Tanzania (JAST) processes being integrated within these processes.

4) The Joint coordinating group is intended to provide the highest level of dialogue in the coordination of development assistance, including overarching development policy discussion, harmonisation, and alignment of development partners' programmes, projects and budget support in support of the implementation of MKUKUTA and MKUZA. The JCG includes participants such as Permanent Secretaries and DP Heads of Cooperation.

The work of the JCG is complemented by an informal forum for dialogue, the Development Cooperation Forum (DCF), chaired by the Government's Chief Secretary and attended only by a selected number of DP representatives (at Ambassador-level) Source: (<http://www.tzdp.org.tz>) and interviews/discussions with Staffan Herrström, Thorvald Åkesson, Anders Frankenberg, Erik Jonsson).

One challenge for Tanzanian government—an parliament—has been the great number of multilateral, bilateral, and other actors who have been and are involved in development cooperation. It is a challenge for the government to overview the total available funding, as well as activities. In addition all donors demand contacts, time for negotiations, development of programmes and projects, reports, evaluations and goodwill. Moreover, different donors have different forms and modalities for aid, programming and reporting. This makes a lot of demands on meagre administrative and political resources. It is also a challenge for the democratisation process. To whom is the government accountable, to donors who provide crucial funding or to the citizens that have few resources to pay taxes? How are policies designed? Who is deciding on policies? In addition, where are these decisions made? Moreover, how can political parties, citizens, and civil society get access to information and arenas to participate in these processes? Who is in the driver's seat? Where is the ownership of the process?

After the discussions in the nineties, donors realised that there was a need for simplifying and coordinating aid activities in order to ease the burden for the government, and make it possible for the government to get a larger degree of ownership and control. This discussion took place in the broader global discussion on international development cooperation that later resulted in the international agreement between donors and development partners on aid effectiveness, the Paris Agenda, in 2005.²⁶ It was agreed that aid is most effective if the five inter-locking principles of ownership, alignment, harmonisation, results, and mutual accountability were used to guide development cooperation. *Ownership* means that governments, in consultation with parliament and civil society, take charge of their own development plans and use aid in a coordinated manner to implement those plans. *Alignment* includes that aid is distributed in a manner that supports a country's development plans and uses local systems. The principle of *harmonisation* implies that donors should coordinate their support to particular developing countries to simplify procedures, reduce duplication and transaction costs. *Managing aid for results*, aid management, and planning should be driven by a focus on monitorable (and measurable) results; and fifthly, *mutual accountability*; that donors and recipients of aid should be accountable to each other, in a transparent manner, for aid effectiveness (OECD 2010; Wohlgemuth

26 The Paris Declaration, endorsed on 2 March 2005, is an international agreement to which over one hundred ministers, heads of agencies and other senior officials adhered and committed their countries and organisations to continue to increase efforts in harmonisation, alignment and managing aid for results with a set of monitorable actions and indicators. At a follow up meeting in 2008 in Accra, the commitments agreed in the Paris Declaration were further developed in the Accra Agenda for Action (AAA) (OECD 2010). The Paris Declaration was based on the earlier Monterrey Consensus on Financing for Development (2002), the Rome Declaration on Aid Harmonisation (2003), the Marrakech Memorandum on Managing for Results (2004).

2009). General Budget Support (GBS) was also made the preferred modes of aid, as it is supposed to give the government better overview and control over incoming resources.

In Tanzania, the discussion on the need for and appropriate mechanisms for how to coordinate aid (re-)started in the mid nineties, and in the 2002 the government decided upon a Tanzania Assistance Strategy (TAS), in dialogue with donors. TAS aim was to strengthen aid coordination, harmonisation and alignment as well as national ownership and government leadership of the development process, based on “13 best practices”²⁷. From 2002/03 until 2004/05, the TAS served as the medium-term framework for development co-operation (URT, 2002b). In 2006 a Joint Assistance Strategy for Tanzania (JAST) was developed, largely by the government, but in close cooperation with the donors. JAST aims to be more comprehensive than TAS, going beyond the 13 best practices and four priority areas of the TAS and covering all aspects of the development partnership between the government and development partners as well as the role of non-state actors (URT, 2006a). JAST is Tanzania’s national strategy for managing development co-operation between the government and its development partners (DPs) to achieve national development and poverty reduction goals. Whereas the JAST document outlines main objectives, principles, commitments and broad arrangements for JAST implementation, the JAST Action Plan and Monitoring Framework specifies the concrete actions to be undertaken by the government and DPs to put JAST into practice during its cycle of implementation (2006/07-2010/11). The JAST Action Plan and Monitoring Framework also lists a range of monitoring indicators for assessing progress in achieving JAST commitments and objectives (JAST 2007).

The cooperation structure is very complex and involves donors, the government, and CSOs. The MKUKUTA is supposed to be the main coordinating framework. The cooperation structure is largely built around the MKUKUTA clusters and themes. The structure is complex and quite difficult to overview, and hence a challenge for the

27 The 13 TAS best practices are (1) the government takes leadership in developing policy priorities, strategic frameworks and institutionalised co-operation mechanisms in various areas and sectors; (2) the government involves civil society and the private sector in developing national policies, strategies and priorities; (3) the government prioritises and rationalises development expenditures in line with stated priorities and resource availability; (4) resources are integrated into a strategic expenditure framework; (5) reporting and accountability systems are integrated; (6) resource disbursements are adequate relative to prior commitments; (7) the timing of resource disbursements is responsive to exogenous shocks to the Tanzanian economy; (8) development partner policies complement domestic capacity building; (9) firm aid commitments are made for longer time periods; (10) public financial management is improved; (11) the government creates an appropriate national accountability system for public expenditure; (12) ministries, regions and districts receive clean audit reports from the Controller and Auditor General; and (13) reporting and accountability at national and sector level is transparent (URT 2002).

democratisation process as it is difficult for the political parties, CSOs, and media to have access to, information and knowledge about the process. And of course this is even more difficult for the citizens (See figure 10 in appendix).

In 2008, a new Dialogue Structure was endorsed and is supposed to guide the co-ordination between the government, development partners, and domestic stakeholders by integrating all major national and sectoral development interventions into a single structure, whilst retaining government exclusivity on its internal dialogue. The structure covers four main levels: Sector and Thematic Area Working Groups, Cluster Working Groups, MKUKUTA-PER Main Group and the Joint Coordinating Group.

What we can note is that there are relatively well-developed structures and capacities for coordination within the government, on the donor side and to a lesser extent between the donors and government. The largest challenge, from a democratisation point of view, is that this structure is highly complex and difficult to access for actors outside government, donors or even for actors in the ruling party that are outside the process, from MPs to members of the NEC in CCM. And of course, it is even further away from the citizens in the villages or townships.

It should be emphasized that a number of important donors stay outside the JAST-process and continue to work through project by project directly with the government, complicating the picture above even further (Wangwe, Wohlgemuth 2010), not the least the new huge “vertical funds” for specific development issues, like the PEPFAR.²⁸

The aim with this presentation was to show how complex the policymaking and governance process are in an aid-dependent country like Tanzania. In the context of this study, we use this as an illustration of the challenges it brings for the democratisation process, rather than analysing the shortcomings or advantages of the mechanisms as such. Again, it raises the question to whom the government is accountable, the “development partners” and their need to report how their taxpayers’ money is spent, or its citizens in Tanzania? For “the international development partners” it is a delicate balance between the Paris agenda’s objectives to strengthen ownership and promoting democracy, and to hold the government, and other actors receiving aid, accountable for using aid according to agreed principles and objectives.

The challenge with this complicated structure for the democratisation process, is that it is difficult for various actors, not the least for the opposition, for the parliament, CSOs and media, to get access to information, understand the process, find entry points and get access to space in these complicated structures, and to find out when it is possible for them to have influence. Linked to that challenge are the prevailing at-

28 President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), a vertical fund started by US President Bush in 2003, channelling large amounts of funds for projects to fight against AIDS in 12 African countries.

titudes and culture within the government, that limit access and information for non-government actors (PI: Lipumba, Komu).

In discussions I had with different representatives for the donor community it was stated that it at times could be difficult for the donors to overview the process, and to get access to fora where decisions were made (Discussion with the Swedish ambassadors Thorvald Åkesson 2006 and 2007, Staffan Herrström April 2010, Torbjörn Petterson, Country Economist Bertil Odén, Jörgen Levin, desk officers Sida).

5.7 Conclusion

Hence, a number of the necessary policies, institutions, and legal framework for democratic governance are in place, as well as the regulations to give them a mandate to pursue their activities. However, the capacity, and maybe the political will, to implement the mandates are still weak. In a recent study evaluating the CHRAGG, concludes:

The constitutional and legal mandates of the commission are clear, but its current capacity makes it appear to be a white elephant because it has been prevented from being as effective as it should have been. Basically, it lacks the resources to implement its mandate, though it has succeeded in pursuing some of the human rights and good governance issues brought to it (Mallya, 2009: 33)

Similar conclusions could be drawn for the institutions we have analysed in this chapter. The institutions of the executive, the parliament, and the judiciary are established, but the executive is relatively stronger than the other two branches of the government. In the legal framework a clear division between the executive, the parliament, and the judiciary has been made. The challenge is, however, that the capacity of the parliament and the judiciary still is lagging behind the executive. Hence, both the parliament and judiciary need to be further empowered in order to be able to exercise their democratic mandate. We have also pointed at some of the challenges for a strengthening of national democratic decision-making that international development cooperation brings about.

On a local level, the reforms have brought about a decentralisation.

Despite a number of reforms, Tanzania is still in 2010, I would argue, in transition from a one-party to a consolidated multiparty democracy.

Administrative reforms—good management rather than democracy?

The reforms of the public sector at different levels are strongly influenced by the New Public Management Approach aimed at establishing a small, accountable, transparent,

efficient, and less corrupt public sector (Bangura, 2000; Therkildsen, 2001). This is an important step towards a more efficient state apparatus that can facilitate economic growth, and democratisation. An efficient, transparent civil service is a cornerstone in the building of a democratic society.

However, in the context of the attitudes of public servants, the hierarchic and centralistic structure of the public administration, and focus on managerial reforms rather than accountability, the administrative reforms might also undermine the democratising aspect of the well-intended reforms—as the increased capacity of the administration might be used by to strengthen key public servants and ministries. While the weak resource base of the parliament, the opposition, and NGOs does not enable them to develop their capacity at the same pace as the public administration. The public sector reforms might in that way even maintain undemocratic forms of governance. Such reforms must therefore include making the parliament, opposition, and CSOs strong enough to monitor the work of the civil servants and the presidency, including access to information and openness (Abrahamsen, 2000; Kelsall, 2003; Kelsall et al., 2005; Kelsall and Mercer, 2003). There is also a need for changing the mind-set of public servants to be accommodating to the public's demands (Mwapachu, 2005).

The reforms have thus strengthened the executive and managerial functions of the government, on central and local levels, compared with the representative function. This observation is also supported by the evaluation of the budget support 1999–2004 URT (2006b), a study on the patterns of accountability in Tanzania Mmari et al. (2005) and a study on the PRSP process (Gould and Ojanen, 2005).

According to the interviews carried out with MPs, the political parties and NGOs, it was hard for them to be part of the process, not the least because they did not share or were part of the epistemic community.

A similar phenomenon is also true for the extensive local government reform process, according to the findings from the field studies. The better-educated “technocrats” in the local administration are empowered through the local government reforms, at the expense of the democratically elected district councils. Most of the councillors are peasants with at best seven years of primary education, and feel that they have little opportunity to monitor the administration, according to our interviews.

This conclusion is supported in the literature, see e.g., Shivji (2003).

Since the election in 2000, a number of efforts and reforms have been made to strengthen the parliament and the councillors in the local government. MPs and councillors have been educated, and the institutions strengthened. The work in the standing committees has improved. A new parliament building was inaugurated in 2006, with better facilities for the MPs, not the least computers, a library and research assistance.

The parliament has a functioning homepage with information on procedures and bills. Nevertheless, the imbalance remains.

6

Sphere 3 and 4:


Political Institutions outside the state. Media, NGOs, democratic culture and economic development

In this chapter, we discuss a number of institutions outside the governmental structures that contribute to vertical accountability and hence are a fundamental part of the process to consolidate a more substantive democracy. I will present findings on different aspects of the civil society, the media, the NGOs and lastly on the democratic culture and inclusive economic development, the third and fourth sphere in the analytical framework presented in chapter 2, and in the segment of that framework in figure 7.

In Tanzania, like in many newly democratising countries, media play a pivotal role for the democratisation process, hence we will put a little more emphasis on the media than the other two institutions analysed within the CSOs.

We start with briefly situating the civil society theoretical context. In democratic theory, civil society is usually defined as an arena of action and interaction, operating from spaces between the family, the state, and the private sector. It exists in the plural, as it is cross-cutting in its approaches to sectors and issues, and absorbent and reflective of a basically unlimited range of interests, purposes and influences, as discussed in chapter 2. As an arena of action and interaction, civil society is shaped, first, by the nature of the needs and interests it responds to, and, second, by the specific environment that determines its room for manoeuvre, for mobilisation, co-operation, articulation and influence.

Figure 7 Sphere 3. Civil Society



In liberal democratic theory the CSOs promote a democratic development in at least 13 different ways, as summarised by Diamond 1999 in box 2 below. CSOs are, together with the political parties, an important part of the vertical accountability mechanism.

Civil society in Tanzania has been shaped by the history of authoritarian tradition from the colonial era and later on during one-party rule. For several decades, therefore, civil society was largely restricted to activity within the agendas and control of the state. However, some membership-based organisations and institutions developed during the first years of independence and later during the one-party era and expanded from the late eighties up to today. In a context like the Tanzanian one, where the civil society and opposition parties were weak after years of statist development, the media has come to be one of the major actors in the democratisation process. Hence we give a little more space to the analysis of the media sector and its role, its independence and some of the challenges the sector is facing.

For democracy to be established it is necessary to establish the institutions of democracy, but is not sufficient. For consolidation of democracy, a democratic culture encompassing all actors, institutions and mind-sets is needed. The democratic culture is discussed in section 6.3.

The economic society is discussed in 6.4. below.

Box 2 13 ways the civil society promotes democratic development and consolidation of democracy:

- Checking and balancing the state;
- Supplements the political parties in stimulating political participation, increasing political efficacy and skill of democratic citizens and promotes an apprehension as well as rights of democratic citizenship;
- Education for democracy of citizens, organisations, state institutions and companies;
- Construct multiple channels, beyond the political parties for articulating, aggregating and representing interest;
- Effecting the transition from “clientelist” to citizenship, that is to strengthen “horizontal” relation of trust and reciprocity—and undermining “vertical” relations of authority and dependence, like patron-client relations;
- A rich and pluralistic civil society contributes to crosscut and mitigate longstanding political conflicts built on regional, ethnic, religious or partisan cleavages;
- Recruitment and training of new political leaders;
- Explicit democracy-building activities, like monitoring of elections, human rights and debates on issues related to democracy;
- Build coalitions to consult on and support economic reforms;
- Conflict resolution and mediation;
- Strengthen the social foundation of democracy;
- Disseminate information and so empower citizens in collective pursuit of their interest and values

Source: (Diamond (1999:239-255)

6.1 The media—straddling the political, economic and civil society

In democratisation theory, the role of a free media is crucial for democratisation. The media can play the role of watchdog of the political and economic society, provide information for the citizen, provide space for political debate and hence facilitate both horizontal and vertical accountability. All media does, however, not necessarily play a democratising role. It could be used by used as a megaphone for the political and/or economic elite—or ruling party; it could focus on entertainment rather than facilitating a democracy. In order for the media to do play a democratising role, there must exist a regulatory framework allowing for press freedom, access to information as well as monitoring of the power holders. In addition, there need to be media companies/institutions with capacity and organisation to fulfil their role (Diamond 1999, Hydén 2001).

A question often discussed in the literature is whether media is a part of civil society or not. Most media institutions are either private companies, and thus should rather be classified as part of the economic society or owned by the state or political parties, and is classified as part of the political society. In both cases, the media can have an important civil society function to keep citizens and civil society informed, monitoring the political and economic society—and the civil society—and holding them accountable. In this section, we analyse the media sector in Tanzania, identifying challenges that the media are facing in their role as a democratising force.¹

The media developed strongly from the mid-nineties in Tanzania, printed as well as broadcast and Internet based media. In 2006, there existed more than 100 newspapers, even if most have very limited distribution. In 2000 there were just 0.6 newspapers per 1000 inhabitants. This increased to 1.6/1000 inhabitants in 2004 (the latest available figure in January 2010 in WDI (2009)). This is low even compared with other countries in the region. In SSA, the average was 12.1 newspapers/1000 inhabitants in 1998 (again the latest figure available in WDI 2009).

The media has played an important role as a catalyst for political reforms in Tanzania, in the absence of a strong civil and political society. The media now plays a major role as an opposition and helps keep the government in check, providing a voice for the opposition, citizens, and different interest groups (interviews with researchers Kiondo, Mukangara and Baregu at UDSM, TMC and NGOs). Even if limited to urban areas, the press also plays an important role in public education with regard to issues related to democracy and human rights.

Most media are based in Dar es Salaam, the commercial capital. Newspapers published in Dar es Salaam are available in most district headquarters and other urban centres the day after they are published. Regional and local newspapers are also emerging. The outreach of newspapers in rural areas is, however, very limited. *Maelezo*,² the government information service, assess that 90% of the circulation is in urban centres, serving less than 17 per cent of the population. 50 per cent of the distributed copies of newspapers are sold in Dar es Salaam (Malazelo accessed 19/05/2009).

In the mainland, approximately 20 television stations (including those owned by District Councils and largely being receiving stations) and 30 radio stations are in operation. Radio Tanzania, the state radio channel, for many years was the only domestic radio station. It broadcast a mixture of policy information, educational programmes

1 There exists a range of various theories on the media. I will limit my self only to aspects of media in relation to democratisation.

2 *Maelezo* or Tanzania Information Services (TIS) is a governmental department and the spokesperson of the government on all matters relating to government policy and its implementation in the development process (<http://www.tanzania.go.tz/maelezo>, accessed 17/05/2009).

and propaganda for the ruling party and some music and entertainment programmes. The government-owned radio was transformed into an executive agency in 1997 and today formally provides broadcast time for views for all political parties.

A number of competing radio stations and community-based radio projects have been established since the early nineties. Mostly, however, they are owned by either religious associations—that broadcast mainly religious programmes and educational programmes—or commercial enterprises that mainly broadcast lightweight music and entertainment programmes. Neither provides very much space for political debate or programmes that are more informative. The argument is that people are tired of the educational programmes provided by the state radio channel before and prefer listening to music and entertainment, according to Pili Mtambalike:

Most Tanzanians listen to FM-stations, particularly for music. Radio Tanzania is considered boring and many Tanzanians are not interested any more. Radio One and RFA are the most popular channels [music and entertainment channels] (PI: Pili Mtambalike, Tanzania Media Council, (TMC) 6 June 2006).

However, there are a number of exceptions. For instance is the University of Dar es Salaam based research program (Research and Education for Democracy in Tanzania (REDET), broadcasts a weekly radio programme on current political issues (Kiondo, Mushi). In addition, opposition parties, NGOs, or private enterprises can buy time to air their programmes. In practice, however, there is limited broadcasting of competing views, according to the opposition in the interviews we did. The opposition also lack economic resources to buy airtime and have limited capacity to make radio programs (see chapter 9). There has, however, been a gradual improvement, and in the period after the elections in 2005 there has been a much wider reporting on the opposition and its points of views (PI: Lipumba, Komu).

Television reception and coverage are limited to the major cities and the richer strata of the population that can afford to buy TV sets. A major problem for the media producers is people's limited purchasing power, which makes the media dependent on incomes from advertisements and hence vulnerable for eventual changes in the flow of advertisements. The cost for production and distribution of local TV programmes is high and the capacity to make programmes limited. Therefore, most programme listings are dominated by cheap international productions, including news. Entertainment programmes, like soap operas not least from South Africa and Nigeria, old films, and music video programmes are the most frequent.

For TV the problems are that most of the news is foreign oriented. ITV has good

programmes, channel 5 is music and MNT is very sexualized. We (MTC) have suggested that 60% of the TV programmes should be local and 40% should be foreign, but the reality is that 90% are foreign and only 10% of the TV programmes are local. We need to have well trained journalists on specific programmes so that we can develop local programmes. If the government want to close the media because of programming being 90% foreign, almost all the media will be closed. Singers are also dominating in our media. (PI: Pili Mtambalike (TMC), 6 June 2006)

Most newspapers tend to be dominated by “yellow” journalism,³ that is sensational journalism, not always based on well-researched stories. Nevertheless, a number of more serious newspapers have emerged, particularly those printed in English and targeting external and internal elites. Among them are the authoritative weekly *Business Times* and its competitor *Financial Times* and the dailies *The Guardian* (IPP), *This Day* (IPP) and the *Citizen* (Mwananchi) with their Kiswahili sister papers *Nipashe* and *Mwananchi*. *Mtanzania* and the African, from Habari Corporation are also rated as more serious papers (PI: Kiondo, Mukangara, Ndumbaro, Shao, TMC).

6.1.1 Structure of media—part of the economic and political society

The aim with this sub-section is to show how a private media industry has developed as a result of economic reforms/liberalisation thus providing a critical counter-balance to the government, and government owned/controlled media. However, the media are closely related to the largest business interests in the country. And some of those interests in turn have a close relationship to the ruling party, which might limit their function as an independent “civil society” watch dog, both of the political and economic society. It also point at that the division between civil society, economic society and political society in the liberal theory of democratisation, is not that easy to uphold in a context like Tanzania and Africa, as e.g., Nyamnjoh (2005: 40ff) has pointed at, and which I will try to illustrate through a brief analysis below.

In Tanzania, three private media groups controlled a substantial part of the media in 2006: the IPP group, the Maarifa group, which includes the Habari corporation, and the Business Times group. The IPP and the Maarifa groups are regarded to be close to CCM, even if they are private (PI: Kiondo, Baregu and Mukangara on various occasions). The IPP media group owns *Guardian Ltd.*, which publishes some of Tanzania's

3 Yellow journalism is a type of journalism that downplays legitimate news in favour of eye-catching headlines that sell more newspapers. It may feature exaggerations of news events, scandal mongering, sensationalism, or unprofessional practices by news media organizations or journalists. Campbell (2001) defines yellow press newspapers as having daily multi-column front-page headlines covering a variety of topics, such as sports and scandal, using bold layouts (with large illustrations and perhaps colour), heavy reliance on unnamed sources, and unabashed self-promotion (Wikipedia 6th of April 2009.)

leading weekly and Sunday newspapers: *The Guardian*, *The Sunday Observer*, *The Daily Mail*, and the *Financial Times* in English. The papers are targeting educated and professional Tanzanians, and foreigners. Papers in Kiswahili include *Nipashe*, *Nipashe Jumapili*, *Alasiri*, *Kasheshe*, and *Taifu Letu*. IPP's broadcast media include *Independent Television Ltd.* (ITV), *East Africa Television* (EATV, formerly Channel 5), *Radio ONE*, *Sky-FM* (in a joint venture with BBC) and East Africa Radio.

The IPP group of companies is one of the largest in East Africa and includes a Financial Consulting firm (IPP Consulting), a soft drinks bottling company in a joint venture with Coca-Cola (Coca-Cola Kwanza, Bonite Bottlers and Kilimanjaro Spring Water), Tanzania's leading manufacturer of soaps, detergents and toothpaste (IPP Bodycare Ltd). The main owner of the group is Reginald Mengi, a high profile businessman who uses his media as a platform to voice concern over contemporary political, social and economic issues. Mengi was born in Kilimanjaro region and is at times seen as an example of the overrepresentation of people from that region in Tanzania's economic, administrative and political life.

Habari Corporation publishes *The African*, in English and in Kiswahili *Mtanzania*, *Rai*, *Daima* and *Bingwa*. The chairman and CEO of Habari Corporation is Jenerali Ulimwengu, a senior journalist and a radical youth activist in the sixties and seventies. He has served as Member of Parliament 1995-2000, Member of the CCM executive committee, District Commissioner and Chairman of the National Sports Council. He was appointed to Benjamin Mkapa's campaign team for the presidential race in 1995 (East African 25/02/2002). Even if Ulimwengu is closely related to CCM, he is a critical voice in the Tanzanian society. As newly elected MP, Ulimwengu was part of a leftist caucus that drafted the bill in 1995 designed to control corruption among leaders. The papers *Rai* and the *African* were started in 1993 with the objective to provide critical journalism and have since been regarded as producing reasonable pieces of critical and investigative journalism, writing about corruption and other misuse of powers in Tanzania. He is an active member of the Tanzanian civil society. Ulimwengu is for instance a member of the board of *HakiElimu* (www.hakielimu.org). He hosts a popular weekly TV program, which analyses and debates policy, politics, economics and social life in Tanzania.

We can use Habari Corporation as an example how the press freedom is limited in various formal and informal ways. Ulimwengu's paper started to publish stories on corruption and mismanagement in the Mkapa-led government. The state gradually reduced its advertisements in Habari Corporation media, and as the state is one of the most important advertisers the company's economy was hollowed out. Moreover, in 2001, Ulimwengu was declared stateless by the government of Tanzania, and denied

Tanzanian citizenship on 12 February 2002, despite the fact that he was born in 1948 in Kagera region, Tanzania. He was educated and has spent his professional life in the country. The government argument was that even if he was born and had lived in Tanzania for his whole life, he was a Rwandese, as his parents were of Rwandese origin and never applied for Tanzanian citizenship (Pan African News agency 3/1 2002). The move was strongly criticised as an infringement on press freedom by media, human rights activists and university staff. 11 NGOs objected to the government action because it went against President Mkapá's pledge for transparency and the immigration laws of Tanzania. A petition was signed by 141 university lecturers and Dar es Salaam University Academic Staff Assembly made a statement in defence of freedom of speech and the press 16/02/2001 stating:

If a country becomes intolerant of criticism and dissent and allows its journalists and academicians to embrace a culture of sycophancy and spineless bootlicking, that country will soon lose its national bearing and gradually plunge into abyss of autocratic misrule (Cited from East Africa 25/02/2001).

After a long process, Ulimwengu was granted citizenship by naturalisation in March 2004 (East African 15/3/2004). Ulimwengu's case was one out of several where journalists have either been expelled or denied citizenship (MISA).

The treatment of Ulimwengu illustrates how delicate the press freedom is. It contributes to self-censorship by individual journalists and maybe media owners/editors. If such a well-established and prominent journalist—and owner of a media house, can be treated like that, it is not difficult to understand if an individual low-level journalist is careful with what he or she writes.

There are other examples of the close connection between business interests, media and the ruling party, CCM. The Minister of Livestock, Anthony Diallo, owns *Sahara Communications Ltd* that operates *Star Television*, one of the larger TV stations. He also owns *Radio Free Africa* and the weekly magazine *Msanii Africa* (Daily News).

The Business Times Group Ltd is publishing the authoritative weekly *Business Times*, and in Kiswahili; *Majira*, *Dar Leo* and the sports paper *Spoti*.

A change in the Tanzanian media landscape was brought about in 2003, when the Nairobi based Nation Media Group—the largest and most professional media company in East Africa, owned by the Aga Khan—bought *Mwananchi*, with the aim of publishing two high quality newspapers, *The Citizen* in English and *Mwananchi* in Kiswahili, in collaboration with two of Tanzania's largest businessmen, Rostam Aziz and Ferdinand Ruhinda, a former ambassador turned businessman and close ally to

former President Benjamin Mkapa. The improved salaries, management, editing, equipment/working enhanced the conditions for journalists, and improved the quality of the journalistic work. This development has challenged the media sector in Tanzania and has led to improvement of most papers. Among the improvements are better-researched stories and more investigative journalism. IPP media started a new paper, *This Day*, in order to meet the challenge from the Citizen (interviews with journalists and TMC). As a result, Tanzania got two competing high quality papers. The *Mwananchi* and *Citizen* had more local contents compared with other newspapers and make an effort to do investigative journalism (IPI: Sebastian Constantine, journalist/senior business editor, the Citizen 6 June 2006; Hussein, journalist senior news editor Financial Times, Guardian Media Group, 5 June 2006).

In late 2006, Rostam Aziz fell out with the Kenyan counterparts, allegedly on the reporting on the Kikwete government, and bought majority shares in Habari Corporation, the largest private media house in Tanzania, considered as having high quality and being a vocal critic at government. Aziz renamed the company *New Habari Corporation Ltd.* After the purchase there was less critical analysis of government and CCM activities, according to respondents interviews, as well as in Indian Ocean Newsletter (October 27, 2006). Aziz is one the larger businessmen in Tanzania, with a Tanzanian-Arabic background. He has been one of financiers of Kikwete's presidential campaigns and of CCM. He was elected MP for Igunga, Tabora in 2000 and re-elected in 2005. He is advisor to the party on economic and financial issues, and became treasurer of the *Chama Cha Mapinduzi* (CCM) after the election of 2005. In 2007/2008, he was implicated in large-scale corruption in connection with the Richmond scandal (see below) and was not re-elected as treasurer.

6.1.2 *Is the media independent today?*

Apart from the legal restrictions that affect freedom of speech, there are a number of informal constraints for the media. Corruption in the media itself is an issue that continuously has been discussed, not the least in connection with the elections in 2000 and 2005. It ranges from "petty" corruption in terms of political candidates having to pay for transport and food for journalists in order to get election rallies or press conferences covered (interviews with political parties' candidates) to more large-scale corruption.

Dependence on advertising revenues might reduce the propensity to write critical reviews of the government that is the major source of advertising revenue, or the private companies, and hence limit the "civil society" window of the private media companies.

Journalists' salaries are very low and their working conditions are bad, with some

variation between the companies. Many of the journalists still work on a free-lance basis and thus neither have time nor resources to do thorough investigative journalism (PI: Hussein, Senior Editor Financial Times). This makes journalists susceptible to go for extra income, which might interfere with their objectivity. Low salaries and bad working conditions make it difficult for media companies to attract qualified staff. It also opens up for journalists/media to ask for different types of compensation for a journalistic job to be done, from small to more large-scale corruption, as illustrated below with two quotations from one senior journalist, and from one senior journalist and director for the Tanzania Media Council:

Also the working environment is not so conducive, and you might find two or more journalists sharing one computer. No access to telephone, Internet or transport etc. I worked on a newspaper and I was getting 12,000 Tsh per week. [10 US\$] Sometimes journalists are bribed due to low pay to publish information, which favours certain business people or institutions. Corruption in Tanzania is a cultural syndrome. Even if journalists are well paid, they are open for corruption. (PI: Sebastian Constantine, senior editor/journalist The Citizen 6 June 2006)

Also we face corruption in media, particularly in music. An example is Bongo Flavours [The very popular Swahili Rap music] promoted by local media, and there is a story that if you want your music to be broadcasted you have to pay the broadcaster, instead of the artists being paid (PI: Pili Mtambalike, 6 June 2006).

Even worse is that low payment and status might lead to self-censorship or corruption, in particular if the journalist is reporting on influential business people, who often also have political functions:

It is very rare to report on financially strong people, because powerful people have money and they can even eliminate you physically. If you [as a journalist] report about them you either need to have strong courage, backed up by your media company—or have to use self-censorship or take a bribe, even if people know that the person you are writing about is corrupt. (PI: Pili Mtambalike, 6 June 2006)

The level of education of most journalists is comparatively low. This gives journalists and journalism a low social status. Low level of training in combination with difficulties to attract qualified staff affect the medias' ability and capability for quality journalism (interviews with journalists, MISA, Tanzania Media Council, political parties

and (Kilimwiko, 2002)). Another challenge is that the type of training well-educated journalist have is not always useful in the practical work of making a newspaper:

Journalists are not exposed much to journalism training and they do not know how to produce good news. I.e. if the graduates come, they cannot even translate a press release into something that is readable in a paper. These are complaints we get from the common people. University graduates perform very well, but they are detached from a practical and realistic school of thought. Sometimes it is very difficult for them to write hands-on reports and news. If you want journalists with technical skills you have to go to the technical colleagues, because the journalist education at the university is much too theoretical (PI: Pili Mtambalike, 6 June 2006).

Lack of relevant training also makes it difficult for journalists to do investigative or more in-depth journalism not only on the political society, but also on private companies, as they lack sufficient knowledge on financial and management issues, how to get relevant information about that and to analyse it (PI: Mr Hussein, senior editor/journalist, Financial Times 8 May 2006).

The owners' political and/or business interest could at times also tend to undermine media's civil society role, as they use media to undermine competitors both within the political sphere and business life, as illustrated in this quotation:

Other problems we do face in media are that the owner's use of their media to suppress their business opponents. Like in the last two weeks, Mr. Mengi [owner of one of the largest media houses, IPP media and a number of other companies] has been using his media industry to fight Mr. Mani [owner of another large media house and large number of companies], and I think the media is supposed to be more issue oriented rather than focusing on personalities. However, this is almost happening in all media, where owners are supporting certain political candidates and undermining others, through slandering or not well-researched stories (PI: Pili Mtambalike, 6 June 2006).

Despite these shortcomings, freedom of the press is considered to be relatively high on Tanzania mainland, while the situation in Zanzibar is worse (Reporters without Borders 2006). However, the legal framework does to a certain extent limit the freedom of the media; in particular through a number of "claw back clauses" making vague threats in referring to the national security. The government explains their view in the following way *"it respects the freedom of the press, but it does not entertain the 'Free Freedom'."*⁴ On the other hand, Article 18 of the constitution provides for the freedom of the press and right to information:

4 Tanzania government home page (<http://www.tanzania.go.tz/>).

(1) Without prejudice to the laws of the land every person has the right to freedom of opinion and expression, and to seek, receive and impart or disseminate information and ideas through any media regardless of national frontiers, and also has the right to freedom from the interference with his communication.

(2) Every citizen has the right to be informed at all times of various events in the country and in the world at large which are of importance to the lives and activities of the people and also of issues of importance to society.

Media and human rights organisations criticise the three acts in which the activities of the press are regulated for being too imprecise and vague, and for being used by the government to circumscribe press freedom and the right to information. The acts that have most severe impact on the press are *The Newspaper Act 1976 (Act No.3/1976)*, which gives the president powers to prohibit any publication from being imported or printed if he/she finds that it jeopardises national interest. The 1976 Newspaper Act licenses print media organisations. *The Broadcasting Service Act (Act. No. 6/1993)* establishes that the commission under section 6(1) issues broadcasting licenses, regulates and supervises broadcasting activities—and that the commission is responsible for standardization, planning and management of the frequency spectrum. *The National Security act*, with its origins in the English Official Security act of 1911 (sic!), gives the government authority to define what should be disclosed to, or withheld the public from in the name of national security. Media and NGOs have criticised the act for the fact that the term national security is not defined (PI: Mtambalike, Peters and Haji June 2006). Therefore the right to information and expression can just be arbitrarily denied or granted. The Broadcasting Services Act 155 allows the government to regulate the electronic media. Towards the end of 2008, one investigative newspaper *MwanaHalisi* was suspended from operating for three months (up to January 2009) by the government on allegation of seditious stories against the government. In 2009 the three newspapers *Kulikoni*, *Taifu Letu* and *Sema Usikike* were suspended by the government, on the same pretext as *MwanaHalisi*.

Freedom of opinion and expression is guaranteed by several international human rights instruments mentioned above. Moreover, Article 18 of the Constitution of 1977, which is the same as Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966 and Article 19 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights of 1981, provides that, every person has a freedom of opinion and expression of his ideas. Despite this wide freedom of expression guaranteed by the supreme law of the country, those enacted laws and regulations in Tanzania that we have discussed above, in one way or the other infringe on the right to opinion and expression. According to TLHRC the international human rights standards must always prevail over contradic-

tory national laws. That is why TLHRC and other media stakeholders find it necessary to amend certain provisions of the laws of Tanzania (TLHRC 2010).

A survey that was conducted by IDASA/ODAC in collaboration with MISA-TAN in 2004 indicated that accessing information in Tanzania by a normal citizen was difficult. Apart from the challenge of unavailability of infrastructure, there are the laws discussed above, which contain harmful provisions to the detriment of the right to freedom of information and the press. In addition, *The Public Leadership Code of Ethics Act, Cap. 398* prohibit publication of information regarding assets, interests and/or liabilities of public leaders.

Journalists – not to mention the public – do not have the right of access to public information, according to the law, with roots in the colonial era. It is even illegal to receive information from an official who is not authorised to pass on that information (HakiElimu, 2005). Access to information produces huge constraints for the journalists to monitor the public sector. Apart from formal constraints, the democratic culture suffers in terms of the officials' attitude towards disclosing information, as stated below by one senior journalist:

The journalists have a red tape and attitude problem with getting information from government officials. They are not ready to disclose government information. Even if there is a policy that they should share certain information with the public and journalists, they hide the information requested. Presidents Mkapa and Kikwete have been working on changing the public servants' attitudes to provide information to the journalists. At least the situation now is improving. We are very optimistic with this new government (PI: Sebastian Constantine, senior editor/journalist, *The Citizen*, 6 June 2006).

Even if existing legal restrictions are not frequently used, they tend to instil self-censorship among the media (PI: journalist and media organisations). There has been an ongoing debate on a bill regarding freedom of access to information that has been prepared for tabling to parliament since 2005. The media owners' association and NGOs believed that the proposed bill was too restrictive and retrogressive on freedom of the press.

The long awaited finalization of the proposed Right to Information Bill came in 2008 and the Media Services Bill, 2008 did not bring any substantial changes, according to TLHRC. The tug-of-war regarding the contents of the proposed media laws dragged the enactment process and left it stalled by the end of December 2009. One of the issues, which dissatisfied the media stakeholders, is the Bill's proposal to restrict access to information to documents only when the source is any of the government agen-

cies. Access to all documents containing cabinet deliberations, proposals and papers to be presented to cabinet for discussion, policy formulation processes, and many other documents would be exempted. In that way important information on the ongoing policy process would not be available to the civil society, media, or the public.

There have been a number of cases where the government has tampered with the press, on the mainland and in Zanzibar, based on the above acts (interviews with researchers TMC, journalists and political parties). Some journalists are highly critical and do not fully agree with *Reporters without Borders* statement above that press freedom is relatively good in Tanzania. Lawrence Kilimwiko, the chairman of the association of journalists and media workers (AJM) in Tanzania states for instance in his booklet from 2002 that:

The media operates under a very restrictive framework. (...) Tanzania has never had a free media. So many laws that are very restrictive hamstringing the media. Likewise, freedom of expression as provided in the constitution is seriously eroded by a plethora of laws dating back to the colonial era. (...) The press must obey totalitarian laws while serving a society in transition to a liberal political economy. That there is press freedom is a myth (...). (Kilimwiko 2002:45)

In April 2003, the National Assembly enacted the Tanzania Communications Regulatory Authority Act, and a new policy regarding information and broadcasting. These actions were regarded as positive for media independence and freedom of expression, but the government still maintains control and influence over the media through the legislation mentioned above. And the media and NGOs are not impressed:

The legislation has not really been changed. The Legal Sector Reform Programme, proposed to introduce a law on access to information. The government is now through the ministry drafting a freedom of information act. In 2005, there was a change of the constitution. Article 14 speaks about freedom of assembly and association, but there was a clause that limits that freedom. That clause was removed. We are not moving fast in this area, but the President and Prime Ministers have made several speeches insisting on access and freedom of information. However, so far it is just speech and not a policy. (PI: Pili Mtambalike, 6 June 2006)

For example, the Ministry of Information suspended the Kiswahili newspaper *Daima* for two days in December 2005 for printing an unflattering photo of President Mkapa. This was imposed under the Newspaper Act, which allows the minister for information and culture to prohibit any publication of any newspaper “in the public interest” or “in the interest of peace and good order”.

But as can be noted from the quotation above, a great change to the better has taken place in the period up to 2010.

6.1.3 *Political Parties' Views on the Media*

If a lively multi party system with open political debate is to be established, a sign of a consolidated democracy, the opposition political parties must also have access to information, media and public space. The opposition, however, claim that they have difficulties to get access to media, not the least between elections. It is, not surprising, more difficult to get exposure in media owned by or close to the state, or the ruling party, as we can see from the quotation below.

We do not easily get access to the government owned media such as RTD, TVT, Daily News or Sunday news. We get better exposure in the independent media. We sometimes get space to broadcast our view, but we have to pay for that. And it's very expensive. But CCM is covered for free, at least by the government owned media. Journalists can collect information from the opposition or find critical information about CCM. But it is the owner of the media that decides which information that is reported. Most of the media are based in Dar es Salaam and do not have enough resources to travel to the regions and can thus not report about our party activities outside Dar es Salaam or monitor what CCM is doing (PI: Mr. Shabani Akwilombe CHADEMA Deputy Secretary General and Mr. Erasto Shija, Election Officer, 20th May 2006).

In interviews with the opposition, a common perception was that it is not only the state or party owned media that limit reporting on the opposition's political activities, but as emerges above and below, also the large private owned media that are close to CCM. Reporting on political activities outside Dar es Salaam/Dodoma is a challenge not only for the opposition, but also for all different actors.

We got similar views from CUF chairman Ibrahim Lipumba:

The media was basically bought by CCM in 2005. The press was almost only covering CCM and particularly Kikwete. CHADEMA got some press but the other opposition parties hardly any. We felt as if our campaign activities were boycotted. It became even worse after the elections were postponed. The Zanzibar election took place on 30 October 2005 as scheduled. The results announced by the Zanzibar Election Commission did not match with the results we received from the polling stations and we protested vehemently. We just did not accept the Zanzibar results. When the results came out there were a lot of demonstrations at our headquarter in Dar es Salaam demanding that we should

do something to get the correct results in the Zanzibar election. We had announced a press conference in our Dar es Salaam headquarters. Journalists came as requested. They came in the midst of a heated demonstration outside our offices and some journalists were beaten up. I went to see one particular journalist that was wounded to apologize, and he told me that the person that beat him and kicked him probably was not a CUF member. The perpetrator had worn army boots and he suspected that he was from the security services. I apologized to the journalists and the media house but after that sad incident, the media particularly the IPP media that is the largest media house in the country, with television station that has widest coverage in the country, radio network and numerous newspapers completely boycotted us. We were only covered when there was something negative to report. For example they did report that my laptop was stolen although it was not my laptop but a flash disk (PI: Ibrahim Lipumba April 2006/February 2010).

Another challenge is what type of reporting of the activities of the opposition is reported. In the cases when the opposition is reported upon, it is when there is something negative to report, as we can see from the quotation above from the in 2005 largest opposition party, CUF. This might tarnish the legitimacy and reputation of the opposition. It should be noted that this is the perception of the opposition, and we have not discussed these particular incidents with the media or CCM.

The views of the political parties will be further developed in the next chapter.

6.1.4 New media/technology and democracy

The rapid spread of mobile telephones and to a lesser extent Internet has created opportunities that could be used to enhance democracy. The Internet and e-mail provide access to global/regional, national and local information and networks. Internet cafés are found in most regional centres and district headquarters. The number of Internet cafés increased rapidly after liberalisation up to the early 2000's. Many could however not be sustained because of over-establishment. The government made an ICT strategy in 2003 (URT, 2003). In that strategy it is estimated that in 2002 the total numbers of Internet subscribers (Dialup accounts and Wireless) in the whole country were only 14000, in a country with around 35 million inhabitants at the time.

The number of Internet users was estimated to be only 500 in 1995, in 2000 it had increased to 40,000, and 2009 to 676,000, but still just above 1.5% of the population (table 2 below). The vast majority of the population cannot afford to use the services of an Internet café or own a computer.

Table 2 Mobile subscriptions and Internet users 1995-2009

	1995	2000	2005	2009
Mobile cellular subscriptions (1000')	3.5	111	3390	17469
Mobile cellular subscriptions (per 100 people)	—	0.3	8.7	40
Internet users (1000')	—	40	384	676
Internet users (per 100 people)	—	0.1	1	1.5

Source: World Bank: World Development Indicators 2011

One of the major technological changes that have benefitted the democratisation process is the rapidly increasing expansion of the mobile telephone nets. The number of mobile phone subscriptions has increased spectacularly, from 3500 in 1995, to 17.5 million in 2009, which means that there were 40 mobile phone subscriptions per 100 people in 2009 (table 2). The mobile telephone has promoted the democratisation process in several ways. It has helped the political parties to organise their activities and consolidate their organisations. The following quote illustrates how several party and NGO activists stated how the mobile telephone has simplified and promoted their work:

(...) before we had mobile telephones it was very difficult to reach out to our grassroots organisations with urgent information and for them to contact us. For instance during elections it is not unusual that you have to reschedule campaign meetings due to bad infrastructure, rains or harassment from local officials. People waited in the sun and got tired and went home. When the Presidential candidate got to the meeting point it could be difficult to get people back as they had started other activities. Now we can maintain contact and reschedule accordingly (CUF campaign manager 2005 election).

More important is that mobile telephones offer an opportunity for citizens and parties to monitor local authorities and officials. The combined power of mobile phones, mapping technology and social networking can enable citizens in crisis to seek help, facilitate aid deliveries, bear witness to abuses and hold governments and aid agencies more accountable. One example is that it has helped political parties to maintain contact between different levels of their organisation in the vast country. Another is that for instance the opposition established parallel structures for reporting votes from each constituency, in order to avoid manipulation of voting results. Local party agents report results directly from each counting station upwards in their own organisation and hence make it more difficult to attempt to rig the counting process. NGOs' activities are enhanced in a similar way, making it easier to maintain contact, organise meetings

and coordinate activities (interviews with CUF, CHADEMA, NCCR-Mageuzi and TLP party representatives and TANGO).

6.1.5 *Press freedom in Tanzania – recent development and comparison with EA*

A number of changes have taken place since 2005. Media stakeholders have completed drafting proposals for two media related bills, the Right to Information Bill Proposals (2007) and the Media Services Bill Proposals (2008).

The freedom of the press has increased quite substantially since 2005. A number of very critical analyses of large scale corruption have been published in major media, like the newspapers *The Citizen*, *This Day*, *Mwananchi* among others pointing at the former president Benjamin Mkapa. The prime minister and running mate to Kikwete in the election of 2005, Edward Lowassa, were forced to resign in 2007 as a result of information from the press on corrupt practices. It was not only the first time such information was allowed to be published, but also the first time such a top-ranking politician had to resign due to well-grounded information of corrupt behaviour being made public – a big step forward for the civil society function of media, and for democracy. The quality of the press has improved. Stories appear to be better researched and thus are more difficult to be dismissed by the government or private companies.

On the other hand, there are recent examples of limitation of press freedom. In October 2008 the newspaper *Mwana HALISI* was banned for three months after it published a story claiming to link prominent persons in the ruling party CCM to an alleged secret plot to oust President Jakaya Kikwete. The ban was severely criticized. Various media actors, including *Media Institute of Southern Africa* (MISA) *Tanzania Media Women Association* (TAMWA) and editors of newspapers staged a demonstration in Dar es Salaam (The Guardian 20081029).

But as a whole, press freedom in Tanzania has improved and is rated the highest in East Africa, 10th in Africa and number 62 out of 175 countries assessed by *Reporters without Borders* (Reporters without borders, 2010b). Press freedom has improved from 2002, when the first index was published, to 2010, from an index mark of 21.5 to 15.5, as emerges from Table 1. It should be noted, however, that the indicator does not assess the quality of the media, but press freedom without regard to the content of the media (and thus, e.g., if pornographic material or ill-founded slander are banned from being published it is rated as an infringement of press freedom). According to Reporters without Borders, the local media is very diverse and includes quality newspapers. But fairly strict laws can lead to censorship, if reporting is deemed to be “contrary to the public interest” and for “sedition”.

Table 3 Press freedom East Africa 2002-2009. Marks and ranking compared the world.⁵

	2002		2005		2009		Rank in Africa
	Mark	Ranking (N=139)	Mark	Ranking (N=167)	Mark	Ranking (N=175)	
Tanzania	21.5	62	17.5	74	15.5	62	10
Uganda	17	52	19.3	80	21.5	86	
Kenya	24.8	75	30	109	25	96	
Burundi	24.5	72	23	90	29	103	
Rwanda	37.5	107	38	122	64.7	157	

Source: Reporters without borders (2010a)

The newspaper *Leo Tena* was, e.g., shut down in January 2010, for publishing alleged pornography and the investigative weekly *Kulikoni* was suspended for three months because of a report about the army which the government perceived to lack evidence, without the matter going before the regulatory authority, the Tanzania Media Council. In Zanzibar, press laws are stricter and local government monitoring more severe, though the situation has eased in recent years. Censorship and harassment have become less and the population has free access to the mainland media (Reporters without borders, 2010b).

The challenges as well as progress in the media sector are well summarised by an editorial on World Press Day 4 March 2010, in *The Guardian*, one of the English-speaking newspapers (The Guardian, 2010), where among other things the importance of access to information is highlighted, for media, as well as for the political and civil society, to be able to play its democratising role:

Tanzania has recorded major gains in the march to freedom of the press. The country has the biggest choice of private and public newspapers in East and Central Africa. It has a growing number of private and public electronic media,

⁵ The mark ranges between 0 (for Denmark) and 115 (for Eritrea). The index measures the amount of freedom journalists and the media enjoy as well the efforts made by governments to see that press freedom is respected. The marks are based on a questionnaire assessing press freedom and asking for details of direct attacks on journalists (such as murders, imprisonment, physical assaults and threats) and on the media (censorship, confiscation, searches and pressure) and the degree of impunity enjoyed by those responsible for such violations. It includes an assessment of the legal environment for the media and the behaviour of the state towards the public media and the foreign press. It also noted the main threats to the free flow of information on the Internet. The questionnaire was sent to people with a real knowledge of the press freedom situation in one or more countries, such as local journalists or foreign correspondents living in the country, researchers, legal experts, specialists on a region and the researchers of the Reporters without Borders International Secretariat. It does not take account of all human rights violations, only those that affect press freedom (Reporters without Borders 2010a).

giving a bigger choice of information sources. The media, despite constraints, has been able to accomplish a lot, in its watchdog role. It has gone on to boldly expose several corruption scandals, some of them grand, embezzlements, mismanagement and outright thefts, most times putting the journalists and media houses pursuing such stories on collision course with the powers that be. And indeed, in undertaking these risky assignments, many a journalist and media houses have tasted the wrath and retributions of those they dared touch. Most have remained steadfast and we salute them for their courage and resoluteness. And march on they must, in spite of the prevailing constraints, including the lack of legal protection in the course of their work.

A lot remains to be done to get to the ideal press freedom, which guarantees the other basic rights and freedoms in the country. Indeed the process to get the right to information written into law has been dragging, due to an apparent reluctance on the part of the government. But it is in the best interests of the government to have the law in place soonest (...).

We expect members of parliament, whose main task is to ensure that government ministers and officials implement agreed plans and policies, intensify efforts to get the right to information passed into law to consolidate transparency and accountability.

The government needs to play its full role by not only enacting the right to information act, but also by doing away with all the other constraints to press freed (The Guardian 20100304).

To conclude this section on the media: if we connect back to the issues in the focus of this study, it is obvious that the political and economic reforms have created the foundation of much more diverse media. At the same time, this brief analysis shows that the media in Tanzania are part of or closely allied to the political society, the economic society or state owned, which limits their critical civil society functions in various ways. It is thus difficult to argue that the media as whole by definition are part of a civil society. To publish yellow journalism of various kinds, or even sports etc., is, even if it is an indicator of the freedom of the press, hardly to be regarded as part of civil society activities. The press in Tanzania does, however, play a fundamentally important role as a watchdog of the government and the private sector, and hence is an important part of the civil society. The capacity, quality, distribution and freedom of the press have improved dramatically in Tanzania since the multiparty system was introduced in 1992. However, we have in the course of this study identified a number of challenges that limits the capacity of the media to play their civil society/democratising role:

- Dependence on revenues from advertisement
- Low purchasing power of the public

- Limited distribution
- Dominance of yellow journalism
- Bad working conditions for journalists
- Low salaries and education among journalists
- Self-censorship and various types of corruption
- Close connection between large business interests and ruling party
- Laws and regulations that infringe on freedom of the press
- Uneven access to information; and the need for the new act of right to information
- Attitudes among public servants about not disclosing information
- Public sector reform aimed to change the attitude among the public servants

Hence, media *can* be an important part of a democratisation process, and have a very strong potential for that. But they could also, as Nyamnjoh (2005:2) notes, be a “vehicle for uncritical assumptions, beliefs, stereotypes, ideologies and orthodoxies that blunt critical awareness and make participatory democratisation difficult”. Even if a number of the above mention challenges also exist in more “developed” countries, not the least the dependence on revenue from advertisement, it must be looked at in the context of the small formal economy, and the relatively small economic and political elites—and hence much less alternative markets than in a more diversified economy and society.

6.2 CSOs and Participation

In democratic theory, the civil society plays a fundamental role in the democratisation process. Its role is to voice issues and concerns from the citizens and to monitor the government, and in that way contribute to keeping the government accountable. Here, we will focus on a more narrow aspect of the civil society, the civil society organisations (CSOs), not the civil society as a whole (see discussion in chapter 2 on civil society). In this section we explore some views on the challenges for the CSOs in relation to the democratisation process in Tanzania since the introduction of multiparty democracy in 1992. Among the CSOs, I will focus on the NGOs that work with accountability and democratisation, and on trade unions and cooperatives.

6.2.1 NGOs in Tanzania – rapid expansion, but who do they represent?

The civil society organisations in Tanzania is a complex web of traditional institutions; Community Based Organisations (CBOs); professional organisations, co-operatives, trade unions, faith based organisations and semi-state NGOs, and NGOs (Kiondo and

Nyang'oro, 2006; Kiondo, 1995; Kiondo, 2002; Shivji, 2004). Hence the character of the civil society is extremely heterogeneous, encompassing foundations; consultancy firms in the development business—some implementing services earlier provided by the state; religious associations; professional associations; and a few social movements. However, most are neither member based nor characterised by an internal democratic culture or praxis (Mogella, 2007).

The number of NGOs has increased dramatically the past 20 years since the first structural adjustment programs were introduced in 1986. The figures vary between different sources. According to the Vice Presidents' Office, the number of registered NGOs increased from less than 200 in 1989 to 2700 in the year 2000 (URT, 2000a). In an interview with Tanzania Association of NGOs (TANGO) it was claimed that the number of NGOs increased from 187 in 1986 to more than 9,000 in 1999. This appears to be on the high side and might include CBOs and cooperatives. Note that in the Tanzanian legislation NGOs, trade unions, co-operatives and faith-based organisation are separated, and hence a great number of CSOs exist in addition to NGOs, which we discuss further below.⁶ In 2009, the number of registered NGO's was around 3200 (Tanzania Policy Forum, 2011).

The proliferation of CSOs is a result of a combination of democratisation, weakened state capacity to deliver social services, and a deliberate government policy of allowing larger involvement of NGOs in the provision of different services, in line with the ideology behind the SAPs to limit the role of the state. The majority of the NGOs are based in Dar es Salaam, often with limited membership and they do not necessarily have democratic structures or culture. The NGOs are heavily dependent on donors' funding and often closely connected to professional interest groups.

Very few NGOs are to be regarded as social movements, in a Scandinavian sense of the concept, as social movements or interest organisations with internal democratic procedures and culture. There are of course a great number of activists and professionals with strong commitment that work in various ways to provide social services, advocacy work and make effort to hold government at various levels accountable. But

6 NGOs are according to the URT NGO Act, 2002, Section 2, defined as “ a voluntary group of individuals or organization which is autonomous, non-partisan, non-profit making, which is organized locally at the grassroots, national or international levels for the purpose of enhancing or promoting economic, environmental, social or cultural development or protecting the environment, lobbying or advocating on issue of the public interest of a group of individuals or organization, and include a non-government organization established under the auspices of any religious organization or faith-propagating organization, trade union, sport club, political party, or community based organization; but it does not include a trade union, social club or a sports club, a political party, a religious organization or a community based organization.

many NGOs are to be regarded more as consultancy firms or small-scale entrepreneurs providing social or consultative services of different kinds, making effort to get contracts from international or national actors. Not least the NGOs that are started by staff from the public administration or the universities are among these. In addition we have the international NGOs (INGOs) with activities in the country, by them selves, or in alliance with Tanzanian NGOs.

Very few of the smaller Tanzanian NGOs have the skills needed to undertake comprehensive policy analysis and formulation, research, advocacy or outreach activities (TANGO self-assessment 2006). Few have a clear vision of their mission as civil society organisations. In order to strengthen the NGOs and their accountability functions, four major NGO umbrella organisations have been created: Tanzania Association of NGOs (TANGO); Tanzania Gender Network Programme (TGNP); Tanzania Media Women's Association (TAMWA) and Tanzania Council for Social Development (TACOSODE). A number of networks also exist in the fields of human rights, land rights and environmental issues. NGOs in some districts has formed network to strengthen their capacity. One of the main constraints for the emergence of a more democratic society was and still is the lack of arenas for participation and voicing one's opinion (Kiondo 1999, 2000, DFID 2000)(AFRODAD, 2002; Gibbon, 2001; Kiondo, 2002). The CSOs has continued to expand, both in numbers, members and activities. Global networks and better communications have increased the capacity of NGOs, even though most have limited capacity both in terms of human, institutional and economic resources. However, most NGO's are top-down organisations organised by various elite groups rather than emerging from grassroots, or social groups. Several interviewees pointed at the fact that many NGOs developed as a direct response to donors interest to find "partners" outside the state, along the lines with liberal theory to reduce the state. Even if NGOs might address concerns of the marginalised groups, or "masses", it is not, as (Shivji, 2004) argues, an activism *with* the people but *for* the people that are the *beneficiaries*. In the process the civil society organisations that have a long tradition an anchorage in Tanzania, the traditional organisations and the trade unions, has become marginalised.

The donor press for finding ways to have a "civil society dialogue" with "stakeholders" in order to promote "democratic governance" also promote emergence of new NGOs. As the donor's also finance the policy processes, the government is pushed to be in dialogue with these new NGOs (Shivji, 2007). Donors finance the new NGOs that succeed to organise in response to the new demands. Consultants need contacts with the "civil society" and consult the NGOs that have been created in the process. But the question is, whom does these NGOs represent?

The more participatory processes around the government budget process and the formulation of policies have gradually provided the NGOs with new arenas. A few developed NGOs have managed to use the new space to forward their views and participate in the policy formulation processes, like TGNP, *HakiElimu* or Tanzania Legal and Human rights centre. In that way more democratic spaces has been created. This does not always concur with the government's interest or perceptions of what an NGO should or not should do. This was clearly illustrated in September 2005 when *HakiElimu*, the strongest educational NGO in Tanzania, disseminated a critical report on the first phase of the primary education programme. The report was based on the government's own reports and findings and highlighted a number of challenges in the education sector. *HakiElimu* was banned from undertaking any studies or publishing any reports on the education sector, with the argument that it was relaying misleading information on education in Tanzania and gave the ministry of education a bad image. President Mkapa stated that *HakiElimu* should not set its foot in Tanzanian schools again until it apologized for what was described as 'ridiculing government efforts in development of the education sector in the country'. *HakiElimu* refused to apologize as the report was based on the government's own findings or well-founded research (PI: Rakesh Rajani *HakiElimu* May 2006 and Mars 2007, *The Guardian* 20051019, 20060407, 20070202). In January 2007, it was banned from continuing to make the popular 45-60 second TV and radio advertisements on rights issues. In March 2007, the ban was lifted after an agreement between the government and *HakiElimu* was reached. The organisations should not only criticise what has been achieved, but also highlight what positive developments that has been achieved. The consequences of the agreement will not, according to its director, lead to self-censorship and the organisation will continue its advocacy work, but include positive developments as well in its reports (PI: Rakesh, 20070326 *HakiElimu*).

The view on the NGOs from the ruling party might be illustrated with the following quotation, an answer on how to strengthen democracy in Tanzania:

It is also impossible to strengthen NGOs to watch the government, because CCM was elected by a vast majority. The NGOs are not elected by people to watch the government. (...) I don't suggest changing the electoral system, because I am satisfied with the current electoral systems. There are some people who may come up with a system on how to demolish CCM, but in Tanzania and CCM in particular we are satisfied with current systems. (...) We always zero out the outcome of the research on a particular section and if you don't believe in

the party system here in Tanzania, you better be quiet. (...) In Tanzania, we do conduct public hearings to involve more people in decision-making and discuss different agendas, and you can get the pros and cons of any agenda and policies (PI: Juma Akukweti, Minister for Parliamentary Affairs, in the Prime Ministers Office, 6 June 2006).

NGOs are not generically good or necessarily democratising, but are part of societal power struggles. Hence it is necessary to analyse the different NGOs social base in order to understand what role it plays in the democratisation process, as for instances pointed at by Nyamnjoh (2005: 31):

“where there are signs of an emerging civil society in the form of voluntary associations, there is a tendency for these to be infiltrated by organisations that are clearly undemocratic in orientation. Thus while civil society as counter hegemony or counter weight to state power may be unproblematic in principle, the reality of organisations passing for civil society is often more complex”.

The problem with Cohen and Arato’s model presented in chapter 2, is that it does not manage to sufficiently capture the essential formal or informal channels of governance that exist in the African context, institutions that straddle between the modern and the pre-modern but still function, like elders councils, clan organisations etc. I will illustrate this with one example from the national and one from the local level. One important form of voice has been the self-recruited “group of elders” that exist on regional level. They are under neither CCM control nor the administration. When regional interest is thought to be at stake they could both convene meetings in the district or send delegations to Dar es Salaam [informant discussion in May 2006]. On the local level, numerous institutions exist that are used for articulation and mediation of interests. The clan council still plays a prominent role in some areas in Tanzania, for example in Arumeru district (group discussion in Moivaro village). The clan council could for instance have views on if land “belonging” to clan/family member should be sold or not. Somehow this contradicts the view that Africa lacks a tradition of civil society. This example goes along with Bratton’s (1998) argument that “far from being stunted in Sub Saharan Africa, [associational life] is rich and diverse”.

As argued by Shivji (2004) and (Shivji and Peter, 2003) the focus on NGO’s has led to the marginalisation of “traditional” CSOs that is, or at least, was organic parts of the society. Another type of CSO organisation that has been overshadowed by the focus on NGOs is the mass based organisations, the trade unions and the peasant co-operatives.

6.2.2 *“Mass based” organisations: trade unions and co-operatives—more representative?*

In both liberal and radical democratisation theory cooperatives and trade unions play an important role for the democratisation process, in at least three ways: as voluntary associations pursuing the member's economic interest, by participating/engaging in debates/dialogues in various forums to promote economic and social policies and lastly through strengthening democratic practices and the democratic culture (Beckman et al., 2010; Kraus, 2007). Hence, peasant/producer and other types of cooperatives and self-help groups have the potential to give members an opportunity to experience real governance in the neighbourhoods and villages where they live and work. In the process, the local community/members are attempting to decide their priorities, discuss common issues, formulate ideas and give voice on aggregated interests to local and central authorities, and market interests. Experience on democratic procedures, principles and culture are developed (Ewald, 1997) and civil virtues and society developed, according to the theory (Ottaway and Carothers, 2000). Trade unions can play a similar role. In radical development theory, mass based organisations are considered to play a pivotal role for societal change as they are perceived to represent the marginalised majority classes of the peasants and workers and important channels for collective action and emancipation. According to Kraus (2007) e.g. democratic trade unions were critical in launching and sustaining democratization in Africa, as “unions represent the popular classes and invigorate democratic life in these otherwise elite-dominated countries” (Beckman et al., 2010). Like the NGOs, the trade unions and co-operatives are part of—and the stage for—various social power struggles.

The traditional mass based organisations in Tanzania, the labour organisations and peasant cooperatives have a slightly different history than the NGOs, but experience similar challenges. Trade unions and cooperatives have played an important role in Tanzania's political history, as discussed in chapter 4. With agriculture accounting for 75% of the labour force above the age of 15 in the year 2006 URT (2007), agriculture based cooperatives have a huge potential for collective actions. The social base of the traditional trade unions is much more limited as only some 11.6% of the workforce has employment in the formal economy.⁷ Trade unions have tried to make inroads in the informal economy, where 10.1 % of the labour force is engaged.

7 Employment in the formal sector is as follows: private 8.6 %; central/local government 2.6 %; and employment in parastatals 0.4 % according to URT 2007 Integrated Labour Force Survey of 2006.

The cooperatives

Cooperatives and local self-help associations of various kinds have played a significant role in Tanzanian development thinking and praxis (TFC, 2006). They played an important role in the independence movement and by 1968, Tanzania's was the largest cooperative movement in Africa, according to Maghimbi (2010: 2). Even if most were agricultural marketing cooperatives, there were a number of consumer-cooperatives and various forms of producer cooperatives. The relatively strong cooperative movement umbrella organisations were nationalised from the late 1960s and replaced with parastatal marketing organisations or state owned companies, like regional trading companies and district development corporations. In 1976 primary cooperatives were abolished and their functions were supposed to be integrated in the village governments, as part of the villagisation programme and the *Ujamaa* policy. The system collapsed and the cooperatives were reintroduced in 1982. But the primary cooperatives were not allowed to be autonomous; they were a part of the village government, which was supposed to be a political wing of CCM *and* a multipurpose cooperative at the same time (Maghimbi, 2010). With political liberalisation, a new cooperative law was decided upon in 1991. Cooperatives became independent of the state and membership voluntary. At the same time markets were liberalised and the new cooperatives were unable to compete with private traders due to lack of capacity, accumulated debts, corruption – and bad reputations among farmers (Ewald, 1997; Ponte, 2002). The problem continued, but the idea of cooperatives as an important tool for people's participation and development thrived, and a new cooperative development policy was formulated in 1997, where it was stated that the cooperatives should build on the International Cooperation Alliances principles. But the problems with the cooperatives worsened (Cooksey, 2003).

A Presidential Special Committee was appointed in 2000 to review the cooperative movement and propose a way forward. In the unusually frank report, the committee cites poor leadership, bad management and theft as among the factors contributing to the poor performance of cooperatives and points at the need for separating the cooperatives from the state, reforming the inefficient, mismanaged and corrupt organisation through a re-democratisation of the cooperatives, re-organisation of the complex structure, and changing policies and legal frameworks (URT, 2000b). A New Cooperative Development Policy was decided upon in 2002, an amendment to the law was done with the Cooperative Societies Act in 2003 and the Cooperative Societies Rules in 2004. A multi-stakeholder team⁸ was established in 2004 to develop a new 10 year stra-

8 The team was composed of 20 members from the cooperatives, the government, NGOs and the academia. The CRMP was developed to be in alignment with the MKUKUTA and the Agricultural Sector Development Program (ASDP).

tegic Cooperative Reform and Modernisation Program (CRMP) for the period 2005-2015 which was decided upon in 2005. The CRMP is built on the earlier documents and identifies the following as main problems: inflexible cooperative structure; weak cooperative leadership and management; having an indifferent, submissive and small membership; weak economic base and lack of strategic planning; lack of adequate capital. The proposed way forward is to revise and re-democratise the co-operatives with the purpose to “initiate a comprehensive transformation process of cooperatives to become organizations which are member owned and controlled, competitive, viable, sustainable and with capability of fulfilling members’ economic and social needs” (URT, 2005a: 4). The cooperatives are organised in a three-tier structure, with primary cooperatives, cooperative unions and the Tanzania Federation of Cooperatives (TFC) at the top. The Savings and Credit Cooperatives (SACCOs) have a separate organisation, with similar structure.

The cooperatives have a considerable potential in the democratisation process. In 2008 there were in total 8551 registered cooperatives in Tanzania with around 1,600,000 members.⁹ Most cooperatives are SACCOs or agriculture related cooperatives. As most members are heads of a household, quite a large part of the population is related to the cooperatives.

The primary cooperatives give local farmers an opportunity to participate in the civil society at the local level. The structure of the cooperatives is supposed to aggregate members’ interests to the national level, where TFC in turn is supposed to participate and represent members’ interests in national dialogues. The cooperative movement is, however, still characterised by the previous mentioned problems, and in similarity with other CSO organisations, has weak capacity of all kinds. Even if the laws and regulatory framework have changed, the cooperatives are still not autonomous from the state/government (Maghimbi 2010).

Trade Unions

The trade unions like the cooperatives played an important role in the independence struggle.¹⁰ The unions were among the strongest social forces outside the state after independence. They continued to mobilise workers, and argued for an “Africanisation” which led to conflict with the newly independent government who pursued a non-racial policy in order to build an inclusive coalition of elites that transcended ethnic,

9 Most cooperatives are SACCOs (4780) and crop marketing cooperatives (2614). There were 185 industrial; 218 service; 129 fishery; and 103 consumer cooperatives; 98 water users/irrigation; 71 live-stock; 11 housing; 4 transport; 3 mining; and 335 others TFC (2009), cited in Maghimbi (2010).

10 The number of members increased from 0 in 1951 to 203,000 in 1961 (Iliffe 1979:539).

racial, religious and occupational boundaries (Shivji, 1976; Omari, 1995). When political parties were abolished in 1963, the African National Congress¹¹ leadership used the trade unions as a platform against the ruling TANU. After the alleged participation in the military mutiny in 1964¹², the unions were nationalised and transformed/fused with the branches of the ruling party/state. For example, the Secretary General of the trade unions was appointed by the president and was at the same time the Minister of Labour. The Secretary General appointed all the top-line officials in the different divisions (Shivji, 1976; Mlawa et al., 2003). In 1977 the trade union organisation was made one out five mass organisations of CCM, *JUWATA*. Salaries were set by the government and announced on 1 May and there was a limited right to strike.

With pressure for democratisation and liberalisation a first step towards autonomous trade unions was taken with the trade union act of 1991, which paved the way for the formation of OTTU/Tanzania Federation of Free Trade Unions (TFTU), consisting of 11 sectoral trade unions. The members were for the first time after 1964 supposed to be allowed to elect their leader. However, the government continued to have control Mukandala (1999). In line with the earlier top-down type of governance, the Secretary General was appointed by the government, and a large part of the old cadre was reappointed, according to an interview in May 2006, where the Deputy Secretary General for TUCTA states:

The new unions were not grassroots rooted. They were created in a top down approach. It was not the members that formed the different unions. Sectorial unions were drawn up by and decided upon by the government. Those who headed the department before 1991 were the ones who were appointed to lead the new unions. This did not satisfy our members (PI: Hassan M Raha, Deputy Secretary General, TUCTA, 31 May 2006).

At the same time the consequences, real or perceived, of the Structural Adjustment Programs started to take their toll in terms of massive retrenchment of state employees and decreasing real wages. As the public sector was by far the largest employer and very few opportunities developed outside the state sector at the time, unemployment increased. Lower wages and retrenchment led to a pressure on the trade unions to take

11 African National Congress' main argument was that TANU was too multi-racial and was not really committed to "Africanisation".

12 The soldiers wanted to Africanise the military and hence to replace the British officers who they felt were looking down upon the African officers and the rank and file, and to increase pay and restore certain fringe benefits. A number of the African National Congress' leaders used the trade unions as a platform for the opposition after the party was banned (Shivji 1986, Havnevik 1993).

their members' issues to the government Chambua (2002), in similarity with other African states (Beckman et al., 2010). The unions at the same time proved incapable of protecting the economic interests of their mostly public-sector and urban rank and file, who had seen their purchasing power eaten away by inflation, economic recession, and the state's retrenchment policies. The confidence in the trade unions - that were already distrusted after their long connection with the state and CCM - was further eroded. The nationwide general strike in 1994 was considered as a first step towards independent unions, even if the strike was not followed up further (Chambua 2002). One exception was the Tanzania Teachers Union (TTU) that managed to organise itself comparably more efficiently, and organised a series of strikes and lobbying acts to improve the teachers' situation. Pressure on the government from the unions, the larger civil society, from within CCM and from donors led to a new Trade Union Act being written which provided for the formation of free associations of trade unions. The eleven sectoral trade unions of TFTA formed a congress in 2001, the Trade Union Congress of Tanzania (TUCTA) (PI: Hassan M Raha, TUCTA, 2006). The unions are now part of a tripartite cooperation with the government and the employers on the market.

Even if the legal framework has given more autonomy to the trade unions, a number of the earlier challenges remain. These are the low capacity, not the least research capacity, to formulate alternatives to the government policies and participate in national dialogues, access to information and the unions' internal democratic structures. Participation in the national policy dialogue on the first PRSP in 2000 was minimal due to a combination of a repressive legislative framework, negative attitude from the government towards the new trade unions and lack of capacity in the unions at the time (Mlawa et al., 2003, PI: Hassan M Raha, Deputy Secretary General, TUCTA, 31 May 2006, PI: Margareth Sitta Chairman Teachers Association, 2003). However, trade unions formed alliances with the ILO, western trade unions, national and international NGOs, to strengthen their capacity for policy work and lobbying in combination with pressure from the international community on the government to be more inclusive and trade unions were able to participate in various forums, not the least in the formulation of the MKUKUTA, the National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty in the period 2004-2005. The trade unions perceive that the legislation still has a number of provisions that limit their associational autonomy. The government control is exercised by the role of the registrar of the trade unions, and restrictions in the right to strike. The new labour law in 2004 removed some of these constraints, the power of the registrar was reduced and the procedures for legally calling a strike simplified, but the government still directly and indirectly control the unions. The trade union movement perceive that the government is still suspicious about its activities (Raha).

In 2006, there were 16 fully recognized and registered trade unions. These include the unions for: local government authority workers; Tanzania teachers; health workers; Tanzania marine and construction; Tanzania railway workers; industry and commerce and finance; Tanzania plantation and agriculture workers as well as conservation and domestic workers. There are also pending applications from security workers companies, fisheries workers and others who have applied to join TUCTA.

Among the internal weaknesses is lack of coordination and proper channels from the local to the national level. This raises issues on whom the national trade unions are representing. The various unions are also competing between themselves over members, which weakens the combined strength of the unions (PI: Raha).

Weak leadership of the unions was also pointed at. An issue that was raised in several interviews was that leaders used the trade unions as a springboard to get appointments in the government or on boards. This makes them less prone to confront the government or other potential employers. The government for its part recruits good leaders from the unions – and undermines their strength. *“Generally the president picked those ministers who are loyal to him, but also those who can address and articulate community frustrations and interests for the government”* (Raha). In a way this was considered to be a good thing, as union interests got a voice at higher levels. The unions have also tried to get a special seat for the unions in the parliament, like Uganda has. The speaker rejected the proposal, instead CCM came up with the move to set aside one special seat for trade union, that is one woman seat representing trade unions. *Strangely enough, CCM is the one who is nominating who should represent trade unions. It could be fair if we could nominate this candidate ourselves instead of CCM* (Raha). For the trade unions, this became a mixed blessing. One of the most outspoken leaders, the Chairman for the TTU, Margareth Sitta, was nominated to the special seat for woman trade union representative in parliament.

She was appointed as a minister responsible for teachers and education as the previous government were facing teachers’ salaries accumulation, and they were expecting to be addressed by this minister. I saw this as a way of silencing the trade union, and if you want to silence the trade union, give them a space for running those difficult areas. If you look at Mrs Sitta minister for education, she is not doing as the way she was saying and planning when she was in the trade unions as teachers’ representative, and in long run she will fail to control her constituencies. (PI: Raha, TUCTA, May 2006)

Several additional examples of the co-optation of trade union leaders could be mentioned here.

Another challenge for the trade unions is that with the economic reforms new economic actors are dominating the economy. With globalisation and foreign investment, the trade unions meet new challenges, in terms of foreign investors, as this statement illustrates:

The on going globalization is causing trouble to labour, because the investors are moving to areas where the labour laws and trade unions are weak. We need to harmonize labour laws within EAC and Africa. Now (PI: Hassan M Raha, TUCTA, 2006).

Privatisation is a challenge for the government and for the labourers. The effects of privatisation in Tanzania, like elsewhere in Africa, have led to vitalisation of the trade unions. The revitalised trade unions and the union activists, are in turn met by resistance from the investors, who try to reduce transaction costs through firing trade union activists, as this statement shows:

The investors come and identify the troublemakers of labour movement and also they say after privatization all staff are redundant and have to re-apply again and in the process all the “trouble-makers” are kicked out. For example, in Geita Gold Mine – the labour movement should not allow operating here. But there was a huge crash, but now they were allowed not to meet in the working hours and outside mining areas. And for that matter we have to be tactical through twining and collaboration.

Investors need to reduce transaction costs through formalization of procedures and regulations because investors know that labour movements should not be left out, because they can cause trouble in the production process, as in the case of TANESCO, NBC Ltd etc. (PI: Raha).

Trade union rights are extremely hard to exercise in practice due to anti-union discrimination in the private sector and serious restrictions on the right to strike, which workers in some occupations are prevented from exercising entirely. Restrictions on exercising labour rights are worst in the island territories of Zanzibar and Pemba, where a distinct legal regime for labour rights prevails (ICFTU, 2006) (LO/FTF Council, 2003).

Another challenge for the trade unions is the changing character of the economy, where most labour is self-employed or works in the informal sector (Egulu, 2004; Fischer, 2011). The self-employed have more of a business orientation than traditional blue and white-collar workers. Trade unions hence need to change their strategies to

reach self-employed workers. The number of members in the trade unions was estimated to 330,000 in 2005 (PI: Raha, TUCTA). This could be compared with the 203,000 members in 1961, with a much smaller population and labour force in the formal sector.

The relative importance of the trade unions depends on how membership is measured and what influence the organisation could have. As the bulk of the labour force is working as self-employed in the agricultural sector, or in the informal sectors in urban areas, the percentage of the total labour force that are members are low. Among the employed in the formal economy, the membership is estimated to be around 25%, which indicates the relative importance of the trade unions for a democratic development.

A number of the issues raised here are general problems for trade unions not only in Tanzania. But it has been outside the scope of this study to compare with e.g., the developments in the neighbouring countries.

6.2.3 Are the CSOs strengthened and can hold the government accountable?

The argument I have tried to forward in the previous section is that there has been a quite dramatic change to the better for the CSOs, in particular since around 2000. The legal framework has been changed, even if a number of problematic provisions remain. Policy making at central level is more inclusive and a number of forums have opened up for participation from CSOs. The CSOs themselves have been strengthened and as a result, the last two decades have seen the emergence of a more diversified and active civil society in Tanzania. However, despite these changes, a number of challenges still exist for CSOs to be able to hold the government accountable, as well as influence/participate in policymaking, on local as well as central levels. We have pointed at a number of structural constraints in the institutional and legal framework and within the CSOs themselves. Not the least the question of whom NGOs represent is crucial in that context. There is also the question if there is a political will and culture within the government, the administration and the ruling party to let CSOs continue to expand and to be resourceful enough to hold the government accountable. Hence we turn to discuss the crucial but more ambiguous concept of democratic culture.

6.3 Democratic culture

In the literature on democracy and democratisation, it is emphasised that one of the most important aspects for consolidation of democracy is the establishment of a democratic culture, e.g., Diamond (1999: 161). This section briefly discusses the culture of democracy in Tanzania.

The culture of democracy in Tanzania is not very well developed, neither within parties, the society, nor within most of the NGOs, according to most of the respondents. However, the long history of democratic processes *within* the framework of a single party system and within TANU/CCM not should be understated. There have been democratic practices and frameworks at work within the party and government since the sixties, even if they have been guided from above.

One of the major constraints for a deepening of democracy is the elitist attitude of administrators and political leaders on different levels in the society as well as in the NGOs and political parties (REDET, 1997) (PI: Andrew Kiondo, UDSM 1999, 2000, 2001; Ibrahim Shao, UDSM; Hasa Mlawa, UDSM; Daudifen Mukangara UDSM, May 2006, April 2007; Mwesiga Baregu, Professor, 2007, 2010; Maria Shaba, Chairperson, TANGO; Ibrahim Lipumba CUF, February 2010). To change the attitudes within central and local government is also a key component of the ongoing reforms of the administration at central and local level, as discussed in last chapter.

According to a number of interviewees, a culture of dominance and patronage still characterizes the society, from the top down to the household level and the relationship between different strata in society, man/woman and children/parents, a situation that is not unique to Tanzania. The secret service, *Usalama wa Taifa*, with the popular nickname “shu shu shu” (hush-hush) is still claimed to have a widespread network and reporting system (interviews with political parties and activists), even if a great change has taken place since the single-party era before 1992. People in general express their views freely, but are careful about saying too critical things about the government or leaders if a suspected secret service agent or government official is present. It might be that this fear remains from the one-party era without anchorage in today’s situation. The government, in particular at local level, is regularly accused of using its powers in order to suppress criticism. A businessman may not get his license renewed or is afraid that it might happen.¹³ Another example is that two members of *HakiElimu*’s initiative *Friends of Education* were arrested in 2006 when they criticized the quality of the primary school at a local school committee meeting.

Gradually, however, a change is being brought about. Several of the ongoing reforms include components for promoting a democratic culture, including the Public Sector and the Local Government Reform Programmes and the Primary Education Development Programme. The issues are also regularly taken up in the political dialogues development partners are pursuing with the government (PI: Sten Rylander, Thorvald Åkesson). Both bilateral and multilateral donors finance a number of pro-

¹³ This was stated in several interviews in Pangani, Tanga and Kinondoni District during the election campaigns in 2000.

jects run by NGOs to support accountability, democratisation, good governance and education. After the 2000 election, the president firmly pushed democratic reforms ahead, including establishing a more democratic culture. Some of the measures included mechanisms to facilitate better communication between the public and the government. President Mkapa introduced monthly radio speeches where he elaborated on different policies. A feedback mechanism was created where citizens could respond to the presentations. A communication unit was established in the president's office in order to create better communication between ministries and the public (PI: Wangwe 2006.). It could of course be discussed to what extent this was a continuation of the "top-down" development model (PI: Baregu, Mukangara 2005/2006 and 2010). Reforms are also being undertaken within all government sectors in order to facilitate a change of the attitudes of public servants as part of the Public Sector Reform. However, people's satisfaction with services provided is still low, and in particular at the local government level, where as many as 50-75% of the respondents are dissatisfied with the services, compared to 25-50% of the central government services (URT 2005d: State of the Public Sector Report 2004).

Despite these changes opposition parties, and a number of NGOs and observers perceives that the authoritarian tradition inherited from the one-party era, "the dictatorship" as CHADEMA General Secretary calls it, still to a large extent characterises the ruling party and civil servants:

The natural dictatorship is the main problem. People want to remain in power their whole lifetime. Even Nyerere wanted to remain in power as long as he could. (...) We believe that in Tanzania multipartyism was not received whole heartedly. People, who are employed or appointed by the current government in collaboration with government and the ruling party, make every effort to make sure that opposition parties do not have a chance to get into power. They fear to lose their jobs when any opposition party gets into power (PI: Mrs Komu, CHADEMA, May 2006).

The opposition also question to what extent CCM actually is devoted to building a democratic culture and society or whether the long-term objective is rather to keep power, using the state as a tool and hence un-level the playing field further:

We are not competing with CCM but with the state machinery. President Mkapa was an old fashioned autocrat and had no commitment to laying the foundation of a democratic polity. President Kikwete has enormous political skills but is completely uninterested in thinking about a development vision that in-

cludes building democratic structures for Tanzania (PI: CUF Chairman Ibrahim Lipumba 2010).

Important steps have been taken to develop a more democratic culture, but as we can note from the quotations above several actors in the CSOs, political parties and intellectuals point at the need to develop it further.

However, it should be noted that this was a perception from the opposition parties, and does not necessarily reflect the reality.

6.4 Substantive outcome: Economic growth, but limited development—increased number of poor

In this section we analyse some aspects in the fourth “sphere”, the economic society, as presented in the analytical framework in chapter 2, with focus on the substantive outcome of the pursued policies in terms of inclusive economic development. In democratic theory, the substantial democracy approach argues that the theoretical argument for an inclusive economic development is firstly necessary for legitimacy, long-term sustainability and hence consolidation of democracy. Secondly, the outcome in terms of poverty alleviation is also an indicator on to what extent the political decisions made follow the interests of the vast majority of citizens in Tanzania.

Figure 8 “Sphere 4” Economic Society—substantive outcome



The economic development has improved considerably, on the *macro level*, in the past ten years. An economic change started in Tanzania from the late 1990s. The sectors of mining, tourism, construction, communication as well as new industries generated a comparatively rapid real GDP growth/capita of 3.9% in 2004 (IMF; IMF, 2009; URT, 2009) and 4.4% in 2005, among the highest in the region (Bank of Tanzania, 2002-2009) and among the higher in SSA (World Bank, 2000-2010). In 2006 the economic growth slowed to 3.8 per cent/capita as a result of the prolonged drought and

energy crisis. In 2007 and 2008 growth increased slightly again to 4.4 per cent/capita. After several years of relatively high growth, the global economic crisis and drought hit the Tanzanian economy 2008/2009, with effects on food security, poverty alleviation, infrastructure/construction, tourism and other economic activities. Growth/capita slowed down to 3.2 per cent in 2009, from 4.3 per cent on average in the previous three years (IMF, 2009; URT, 2009).

A reasonable macro-economic stability has been achieved, even if inflation and budget deficits at times have been high (URT, 2005b; IMF, 2009). Tanzania was among the first countries to qualify for a reduction of its debts via the HIPIC framework from the year 2000. Tanzania's political stability, reasonably prudent management of the economy and relatively effective implementation of reforms have been acknowledged by the international society. Aid flows resumed and increased from the late nineties. Aid per capita has increased from 29.1 \$ in 1999 to 46.4 \$ in 2004 and 68.1 \$ in 2007. Aid as a percentage of GNI has increased from 11.6 % in 1999 to 15.4% in 2004; still considerably lower than the all time high 30.3% of GNI in 1993 (World Bank, 2000-2010). From 2008, however, a gradual discontent with the pace of the reform process and corruption started to develop among donors. In 2009 and 2010 several donors, including Sweden, cut aid to Tanzania.

The challenge so far is that the positive macro economic developments has not trickled down to the vast majority of the population (Afrobarometer/REPOA, 2006a; Afrobarometer/REPOA, 2006b; Chaligha et al., 2002; URT and REPOA, 2005; Chaligha and Davids, 2004). The by liberal theory expected trickledown effect has not occurred, so far. Partly, that has to do with the fact that the sectors that are growing are mainly the mining industry; the tourist industry; and construction sector. Sectors that create few income opportunities for the majority of the population and have limited linkages to the rest of the economy (Campenhout, 2002; Chachage and Gibbon, 1995; Kulindwa, 2003; Njau, 2001; Phillips et al., 2001b; Wangwe et al., 2004; Kikula, 2005).

Table 4 Poverty head count ration at \$2 (PPP)/day 1992-2007 (% of population below poverty line)

	1992	2000	2005	2007
Sub Saharan Africa	58	.	51	..
Kenya	59	..	40	..
Rwanda	90	..	90	..
Tanzania	91	97	..	88
Uganda	89	..	76	..

Source: African Development Indicators 2011

Despite all the gains at the macro level, poverty remains widespread and deep. Never had so many Tanzanians lived in poverty as in 2007, according to the latest household budget survey (HBS) (TAKWIMU 2009). In 2001, 36% of the population lived under the basic needs poverty line in 2001 (URT and REPOA, 2005; TAKWIMU, 2002). In 2007 that was slightly reduced to 33% of the population. On the other hand *the number* of poor people increased from 11.4 million people to 12.9 million, as a result of population growth. Even if urbanisation has increased the share of poor living in urban areas, poverty is most widespread in rural areas. Of the total number of individuals below the basic needs poverty line, 83% live in rural areas (TAKWIMU, 2009).¹⁴

Table 5 Income distribution (Gini coefficient) Tanzania and neighbours 2000 and 2007

	1992	2000	2007
Tanzania		35	38
Kenya	56	..	48
Uganda		-	45
Rwanda		47	53

Source: African Development Indicators 2011 (some of the figures refers to the previous or following year)

If we use the World Banks' 2 PPP\$/day head count ratio, 97% were estimated to live below that line in the year 2000, and 88% in 2007 (Table 5). The situation deteriorated from 1992 to 2000, but has since improved slightly. This shows how narrow the emerging middle and "upper" class is. Income distribution is extremely uneven between the poor majority and the small strata of wealthy households, but relatively less uneven compared with the neighbouring countries (Table 6).¹⁵ The HBS 2007 estimated that the Gini-coefficient was 35 in 2007.

The social indicators point to the fact that the situation was deteriorating for the majority of the population from when the structural adjustment programmes were implemented in 1986 up to the end of the 1990s. Tanzania was early on committed to the provision of free Universal Primary Education (UPE) (Roy-Campbell et al., 1992; Nyerere, 1967) and from a quantitative perspective, there was a considerable success in boosting primary school enrolment with gross enrolment rates of well over 90% being recorded

¹⁴ The poverty line used in Tanzania's household budget survey was based on the cost of obtaining sufficient food to meet calorie needs with a consumption pattern typical of the poorest 50 per cent of the population, plus an additional allowance for non-food essentials (TAKWIMU 2009).

¹⁵ Most of the above figures are based on Tanzania's unreliable national accounts data and hence conclusions should be handled carefully.

in the early 1980s. To give another example, under-five mortality decreased for the whole period from 1960 up to 1985 but *increased* from 160 deaths per 1000 live births in 1985 to 165 deaths in 1999. Gross enrolment to the first grade *dropped* from 93% in 1980, to 63% in 1996 (UNICEF, 2002). Further, under-five mortality decreased for the whole period from 1960 up to 1985 but *increased* from 160 deaths per 1000 live births in 1985 to 165 deaths in 1999. This situation illuminates well how the majority of the population became deprived of their rights to increase their capabilities to improve their living conditions and as a result how they are disempowered from participating in the political processes, if we use Amartya Sen's theoretical framework (Sen, 1999).

An improvement of the social sector indicators has, however, gradually started to take place since 1999, not the least in the education sector where gross enrolment ¹⁶ went up from 66% in 1998 to 107% in 2005 and 112% in 2008.¹⁷ One of the major reasons behind the increase was the abolishment of "cost sharing" in 2002, as part of the wider Primary Education Development Programme (PEDP), which was launched in January 2002, in combination with an increase of classrooms and teachers.¹⁸ In 2004, more than seven million children were enrolled in primary school, an increase of nearly 2.2 million children as compared to 2001. It could be noted that there is near to gender parity with regard to enrolment of girls and boys at the primary school level. 40 000 new classrooms are reported to have been built, financed with devolved development and capitation grants controlled by the local school boards. This contributes to increased local ownership and empowerment. On the other hand, it is debated how the large increase of primary school enrolment has affected the quality of the education provided. Even if the PEDP encompassed massive expansion of the number of classrooms, teachers and teaching material it has not increased in pace with the rapid expansion in enrolment (Ewald et al 2006, Mbelle 2008). The admirable and well intended quantitative expansion of primary school enrolment has not yet led to similar

¹⁶ Net enrolment ratio is the ratio of the number of children of official school age (as defined by the education system of a particular country) who are enrolled in school to the population of the corresponding official school age. It does not reflect attendance or dropout rates during the year. Gross enrolment ratio is the total number of pupils, irrespective of their age, that are enrolled in schools, in relation to the number children of official school age.

¹⁷ The reason for gross enrolment over 100% is that a large number of children above the age of seven enrolled in primary schools after cost sharing was abolished.

¹⁸ The objectives of PEDP were to improve quality, expand school access and increase school retention at primary level, an alignment to the goals of Education for All (EFA) as a key pre-requisite and strategy for combating poverty and achieving the Millennium Development Goals. The objective was to reach Universal Primary Education by 2006.

improvement of the quality (Ewald et al 2006).¹⁹ Even if all the interviewed households were positive to the changes in general, not the least for the very visible new “Mkapa classrooms”²⁰, most were disappointed and anxious that the low quality in schools would not prepare their children enough to make a living outside agriculture or the informal economy

The lack of economic development for the poorer segments of the population was a theme that re-occurred in almost all interviews we did on the household level, among CSOs and opposition parties.

It might be that the statement by Nyerere in 1966 about “Growth without development” has turned out to still be valid: “...if this kind of capitalist development takes place over the country, we may get a good statistical increase of national wealth of Tanzania, but the masses of the people are not necessarily better off” (Nyerere, 1968: 344).

On the other hand we should not romanticise the outcome of the economic policies suggested by the Nyerere governments.

6.5 The interface between economic, political, and administrative reforms in Tanzania—is a democratic pro-poor growth development regime established?


In this last section of the chapter we try to bring together the analysis of the political, administrative and economic reforms in order to understand to what extent the processes are mutually reinforcing or if there could be tensions in-built that might undermine the move towards consolidation of democracy in Tanzania.

Are the economic reforms – undermining or supporting the democratisation process? Since 1994, Tanzania has managed to accomplish a successful structural adjustment programme and according to the IMF and the World Bank the “basics are right”. The macro-economy is in relative balance and inflation was below 5 percent. In November 2001 Tanzania reached the completion point in the HIPC program and got a substantial reduction of its debt. Between 2000 and 2006, the GDP growth rate has been around 5% per annum. In 2005-2008 the GDP growth was 6.8% (URT, 2006b; URT, 2006a; URT, 2005c). This makes Tanzania one of the better among reforming

19 One indicator on that is that the student-teachers’ ratio in primary schools has increased from 38 pupils per teacher in 1999 to 56 in 2005 and 53 in 2008. The teachers’ motivation and quality of the education are hampered by large classes, often in make-shift, or in rudimentary classrooms and lack of desks, chairs, chalks and all kinds of teaching materials, in combination with relatively low salaries for teachers and lack of proper accommodation for teachers in rural areas.

20 Named after the then President Benjamin Mkapa after the reform aiming at adding new classrooms of each school.

African countries. The government was rewarded with increased aid flows from major donors, including Sweden. Net official development assistance (ODA) almost trebled in constant 2009 US\$, from 1995 when the first multiparty election was held, to the peak in 2007 (Diagram 1).



These achievements on the macro level, so far, appear not to be reflected in the everyday life of the majority of Tanzanian citizens, or at least not in a way so that the majority perceive that their situation has improved. Quite the opposite, the number of poor is perceived to have increased (Ewald 2007). This macro-micro paradox was also mirrored in a number of social indicators until around 2002/3; food production/capita was sinking, the number of underweight children increasing and the hospitals were not fully utilised because of the perceived high cost for medical treatment.²¹ Since 2004, this situation has changed. The massive inflow of resources to health, the primary and lately secondary schools as a result of the HIPC and the following years' increased budget for the social sectors, with MKUKUTA I and II, have brought about a change. After the abolishment of school fees in 2002 enrolment rates have increased dramatically. New secondary schools have been constructed in almost every ward.

The economic reforms have created new opportunities for entrepreneurs, both small scale on the village and large scale on the national level. Economic liberalisation has attracted a few transnational corporations to invest, mainly in mining and tourism.

²¹ Conclusions in this and following paragraphs are based on a study done in Pangani, Rombo and Geita Districts 1999-2003 for the project "A Matter of Choice" (Ewald et al 2004/2007).

Goods are now available almost everywhere but at a too high price for most consumers. Social stratification is therefore on the increase. Local communities are under severe stress and the fabric of rural and urban societies is changing. Popular culture from different corners of the world is trickling all the way down to the villages, creating expectations that are difficult to realise. The traditional extended families' security networks are getting thinner. Almost all households responded that the extended family networks have been drastically reduced (Ewald, 2004). The level of trust of local communities in district and national administration was gradually undermined during the crisis years from the early eighties to the early 2000s. The last few years' development has not been able to change that (Household Budget Survey, 2009). Even if relative poverty has decreased slightly, the number of poor people is larger than ever in Tanzania's history.

The outcome of the economic reforms risks undermining people's trust in the nation building process and the state. On the other hand, increased donor support has strengthened the ruling party's resource base in monetary and prestige terms. For example, in April 2000 among others Sweden and Japan decided to disburse budget support for 1999 and 2000, that had been frozen in 1999, at the same time as the internal nominations for the presidential candidates started. This gave the incumbent president a strong position in internal, as well as external, campaigns. When donors three weeks before the election in October 2000, gave a new injection in the form of rescheduled debt within the HIPC framework, the ruling party received another boost in its election campaign. These two incidents of increased donor support – long awaited from the Tanzanian side and provided by the donors as a reward for managing the economic reforms and aiming to support a stable country in an unstable regional context – were used in almost every election campaign, we observed, by the ruling party as an argument that the party was the most able to manage the economy and had the support of the donors. The decision to increase donor support followed rules and procedures, but there were apparently limited analyses of the political consequences of the support to the economic reforms, its timing and how it would affect the political balance in the country.


Another challenge for the opposition is that the room for economic decision-making is circumscribed by the conditions contained in the SAP/PRSP. This leaves little room for competition among the parties on economic policy or ideology.

6.6 Conclusion

In this chapter we have tried to analyse to what extent the developments within the civil and economic society have developed in a way that facilitates a consolidation of democracy. In the first section we discussed formal and informal challenges for the me-

dia. We noted that there has been a tremendous expansion of media, printed, broadcast and Internet based. We also noted the increased capacity and political will to produce media that also hold the government and ruling party accountable, which the recent debates on grand corruption are a sign of. Press freedom is relatively high in Tanzania. At the same time we also noted a number of formal and informal constraints for media, in the legislation as well as in the form of negative attitudes among officials within the administration, and ruling party. Most media are private owned, and many are close to the ruling party. We also noted that informal or self-censorship limits media's reporting, as do the limited human capital within media and low purchasing power among the population. This limits the outreach as well as reporting from regions and local societies.

Figure 9 Sphere 3. Civil Society



Despite that a relatively lively civil society has developed, both in terms of NGOs and slowly recovering trade union and cooperative movements, it is the media that has played the major civil society role. There are, however, a number of international, regional, national and local NGOs that are linking up and playing an important role in civil society, not the least in the poverty reduction strategy process and annual budget process. The social base of most NGOs is narrow, and few have a substantial national outreach, due to limited human and financial resources. The traditional mass based

organisations, the trade unions and the cooperatives are still in a process to reorganise after being part of the one-party system. The potential for cooperatives is substantial in a context where 70% still depend on agriculture for a living. The limited number of salaried work opportunities limits the trade union role. Most of the labour force that works outside the agriculture sector is self-employed and trade unions are now developing strategies to reach those groups as well. Even if we can note a number of internal and external constraints for the CSOs, important steps towards a strengthening of CSOs' capacity and functioning have been taken since the first years of the 2000s. There are, however, further steps to be taken before the strength, outreach, autonomy from various power groups, and capacity are enough to exercise their role along the lines of a consolidated democracy to facilitate vertical and social accountability.

One of the challenges, we noted, was that the culture of democracy was not yet firmly established within the state, government, parties, economic as well as civil society and the citizens, even if a lot of steps forward had been taken. Access to information is still limited, both by formal rules and regulations, and informally by e.g., attitudes among officials on local as well as central level.

Within the third sphere, the economic society, we noted that despite 25 years of economic reforms and 20 years of multiparty democracy, a broad-based and inclusive growth resulting in substantial poverty reduction has still not been established. Poverty has increased, in terms of number of people, and at the same time a highly visible small middle class and even smaller economic elite have developed. This point at increasing rifts between the majority and the small elite, which might challenge the legitimacy of the ruling party, as well as the opposition and the democratisation process. This also indicates that there is still a long way to go before the forms of liberal democracy also generate a substantial outcome in terms of improved conditions for the vast majority.

In the next chapter, we analyse the political parties and in the following one, we use the elections as a focus for understanding the relative strength of the various institutions of democracy and hence to assess how far Tanzania has moved towards consolidation of democracy.

7

Sphere 3: Political Parties— challenges for the opposition¹

In democratisation theory, the development of a healthy and vigorous opposition is a crucial part of a liberal democratic framework (Carothers, 2006; Diamond and Gunther, 2001; Gunther et al., 2002; Lindberg, 2007; Ware, 1996). A multiparty system needs by definition reasonably well functioning parties, at least more than one. In this chapter we will make an analysis of the main political parties in Tanzania and the challenges that they are facing, in order to better understand to what extent Tanzania is moving towards consolidation of a multiparty-democracy. In our analytical framework in chapter 2, it is the sphere “political society”, with the two main institutions “viable multiparty system” and “Free and fair elections” that will be dealt with in the two coming chapters, which we have reproduced in figure 9 below. As the political society is in focus of the study, the account for the political society is given more space and is divided in two chapters, one on “viable multiparty system” and one on “free and fair elections”.


The political society is crucial from an accountability perspective, as the political parties are in the intersection of horizontal and vertical accountability. The elected party members in respective representative assembly on various levels hold the executive

¹ I have in this chapter chosen to have longer extracts from various interviews in order to bring out the political parties own views. It should also be noted that it is the perception of the parties, where the views at times of course differs strongly between the opposition and the governing party.

accountable, *horizontally*. There is, according to the theory, a two-way relationship between representative assemblies and political parties. Well-organised parties, party caucuses and parliamentary committees, strengthen the role of the parliament and councils, vis-à-vis the executive, and hence strengthen horizontal accountability, and the efficiency of parliament and councils. Strong parliaments and councils in turn strengthen building of political parties, as the parties are perceived to have an influence (Burnell, 2006; Carothers, 2006). In democratic theory, the parties are also the major mechanism for aggregating the citizens views and expressing their interest as well as mobilising, educating and developing visions and policies for short and long term development, through the parties internal structures as well as outside the parties—and to hold leaders on various levels accountable, and hence an important *vertical accountability* mechanism (Rakner and Svåsand, 2002; Randall and Svåsand, 2002). Strong parties hence have the potential to strengthen democracy, through horizontal and vertical accountability and participation. A challenge is to understand which social base and interests various parties represent, the internal democratic processes and of course what ideology and policies the party pursues—and hence what democratising effect the introduction of multiparty system has for a substantial democratisation.

In the vast literature on transitions to democracy one useful terminology are the distinctions between *elite continuity*, where elites from the pre-democracy era, often within in government structures start new (opposition) parties and challenge the ruling party, and at times become a new incumbent party or continue as opposition party—most often based on a rightist ideological position. *Party continuity* regards the situation where the party identified with the pre-democratisation era transform and adapt to a multiparty environment and manage to maintain power. *Elite and party discontinuity* refers to a situation where a transition to multiparty democracy brings about a break down of previous elite's controls and a fading away of parties and actors connected to the pre-democratisation process regime (Morlino, 2009).

Until recently not much research was done on the political parties in Africa (Basedau et al., 2007), notably exceptions are (Salih, 2003; Olukoshi, 1998), but the few years a number of studies has taken on the political parties. In Tanzania the department of political science have done several studies on the political party, among theme Max Mmuya who did a number of studies of the political parties in the early years of the introduction of the multiparty system (Mmuya, 1998; Mmuya and Chaligha, 1994).

Figure 9 “Sphere 3” The political society

In this chapter I first give a general overview of the political parties. A detailed analysis of the various parties has been put in the appendix 1 on page 339ff, where the political parties organisation, ideology and policies are presented and analysed. In the second section of this chapter a number of thematic issues that was brought up in the interviews with the political parties regarding general challenges to build parties and to build democracy both within the parties and in society will be discussed.

Elections are one important component of a democracy. Hence, in chapter 8 we will discuss the challenges facing the parties in connection with the elections in 2000 and 2005.

7.1 Characteristics of the ruling party and the opposition

As was discussed in the history chapter, Tanzania had 18 registered political parties in the election 2000, 2005 and in 2010.² Only five, however, managed to get enough votes to get into Parliament. The ruling party *Chama Cha Mapinduzi* (CCM) has dominated Tanzanian politics since late 1950s when its predecessor TANU led the independence

² In Mars 2010 a 19th party got preliminary registration, after several months of public debate, but was later de-registered Mjasiri J. (20100920) Tanzania: Was CCJ a Hoax After All? Daily News. Dar es Salaam. Ulimwengu J. (20100208).

struggle. It was the ruling party during the single-party era 1964-1992. CCM has, consequently, a well-developed organisation with elaborated procedures and structures for (relative democratic) decision-making within the party. But it is also characterised by a strong central authority and personal networks, with close links to the administration at different levels, as well as to various economic elites and power centres outside the party, according to various interviews and (Mmuya, 1998; Hydén, 2005; The Citizen, 20090826; Hydén, 1999). The one-party culture still to a large extent characterizes the party, the administration and the political culture—not least on local level, according to a number of interviewees. Nevertheless, changes have taken place. Not the least through new generations of members that got their political schooling/world view formed in a multiparty context (for a further analysis of CCM, see page 339ff).

No party has developed to be strong enough to challenge CCM, so far. In particular in rural areas, the opposition parties neither have the organisation nor the resources to develop structures at all the district/local level, in parity with CCM's. The transition can then, in line with the discussion in the introduction of the chapter, be termed as *party-continuation*.

That no strong nationwide opposition has emerged is similar to the situation in a number of other African countries (Olukoshi, 1998; Melber, 2003; Salih, 2003; Lumumba-Kasongo, 2006; Mbaku and Ihonybere, 2006; Lindberg, 2007; Salih and Nordlund, 2007; Edozie, 2009; Rakner and van de Walle, 2009). Zanzibar, and in particular the small island of Pemba is an exception, here CUF is a real challenge for CCM, based on the turbulent history of the islands. It is also on Zanzibar the political conflicts has been most intense and at times fiercely violent, with e.g., 45 people killed in the peaceful demonstration for rerun of the perceived flawed elections in October 2000, on January 23rd 2001.

From the time of the introduction of the multiparty system in 1992/93 the newly established opposition parties slowly developed. With CCM's better access to information and long experience, the party had a clear advantage compared with newly started opposition parties. However, at the first multiparty election at national level in 1995 the opposition managed to get 37% of the votes in the Parliamentary and 39% in the Presidential elections. After the election in 1995, the opposition parties disintegrated and were even weaker in 2000 than during the previous election, and got 34% and 28% respectively in the Parliamentary and Presidential elections. After the election 2000, the opposition made effort to strengthen the parties, programs and strategies. The CUF (see page 352), CHADEMA (page 359), NCCR-Mageuzi (page 361) and to a lesser extent TLP (page 365) and UDP (page 368), could at that time be considered more fully developed parties. The remaining 12 parties were very small (see page 370).

Most parties lacked a comprehensive and realistic political programme, with the exception of CUF and CHADEMA, and to some extent NCCR-Mageuzi and TLP. All parties were and are to a large extent based on charismatic individuals, have a relatively narrow social base, and are mostly urban biased, (according to own observations and interviews with Kiondo, Baregu, Mukangara, Mushi at various occasions and (Mmuya, 1998), a situation that is similar to most African countries (Salih and Nordlund, 2007). The opposition parties lack of comprehensive policy alternatives to CCM was also one of CCM's critique against the opposition in 1995, 2000 and 2005 election. A critique shared by media, CSO, key informants and voters interviewed. In the election 2005, the opposition share of the votes went down to 30% in the Parliamentary, and 19% in the Presidential elections. So what are the reasons behind the strength of CCM and this weakness of the opposition parties?

A large part of the parties' time and energies are devoted to internal power struggles—quite naturally for newly started parties in newly introduced multiparty context. Not the least the struggle over who should be chairman and/or presidential candidate, as demonstrated by, e.g., the struggles within NCCR-Mageuzi and TLP. But also struggles and rivalry with other parties in the opposition—and with the ruling party. Where influential individuals could be attracted to leave a party that does not give what he/she (most often he) think is the best opportunities and move over to another party, with followers. One example is the strongest and most prominent opposition party during the 1994-1999 period, the NCCR-Mageuzi. The party was strengthened when Augustine Mrema, a strong and popular former Minister of Home Affairs, left CCM and joined the NCCR in 1995 to run for the presidency on a NCCR ticket. In 1999 NCCR was splintered and severely weakened when Mrema left with the majority of his followers to join TLP. As a result both NCCR and TLP became preoccupied by internal power struggles, further weakening both parties—and most likely the opposition as a whole. These struggles relate most often to which faction of the party that has the right to the government subsidies to the party or other assets—or who should be elected to be the presidential candidate, MP/councillor-candidate or other functions/position in the party. The struggle within TLP continued after the election 2000, and the party did not managed to reorganise itself to its former strength before the 2005 election. Consequently, TLP's presidential candidate Mrema thus got only 0.75% of the vote in the 2005 election.

Another example is the United Democratic Party (UDP), started and chaired by John Cheyo, but was splattered in 2002 (See page 368).

With NCCR, TLP, UDP and CHADEMA preoccupied with internal struggles, CUF emerged as the strongest opposition party during the 2000 election. It continued

to develop its organisation policies in the period up to the 2005 election and beyond. In the election 2005 the party also had one of the most developed programmes among the opposition parties. The CUF is often by rivaling parties charge of being mainly an Islamist party, with its strong base being in Pemba/Zanzibar, along the Coast and around Lake Victoria. Areas where Islam is the dominating religion, or relatively strong. That CUF should be an Islamist party, or a party for Muslims, is strongly denied by the party. Several of its leading cadres are Christian and its base is not only along the coast and in Zanzibar, but also in several regions on the mainland. The political program is not directed towards transforming Tanzania to an Islamic state (PIs: CUF Chairman, party Secretary and Director of information at various occasions).

CHADEMA (page 283) developed its organisation and changed leadership prior to the elections in 2005. Its presidential candidate Freeman Mbowe is presented by the party as young and dynamic businessman from a new generation, in order to attract young and aspiring businessmen and woman during the election campaigns.

Policy wise, TLP and NCCR-Mageuzi define themselves as left/social democratic parties, CUF as liberal while CHADEMA call itself a conservative party and is also a member of the African and International conservative alliance. However, CHADEMA has also enrolled former members of the NCCR-Mageuzi as well as radical activist with a background in the student association at University of Dar es Salaam. The party has with that moved towards the political middle. It is however doubtful if the ideological scale development in Europe during the 19th century is useful concept for categorising political parties ideology in Tanzania today. At least does most party activist and voters have a bit of a difficulty to explain the ideological domicile when interviewed—and the main differences between the political parties policies.

The ideology and policies of the political parties are presented and analysed in greater detail in appendix.

To sum up, we can note that liberalisation of the party system has created a diverse multiparty system. However, the former ruling party is still dominating and the opposition parties very weak. Based on what is presented above and in appendix III, we can note different degrees of institutionalisation among the parties, where CCM, CUF and CHADEMA are the only parties that have developed to more institutionalize political parties. All three parties have well elaborated structures and procedures for elections to various organs of respective party, and branches in various parts of the country. The three parties also get a substantial support in the elections, and hence command a degree of legitimacy. The three parties resources, financial, human and organisation are however, very asymmetrical. NCCR and TLP make up another segment and are

two parties that at have attracted substantial numbers of votes in the 1995 and 2000 elections, but been thorned apart by internal conflicts, which indicate low degree of institutional capacity to manage conflicts. The remaining parties are very small and have an even lower degree of institutionalisation.

The conclusion we can make in relation to the research question to what extent Tanzania is moving towards a consolidation of democracy, is that even if a multiparty system has been established and three parties are reasonably well developed, there is still a way to go before the opposition parties will be strong enough to challenge the ruling party—and a multiparty system consolidated.

7.2 Views on structural challenges for the consolidation of the multiparty system

We have seen from the forgoing that the major party and former ruling party during the one-party rule of Tanzania, CCM, is well established and is according to my many interviews with representatives on all levels of the party quite at ease with the present legislation and rules governing the democratic process of the country. In this section, we will therefore highlight a number of issues that were noted as major constraints for the parties' activities and for the consolidation of democracy, as perceived by the opposition parties and various other actors in Tanzania. Among the major "external" constraints were rules and regulations, the constitution, the ruling party dominance, financial constraints, harassment, access to information and media and the NEC, which we hence will discuss below.

There are also a number of "internal" constraints within the opposition, and the opposition parties such as weak organisations, conflicts, and lack of financial and human resources, which be dealt with in section 7.4.

7.2.1 Ruling party dominance and overlap state-ruling party

Although CCM is formally detached from the governmental structures, the old ties from the one-party system between the party and the administration still exists, both formally and informally (PIs: Kiondo 1999, 2000, 2002, Mukangara 2007, Baregu 2010, Mushi) (Mukandala 1995; Mukandala, Mushi and Baregu 2001; Mukandala, Mushi and Rubagumya 2004; Mukandala, Mushi, Barkan et al. 2005). An example of the formal ties is that all key government functions down to District Commissioners, Divisional Secretaries and judges are directly appointed by—and thus dependent upon—the Presidency, as discussed in the last chapter. As most "political opportunities" arise within the government administration—rather than the political structures or the pri-

vate sector—the “political opportunity cost” to stand outside CCM or join the opposition is very high. Incentive exists even for strong leaders from the opposition parties to join CCM. This opportunity cost for being active in the opposition was observed at various occasion during the preparation and campaigns for presidential and parliamentary elections in both 2000, 2005 and 2010. It was stated often stated in interviews with opposition members trying to get a living outside the small salarised economy. Almost every CCM-rally had an item on the program where former opposition members were welcomed back or to CCM, with trumpets and fanfare.

There is no doubt that the opposition perceives that there is an overlap between the state and ruling party, which makes it more challenging for the opposition to establish themselves:

Establishing a democratic system of government with free and fair elections and where democratically elected governments are transparent and accountable to the electorate will, however, not be easy. The single party system had entrenched itself. The machinery of government was answerable to the ruling party.

The coercive machinery of the state including the army, police and the security (secret police) were under the party authority. The judiciary was only nominally independent of the government and the party (PI: Ibrahim Lipumba February 2010).

The interlinked between the party, state and the police is, according to the opposition, used to strengthen CCM, and undermine the opposition, in two ways, 1) The intertwined structure enable CCM to use state organs and resources to promote it activities, and 2) to intimidate opposition supporters and create an atmosphere of fear, as exemplified in the two quotations below from two different opposition parties:

The members of the opposition are not treated fairly by state organs. DCs use government vehicles, drivers and fuels for CCM campaign. They provide orders to arrest people for different reasons. In Ngara, Mvungi was stopped to make rally due to CCM interference. In Arusha the TLP candidates they were beaten (PI: Bakome NCCR aSG, June 2006).

Above that the government bureaucrats like the Dar es Salaam Regional commissioner Yusuf Makamba who is supposed not to engage him in politics has now and then been breaking that principle. He as a regional commissioner is supposed to serve the public both equally regardless of their party affiliation. The regional commissioner has been attending the ruling party (CCM) meetings and sometimes give orders to police to beat the opposition party members in

case they cause troubles. He gave out statements like "*Wakileta fujo piga!*" Which means "if they bring troubles beat them" (UDP chairman, 2000).

This perceived dominance and control by CCM of the governmental structures, is even more difficult for the opposition to challenge at the local level, as exemplified with a view from NCCR acting Secretary General and Director of Elections:

The CCM as a party has been in power for many years, it is well organized and when election starts, it makes sure that the grassroots leaders are geared to favour CCM. The ten cell leaders and government officials such as VEO, WEO, DCs, RCs interagency officer, are favouring CCM and intimidate the public and fix them to sue to court. All businessman who were supporting the opposition, have been threatened by TRA. For instance, RCs, DCs, and Intelligence unit accompanied Kikwete to his campaign (PI: Bakome NCCR, aSG, June 2006).

We can note the statement above that the opposition perceive that if you are a businessperson and stand for the opposition the government will use the tax authorities to undermine your business. This issue came up in almost all interviews with opposition representatives/candidates. It has not been possible to follow up the issue with the TRA so it is difficult to state that it actually happens, or is merely hearsay, used by the opposition to mobilise support against CCM. On the other hand, it was a strong perception in and among the opposition that this happens and hence most likely discourages or deters people from being active in the opposition.

Above that the government bureaucrats like the Dar es Salaam Regional commissioner Yusuf Makamba who is supposed not to engage him in politics has now and then been breaking that principle. He as a regional commissioner is supposed to serve the public both equally regardless of their party affiliation. The regional commissioner has been attending the ruling party (CCM) meetings and sometimes give orders to police to beat the opposition party members in case they cause troubles. He gave out statements like "*Wakileta fujo piga!*" Which means "if they bring troubles beat them" (UDP chairman).

The blurred line between CCM and governmental structures might be largest at the lowest level of administration, at the grassroots and the village level. Before the public sector and local government reforms, the 10-cell (10 household) was the lowest level in the system. It was both a CCM-cell and an administrative structure within the local government system. In the new system the Mtaa and the vitongojis are the lowest local

government organ, and formally separated from the party's lowest level, that is called a cell (as discussed in chapter 5). Mtaas and Vitongojis usually are constituted of considerably larger number of households than the former 10-cell structure. Still, the grass-root level organisation or chairman is named 10-cell and 10-cell leader. The opposition parties claim that the 10 cell leaders, which in the new system is CCM's cell chairman, that have a good overview of the 10 households within in its "constituency", are used by CCM to report on and constrain opposition party activities. One example, or claim, on this overlap between state and ruling party system from the elections in 2005 was:

It's against the law for a political party to record voter's cards. But CCM ten cell leaders registered the number of the voting cards, e.g., in Moshi. They said it was because they wanted to give loans. We still wonder how the vote number is associated with loans (PI: Bakome, acting SGS and Director of election 2005, NCCR-Mageuzi, December 2005, June 2006).

The combination of an extensive and relatively well working organisational structure, longer history and close cooperation with various elites - as well as direct access and control of the major power centres, makes CCM to be a formidable challenge for newly established opposition parties to compete with. According to the opposition view, the opposition does not get any chances to develop and expand. Below is an example how the opposition perceive that CCM is using its advantage and governmental structures to outcompete the opposition in the by-election in Tunduru district in Ruvuma region, where CUF has a strong hold and had an opportunity to win a by-election in 2008, after that the (CCM) MP passed away. It is a rather long quotation, but I think it in an interesting way illustrate the opposition views on how CCM and the governmental structures are intertwined, and used to undermine opposition against the ruling party. The quote illustrates as well similar stories told in interviews with other opposition parties claiming similar experiences:

A by election does not receive the same attention as a regular election. However in Tunduru the by-election attracted a lot of people. We could see that in number of public rallies that we participated in. Because there were critical issues such the conditions of the roads (the roads in that district are just unimaginary bad) and the official price of the major cash crop cashew nuts. Our candidate was driving these issues over the whole district. In addition the CCM candidate did not have full support in his party and the district commissioner was opposed to him. He was not considered to be a local person and not popular in his constituency. So we had high expectation.

But the election campaign led by the CCM party secretary general and the vice-chairman changed all our expectation. All important observers were owned by CCM such as the representative of the election council, the district officials and the Police—this was explicitly stated by the CCM election campaigners. The condition for us to campaign became impossible. Our supporters when they heard that we were there they were waiting for us. The police told them to disperse. When they did not do that they were tear-gassed and when we arrived there we found that police surrounded the whole place. And many of our supporters had been taken to prison. We had to go to the District Commissioner and negotiate the release of our supporters from prison. So there were as lot of use of police force. But why did CCM put up all this? If they would lose this seat CCM would still have 85 of the members of parliament but they were still using all forces to win this only mandate, also.

They were using state resources. They were using government vehicles with changed registration plates. Otherwise how could they muster so many vehicles? What was even worse was we found that very few voters actually voted during the Election Day and when we investigated with our supporters we were told that they had been threatened severely. We saw that there were very few people at the polling stations. We found out that representatives of CCM were buying identity cards from voters. The ten cell leaders of CCM also threatened people particularly people in vulnerable positions that they would register the numbers of the identity cards of the voters and that they had their way to know everyone who voted for CUF. So in spite of a very high public interest in the campaign because of the important questions on the table and a distrust of the CCM representative, participation in the election were less than 50 per cent of the registered voters. And the issue of registering the identity card numbers of the voter is illegal. We reported it to authorities. But as they were connected to the CCM the electoral commission did not investigate the issue. Our candidate who got 37,287 votes according to the official tally in 2005 did only obtain less than half of that 18,182 in the by-election. He got 45 per cent in 2005 of the total vote and now he got only 37 per cent. This is certainly circumstantial evidence. There is no reason that our candidate should have fewer votes than in 2005. If anything he had a better campaign and should have had more votes in 2007 (PI: Ibrahim Lipumba, Chairman, CUF, Febr 2010).

In this view from the opposition we can observe how it is strongly perceived that CCM does not give the opposition a chance to develop, not even to get one MP, and is prepared to mobilise vast resources even to get an unpopular CCM candidate elected, according to the opposition. We can also note that, according to CUF, there is not a clear

division between the state and the ruling party. We can observe from the quotation that CUF claim that CCM and the government use a number of methods to undermine the CUF. Including to pay the observers; mobilise the police to frighten CUF supporters; using government vehicles; buying identity cards, that is, votes; mobilising the (CCM) 10-cell leaders to threaten voters; manipulate the election process and that the National Electoral Commission is connected to CCM and does not open up a case on the issue. It is strong accusations. We have not, however, been able to get CCM's, the Police or NEC's view on what took place during the by-election in Tunduru. It is of course most likely that their view would be different. Still, the Chairman of CUF is a reasonable man with integrity, and appears to be trustworthy. CUF has of course an interest to portray the loss as a result of manipulation of the ruling party and not due to its own shortcomings. Nonetheless, the emotions, arguments and narratives that emerge from the quotation illustrate well how the opposition perceive the political space and culture it is working in.

7.2.2 *Laws, regulations and the Constitution*

Even if the multiparty system was decided upon in 1992, still in 2010 the constitution and legislation is not fully adapted to a multiparty system, according to the opposition. There was a common perception among opposition parties and civil society organisations that in particular the laws that infringe on freedom of assembly, expression, right to information and other human rights, urgently need to be rewritten. There was a strong urge for starting a process to develop a new constitution. In particular the Political Parties Act of 1992, that regulate the political parties activities, was considered to have a number of provisions, which are constraining the consolidation of democracy. These include the provisions of prohibiting coalition forming, party mergers and state funding for election costs. The role of the registrar of the political parties was also considered to be used by the government to control and limit the opposition parties, as e.g., stated in the quotation below:

The parliamentary act on the establishment of political parties is a very big stumbling block to the development of strong political parties and democracy in Tanzania. The registrar of political parties has powers to register and to deny a registration of any political party. For example the Rev. Mtikila's political party is denied registration to date (PI: Komu, Director of Information (and elections in 2005), CHADEMA 2006)

The need for a review of the constitution—in order to take away laws and regulations from the one-party era that limit the political parties activities—has been on the

agenda since the debate on multiparty democracy started. The opposition views on the constitution is well cached by the Chairman of UMD, a Lawyer, in an interview made in 2000:

The National constitution is a constraint for the development of democracy in Tanzania. (...) It has many oppressive laws undermining the development of democracy in Tanzania. It gives more powers to the executive than any other machinery, such that the executive formulates, implements, evaluates and so much influences all the policies in Tanzania. We find that the unchanged and oppressive constitution is a very strong tool, which the government uses to oppress the opposition parties in Tanzania. The solution to this problem is no other than the government to accept that there is a lot of unfairness in the national constitution. The constitution was formed when Tanzania was the single party political system. Now Tanzania has a multiparty system. From the strong fact, we therefore believe that the need of changing the constitution is inevitable. The constitution must be changed. We also urge donors and non-governmental organizations to put pressures to the government to agree with the need of changing the constitution (PI: UMD October 2000).

Even if this was 10 years ago, basically the same constitution and the same issues continued to be on the agenda up to 2010. A number of efforts have been made from the opposition's side to bring the process further during the years. In May 1998 eight opposition parties set up an 'Inter-Political Parties Committee for Constitutional Reform (KAMAKA)' under the chairmanship of Bob Makani of CHADEMA to 'recommend necessary changes in the constitution'. The Committee pointed at that the constitution still described Tanzania as following a policy of socialism and self-reliance. Other points made were that private candidates for election to parliament were forbidden and that the division between the different branches of government should be much clearer. For instance should not Regional Commissioners be members of the Parliament. A number of proposals to review the constitution have been made since then. So far it is mainly different acts of the constitution that has been changed, or in the process to be changed—and amended to the constitution. For example the NGO act 2002, the election financing act 2005 and 2010, the media act 2008 and the right to information act 2010. One of the major issues why CCM do not want to start a rewriting of the constitution is the sensitive issue on the relation between Zanzibar and the Mainland. A rewriting of the constitution will entail an opening up for break up of the union, or for a three-government system (one for the mainland, one for Zanzibar and one for the union).

7.2.3 *Access to information*

Access to information was key challenge for all parties. It includes basic knowledge about the structures and processes for decision-making in an aiddependent country like Tanzania, as discussed in chapter 5. Aid is to a large extent government to government relation, apart for the funds going via political party support, via CSO etc. As so much of the political agenda and discourse is set in the discussions/negotiations with donors, even if the government to a large extent should be put in the drivers seat, the opposition argues that they do not have enough information on ongoing processes and policy discussion. The laws and attitudes in the executive still restrict access to information, according to the opposition, as discussed in chapter 5.3.1. In order to be able to participate and have an influence it is necessary not only to know what processes and debates that is taking place, but where in which forum—and based on what type of background information. It includes simple things as get invitation in time to be able to prepare for discussion on government communications, or on local level proposals in the council, or participation in the various discussion forays on national level around the MKUKUTA.

7.2.4 *The system of elections: the National Election Commission (NEC)—impartial?*

One of the key issues in a consolidated democracy is that the elections are free and fair, and that there is an impartial authority that monitors the elections, in Tanzania that authority is the National Election Commission (NEC). The capacity and independence of NEC has been contested since the first multiparty election. In 2005 the reformed NEC pursued its work reasonably well, including the management of the new permanent voters registers, according to the international observers. The opposition, however, still claimed that the NEC was and is biased towards CCM:

We have still problems with the National Electoral Commission. We still think that it is very biased in favour of CCM the party in power. NEC is not transparent in its operations. Most serious opposition parties have no confidence whatsoever of the NEC and we have called for the resignation of the chairman. It is a problem that the chairman is selected by the president without any consultation. But the key problem is not the Commission itself but the fact that it does not have any independent structure at the district, constituency and ward level. The officials representing NEC at the regional, district and ward level are government executive officers working under the instructions of District and Regional Commissioners who are CCM party cadres.

As an example we had received tips that voting identification cards had been burned in one of the Government warehouses. I did not believe it so I went with

my party functionaries and journalists to investigate the issue. We found a heap of voting identification cards that had been burnt. Some of them were only half burnt so we collected them. Some were from Zanzibar; some were from 2005 others from 2008. We had not been informed that the National Electoral Commission would burn voting identification cards. The journalists telephoned the chairman of the Commission but he was not aware of the burning any voting identification cards. They called the executive secretary of the commission who was also not informed that voting identification cards were being burned. He was more interested to know how we had received that information. When the journalist told him that we had seen with our own eyes a heap of burned voting identification cards in the Government warehouse, he was furious and wanted to know who allowed us to go there. The journalist told him that how we entered the government warehouse was not the issue but rather the burning of the voting identification cards without informing key stakeholders. After some time, the National Electoral Commission gave a press statement they checked and they explained that they were burning old voting identification cards, which were exchanged with new cards. We are suspicious that there were many CCM supporters who have been registered more than once. The burned voting registration cards were part of excess double registered cards. The National Electoral Commission had not provided the required information to political parties. They do not provide us with information that they are supposed to according to the rules and regulations. Therefore we have a lot of problems all over the country (PI: CUF Chairman Ibrahim Lipumba 2010).

NCCR share the perception that NEC is biased and favours CCM and give the following examples:

The NEC is another obstacle to the development of democracy in our Nation. It is favouring the ruling party CCM and denies some rights to opposition parties. For example: most information concerning the general election came too late to the opposition parties while CCM got those information in the right time. We also believe that the tendency of favouring the ruling party comes from the fact that the chairman of the National Election committee is appointee of the president of the ruling party. Most members in the NEC come from the ruling party. We therefore want members from the opposition parties to be included in the National Electoral Commission (PI: Bakome May 2004).

Similar statements on the NEC were made by Shabani Akwilombe CHADEMA Deputy Secretary General and Erasto Shija, Election Officer in an interview the 20th

May 2006. In a group discussion with TLP National leaders, 2 June 2006, it was stated that “The compositions of NEC and ZEC in not impartial; most of members of NEC are appointed by President who is also Chairman of CCM”.

UMD have a similar view:

NEC is not impartial. It has been favouring the ruling party. The reason behind the unfairness of the NEC is that most of its members come from the ruling party. And above that the President himself appoints the top leaders in the NEC. So, they will definitely favour the President for fearing to lose their jobs. The solution to this is that the NEC should comprise different members from different political parties. The powers of the president should be reduced. He should not be given powers to appoint people in the NEC (interview UMD 2000).

CCM's perception is, not unexpectedly, reversed to that of the opposition: “the National Election Commission (NEC) is absolutely free, and efficient” (PI: Juma Penza Assistant Secretary General CCM June 2006).

The NEC, quite naturally, rejects the claim that it not is impartial, as stated by its Director of Elections:

In terms of composition, there have been criticisms from stakeholders that NEC not is impartial, as the President who is also chairman of the ruling party CCM appoints the commissioners; however, NEC has been playing its role properly. The integrity of the commission is very high. It is not possible for one party to streamline appointments of commissioners, how should that be done? The commissioners must be approved by the Parliament. (...) Most important is that NEC is fully impartial. In ZEC they have representative from political parties, and after the election, they did not agree on the results. Even if you allow NEC to be amended, there is no need to include party members for NEC to be impartial (PI: Rajibu Rubuva Kiravu, Director of Elections, NEC, 2 June 2006).

As we can see, the question on how to assess the work of the NEC is highly politicised. CCM, NEC and international observers think that the NEC is reasonably impartial and that its work have improved, while the opposition strongly criticise NEC and still perceive that it is biased towards supporting the ruling party.

7.2.5 Registration of voters and the permanent voters register

Another issue is the Permanent Voters Register (PVR). Even if all opposition parties considered that the establishment of PVR was an important step forward towards more

fair elections, a common view was that they did not fully trust the PVR, as NCCR SG expressed it:

We have demanded that the PVR should be publically displayed in or for the electorate to inspect, but the NEC has rejected to do that. During the election days you can't inspect properly. We in the opposition don't trust that the Permanent Voters Register is administrated in a political neutral way. (PI: Bakome, acting SG and Director of election 2005, NCCR-Mageuzi, December 2005, June 2006).

However, even if NEC should in itself be independent from the government, it was a common thought among the opposition parties that the CCM government might use its powers to interfere in the election process:

We are not sure if this election is going to be free and fair. Because the president is still having a very great influence in the election processes even though he is one of the contestant. The vice president and the prime minister still use their power to influence different decisions pertaining this general election. Even the commander in chief of police remains to be the same even during election time.

Even the electoral commission has put a very strong law to those who want to appeal against the coming election results. One needs to deposit about 5m. Before filling any election case (NCCR 2005).

TLP's national leadership conveyed a similar perception:

The ruling party CCM, moved around to record voter's card and telling the voters that they should vote for CCM-candidates only, and that the voters registration number on the voters card will be matched with their votes. CCM also said that that the DED and WEO were the returning officers and could follow up on who have voted on which party. All DEDs & WEOs are part and parcel of ruling CCM. CCM government employs them and they are in favour of CCM. Many people in the villages got scared and did not dare to vote for the opposition.

At the polling stations the result were released at wards level in many case. The results, which are announced at the ward level, are quite different from at the village level and this was happened in Moshi rural. E.g., You go to vote with your wife and children but you don't find your votes and even you son and wife!!

The compositions of NEC & ZEC in not impartial; most of members of NEC are appointed by President who is also Chairmen of CCM.

Again, this is the perception from opposition parties that have lost the election, often after hard work and a lot of personal contributions. The stories do, however, resurface in a number of interviews and can at least be taken as interesting view on how the opposition perceive the situation. The views put forward here also describe the political atmosphere prevailing among the opposition parties, and their supporters. As we can see there is a high degree of distrust in NEC and its degree of autonomy vis-a-vis CCM.

7.2.6 Harassment and unfair treatment—perceptions

In almost every interview with different opposition party members, from the ones of the national leadership to common representatives at village and council level, different examples of harassments and claims of being unfairly treated by different state agencies, were brought forward. It was not possible to verify and cross check whether all these various accusations were real or imagined. However, the perception from the opposition members was that the oppositions were subject of various types of harassments. It is unclear to what extent these harassments was an organised activity and sanctioned from district, regional or national leadership, in the governmental structure, or CCM leadership. Some of the harassment might be a result of individual local leaders or official's initiative. It could also be a misunderstanding by local political leaders, officials or security forces of prevailing rules. And of course it could also be that the opposition party members/aspiring leaders blamed the government at various levels, or the ruling party rather than their own shortcomings. But the perception from the opposition was very clear:

We are constantly harassed and stopped in our work on reaching the electorate. Problems occur in the period leading up to elections, during the elections and between elections. This becomes most evident at times of elections (PI: CUF Chairman Ibrahim Lipumba February 2010).

TLP leaders state a similar view: "State organs and police were used by CCM to prohibit and intimidate opposition parties" (Group interview with John Komba, Secretary General, Selemani Ng'ango, Deputy Secretary General Victor Lema, Economic Secretary Jafary Luganga, Youth Wing Secretary General TLP, 2nd June 2006).

As this issue feature so strongly in the various interviews with different opposition party I will give a number of extensive quotes in order to illustrate the oppositions perceptions. This will also give us a number concrete examples, from the opposition parties view. NCCR deputy general secretary state for instance that:

State organs like the police and the intelligence unit worked hand in hand with CCM to ensure that CCM won the election. In some polling station, counting of votes was done in absence of polling agent. (PI: Polisywa Mwaiseje Secretary General and Didas Mfupe, Deputy Secretary General, NCCR-Mageuzi, 30 June 2006).

Harassments are mostly coming from the police force. The police mostly harass us in the election campaigns especially in observing the time set for one to campaign. If one adds just a second, the police come and order him/her to step down the campaigning pulpit. They cannot do the same to CCM contestants. It is harassment by its nature.

Also the police now and then beat the opposition party members. For example in Zanzibar the CUF member have frequently been beaten, tear-gassed, and even shot by bullets. That is very dangerous, it is against universal human rights. It in fact precipitates to blood shedding in our country. CCM should not say that the opposition parties are the one who inspires the shedding of blood in our nation. But if the blood shedding occurs in our nation the CCM government should be held countable. The misuse of power from the police force is the greatest hindrances to the development of democracy in our Nation (PI: Bakome December 2005).

As we can see, it is in particular the police that the opposition view as a major stumbling block for its activities in the rural areas. CHADEMA's view support the other parties' perception:

The police force block to the development of democracy in Tanzania. The police force favours the CCM candidates and not the members from opposition parties. They always report that members from the opposition parties are troublemakers. But when the CCM members are making trouble they don't report and they can in fact do nothing against them (PI: Komu, CHADEMA 2006).

UDP chairman gives, in an interview in connection with the elections in 2000, a similar view and a number of examples on how he views that the police harass the opposition, and directly or indirectly favour CCM—and hence undermine the consolidation of democracy:

Harassment from the police is another constraint toward the development of democratization processes in Tanzania. The UMD believes that the police are supposed to protect all citizens both equally regardless of their political beliefs. But the police force in Tanzania has been totally unfair especially to opposition

parties. The police have been harassing the opposition parties in campaign especially when opposition party candidates have exceeded even a second in their campaigning hours. The opposition parties' candidates are fiercely ordered to step down the pulpit. The police have never dared to do the same practice to the ruling party (CCM) candidates. This act is undemocratic and the favouritism to the ruling party can be viewed as a threat to the democratization processes in Tanzania. (...)

The IGP [the Inspector General of Police] Mr Omary Mahita has been offering threatening statements to opposition parties, and protecting the ruling party CCM and its government. For example when he held a meeting with police at the police officers mess at Oysterbay, Dar es Salaam. He engaged himself in what is called "unnecessary" argument with CUF-members who call themselves "*Ngangari*". The IGP responded by saying if they are *Ngangari* we are "*Ngunguri*". *Ngangari* is believed to mean strong, while *ngunguri*, as a slogan is believed to mean even more strong. So the question to be posed is on whose side is the IGP standing? Why is he getting into unnecessary arguments with opposition parties? The police force is supposed to be fair and neutral to all political parties and it should not be politicised. This is all dangerous to the development of democracy in Tanzania. The solution to this problem is the police force should not be politicised and therefore should do its operations fairly to all the people in all political parties (PI: UMD, Chairman 2000).

Even if this interview was made in the context of the election year 2000, similar perceptions were held in 2006, and 2010, as we will see below. We can of course not take these charges against the police at face value. The point with the interview citation is to highlight the feeling of being harassed and unfairly threatened that prevail in the opposition. It displays the culture of suspicion, and even fear, that exist. Even if this perception is more imagined than real, it most likely has an effect on the willingness to enrol in the opposition. In particular in a context where risks are many and resources few.

The type of challenges the opposition faces will be illustrated with a number of concrete examples, as it is stated from one of the CUF point of view, based on a series of interviews with CUF Chairman Ibrahim Lipumba in February 2010. I have chosen to make a number of long quotations from the interviews as it in an interesting way narrates the type of practical and political challenges the opposition in Tanzania perceive that it face, and how it is described by one of the key actors himself:

In Kigoma October 2002 we were stopped from holding a public rally. The rally was called according to the rules but 30 minutes before the start thereof police came and stopped the meeting on the pretext of meningitis was spread-

ing in Kasulo. (But meningitis does not spread in open areas). We then went to our elected party leaders to have a meeting with them outside their office. We put chairs outside to discuss. Immediately two land rovers with field force units drove in and arrested the chairmen of the District and one supporter on the pretext that we attempted to hold a public meeting despite they had not given their decent.

In September in Tabora District we had a good meeting in a village. After the meeting some supporters and local leaders were arrested on the pretext that they had abused the vice minister of land (who was elected from the area). No such abuse was made, the minister were never discussed. They were arrested for three days and then brought to court.

Such behaviours by the police undermine the opposition. It could be discussed if it is part of a grand plan by CCM to use the police in that way, or if it is local political leaders or individuals within the police/local administration that act in such a way in order to favour CCM. Or if it is unintended side-effects of the local police force effort to maintain what they perceive is its main mission—maintain security.

Another example of the type of challenges the opposition parties meet is a case when CUF made effort to build the party organisation and establish branches in remote corner of the country where it previously CCM has been the only or at least major political party:

In 2000, we went to Newala, a district bordering Mozambique i.e. as far away from Dar es Salaam you can go. We wrote a letter to the police that we intend to have a public rally. Because of communication problems our local party secretary did not send his letter to the police at least 48 hours before a public rally is to be held as required by law. The police received the letter 24 hours before the scheduled rally. When we arrived in Newala the police said that we could not hold our rally because we had not notified the police 48 hours before the rally. So we proposed to postpone the rally for another 24 hours to allow 48 hours to elapse. They did not accept that and requested us to write a new letter. Then we had to wait for another 48 hours. Waiting for two days in Newala would disrupt our other scheduled meetings. So we decided to have an internal meeting, which legally does not require the notification of the police. We hired a place in a school—a hall—that we had to pay for, so our members could come there to discuss policy issues and our political program. We used our vehicle, which had a public address system to announce and inform the public that we were going to have an internal party meeting. As our vehicle moved around Newala inviting members to attend our internal meeting, a police land rover full of armed policemen stopped us.

They informed us we not allowed to invite people to attend our internal meeting using a public address system. If there is an internal meeting we only inform members by letters. Public announcements are not allowed for an internal meeting, the police told us. We asked the police which law prevented political parties from using public address system to invite members to an internal meeting? They threatened to beat and arrest us if we continued publicizing our internal meeting using public speakers. I tried to call the Commissioner of Police in Dar but the telephone connection was too bad. So we ended up going all the way to the border of Mozambique but unable to hold a public rally with the people of Newala.

Thereafter, we went to the regional head quarters in Mtwara. We also wanted to hold a public rally on the 10th of January. Our Party Secretary wrote a letter to the police but was told that we could not hold that rally because 12th of January was the Revolutionary day of Zanzibar and all the police and armed forces in the country were on a standby so there was no police available to come to our rally - to provide security. We told them that there were no problems that required police security, but that they did not accept. So I went to the Nsa Kaisi, the Regional Commissioner to appeal to be allowed to hold a rally. He told me that a regional commissioner today could not interfere with police decisions. I insisted saying how could revolution day celebrations in Zanzibar, affect the security situation in far away Mtwara. With a straight face he responded by saying that the situation in Mtwara could easily be unstable because it is so close to the border of Mozambique and you cannot easily distinguish who is from Mozambique and who is from Tanzania. So we could not hold any rally in Mtwara. Amazingly we now consider Mtwara Region as one of our strong areas. We did well in the 2009 local elections (PI: Ibrahim Lipumba, Chairman, CUF, Febr 2010).

Tanzania is a vast country with a bad infrastructure, which put up further demand on political parties in their effort to reach out. It is both expensive, demanding to organise and tiring to reach and get out to the rural areas, not the least to the more remote regions. To go to Sumbawanga in the south could take several days, and to travel in-between districts and villages many hours. Roads can be flooded, car break's down. It makes it difficult to plan and follow a tight campaign trails, this also makes the campaigns more vulnerable for delays. What the police or local authorities perceive to be legitimate procedures to maintain security, can be regarded as harassment from an overstretched opposition party. Below follows an example of these types of challenges, again from CUF's point of view:

During the 2005 election campaign we tried to reach as many places as possible. We could not afford to hire helicopters [like CHADEMA or CCM] and there-

fore only used motor vehicles. In the campaign trail you cannot reach or stop at every village. Sometimes you are stopped to greet people. Most roads are in poor conditions and therefore sticking to time schedule of political rallies is extremely difficult. We travelled to Sumbawanga in Rukwa region after completing our campaign in Mbeya region. We arrived in Sumbawanga late because of the long distance and the bad conditions of the road. I could only start addressing the rally around twenty to six. Sumbawanga is in the western part of the country the sun sets rather late, so there was no problem of darkness. At six the police came telling us that the law states that we had to stop at six sharp in the evening. I tried to continue to complete my speech. The police threatened to arrest me if I continued. This was around 6.10. It is clear that the police did not believe that I was a potential president in waiting. This law however only pertained to the opposition parties. The CCM candidate was well known to be extremely weak in observing time and schedules. He regularly continued addressing meetings as late as eight in the evening.

This rule that limits campaign rallies to six in the evening makes it extremely difficult with the long distances and the bad roads. It always takes longer time to travel than you have scheduled and you always arrive late and then the police stop you. We have 60 days of campaign and have to cover so much ground. So this happens again and again. In some cases police allows you to go on to 6.30 but in most cases they do not. We try to appeal to the National Electoral Commission. In most of the areas in the Western part of the country there is sunlight up to seven. The law is set to ensure peace and security but most political rallies are generally peaceful. During the campaign you have to give your campaign schedule to the electoral committee and then follow it. If your vehicle breaks down on the road and you are delayed for one reason or another you still have to keep to that schedule. Adjusting your schedule even if it does not conflict with schedules of other candidates is usually not allowed. For example we were late for our campaign rally in Meatu, Shinyanga region. We could not have our rally as scheduled. We tried to have the rally next day because there was no any other political party scheduled to have a rally in Meatu that day. The police intervened and refused us to have the rally because it was not in our official schedule. We explained that we were late the day before but the police insisted that the new date was not in the schedule so that they could not accept that the meeting took place. In some cases the police understand your predicament and accept to reschedule. But often the District Commissioners who are members of the ruling party and head of government operation in the district pressure the police to make the environment as difficult as possible for opposition parties. My NCCR colleague who was a parliamentary candidate for Ngara constituency informed me that Kikwete, the then CCM presidential candidate, arrived in Ngara late in

the evening. He had a campaign rally at eight in the evening and another one in the morning. So the ruling party does not have those schedule limitations. (PI: Ibrahim Lipumba, Chairman, CUF, Febr 2010).

We can see from the above quotation how campaigning becomes not only a fight with numerous practical challenges, but also with time and square headed interpretations of rules and regulations that delay or even derail the oppositions effort to reach out. And again, the police and local authorities might just act out from what they think is their mandate. As within other sectors, the police force lacks human and other resources. The staff in remote areas might not be the most well-educated. They are, though, well aware of that number of income opportunities outside police force and local administration is very limited. They might be afraid of loosing their job if they do not follow and apply what they think is the rules. We continue with another story from the 2005 elections is from CUFs campaign rally in Kilwa.

We were travelling from Liwale, a district that contains a large part of the Selous National Park. We were given a police escort using a vehicle that belonged to Kilwa district council that was driven at a very slow speed. Most members of my campaign team wanted our driver to overtake the escort vehicle so that we can arrive in Kilwa in time. I insisted that we should respect the police and not overtake the escort vehicle. We arrived in Kilwa around five forty-five. I immediately started addressing the rally. Kilwa is a CUF stronghold and there were many supporters at the rally. At six o'clock they stopped me. I did continue to six-twenty and my supporters escorted us to our guesthouse. Some of our supporters including our district chairman were arrested and charged for illegal demonstration. We then found out that the reason that the police delayed our entry to Kilwa was that the former President and the ruling party central committee member Ali Hassan Mwinyi, who was not even a candidate, had been in town and giving a speech in support of the CCM presidential candidate. All other police vehicles were used to provide security to the retired President. In fact we discovered later that our police escort vehicle was driven slowly purposely so that we arrive late in Kilwa to sabotage our campaign rally and create a pretext for arresting our local leaders and supporters who were jailed and charged for participating in an illegal demonstration (PI: Ibrahim Lipumba, Chairman, CUF, Febr 2010).

The example show how the opposition perceive the situation it meets in urban and rural areas in Tanzania. The opposition parties have to devote a lot of time and money to get lawyers to represent them in court. Time, money and energy have to be spent on

managing not only the formidable practical problems facing any actor trying to build organisation and activities in Tanzania, but also to manage the additional constraints put up by local state agencies:

When I am touring the country so much time has to be spent on negotiations with the police and administration. It varies from case to case whether the police act locally on their own initiatives, if they lack knowledge of the rules of the game or whether the central government or CCM support these acts. (PI: Ibrahim Lipumba, Chairman, CUF, Febr 2010).

Again, this is how the opposition view the situation, and we have not verified these examples with information from CCM's or the police's point of view in the specific cases. Nevertheless, it is an illuminating example on how the political space is viewed from within the opposition—and indicates that there are still some steps to be taken before a consolidation of democracy could be said to have taken place.

7.2.7 *Coverage by media*

All opposition parties state that access to media is a challenge for the parties, even if the situation has improved gradually and become better after the 1995 and 2000 elections (as discussed in chapter 6.1)

The media stations have somehow tried to improve their services in time of this election compared with how it was in 1995 election. However the journalists have tendencies of reporting on issues related to conflicts within the parties but write very little on the policies proclaimed by the contestants of the political parties. Some TV stations like the ITV have been airing programs that threaten the electorate to vote for CCM. One example is the program "*Tumbes Amani*", which means let us pray for peace. The heading is good but the content has a very negative impact to the citizens. It shows genocide done in Rwanda and Burundi. I believe that the owner of that TV station Mr Reginald Mengi wants to threaten the public in this time of election. It is a CCM's propaganda to tell people that if you choose opposition parties we are going to shed blood and our country will be like Rwanda and Burundi. (PI: Mr Bakome, Secretary general, NCCR-Mageuzi 12 Oct 2000)

In 2005 the situation had improved further. But still the opposition perceive that they have difficulties to get access to media, and to be reported upon:

The most discouraging part of the campaign was that although we attracted huge crowds of supporters and discussed pertinent policy issues facing the country, we received limited media coverage. Many days could pass without any mention of our campaign in the media despite many journalists being present in our campaign rallies (Ibrahim Lipumba 2010).

To reach out is even more difficult in-between the elections. Most opposition parties interviewed continued to consider access to media as a great challenge, particularly the media that reach most people, the radio:

The Radio is totally CCM dominated. It never brings out our messages. We can buy time in the smaller private stations but we do not have the resources. And even if we get the resources they at times refuse to broadcast. For instance in January 2001 we liked to send a program on our view of the Zanzibar massacre. But we were refused, even if the stories had been in the papers. Printed media is better but reaches too few people. (PI: CUF Chairman Ibrahim Lipumba 2006).

This feeling was confirmed by the media monitoring of the elections in 2000 and 2005, which clearly showed that the ruling party was much more exposed (Tanzania Media Monitoring 2005).

The ruling party CCM, on the other hand, consider that the media works reasonably well, and in addition CCM has a number of other means to use to reach out to the citizens:

The media- both private and public is independent and performing reasonably well. The party also has its own broadcasted and printed media. We also have entertainment groups, like Tanzania One Theatre that we use to attract people to meetings and convey political messages. Above all we use the CCM's extensive structure to disseminate and receive information through the country. So we do not have a problem to reach out with our policies. I think the opposition is blaming media when it is their own lack of organisation that cause the problem (PI: Juma Penza, Assistant Secretary General CCM June 2006).

This view was actually supported by one of smaller opposition party leaders:

In this time of election, the media even made efforts to meet with opposition party's leaders and representatives in Morongo Region, to discuss roles, which the media should play in this time of election. The UMD party truly believes that the media has done the best to observe the rules and regulations or code of conduct discussed there in and agreed upon (PI: UMD chairman 2000)

7.3 Challenges for consolidation from within the opposition

It is, of course, not only various external constraints that limit the degree of institutionalisation of the opposition parties. There are a number of “internal” challenges within the opposition camp that contribute to the relative weakness of the opposition.

7.3.1 *Finances, uneven playing field and personal contributions*

As emerged above on the presentation of the parties, financing of the activities is a major challenge, as for parties all over the world. In a country where resources in general are few, and the ruling party has various sources of funding, the playing field is even more uneven. This was also a point that was returned to in all our interviews with different candidates and leaders in the opposition. The playing field between the relatively well-resourced and well-organised CCM and the opposition parties was not levelled.

NCCR faced with lack of all kinds of resources. CCM not only have access to state resources, they also have a lot of business activates. They get donations from companies. CCM got for example 700 million Tsh from Tanzania Breweries Ltd., in the 2005 election. TANAPA donated 200 million Tsh to CCM. Also some individuals donated to the CCM. Polisy Mwaiseje Secretary General and Didas Mfupe, Deputy Secretary General, NCCR-Mageuzi, 30 May 2006).

Similar views were stated by TLP, where in a group interview with a few of the national leaders, it firmly argued that CCM use various government resources to promote its activities, and even changes plates on government vehicles to use them in CCM-campaigns:

Government leaders like Regional Commissioners, Intelligence Unit and District Commissioners and other big politicians like Ministers used public resources to support CCM. They used official cars. They were removing the car number and put private number.

Further TLP's national leadership also put forward that CCM was using its influence over the local and central government structures from the central to local level to undermine the opposition and promote CCM:

The CCM as a party have been in power for many years, they are well organized themselves and when election starts, they make sure that the grassroots leaders are geared to favour CCM. The ten cell leaders and government officials such as VEO, WEO, DCS RCs interagency officer, they are favouring CCM and intimi-

date the public and fix them to sue to court and sometimes all businessman who were supporting the opposition, they have been threatened by TRA. For instance, RCs, DCs, and Intelligence unit accompanied Kikwete [CCM's presidential candidate] during his campaign (Group interview with John Komba, Secretary General, Selemani Ng'ango, Deputy Secretary General Victor Lema, Economic Secretary Jafary Luganga, Youth Wing Secretary General TLP, 2nd June 2006).

In order to be a contestant, substantial private resources are needed, both in the local government elections, the parliamentary and the presidential elections. This gives an edge to the parties, and candidates, that could mobilise most support. The role of private contribution is quite interestingly illustrated by the CUF chairman's personal story, comparing the elections 1995, 2000 and 2005:

In 1995 when I entered into the Presidential race in the last minute I was not very well prepared. My colleagues were also not very well prepared particularly in financing the campaign. At that time, I had just returned from my teaching at Williams College in the USA. I had US \$ 40000 of savings from Williams College. So I used all my saving for the campaign. This was not much but with the help of supporters who provided food and shelter for us during the campaign we managed. After 1995, the government started providing subsidies to parliamentary parties in proportion to the number of seats. The bulk of the government subsidy, more than three quarters go to CCM. The government subsidy is the most dependable source of financing. In 2000 General Election, we had saved some of the subsidy to finance election activities

During 1996-1998 I was a Senior Researcher at WIDER in Helsinki so I had a small saving from there which I also used for to finance our party campaign. So we managed but with minimum resources. As a presidential candidate I had only one vehicle - a two door short chassis Land Cruiser, that was packed with a public address system, campaign materials, personal luggage and five persons campaign team. We travelled around the whole country with this vehicle. So we really lived on a shoestring budget.

In 2005 we were a little better organized but we also had some luck. We had been underpaid of our government subsidy. We obtained a sum of 400 million shilling as arrears just before the election campaign. The subsidy is not for the election but rather for the period in between elections and is supposed to help the party in its operations. The subsidy arrears helped us finance our campaign. Although we continued having the problem of not receiving adequate media coverage, we had an effective campaign and trained polling agents for more than half of the 45000 polling stations (PI: CUF Chairman Ibrahim Lipumba 2010).

We can from this quotation note how the candidates are using private savings to finance party activities. It could of course be regarded as a sort of investment in a potential political office. For the presidential candidates in the opposition, however, the prospect of being elected as president is very small.

At the same time the ruling party is accused by the opposition to use state resources for its campaigns, as exemplified with this statement from a group discussion with TLP leadership:

The Prime Minister was elected to be a CCM leader of Kilimanjaro region, which he used his capacity to raise funds and other resources to favour CCM and make sure that CCM should win in Kilimanjaro. The resources which were raised and favoured CCM to win where Khangas, T-shirt and Caps. Also the former PM—Msuya and chairman of NDC and Joseph Butiko from Nyerere Foundation, held a party fundraising in Dar es Salaam to support CCM in Kilimanjaro region. They got more than Tsh 200 million for CCM-elections campaign in Kilimanjaro region. And President Mkapa did a fund raising for Kilimanjaro at Golden Tulip Hotel (in Dar es Salaam). (Group interview with John Komba, Secretary General, Selemani Ng'ango, Deputy Secretary General Victor Lema, Economic Secretary Jafary Luganga, Youth Wing Secretary General TLP, 2nd June 2006).

The narrow resource base of the opposition parties also makes them more exposed to changes of the playing-field. It is not only difficult for the parties and candidates to raise funds to run the campaigns, but also for recruiting and paying for the parties' election observers during the voting day. In the elections in 2005, the unexpected death of one of the vice-presidential candidates led to a 45 days postponement of the elections. As the parties already had exhausted their campaign budgets, this delay became a serious challenge to meet, as well described in the quotation below:

Unfortunately the vice presidential candidate of CHADEMA died only a few days before the election date. The elections were therefore postponed. If we had an independent electoral commission, only the Presidential election should have been postponed, but the parliamentary and council elections should have taken place as planned. But they postponed all elections for 45 days. That allowed the CCM to be better organized because they had financial resources. For us it was a disaster because we had no more money left to travel around the country campaigning. We had budgeted money for allowances of polling agents. The money had already been transferred to parliamentary candidates. These candidates had to continue with campaign activities for another 45 days and ended up using the

money budgeted for the polling day activities. So we really did not have effective polling agents in most of the 45,000 polling stations. This was true for all opposition parties, although, CHADEMA seem to have been somewhat better financed even after the elections were postponed. The ruling party CCM spent more money after the election was postponed and had more campaign activities (PI: CUF Chairman Ibrahim Lipumba February 2010).

It has been debated whether party-subsides could contribute to a levelling of the playing field. Some of the parties were calling for more subsidies as the solution, like in this example:

The government has not provided subsidies to political parties in this time of election. Most opposition parties in Tanzania are very poor. But the ruling party CCM has established its self for a long time; it has rich people and bureaucrats from the government who can easily help the party to curb the financial constraints. The capacity, which almost all political parties in Tanzania don't have. If this situation of not providing subsidies to political parties continues, it will definitely endanger the democratization processes in Tanzania. The solution to this kind of constraint is to give support to political parties by providing them with funds, which would help them in the election campaigns and in starting different economic projects. In the UMD party we have planned to start projects, which would deliver social services to citizens. Social services like health services such as hospitals, starting school, which would be very helpful to the public at large—and give incomes to the party. However, lack of fund is the major constraint even to start income generating activities (PI: UMD Chairman 2000).

However, a view that often was put forward from observers outside the opposition parties was less convinced that it mainly are driven by the desire to get access to subsidies or positions that could generate income.

I don't support subsidies to the political parties, because it is a risk to undermine the parties legitimacy from the people (PI: Chris Maina Peters 31 May 2006).

We did, however, also meet a number of people with a combination of strong personal engagement, and often with personal financial contribution, and sacrifices.

7.3.2 *Organisational and institutional issues*

Strong leaders versus strong parties

From the interviews we have made it appears that strong leaders, and weak party organisations characterize the opposition parties. While the ruling party have comparatively well developed party structures, due to its longer history. Gradually two of the opposition parties have managed to develop stronger party organisations, the Civic United Front and CHADEMA, but still the parties mainly operate as nation wide parties to mobilise support during the elections.

Party program, ideology, policy formulation

One of the largest challenges for weak opposition parties is to develop capacity and access to information to be able to match the executive and the party in power. We have noted in the section on the different political parties that several of the opposition parties has a leadership with well-educated and experienced political leaders, like CHADEMA with Mtei, the former governor of the Central Bank, CUF with its Chairman Lipumba, a professor of Economics. The parties also have advisors from academic and private sectors. The challenge, not the least in a poor country like Tanzania, is to attract enough members with capacity to participate in debating ideology, party programs and formulation of policies. CHADEMA and CUF is in that respect much more institutionalised then the other parties. That capacity will grow with a larger number of members in Parliament and Local governments getting experience from the political process. We have, however, experienced during the fieldwork for this study, that even if there is a competent leadership in the parties, that capacity rapidly diminish outside the top positions in the party.

CUF and CHADEMA has successively developed their party programs to comprehensive alternatives to CCM, even so it appears that there is a needs to make serious work to develop comprehensive political programs that could match CCM's. The smaller parties has of course an even more greater challenge to do that, with even more limited resources than the large opposition party. And even if a party-programme is developed, the knowledge about the program and its policies must be disseminated and known on all levels of the party.

Internal working of parties

All opposition parties and observers pointed at the need to improve the leadership and strengthen the organisational structure of the political parties. It was pointed at that it was not only a question about increasing the number of members and branches of

the different parties. It was a need for developing the constitutions of the parties and to improve democracy *within* the parties—in order to facilitate a consolidation of democracy in the society as a whole.

7.3.3 *Conflicts within and between the parties*

Weak organisations and procedures for managing interest-conflicts within and between the parties also generate conflicts, as we have elaborated briefly upon above, when the different political parties were analysed. All parties are constituted by individuals and faction competing for influence and power. So conflicts are a part of the political process. If there exist rules and procedures that are perceived to be legitimate, conflicts could be managed.

All parties, with exception for CUF and CHADEMA, have been ravaged by internal conflicts, as described above, which indicate the low degree of institutionalisation of the concerned political parties.

Unmanageable or uncontrolled conflicts within political parties are another hindrance to the development of democracy in our country. Most parties fail to resolve their internal conflicts before they become very acute. Hence political parties especially opposition parties now and then tend to break up (PI: Bakome, aGS., NCCR, Dec 2000).

Another conflict line is between different parties. The different political parties make of course effort to attract as many members, voters and qualified leaders as possible. In the competition between the parties, the ruling party with its access to power and resources tries to win over prominent members of the opposition—or undermine the opposition in various ways.

Dr. Lamwai's defection from NCCR to the CCM in May 2000 might illustrate this point, or Chief Fundikira from UMD who was appointed MP for CCM in 2000. Dr. Lamwai was among the few prominent persons that were remaining in the opposition camp at that point, apart from CUF's Ibrahim Lipumba; (CHADEMA)'s Edward Mtei (a former Minister of Finance), who had resigned as party chairman in 1998, and Tanzania Labour Party (TLP)'s Chairman Augustine Mrema, a former Minister of Home Affairs and a few others. Another example is the Lawyer Mabere Marando, one of the pioneer multiparty activists and founder of NCCR-Mageuzi and its chairman for many years, who left for CHADEMA in July 2010 (Nyakeke, 2010:723) after internal conflicts, and was recruited to CCM.

The ruling party is accused for using its huge apparatuses for undermining the weaker opposition parties, with harassment as described below, spreading rumours

about hidden agendas among the opposition parties to undermine peace and security and direct efforts to recruit prominent as well as less prominent members of the opposition to CCM:

After the 2005 election after having obtained some 85 per cent of the electorate the CCM still did its utmost to bribe newly elected members of the opposition to join their party. An example is the prominent member of our party from Dar es Salaam Tabo Hiza, who was a candidate in 2000 and 2005 for the Temeke constituency in Dar es Salaam. After the election we had a small reshuffle of the members of the secretariat of our party. He was a publicity secretary of the Party. He continued to be a member of our Governing Council. But he was seduced by CCM. He was running a small business of wheat meal and depending on loans and on suppliers. CCM promised to help him with the loan. Why should in a thriving democracy a party that has gained 85 per cent of all parliamentary seats work so hard to win over the few people from the opposition after the election? Our candidate from Kondoa constituency was very strong. He has now been solicited and is now party secretary for CCM in Bukoba Urban. I had a very strong member in Kabeba district that is now taken over by CCM. And so on. This does not only relate to our party but also the other opposition parties. The vice chairman of CHADEMA was solicited and has now an important position in CCM. These are examples that there are no commitments by the ruling party for a real well functioning democratic system in our country. (PI: Ibrahim Lipumba, Chairman, CUF, Febr 2010).

At all CCM election rallies I made observations of in 2000 and 2005, a reoccurring item on programme was the welcoming back of members of the opposition to CCM. This also happened to a much lesser extent in a few opposition rallies, where members from other opposition parties or CCM was officially welcomed to the party.

7.3.4 *Difficulties to collaborate—or smart strategy?*

One way for the divided opposition to challenge CCM would be to cooperate and field joint candidates. A number of efforts to do that have been tried over the years. In the elections in 1995 and 2000, CHADEMA and CUF had a joint presidential candidate, but in 2005 CHADEMA decided to have its own candidate. The small parties outside the Parliament formed the *Outside Parliament Political Parties Organisation* (OPPPO) in late 1999 with the aim to enhance the cooperation between the opposition parties. But in the by-elections in Dar es Salaam in 1999 the group was split when Dr Edmund Sengondo Mvungi was put forward as opposition presidential candidate for

United Democratic Party (UDP), the Forum for the Restoration of Democracy (Ford), NCCR-Mageuzi, National Reconstruction Alliance (NRA) and the United People's Democratic Party (EIU Country Report 3rd quarter 1999). Another effort was inspired by the successful cooperation by the Kenyan opposition, the National Rainbow Coalition, in the December 2002 elections. 11 opposition parties in Tanzania, including CUF, CHADEMA and NCCR-Mageuzi, agreed on the idea to put forward a joint Presidential candidate in the 2005 election. The effort derailed already in June 2003, when CUF decided to field its own Presidential candidate, after successful by-elections in May 2003.

In 2007 another effort was made to establish a united front against CCM. The four biggest parties; CUF, CHADEMA, TLP and NCCR-Mageuzi, made an agreement that was said to be the beginning of a process that would lead to the formation of a single political party that would front a common presidential candidate in the Presidential elections in 2010 (Guardian 20071110). After strategic considerations, CUF and CHADEMA decided to withdraw from the project and instead go ahead as parties.

7.4 External support to democratisation and parties

One challenge is to find methods to support political parties without undermining their legitimacy and social base. Direct support to political parties could create parties that rather than being expressions of social interest, are briefcase-parties established to get access to donor funding.

In the earlier debate on support to reforms of single party systems, a radical critique was that US and the West supported liberal democracy in order to promote political parties that could undermine radical regimes, and in that way strengthen West's control of the South (Mmuya, 1998; Abrahamsen, 2000). Opposition parties came to be regarded as (or was) western agents, or that support to the opposition threatens national sovereignty and the delicate nation-building process. To a certain extent that view still coin the at times sensitive debate in Tanzania.

The delicate balance is for instance well illustrated by President Kikwete's new years speech 2010:

We are thankful to all of you who have been supporting our electoral processes under the framework of Election Support Programme Being facilitated under the auspices of the UNDP. Please continue to support us build capacities for organising and managing elections.

The only thing we do not want is for you to become partisans and dictate who or which party is good for Tanzanians [emphasis by author]. Please, desist and refrain from doing that. If you do that you will be over-stepping your mandate. In fact, it will amount to improper conduct on the part of a diplomat. However much we respect you, we will find it hard to tolerate such actions. Please, spare us the agony of reminding anyone of you about proper conduct of a diplomat (Kikwete, 2010).

At CCM's congress in Dodoma 11 July 2010, Kikwete was elected, with 99% of the votes, to be CCM's presidential candidate in the 2010 election. In his speech to the congress he stated:

There is one country that I would not name, whose development minister asked me why opposition parties are always defeated in the elections. I told them to ask the opposition, because I don't know. Then they used a journalist to ask me the same question, and I told him that people like our policies and we care for them." Amidst cheers Kikwete claimed some foreign envoys are here to make sure that CCM loses, adding that they will never fulfil their dream. (Reported in Habari Leo 20100711).

This strong statement against what is perceived to be internal political affairs should be put in context of the history of strong international pressure on the government at various occasions to change policy in a certain direction in order to benefit from further assistance, on the one hand, and that CCM, on the other, perceive itself as being the party of the "masses" and that the opposition parties represent different special interests groups, or do not have adequate experience to manage a government.

7.5 Conclusion: Could there be a multiparty democracy without political parties?

Focus in the debates on democratisation and good governance has been on strengthening the capacity of state and local government structures, the judiciary and the parliament, as well as strengthening civil society. Less attention has been given to one of the cornerstones in a multiparty system, the political parties. In Tanzania a remarkable well organised ruling party with extensive branches and membership challenge small, weak opposition parties with narrow membership base, apart from CUF in Pemba and to certain extent in Unguja. The opposition parties are facing a number of challenges in the form of structural constraints such as of the dominance of the ruling party, lack of

access to information and media exposure and a society where the culture of democracy still is weak, in particularly on local level. Internal constraints in the form of weak management capacity, lack of human and financial resources, weak internal democratic structures, a political culture of strong leaders and not well developed political programmes that could compete with the ruling party with its access to information and expertise.

With a high degree of fungibility of funds, economic support to the government may be indirectly or directly diverted to the ruling party. The opposition is therefore weakened by CCM's control of the government, administration and media, not least at the local level. The strong donor interests in the managerial issues of the public sector undermines the efforts to build a strong political community and opposition, due to the informal interlinkages of the ruling party with central and local government administration. Even if reforms have been made this is still in 2010 perceived as a constraint for the opposition.

The findings from my empirical work indicate that there are a number of external/structural constraints for the opposition parties in Tanzania to be strong enough to become the important force envisaged in the literature on democracy, to be able to contribute to interest aggregation, horizontal and vertical accountability. The playing field is still un-levelled and the political culture is still quite harsh. The "opportunity cost" for engaging in the opposition is high. The opposition parties in turn need to tackle their internal inherent problems. Even if one could as to what extent the opposition really have had a fair chance, it is the opposition itself that need to build its structures. However, the multiparty system was introduced a mere 20 years ago, in a context of scarcity of all kinds of resources. It could be worth remembering that it took several 100 years to develop the western party-system, and that at a time when the countries already had relatively more diversified and developed economies. What we have tried to point at here is not that the opposition per se should take power, be more democratic or be more efficient manager of the government than the currently ruling party and hence deliver more pro-poor policies and substantive outcomes, but in a democracy there must exist a reasonably levelled playing field.

Changing the situation is made even more difficult as political parties in general have bad reputation. It is interesting to note that the perceptions that we got with different actors in Tanzania on the political parties almost are the same as what Carothers, one of the Nestors in research on aid to political parties, call the "standard lament" about political parties, based on his research on political parties in Latin-America, Africa, Asia, and Central and Easter Europe:

- Parties are corrupt, self-interested organizations dominated by power-hungry elites who only pursue their own interests or those of their rich financial backers, not those of ordinary citizens.
- Parties do not stand for anything; there are no real differences among them. Their ideologies are symbolic at best and their platforms vague or insubstantial.
- Parties waste too much time and energy squabbling with each other over petty issues for the sake of meaningless political advantages rather than trying to solve the country's problems in a constructive cooperative way.
- Parties only become active at election time when they come looking for your vote; the rest of the time you never hear from them.
- Parties are ill prepared for governing the country and do a bad job of it when they do manage to take power or gain places in the national legislature (Carothers, 2006).

Despite these shortcomings, it is difficult to envisage a democracy without reasonably well functioning political parties. Even if we consider the critic against liberal democracy and the good governance agenda from radical critics as for example Professor Issa Shivji (2008).

Or to conclude with a citation from international IDEA's research report on Political Parties in Africa, pointing at the need to qualify under which conditions a multiparty system could be a democratising force:

The existence of multiparty politics is no guarantee of representative democracy. While political parties are an indispensable part of democratic processes and multiparty politics may empower vulnerable and previously excluded groups, increase accountability help to mediate conflict and achieve redistribution of resources and income, it can also be used to increase the influence of already wealthy and powerful elites. In many instances this leaves the poor and minorities marginalized, and ethnic and religious groups are mobilized against each other for elite purposes. Well-functioning, responsive and genuinely representative political parties are central for sustainable democratic institutions and accountable government (Salih and Nordlund, 2007).

In the next chapter we then bring together the analysis of the various democratic institutions and the political parties in an analysis of the elections in 2000 and 2005. In an election all the various structural and institutional challenges for democracy are sharpened. The elections then are seen as "litmus test" of how far Tanzania has moved towards a consolidation of a multiparty democracy.]

8

Political reforms and the 2000 and 2005 elections— the consolidation of electionalism, but not of democracy?

In this chapter I bring together the analysis from the previous chapters on various structural conditions of importance for the democratisation process through the lens of the elections. The elections hence are used as one of the indicator of the democratisation process. Through studying the election process I will bring up some of the structural impediments of the “free and fairness” not only of the elections, but of the democratisation process at large. Elections are an interesting peak in the democratic process, as Bratton (1998) notes:

Even if elections and democracy are not synonymous, elections remain fundamental, not only for installing democratic governments, but as a necessary requisite for broader democratic consolidation. The regularity, openness, and acceptability of elections signal whether basic constitutional, behavioural, and attitudinal foundations are being laid for sustainable democratic rule. It is meaningful to study elections for the simple reason that, while you can have elections without democracy, you cannot have democracy without elections.

It could be added that at the election the political society is on its toes—and at the same time confronts the ruling party and the state—and in that way provides an opportunity to test the boundaries of the democracy, as argued by Lindberg (2009). The way elections are conducted can in that way be an interesting tool to get a deeper

understanding of the relative deepness of the democratic process, as well as its relative legitimacy. Elections and the way they are conducted is a signifier of the degree of consolidation of democracy, as Rakner and Svåsand (2002) note:

Even if formal rules are in place and are being observed, for democratic consolidation to take place, the citizenry must be involved in, as well as appreciate, the democratic process. Obviously, the extent to which they do so is affected by the rules themselves, but it is also a reflection of the extent to which political participation through the electoral channel is seen as a relevant way to express political interest and to channel political demands.

Tanzania has a long record of well-conducted multi and single party elections, as discussed in previous chapters. The first multiparty elections were held during the colonial time in 1958/59, supplemented with elections for a transitional government in 1960. But as Mmuya suggests these elections were not free, as they were guided by the colonial authorities (Mmuya, 1998). After independence in 1961, a republican, multiparty-based constitution was adopted. The first post-colonial elections were held in 1962, with several parties contesting. TANU won and 99.2% voted for Nyerere for president. A one-party system was gradually introduced from 1963. The main argument for this was to strengthen democratic practices and avoid the “trickery and dishonesty” and conflicts usually connected with (multi party) politics, Nyerere cited in (Mazrui, 1967). In 1965 the first competitive elections within a single-party system were held. A number of new leaders challenged—and defeated—some of the “old guards” from the nationalist movement on the ground that they had neither worked for their constituencies nor the country, showing an emerging democratic culture in Tanzania. Several ministers lost their seats (Cliffe, 1967). Subsequent elections to parliament and to the presidency were held every five years up to 1992, when the multiparty system was (re-) introduced.

Three “multiparty elections” were held in Zanzibar before the revolution in 1964, but could hardly be called democratic as the political processes were limited by the British colonial rule, and its favouring of the economic elites of Arabic and Indian descent. It was first in 1980 that Zanzibar resumed the conduct of its elections.

Multiparty elections have been held in Tanzania in 1992 (Local Government), 1994 (Village Government), 1995 (Local Government, Parliament and President), 1999 (Village Government) and 2000 (Local Government, Parliament and President), and again in 2004 to Village Government, and 2005 to the Local Government, the Parliament and the Presidency. The latest round of elections started with the village/street government elections in 2009, and the local government, parliament and presidential elections in October 2010. This chapter deals with the elections in 2000 and 2005, with the 1995 elections as a starting point.

8.1 An analysis of the elections 2000-2005

8.1.1 The election results

CCM has dominated the elections ever since the multiparty system was introduced in 1992, and even strengthened its share of the votes in the all elections up to 2010. From table 6 below it can be seen that the opposition was severely undermined as a political force in 2000. Mkapa strengthened his edge from 62% of the votes in 1995 to 72% in 2000. The main rival in 2000 Augustine Mrema was far behind with a mere 8%, a drastic reduction from 1995, when Mrema got 27 per cent of the votes. The main opposition competitor in 2000 was the CUF and CHADEMA joint candidate, Professor Ibrahim Lipumba. He, however, received only 16 per cent of the votes and mainly from Zanzibar, along the mainland coast and in the Lake Zone.

Table 6 The Union Presidential Elections 1995, 2000 and 2005
(% of total votes, mainland + Zanzibar)

	1995	2000	2005
CCM (Benjamin Mkapa 1995 & 2000, Jakaya Kikwete 2005)	61.8	71.7	80.3
CUF (Ibrahim Lipumba (1))	60.4	16.3	11.7
TLP (Augustine Mrema) (2)	27.8	70.8	00.75
UDP (John Cheyo)	4.0	40.2	-
CHADEMA (Freeman Mbowe)		- (1)	50.9
NCCR-Mageuzi (Mvungi Sengondo (2))			0.5

Source: NEC 2001, 2006 1) I. Lipumba was a joint candidate for CUF + CHADEMA 2000

2) A. Mrema was the presidential candidate for NCCR-Mageuzi 1995 and crossed over to TLP from 2000

In the election of 2005, CCM increased its dominance even further to 80% of the presidential votes for its candidate Jakaya Kikwete. Lipumba got 12% of the votes in 2005. CHADEMA elected Freeman Mbowe as national chairman and later presidential candidate, a “young” (born 1961) businessman who cultivated an ambience of dynamics and energy. He attracted 6% of the votes after a spectacular election campaign where he used among other things a helicopter painted in CHADEMA’s colours to reach out to various remote constituencies. It was the first time a helicopter was used in political campaigns in Tanzania and it attracted a lot of attention. The CUF and CHADEMA votes taken together were roughly the same as the alliance result in 2000. Apart from these three candidates, the remaining candidates got less than 1% each of the votes.

The parliamentary election results of 2000 showed an even larger defeat for the opposition than in the 1995 election (Table 7 below). On the mainland, the opposition only managed to win 14 constituencies (6% of the 181) while the CCM won in 164. In

the union as whole, the opposition won 29 seats (12% of the 232 constituencies) and the CCM 198 seats. In 2005, the opposition's downward trend continued on the mainland. The opposition only managed to get seven seats on the mainland (4% of the 182 constituencies on the mainland) and 26 in total (11% of the 232 in the union). 19 of the 26 opposition seats derived from Zanzibar, and moreover, 16 of these from the small island of Pemba. From the 46 directly elected seats the opposition got in 1995, it remained with just 26 in 2005. In per cent that equals a fall from around 20% of the directly elected seats in 1995 to around 11% in 2005. In addition to the directly elected MPs, there are special seats for women distributed according to the election results. The number of special seats for women was increased from 20% to 30% of the directly elected MPs in 2005.

Table 7 Results of the Union Parliamentary elections in Tanzania. Comparison between 1995, 2000 and 2005.

	1995			2000			Diff. 1995-2000	2005			Diff. 2000-2005
	% of votes	No. seats	% of seats	% of votes	No. seats	% of seats	No. of seats	% of votes	No. seats	% of seats	No. of seats
CCM	59.2	186	80	65.2	202	87.4	30	70	206	89	4
CUF	5.0	24	10	12.5	17	7.4	-13	14.3	19	8.2	2
CHADEMA	6.2	3	1.3	4.2	4	1.7	0	8.2	5	2.2	1
UDP	3.3	3	1.3	4.4	3	1.3	-2	1.4	1	0.4	-2
NCCR-Mageuzi	21.8	16	6.9	3.6	1	0.4	-17	3.6	0	0.0	-1
TLP	-	-		9.2	4	1.7	5	2.7	1		-3
Total	95.5	232	100	99.1	231	100	3	100	232	100	1
Total for opposition	36.3	46	19.8	33.9	29	12.5	-17	30.2	26	11.2	-8

Source: TEMCO 2001, NEC 2000, 2006, EIU 2000 and 2006


However, even if CCM has increased its share of the votes in elections to the parliament from around 60% in 1995 to 70% in the 2005, the opposition still got 30% of the votes. That is 3,25 million voters, a substantial number of people. And even if the op-

¹ In 2000 the parliament was made up of 231 members elected by popular vote in single member constituencies (50 from Zanzibar and 181 from the mainland); 48 seats allocated for the representation of women (20% of the seats); five seats elected by the House of Representatives of Zanzibar; 10 members nominated by the president; and the Attorney General, in total 295 MPs. In 2005 the parliament was increased to 323 members: 232 members elected by popular vote in single member constituencies (50 from Zanzibar and 187 from the mainland); the seats allocated for the representation of women was increased to 75, or 30%; five seats elected by the House of Representatives of Zanzibar; 10 members nominated by the president; and the Attorney General. (TEMCO (2001), NEC (2000) and (2006), Parliament of Tanzania home page (20070115)).

position only managed to get a majority in seven constituencies on the mainland it still has a substantial share of the votes in a number of regions.

If we look at the regional distribution we find that CCM is strongest in the central and southern part of the country, while the opposition is comparatively stronger in the northern and western parts, as well as along the coast and in Dar es Salaam (map 1 and table 7). That is, along the borders of Tanzania to the north, west as well to the sea in the east. It should be noted that CCM has the majority of the votes in all regions, when counted at the regional level. The map below shows where the opposition is relatively less weak. Thus the areas with grey horizontal stripes show where CCM got 75% or more of the votes, the light grey and white where CUF and CHADEMA got 20% or more of the votes, respectively. The vertically striped, dark grey and the spotted where TLP, NCCR and UDP got 10% or more of the votes, respectively.

Map 1 Tanzania election 2005. Parliamentary election results per region



The voting pattern is more related to socioeconomic and historic factors, than to ethnicity, even if Lake Zone, particularly the western part, is closely related to dynamics in the Great Lakes area with its relatively more developed pre-colonial system of kingdoms. The northern, north-western parts and Dar es Salaam have a relatively more diversified economy and are relatively less poor, in comparison with other parts of Tanzania. These areas have a longer history of cash crop production—coffee in the north and in Kagera in the west, cotton in the Lake Region and Shinyanga—and a longer history of linkages to the world market, with the exposure this brings about. The new growth sectors of the economy are concentrated in these areas as well. Mining and fisheries and fish products in the Lake Region and mining, tourism and horticulture/cash crops in the north. The longer history of cash crop production and market contacts created opportunities and markets for other business activities as well as widening income gaps and discontent. The more business-oriented north has a history of resistance against the earlier socialist policies of CCM. Interest for education has been higher both in the north and the west, reflected in a longer history of a larger share of children going to secondary schools and higher education. This in turn to a certain degree is related to the history of the missionaries in Kilimanjaro, Arusha and the Lake Zone, particularly in Kagera region. These are also the areas that have economic, historic and cultural links to neighbouring countries. The Lake Zone and the highlands in the north are as well the most populated areas of the mainland, apart from Dar es Salaam.

If we look at the voting pattern, we find that CCM got less votes in urban areas than in the rural ones. Dar es Salaam, the economic hub of the country, CCM got 61% of the votes, among the lowest in all regions on the mainland. In Dar es Salaam and the coastal areas Islam has a comparatively stronger position. Even if CUF claims that it is not a Muslim party, its role on Zanzibar and its history appeals to Muslim voters.

If we analyse the election results in the 232 constituencies in Tanzania, rather than computed regional figures, we get a slightly different picture. In table 8 I have compiled the parliamentary election results for the six largest parties in all constituencies, grouped according to the per cent of constituencies the six largest parties obtained ranging from 10% to 95% of the votes (table 11 in appendix shows in addition the number of constituencies).

Table 8 Per cent of votes for the six largest political parties in the 232 constituencies in Zanzibar and Mainland.
Per cent of constituencies with more than 10-95% votes for respective party.

	10% or more		20% or more		30% or more		40% or more		45% or more		50% or more		60% or more		70% or more		80% or more		90% or more		95% or more	
	Zanz	Main	Zanz	Main	Zanz	Main	Zanz	Main	Zanz	Main	Zanz	Main	Zanz	Main	Zanz	Main	Zanz	Main	Zanz	Main	Zanz	Main
CCM	90	100	76	100	68	100	62	99	62	97	62	93	52	77	36	55	16	36	6	17	2	7
CUF	90	46	78	26	60	15	44	7	38	1	38		32		32	0	22		2		2	
CHADEMA		18		13		10		5		3		3										
TLP		7		5		3		3		1												
NCCR		5		4		2																
UDP		4		3		1		1		1		1										

Source: NEC 2005c. Figures and per cent compiled and calculated by the author.

CCM's dominance is still overwhelming; it got more than 50% of the votes in 93% of constituencies on the mainland. Only in 12 of the 182 constituencies did CCM get less than 50% of the votes. CCM got more than 70% of the votes in 55% of the constituencies on the mainland, and more than 90% in 17% of the constituencies. It was only in two constituencies it got less than 40% of the votes, in Kigoma North and Tarime in Mara. It is clearly a party with country-wide support and anchorage. Zanzibar is known for its strong opposition, but it is important to note the difference between Unguja, the main island, and the small island of Pemba. On Pemba CUF won in all 18 constituencies with percentages from 67 to 94%, a result closely connected to the history of the island. On Unguja the highly contested result was that CUF got the majority in only one of the 32 constituencies. (See below for a discussion on the election in Zanzibar).

It is, however, interesting to note that even on the mainland CUF got more than 10% of the votes in almost half of the constituencies (46%), and 20% in around a quarter, and 30% and more in 15% of the constituencies. CHADEMA got 10% of the votes in 18 of the constituencies, 20% in 13% of the constituencies 30% in 10%. Even if the opposition is weak, this result shows that the argument that the CUF is mainly a Zanzibarian party with limited areas of support on the mainland is weak. 10% in half of the constituencies shows that the support and potential is country-wide, if organised and mobilised properly. The result for the remaining opposition parties shows that apart from CHADEMA, the outreach is limited. We can also note that it was in very few constituencies the opposition had a chance to win additional seats. For CUF for instance, it was only in seven per cent of the constituencies it got more than 40% of the votes, and only in one per cent did it have more than 45%. The potential for gaining additional seats was/is limited.

8.1.2 *Registration and turnout of the elections 1995-2005*

The figures for turnout, in terms of the proportion of the registered voters who turnout and vote, range from 72% of the registered voters in the parliamentary election in 1995, 74% in 2000 and down to 70% in 2005. For the presidential election the decrease in turn-out was greater, from 77% in 1995 up to 84% in the year 2000 and then down to 72% in 2005 (table 4). The lower turnout in 2005 could possibly be explained by the prolongation of the election period on the mainland (see above). There has also been an argument that the lower turnout in 2005 indicates voter fatigue with the democratisation process (interviews with political parties, CSOs and researchers).

The figures for turnout depend of course also on how many potential voters made the effort to register. The turnout depends on awareness, knowledge and motivation among the voters, which in turn depends on civic and voter education, mobilisation, and how well the registration process works. In both the 1995 and the 2000 elections the NEC was criticised for mismanagement of the elections by both national and international observers, both in terms of organisation, education and mobilisation (Commonwealth Observer Group, 2001; ECF-SADC and EISA, 2001; Mushi and Mukandala, 1997; Richey and Ponte, 1996). In addition, legal and procedural aspects of the registration and election process constrained the opposition. Among the practical problems was shortage of registration forms and materials; late appointment of election coordinators; inadequate staff; lack of training of the staff; problems with distribution of election materials; returning officers who were not civil servants or local government officials and did not get necessary cooperation from government officials for transport etc.; lack of funds to pay agreed salary to registration assistants which caused a spiral of logistical problems when they refused to return voters' registers and forms (NEC 1997). Among the political problems were double registration of voters; intimidation of followers of other political parties' supporters so they would not register (TEMCO 1997 and 2001, interviews with political party representatives).

The registration process had improved in 2005 compared with previous elections (interviews with political party representatives, NEC and CSO). The numbers of registered voters increased from 8.9 million in 1995, to 10 million in 2000 to almost double, 16.4 million in 2005. Thus, a much higher percentage of the population of the voting age were mobilised and active in the registration for the elections in 2005 than in the previous elections. The paradox of a much higher degree of registration and lower turnout might be explained by that people with less political commitment were mobilised to registered, but were not committed enough to vote in the end. The second factor could be that the election campaign was prolonged with 45 days and voters not could travel back to where they were registered to vote. The higher degree of participation

also meant that the opposition got considerably higher numbers of votes in 2005, even if population growth is considered, than in the election in 1995 or 2000, despite that it lost a number of seats.

The high figure for registration on Zanzibar was a result of a combination of higher degree of political mobilisation due to the political climate on the islands. The opposition also raised severe criticism against the way ZEC conducted the elections, including the registration process.

Table 9 Turn out of registration and voting as per cent of Voting Age Population (VAP), Tanzania 1995, 2000 and 2005 General Elections.

	1995	2000	2005 (3)
Population (mill.) (1)	28.2	32.6	37.5
Population above 18 years (mill.) (2)	13.9	16.1	18.5
Registration as % of VAP	64%	63%	89%
Turnout presidential election as % VAP	49%	53%	64%
Turnout parliamentary election as % VAP	46%	46%	62%

1) Source: 1988 Census population and the 2002 Census estimate of 2.9% growth 1988-2002. 2) Based on the 2002 Census figure of 49.4% of the population above 18 years. 3) Calculated from 2002 Census & 2.9% growth. 4) Figures for registration and votes from table 5 above.

The degree of participation and turnout changes, however, if we calculate the turnout of the voting age population (VAP), that is the estimated number people above 18 years of age, and thus eligible to vote, instead of on the number of registered voters. VAP figures provide a clearer picture of participation as they indicate inaccuracies in the registration figures (IDEA, 2002).² In the census of 2002, the total population in Tanzania was counted as 34.4 million. 17 million were above 18 years, which is 49% of the total population (TAKWIMU, 2003). The growth rate was calculated at 2.9% per annum for the period since the last census in 1988. With an assumed population growth of 2.9% the total population in 2005 would be around 37.5 million and around 18.5 million would then be 18 and above and eligible to vote. The 16.4 million registered voters in 2005 is a

2 Not everyone in the population above 18 is eligible for registration and voting. According to the Tanzanian constitution and electoral law, the following qualifications are needed to register as a voter: being a citizen of 18 years of age or more on the date of election and being an ordinary resident of the ward in which one applies for registration. A person does not qualify for registration if: (i) he/she is a citizen of another state (ii) he/she is mentally infirm (iii) he/she is under sentence of death (iv) he/she is imprisoned for a period exceeding six months (v) he/she is legally disqualified to register as a voter, for instance through failure to provide evidence in respect of citizenship or age (NEC home page, 20070509).

high figure, corresponding to around 89% of the VAP. The turnout as per cent of the VAP was 62% for the parliamentary and 64% for the presidential election (Table 10).

Table 10 Comparison of registered and actual numbers of voters, and turnout. Parliamentary and presidential elections 1995, 2000 and 2005 for Zanzibar Mainland and Tanzania. (Mill. voters & %)

	1995 (1)					2000 (2)					2005 (3)				
	Parliamentary			Presidential		Parliamentary			Presidential		Parliamentary			Presidential	
	Registered voters (mill.)	Actual voters (mill.)	Turnout (%)	Actual voters (mill.)	Turnout (%)	Registered voters (mill.)	Actual voters (mill.)	Turnout (%)	Actual voters (mill.)	Turnout (%)	Registered voters (mill.)	Actual voters (mill.)	Turnout (%)	Actual voters (mill.)	Turnout (%)
Zanzibar						0.45	0.37	83.3	0.38	85.2	0.52	0.40	78.5	0.40	77.0
Mainland						9.64	7.07	73.3	8.14	84.4	15.90	11.04	69.4	11.47	72.2
Tanzania	8.93	6.44	72.1	6.85	76.7	10.09	7.44	73.8	8.52	84.4	16.42	11.44	69.7	11.88	72.3

1) Source for 1995 election results is NEC (1997). 2) Compiled from NEC (2000a-d). 3) Compiled from NEC (2006). 4) The number of registered voters for 2005 are reported differently in different NEC publications. In the report for the presidential/ election the total number of registered voters reported are 16,423,039, while in the official report for the parliamentary election the figure reported is slightly lower, 16,407,318. The 2005 figures from NEC's homepage www.nec.go.tz accessed 20070505.

The more effective registration of voters in 2005 on the other hand highlights the failure of political mobilisation and registration in 1995, and 2000. In 1995 NEC estimated that the population was 28.1 million, based on the 1988 census, and that 13 million would be above 18, based on the fact that 46.5% of the population was above 18 (NEC 1997:30).³ Thus the 8.9 million registered voters correspond to roughly 68% of the potential electorate, and the 6.44 million that voted in the parliamentary election were slightly less than 50%. If we use the figures from the 2002 Census, which should be more accurate, the turnout would be even lower, 49% and 46% for the presidential and parliamentary elections, respectively. The figures for the election in 2000 would be an estimated population of 32 million and 16 million above 18, if we use the 49% figure from the 2002 Census. The 10.09 million registered voters correspond to 63% of the population above 18 years. The 7.4 million voters in parliamentary and 8.5 million in the presidential election of 2000, correspond to the turnout of 46% and 53%, respectively. This means a noticeable increase in the turnout for the presidential, but an un-changed turnout for the parliamentary election.

3 Based on that 46% of the population was above 18 years, a smaller proportion than the 2002 census found. NEC assumed that out of these 13 million above 18, 85% should register, that is 11.1 million. This figure was used to estimate how relatively successful the registration process was, as well as being the basis for distribution of resources for the organization of the election

Table 11 Total number of votes for CCM and the opposition in 2000 and 2005. (Million votes)

CCM		Total votes opposition		CUF		CHADEMA		TLP		NCCR MAGEUZI		UDP		Tot. number of votes	
2000	2005	2000	2005	2000	2005	2000	2005	2000	2005	2000	2005	2000	2005	2000	2005
4.63	7.58	2.47	3.25	0.89	1.51	0.30	0.88	0.65	0.29	0.26	0.24	0.31	0.16	7.34	11.44

Source: Computed from NEC 2000 and 2005

Thus, participation in the elections both in terms of registered and actual voters has increased substantially, from less than 50% in 1995 to above 60% in 2005, if we use the same procedure for estimating the turnout in the different elections.

The increased participation in combination with population growth resulted in that an additional four million voters participated in the election in 2005 compared to 2000 (Table 11). Three million more voted for CCM and around 750 000 more for the opposition. Hence, even if the opposition lost in relative terms in 2005, it gained in absolute terms. This could be of interest as an indicator on that more people actually participated in the political processes and could be engaged in building the political parties and the political society and a culture of democracy. At least an additional almost four million people participated actively in the political process, with registration and voting procedure as the minimum activity, which most likely contributed in some way to increased political awareness and a potential increased interest to create a resource base for building organisations.

The contributing factors behind the enhanced turnout in terms of registration and percentage of VAP are that the whole institutional set up for the elections, from registration to organisation of the elections, has improved considerably, including the NEC, the establishment of the permanent voters register in 2005 and a better informed and mobilised public (interviews with NEC, Donors, Political Parties and CSO 2000 and 2005). This conclusion supports Lindberg's (2006) argument that the quality of the elections in Africa has improved since multiparty systems were introduced. However, despite these improvements a number of challenges and irregularities still existed in the election of 2005.

8.1.3 Electoral system—strong government, underrepresented opposition

The electoral system, where the MPs are elected via single-member constituencies with the winner-takes-it all, or first-past-the-post principle, has been hotly debated since the multiparty system was introduced. The merit of the system is that it creates strong governments, a simple mechanism for appointing MPs and a straightforward link between

the constituencies and their representatives. The draw-back is that it reduces the number of parliamentary seats the already weak oppositions get (Lijphart and Grofman, 1984; Reilly, 2002; Reynolds et al., 2005). This is a source of concern not only among opposition party members but also in civil society. The system was debated in connection with the election in 1995, but remained due to lack of administrative capacity, financial resources and political commitment from the ruling party to build a new system.

The effect of the first- past- the -post system emerges from table 12 below. As we can see CCM got 59% of the votes in the 1995 Union parliamentary election, but received 80% of the seats. In 2005, CCM got 70% of the votes and 89% of the seats, virtually reintroducing the single party system in parliament. If a proportional system had been applied in 1995, the opposition would have received a substantially greater representation in the parliament with a further 50 seats. In the 2000 election, the balance between the CCM and the opposition would have changed with roughly 40 more seats to the opposition — corresponding to about 17% of the seats in the parliament. In addition, a number of women's seats would also have been distributed to the opposition.

Table 12 Balance opposition-CCM with different electoral systems,
(example from the 2000 election, no. of seats in the parliament)

	Winner-takes-it-all, 2000	Proportional
CCM	202	151
Opposition	29	80
Total number of seats	231	231

Source: Own calculations built on NEC 2000

Even if the balance of power in parliament would have been roughly the same, it would have weakened the ruling party's dominance in a number of ways. A proportional system would have made it more difficult for the ruling party to get the two thirds of the votes necessary for constitutional changes. To get the 181 votes needed, the ruling party would have to negotiate with the opposition. In such a case, the amendments to the constitution made in the prelude to the election campaign during spring and summer 2000 that strengthened the incumbent president and the CCM party candidates might not have been possible to pass. 50 more opposition MPs would have given more exposure, information and financial capacity to the opposition.

In 56 constituencies the opposition got more than 40% of the votes, that is in 30% of the 186 constituencies on the mainland, including the 14 where the opposition can-

didate won. In four of these the opposition would have received the majority of the votes, if they had presented a joint candidate. In a further six constituencies the margin was very narrow, for instance in Tarime both candidates got 49% of the votes, but with an advantage of 29 votes to the CCM candidate. In Mwanza region the opposition was close to getting a mandate in two further constituencies, with a margin of less than 2%.

In 2000 the opposition won only in 14 constituencies on the mainland, compared to 23 in 1995 (NCCR 16, CHADEMA 3, UDP 4). In a great number of constituencies the opposition was either unable to raise a candidate or was barred from doing so. Seven government ministers were for example running unopposed. In Arusha region CCM was unopposed in eight of the 14 constituencies, a dramatic shift compared with 1995 when the opposition had candidates in most of the constituencies.

The argument for the British first-past-the-post system in its former colony in Tanzania is that it creates a direct link between the constituencies and their representative, and that it facilitates clear majorities and thus a strong government. The argument is summarised by CCM deputy chairman, and former speaker, Pius Msekwa, when he argues that the proportional system might have merits as every vote counts, but it is not a panacea to all the problems related to representation.

Proportional representation is not a perfect system either. In this system you are almost obliged to form a coalition government after every General Election. This is something that leaves the country without a government for a long time due to interparty negotiations that go with it. (...) in most cases the system never produces an outright winner, and this might not be good for young democracies like Tanzania's (The Citizen 12052010).

For the opposition, as was argued above, a proportional system would create better opportunities for the establishment of a more viable opposition and a more reconciliatory political climate, not the least on Zanzibar (interviews with oppositions' party members 2000 and 2005).

8.2 Political development in the context of the elections

The elections on the mainland were reasonably well conducted by the National Election Commission (NEC), but severely mismanaged in Zanzibar, by the Zanzibar Election Commission (ZEC) (TEMCO 2001, JIOG 2000).

The 2000 (and 2005) elections in Zanzibar became a highly sensitive issue, since the 1995 election had already been charged with mismanagement and rigging. The CCM presidential candidate won, according to official results, with less than one per

cent over CUF's presidential candidate. It is still not known whether the 2000 elections in Zanzibar were just mismanaged or—as the opposition claims—rigged. Due to lack of voting materials and alleged severe irregularities, the counting was stopped in all constituencies in Zanzibar. In 16 (out of 50) constituencies, the irregularities were so severe that the election had to be repeated a week later. In the meantime, the ballot boxes from the other constituencies were moved to ZEC administrative headquarters, without the proper presence of the monitors of the opposition parties. This led to strong distrust in the process, from election monitors and the opposition. The opposition demanded that ZEC should be restructured and that the whole Zanzibar election should be repeated. When this was not done, the opposition boycotted the election in the 16 constituencies. The elected Zanzibar opposition MPs boycotted the union parliament and the House of Representatives (the Zanzibar parliament). As a consequence, the elected CCM government and president in Zanzibar had a limited legitimacy.

The opposition continued to press for a rerun of the election in Zanzibar and organised a series of peaceful demonstrations. The newly elected CCM president, Amani Karume, took a more reconciliatory tone than the former distrusted hardliner, Salim Amour. Almost all senior officials were changed and only a few ministers got reappointed in the new government. It appeared to be a move towards a settlement of the conflict. However, the brutal police attack on a peaceful demonstration for a new election on 27 January 2001 severely undermined that process and created hatred and further distrust of the government. At least 23 people were killed, hundreds were detained, tortured, and raped, the wounded were denied hospital treatment, and at least 2,000 people felt forced to take refuge in Kenya and the mainland (HRW 2002).

The 2000 election can hence hardly be regarded as a step towards consolidation of democracy. It was at best a consolidation of “electionalism”. This is particularly true taking the developments in Zanzibar into account. It was feared at the time that the development might threaten long-term stability in the country in particular if the economy did not expand and more inclusive forms of governance on all levels were developed and adopted (interviews with researchers, CSOs and opposition party members).

During the first quarter of 2001, political tension continued. The promising peace talks on Zanzibar between CCM and CUF did not yield results. CUF continued to boycott the Union Parliament as a protest against what they considered an illegitimate election and government. As a consequence, all 19 CUF MPs lost their seats in the parliament for being absent for three consecutive sessions without permission from the speaker (PI: Ibrahim Lipumba, Chairman, CUF, 2003). The parliament thereby nearly became a single party parliament, with the opposition remaining with only 19 seats, including the special seats for women. A by-election was organised in May 2003.

With 15 new CUF members voted into the parliament, an official opposition could be organised in the parliament from June 2003 and onwards.

The opposition was also weakened outside the parliament due to internal power struggles. For example, the second biggest opposition party, Tanzania Labour Party, was ravaged by a conflict between the founder and the charismatic Augustine Mrema who crossed over from NCCR-Mageuzi with followers to become TLP's presidential candidate in 1999. The conflict was mainly related to who had the right to the party, including its finances.

In September 2001, a second and more far-reaching Peace Agreement (*Mwafaka*) was reached between CCM and CUF in Zanzibar. Most of the claims raised by the opposition were met, among them the appointment of a new electoral commission on Zanzibar and the establishment of a permanent voters register; abolishing the recording of voter registration numbers on the ballot counterfoil; giving the right to party/candidate agents to receive authenticated election results at the polling stations and collation centres; and limiting the role of *Shehas* (local village leaders directly appointed by the government) in the registration process.

Despite these gains, tensions continued as the implementation of the agreement was slow. The agreement, and the issue of how to handle the situation, was not only a source of conflict *between* CCM and CUF, but also one of the most hotly contested issues *within* CCM and CUF. With a number of irregularities in connection with the voters' registration in 2004; allegations that CCM encouraged CCM members on the mainland to return to Zanzibar and controversies related to re-demarcation of constituencies there was a fear that the election of 2005 might spark off fresh violence.

A number of important reforms were made after the 2000 election on the mainland. A permanent voters' register was established. A human rights commission was established. The public sector and local government reforms have changed the structures and contributed to emerging changes of attitude prevailing in the administration (URT, 2005). The work was done in a more transparent manner. President Mkapa was the third president to step down voluntarily in Tanzania, in a process without violence. It is expected that the reforms of the education sector will create more educated citizens who have the capability to participate in the political process. The laws regulating the media were being reviewed. There were, however, a number of debates. The law(s) regulating media and NGOs were still criticised for giving room for the government to control and infringe on the freedom of press and assembly. Corruption was still deep. Even if more information was available on the workings of the public sector, the question was still access to information, which was circumscribed by laws, practice and attitudes.

The 2005 election—the political context

Political party activity increased from late 2003. Parties prepared for the creation of the permanent voters' register and the 2005 election. CCM's year-long intensive and exasperating political battle as regards the internal nomination process ended at the party congress in May 2005, when the presidential candidate was elected from among the 11 aspiring candidates. In the process the "old guard" fraction representative, the Vice Chairman John Malacela (71 years old) was finally out-manoeuvred. The National Executive Committee had nominated Mark Mwandosya (transport and communication minister), Salim Ahmed Salim (former general secretary of OAU and chairman of the Nyerere foundation and originally from Zanzibar) and Jakaya Kikwete, the Minister for Foreign Affairs. Kikwete was a popular candidate with a broad appeal. He was comparatively young (54 years) and symbolised a new generation of political leaders, hoping to be able to bring about a change and was as such supported by the youth wing; he also had a long party history and had served in several senior governmental positions which made him appeal to the older CCM cadres. He was perceived to be un-corrupt, dedicated and hard working, as well as a reflecting but pragmatic politician, and was supported by the outgoing chairman of the party and president. As a Muslim he also appealed to the marginalised Muslim community, not the least the poor Muslims in urban areas and to those in the party that had argued that it was time for a president from Zanzibar.

The relations between the CCM and the opposition CUF in Zanzibar deteriorated and formal channels of communication were suspended. A formal dialogue between the Secretaries-General of CCM and CUF in Zanzibar resumed after facilitation by the international community. A wider Inter-Party Consultative Committee was created, chaired by the Secretary-General of CCM, Mr Philip Mangula, involving the leadership of all political parties.

One important political issue in the run up to the 2005 election was the debate on the nature of the Union - an issue that was particularly hotly debated in Zanzibar. CCM argued for the established policy of two governments, while CUF advocated three governments—-independent governments in Zanzibar and mainland and a Federal Government including representation of both. In the debate concerning the nature of the Union, CCM alleged that the position of CUF would lead to the break-up of the Union. CUF denied this, arguing that the CCM wanted to end Zanzibar's autonomy. A second major issue revolved around proposals for the formation of Government of National Unity in Zanzibar after the election. The CUF pledged to implement this if it won the election, while the CCM only agreed to consider it, as the issue was highly controversial not the least among some factions within CCM. The

idea was later ruled out as against the constitution by the attorney general. Long before the formal campaign began, it was clear that the elections would be keenly contested, particularly in Zanzibar (Commonwealth Observer Group, 2005).

In their manifestos, the major parties also attempted to engage in debates on other concrete issues such as economic development, health, education and jobs. There were differences regarding public policy priorities and the pace and scope of political and economic reform, but there was at the same time consensus on that the reform process should be continued. The alternatives to government policies in the opposition parties' election manifestos were in general weakly developed. Two of the opposition parties had more developed programs, CUF and CHADEMA. CUF, the presidential candidate former professor in economics, Ibrahim Lipumba, contributed to strengthened policy formulation capacity, together with a number of well educated or politically experienced party members in the comparatively large and well-organised opposition party. The revitalised business oriented CHADEMA attracted a number of dynamic people, younger ones from the university as well as more experienced people from the business sector. The election manifestos of the other 15 opposition parties were in general more developed in 2005 than during the election of 2000, but still far from matching CCM's.

Zanzibar 2005

In Zanzibar, presidential candidate Amani Karume narrowly defeated CUF's Hamad on October 30, 2005, in an election surrounded by accusations of fraud, intimidation, unfair electoral laws, a biased electoral commission, a dishonest tabulation of the ballots, and limited implementation of the amendment to the Election Act. CUF claimed that the party was repeatedly denied the right to organize campaign rallies (Civic United Front (CUF), 2005). In addition the large number of security personnel from the mainland intimidated opposition members on the CUF-dominated island of Pemba and on Unguja, where CUF supporters were outnumbered by CCM supporters. The Civic United Front (CUF) did not have fair and equal access to the media during the campaign period, despite assurances by the government. The CCM campaign dominated government radio, television, and print outlets, limiting coverage of opposition campaign events.

Long before the formal campaign began, it was clear that the elections would be keenly contested (Commonwealth Observer Group, 2005).

2005 election postponement and result

The election was postponed a few days before the polling day to December, after the death of CHADEMA's vice-presidential candidate.⁴ This prolongation of the election campaign period by almost six weeks was difficult for the already weak opposition parties to manage.

Unfortunately the vice presidential candidate of CHADEMA died only a few days before the election date. The elections were therefore postponed. If we had an independent electoral commission, only the presidential election should have been postponed, but the parliamentary and council elections should have taken place as planned. But they postponed all elections for 45 days. That allowed the CCM to be better organized because they had financial resources. For us it was a disaster because we had no more money left to travel around the country campaigning. We had budgeted money for allowances of polling agents. The money had already been transferred to parliamentary candidates. These candidates had to continue with campaign activities for another 45 days and ended up using the money budgeted for the polling day activities. So we really did not have effective polling agents in most of the 45,000 polling stations. This was true for all opposition parties, although CHADEMA seem to have been somewhat better financed even after the elections were postponed. The ruling party CCM spent more money after the election was postponed and had more campaign activities (interview with CUF Chairman Ibrahim Lipumba 2010).

The election result was a devastating defeat for the opposition and a landslide victory for CCM (Table). CCM got 80% of the presidential votes, and increased its constituency seats from 202 to 206 of the 232 seats in the parliament, that is, almost 90% of the MPs belonged to CCM. The opposition only won in confined geographic areas. CUF lost its two mainland seats and received 19 seats, 18 from Pemba and one from Zanzibar Stone Town. *Thus CCM won in all but seven constituencies on the mainland.* CHADEMA was the only opposition party that increased its number of seats, from four to five: one in Arusha, Kilimanjaro, Mara, Kigoma and Rukwa region respectively. TLP lost its three seats in Kilimanjaro, Mara and Kagera region and only got one seat,

4 The 2005 elections were scheduled to take place on 30 October 2005. Four days before the elections, the CHADEMA vice presidential candidate, Jumbe Rajab Jumbe, died. According to the electoral law, elections should be postponed if one of the presidential candidates or their running mates passes away. The NEC decided to postpone mainland elections to 14 December. Elections on Zanzibar for the presidency and parliament were allowed to proceed on schedule as the death of Jumbe was considered to be of less relevance to the local elections on the islands. CHADEMA itself proposed that it would have been enough to postpone the election one week.

in Kagera region. UDP lost two seats but John Cheyo, the UDP chairman, retained his seat in his home area Bariadi, Shinyanga region. Only three of the 14 opposition MPs elected on the mainland in 2000 were re-elected in 2005. CCM argued that this reflected that opposition MPs were less able than CCM's to deliver. The opposition argued that CCM focused its attention on constituencies where they had lost in the previous election in order to get the seat back and undermined the work of the opposition candidates.

Election monitors, both local and foreign, declared the 14 December 2005 general elections largely free and fair. Foreign monitors included groups from the AU, the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the European Union (EU), and the East African Community (EAC). In their preliminary statement on the elections they observed that in spite of a few irregularities, 'the 2005 general elections in Tanzania should be accepted as being broadly free and fair' (TEMCO, 2005).

The situation on Zanzibar was more complicated and was criticised by foreign observers and the opposition. The CUF wrote a summary of the mismanaged elections, which CUF was convinced, would have been won by CUF, if they had been free and fair (CUF 2005). The opposition parties argued that even on the mainland, irregularities took place, in particular with regard to the local government elections (interviews with representatives of TLP, CUF and CHADEMA on various occasions).

Actually the situation is deteriorating. The 1995 election was a more level playing field. We got resources for the campaign and there was no harassment during the campaigns. In the 2000 election, there was much more unequal access to resources and a lot of more harassment and in 2005 even more so. No rally was permitted after 6 (security) but the distances are long between rallies, sometimes you arrive at 5:45 and then you are not allowed to address rallies. This in spite of the fact that in the western regions the sun is up much longer.

The most serious problem is that the opposition has no recourses to follow up the elections and the counting of the votes (interview with CUF Chairman Ibrahim Lipumba 2010).

Complaints like the one cited above were dismissed by NEC as unfounded allegations (interview with Dr. Kivu Director of Elections, May 2006). The opposition has instigated a number of court cases, which on the other hand also shows that there are working structures and mechanisms for managing some of the challenging issues around the election processes, and that a culture of democracy is being established.

The media were reported as covering the election reasonably well, but the ruling party, for natural reasons, received more comprehensive coverage (Media Institute of

Southern Africa (MISA), 2005a; Media Institute of Southern Africa (MISA), 2005b).

There was also a great deal of self-criticism among some of the opposition parties that the defeat not only was a result of suppression from the ruling party and the government, but also to a large extent reflected the internal weaknesses of the opposition parties themselves. In the follow up the study I did in May 2006 it was observed that parties like CUF, CHADEMA and NCCR-Mageuzi had started a systematic work to develop the organisational structures, education of party members in policy issues and organisational skills and strategies for increasing membership as well as development of policies and positions. REF

Post- 2005 developments

Following the elections of 2005, the new president and government started very seriously to put the CCM election manifesto slogans into practice. The struggle against corruption was said to be intensified, again. Improved efficiency in central and local government is another area where the new government has made an impact. The parliament, particularly the weak opposition, appeared to find it challenging to keep up with president Kikwete's election slogan *Ari Mpya, Nguvu Mpya, Kasi Mpya*, translated as "new vigour, new zeal and new speed". A vision that during the first years after the election seems to a large extent to have been realised, even if some of the results are contested. From 2007/2008, the critique against the government mounted, both from the opposition that found the efforts to curb corruption insufficient and the commitment to a more inclusive democracy questionable. The donor community started to question the governments' political will and capacity to implement agreed reforms—not the least the fight against corruption.

But in 2010, a number of constraints still remain for the opposition in terms of unclear division between CCM and the security forces, access to information, and CCM's real commitment to democracy, as perceived by one of the opposition leaders:

The CCM lack of commitment to democratic rule was clearly demonstrated by the way the October 2009 local elections - to elect street and village chairpersons and committees—were administered. The regulations for these elections were distributed to us only a week before the beginning of the campaign for the elections. To increase the confusion the Ministry of Local Government and Regional Administration introduced guidelines that in important parts contradicted the regulations. The guidelines introduced many changes that were difficult to implement. Previous elections took place in an open general meeting of the village or street without any use of ballot papers. The new regulations introduced the

use of ballot papers that were organized by the District Executive Directors. Voters had to write the names and the party for each candidate they voted for. They had to master the names of 25 members of the village committee and their parties. In a country where most voters are functionally illiterate, voting by writing names is just not feasible. CCM and state functionaries organized agents to assist those who could not write. In many areas opposition parties were denied the opportunity to have agents who could assist more than one person to vote. The contesters of the elections were required to have their party seal in their application form. The regulations required just a party seal. The guidelines required a seal from the lowest organ of the party that is a party branch. Many CUF candidates were disqualified because they followed the Election Regulations and not the Guidelines. We had contesters in 110 villages from Handeni district who were denied to contest the elections because their application form had a seal from the CUF ward office and not the branch office. In all those villages, CCM candidates were declared elected unopposed. In past elections, when there was a single candidate voters were given the opportunity to cast a yes or no vote. We had not been informed about the new procedures in time. The new rules were thus complicated and the CCM contesters had been informed far in advance. In fact, I discovered the presence of the regulations when I visited the Finnish Embassy a week before the beginning of the election campaign. In the course of our discussion, I was told that the Embassy had received the Election Regulations three weeks ago. Finland was providing funds for local government reform and they were given priority to receive the Regulations. CUF a political party participating in the elections had no information. The Finnish ambassador and his officials were surprised to hear that CUF had not seen them so close before the elections. I called a press conference to complain and the minister for local government and regional administration argued that they had sent the regulations to the Registrar of political parties. However, we had not been informed. In the end we got twenty copies and this was for the whole country. One week before the election campaign began. CCM had known in advance so they could train their people in time. CCM won 90 per cent of the local government seats, over 50 per cent unopposed (PI: CUF Chairman Ibrahim Lipumba 2010).

This is of course the perspective of the opposition, but it indicate the challenges which the opposition perceive to remain.

A number of improvements regarding elections, were made in relation to the elections in October 2010. The opposition have demanded stronger regulation of the spending in connection with elections, where rich CCM members were perceived to have better opportunities to spend in the campaigns than most opposition contest-

ants. After prolonged debates a Financing of Election Bill was passed in the National Assembly on 11 February 2010. The objective of the law is to get rid of inappropriate expenditure in election campaign in order to meet the complaints from both the electorate and political parties that corruption in elections was undermining democracy. The new law stipulates a limit for how much funds individual candidates and political parties are allowed to spend, and what types of spending should be included. In the elections in 2000 and 2005, election contestants circumvented regulations for spending on elections through what was called *takrima*, “traditional hospitality”, to lavishly entertain campaign officials and voters in order to win their support. The new law empowers the registrar of political parties to monitor the financing of political campaigns. Every party and election contestant will be required to account for every expense related to an election (Citizen 20100212).⁵

8.3 Formal and informal constraints for a free and fair election

I will here summarize what has been discussed in chapters 5 and 7 on the many formal and informal constraints for the development of a consolidated democracy in Tanzania. The old one-party legislation has not been replaced (as of September 2010, but rather amended to accommodate a multiparty system. The Nyalali Commission⁶ recommended in 1992 the writing of a new constitution and the removal of some forty laws considered to be anti-democratic and anti-human rights for multipartyism to unfold. Those laws have not been repealed and still restrict activities of the opposition parties and the media, in addition to involving administrative procedures (interview with Prof. C.P. Maina and LHRC May 2006). As shown in chapter 7 the opposition has demanded the writing of new constitution since the inception of multipartyism. In February 2007, the opposition threatened to boycott the 2010 election if comprehensive constitutional reforms were not undertaken to broaden the democratic space and level the political playing field.

The opposition parties have very limited resource bases, in terms of personnel, organisational, and financial resources. This is a severe constraint for the creation of an opposition that could match the ruling party, with its historically strong position.

⁵ As the collection of primary material for this thesis stopped in April 2010, the elections in November 2010 is not analysed. A brief update appear in the end of next chapter.

⁶ A Presidential Commission set up in 1991 under the leadership of Chief Justice Francis Nyalali to collect the views of citizens and make recommendations on whether the country should continue with the single party system or adopt a multiparty system. Despite that 80% of the respondents in the investigation proposed to maintain the single party system, the commission recommended amending both the Union and Zanzibar Constitutions, to make Tanzania adopt a multiparty system

The ruling party *Chama Cha Mapinduzi* has its own resource base in the form of assets and income generating activities built up during the mono-party era, and also access to state resources to a considerable extent. CCM for instance owns most of the football stadiums in the bigger cities, has real estate in prime locations in larger cities and owns large commercial farms. The party has well-established structures all the way down to the household level, where the 10-cell system is still functioning in many places.

Donors provided some funds for the campaigns in the 1995 election. During the period 1995-2000, the government introduced party subsidies, distributed according to the parties' representation in the parliament. As CCM was the most well organised party CCM gained the vast majority of the parliamentary seats in the 1995 election, and thus also received the lion's share of the party subsidies, further adding to its advantage vis-à-vis the opposition. In the 2000 election, the state and the donors gave very limited support to parties for election campaigns. The bulk of the support was divided between the electoral commission, which organised the election, and voter education conducted by NEC and different NGOs (interview with Sten Rylander and others, Embassy of Sweden 2000 and 2002, Kiravu NEC 2001, 2002; Annete Mørk, Coordinator for Electoral Support Fund, 2000 and 2001).

The uneven distribution of resources between the parties was sharpened during the 2000 election campaign. In a poor country like Tanzania, it is difficult for the parties to build up an organisation based on member support. The uneven resource distribution therefore became striking. To quote just one example, the largest opposition party, Civic United Front, claimed that it only had enough funds to print 1,500 copies of its election manifesto, in a country with 32 million inhabitants, while CCM was well supplied with election manifestos and other materials (interviews with CUF Election Campaign Manager, 2000 and 2001). The unevenness was further sharpened when it was decided that the outgoing MPs should have their entire pension paid out immediately when they left parliament. Outgoing MPs received 24 million Tsh each—a substantial sum in a country where a well-educated teacher gets 1 million a year—paid out just when the election campaigns started. This provided the outgoing MPs with a superior economic base for re-election campaigns. In addition, the CCM candidates had strong backing from the party, in terms of organisational capacity, provision of materials, transport, equipment and political experience, while the opposition parties had much fewer resources to support their candidates in various constituencies.

Another constraint for free and fair elections and a strong opposition is that publicly employed staff at any level or branch are not allowed to stand in any election, this includes teaching staff at schools and universities. If a public servant wants to contest, he/she has to resign. If he/she loses, he/she then has to reapply for his/her job. In a

context where economic activities and job opportunities outside the state apparatus are limited, where each employed person supports many others, where the government is drastically slimmed down, and moreover, where unemployment is around 50 per cent, one either needs to be sure of victory or very committed in order to take such a risk. Several of the interviewees mentioned that it was not certain that one would be re-employed in state or local government or teaching institutions if one had contested for the opposition. In addition to most donor funds being channelled through the CCM-controlled state apparatuses, most economic opportunities are provided through loyalty to the party. As a consequence, the opposition has huge difficulties recruiting qualified candidates. This situation was already highlighted in the 1992 election, in 1995 and again in 2000 and 2005. The government had both few resources and limited interest to build up a strong opposition. It might not be the role of the government to do that either, but there should be a levelling of the playing field in order to create the pre-conditions for a healthy opposition.

Despite the debate/critique against the donors for their bias in supporting elections rather than democratic processes, the same bias prevailed in 2005. It is difficult for an aid administration to handle democracy support, as it requires much administration to find the right channels in relation to the small amounts involved. The capacity on the Tanzanian side in the form of well functioning organisations is also low. It is also politically difficult for a government in one country to provide the opposition parties in another country with support. This was highlighted in May 2001 when the Netherlands government proposed to fund political parties' activities as a way to enhance democracy in Tanzania, via the Dutch "Institute for Multiparty Democracy", an umbrella organisation for seven Dutch parties. A diplomatic row flared up between CCM, the ruling party, and the Dutch government. The CCM secretary-general Phillip Mangula for instance stated: "Usually, donors are required to work with the government in power; why did they then decide to work with the opposition?" (The East African, 20010514). On the Swedish side, plans to develop a programme for supporting democracy and human rights began in 1996, but it did not take off until April 2001.

The opposition parties themselves are weak, in terms of both organisational and policy making capacity see chapter 7 and Maliyamkono and Kanyongolo (2003). Only two parties, the NCCR and the CUF, had more elaborated political programmes in 2000. The situation improved in the 2005 election, but apart from CUF and CHADEMA and to a certain extent TLP and NCCR-Mageuzi, other opposition parties' programmes were not elaborated. The lack of comprehensive policy alternatives to CCM, was also one of CCM's critiques against the opposition in 1995, 2000 and 2005 elections. A critique shared by media, CSOs, key informants and voters interviewed.

8.4 Can the election result mirror internal weakness of the opposition rather than an oppressive ruling party?

I have above outlined structural constraints as perceived by the opposition parties. There is also views from outside the opposition that point at the internal weaknesses of the opposition parties, and that the electorate simply does not support the opposition as the opposition do not appear to be a serious alternative to CCM. According to this view, the deteriorating performance of opposition parties in consecutive elections can be interpreted as an indicator of the weakness or lack of popular support for opposition parties rather than the capability and expertise of the ruling party and the state to rig elections. Or as Issa Shivji, Professor of Law at the University of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, puts it:

Today we have some 18 or so parties with perhaps two or three credible ones. But there is hardly any great difference in their vision, outlook or major policies. All are donor-dependent; all are driven by the neo-liberal policies of liberalisation, privatisation and the enrichment of the minority; the so-called “Washington Consensus”; and none has a credible vision of constructing a national, democratic economy and polity in the interest of the large majority (Shivji, 2005).

Does then the overwhelming victory for CCM necessarily mean that democracy is undermined in Tanzania? We conclude with a citation from a long-term observer of the democratisation process in Africa (and Tanzania):

We have to examine why the electorate in Tanzania choose CCM over the competition. Numerous newspaper reports and political commentaries before and after the elections indicate that the majority of people in Tanzania do not think that the political opposition is mature enough to govern the country. All opposition presidential candidates are heard from only during election campaigns. It is therefore difficult for the electorate to say with any confidence that they know the candidates well. Further, all opposition parties have done a poor job of organising their parties across the country and none has an elaborate, countrywide party structure. One or two have pockets of support in a particular district or constituency, but that is more a reflection of an individual candidate’s qualities or a localised issue such as an unpopular CCM candidate. In the circumstances, it is fair to say that CCM’s dominance is a result of the electorate’s will, and therefore fundamentally democratic (Nyang’oro, 2006).

8.5 Conclusion

The formal conduct of the elections on the mainland has improved from the first multiparty election in 1995, to 2000 to the 2005 elections. This includes a substantial increase both in numbers and share of the voting-age population participating through registering. In 2005, however, the turnout, in terms of % of the registered numbers of voters that actually voted, went down slightly. This could be related to the fact that a larger part of the voting-age population registered and that the elections on the mainland were postponed for 45 days. It could also indicate a beginning “multiparty election fatigue”. In Zanzibar the elections have continued to be strongly contested. Improvements have also been made in laws and institutions regulating the elections. This includes a permanent voters’ register, laws regulating election expenses and more transparent elections and vote counting procedures.

The playing field continues, however, to be uneven. The ruling party has from the outset a better organisation, better capacity to formulate and disseminate policies. The opposition is fragmented and weak, and lacks resources to be able to balance the ruling party election campaigns and to recruit election observers at poll stations. A number of regulations from the single party era remain and limit the opposition in various ways. The division between the ruling party and the state and local government apparatus is still fluid, or at least perceived to be so by the opposition. The threat to security regulations is used by the police to limit opposition parties during election campaigns. The media, in particular the state owned Radio Tanzania, which has the largest audience, still gives an un-proportional coverage of CCM during elections.

So, even if a lot of progress has been made, the challenge to build up credible parties based on competing visions still has a long way to go. The challenge now is to what extent the democratic processes will deepen before the election in 2015?

9 Concluding discussion

Tanzania has after independence developed an interesting political culture that has facilitated peaceful development, despite large parts of the population suffering from continuing economic hardships. Tanzania is one of the better performers in Africa with respect to democratic governance, reforms of the economy and the public administration. The research question I have been trying to answer is if these changes have brought about a consolidation of an inclusive and substantive democracy. I will thereby focus on eight key institutions for the democratisation process.

In this section I will bring the analytical framework presented in chapter 2 back in and make an effort to assess to what extent Tanzania is moving towards a consolidation of democracy, making the distinction between the four “spheres”, the state/state capacity, the political, the civil and the economic society. I have analysed a selected number of institutions within each sphere, with the help of a number of indicators.¹ The institutions were analysed from a substantive democracy theoretical perspective. That is, I endeavoured not only to look at the forms of the respective institutions, but also to assess the quality of the outcomes of the democratisation process in terms of participation and an institutionalised multiparty system on the one hand, and an inclusive economic development, on the other. The observations are based on how various actors perceived the process, and how I have interpreted these perceptions. Even if I have triangulated my interpretations with information from various sources, in the end they are my interpretations and not necessarily “reality”.

¹ The selection of spheres, institutions and indicators is theoretically motivated in chapter 2, sections 2.2 and 2.3 and presented in figure 2 on page 74.

9.1 Sphere 1: State/state capacity

Within the sphere “state/state capacity” I analysed two institutions: “The balance between the executive, the representative and the judiciary” and “Good and democratic governance”. The indicators used for the first institution were the “Ability of the representative to hold the executive accountable”; “Independence of the judiciary” and “Autonomy of the executive and representative vis-à-vis donors”. For the institution “Good and democratic governance” I used the indicators “Autonomy of the administration versus the executive”; “Governance reforms”; “Corruption” and “Respect for human rights” (chapter 5).

In the assessment made in this study we can note a number of achievements in the process to strengthen the state, its capacity and to consolidate democracy, but a number of challenges remain. A centralised state developed after independence, where the party and government structures were conflated. The executive controlled the parliament, the judiciary, the civil society and the media. The strong centralised executive power in combination with a strong political party in control of the state has been one of the major challenges for the democratisation process in Tanzania. At the same time, the capacity of the state to implement policies has been weak.

A large number of reforms have been undertaken since the multiparty system was introduced in 1992 in order to make the state and local government administration more effective and accountable. Five of the “core” reform programmes directly address the central and local government/public sector, that is, several generations of Public Service Reforms (PSRPs), Public Financial Management (PFMRP), the Local Government Reforms (LGRs), the Legal Sector Reform (LSRP) and National Anti-Corruption Strategy and Action Plan (NACSAP). On whether the reforms contribute to the consolidation of democracy, it can be noted that a number of structures and institutions that can enhance democratic governance have been established. At the same time, the government decision-making processes to a large extent are still outside parliamentary controls and public scrutiny. There is lack of parliamentary oversight, and local governments still do not have the autonomy required, according to a number of interviewees and also confirmed in many reports, studies and evaluations. Implementation of the reforms has been slow, in particular at local level.

9.1.1 *The balance between the executive, the representative and the judiciary*

The presidency continues to be strong in Tanzania, even if the balance between the three different branches of government has become more even. The representative branch capacity to hold the executive accountable was relatively limited up to 2005.

A number of reforms and support to the parliament have led to a considerable improvement of the functions of the parliament. In the period 2005–2010, the parliament strengthened its position vis-à-vis the executive, as shown in a number of cases. The opposition played a pivotal role in advancing a number of grand corruption issues, in collaboration with critical CCM MPs. For the first time in Tanzania's (short) democratic history, a Prime Minister had to resign as a result of questions raised by the parliament in 2008. In addition, two ministers resigned. However, the parliament still lacks the teeth and capacity to fulfil its role to hold the executive accountable, according to the principles in a consolidated liberal democracy. The relatively few opposition MPs are facing a number of challenges, both in terms of capacity and access to information, in order to balance the overwhelming majority of members from the ruling party. Moreover, MPs within the ruling party are under a strong party whip in the chambers.

In the theoretical discourse on democracy, good governance and development, a common standpoint is that decentralisation not only will bring about better governance but also deepen democracy and bring about poverty reduction. This is also the stated aim in many of the above-cited reforms. Even if implementation of the reforms has been slower than planned, a number of important changes have taken place that strengthens local governments and councils. Power, responsibilities and resources have been transferred, including educated staff, from central and regional level to the local level. We find, however, similar challenges for the representatives at the local level to hold the executive accountable, as at the national level. In addition, the overlapping between central and local level, and the persisting overlap between the ruling party's structure and the different levels in the administration, is a challenge for the opposition parties, as well as civil society.

The constitution is characterised by a patchwork of different amendments to the 1977 one-party constitution, as will be discussed below. The judiciary has, however, been relatively independent since the start of the period in focus of this study. The challenge is foremost the capacity of the parliament and judiciary to fulfil their role. Lack of resources reduces the capability of the judiciary and the legal system to operate effectively, resulting in limited capacity to enforce the laws. In cases where the law is enforced, the lack of availability of sufficient and educated staff with reasonable salaries opens up for arbitrariness and corruption in the court system at all levels. The scarcity of resources makes legal processes unpredictable and slow—which creates abuse of human rights in terms of extremely long periods in remand prisons and in terms of development constraints for commercial activities. Poor people's, not the least poor women's, rights and access to justice are limited as they have little knowledge of their rights and cannot afford legal assistance. The opposition complains over slowness and

overly bureaucratic legal processes. The party headquarters, and the contestants, spend a lot of time, money and energy on legal processes.

It was noted that there has been a strengthening of some of the institutions that oversee the executive. A Commission for Human Rights and Good Governance (CHRAGG) became operational in 2002. CHRAGG is an independent government department, established as the national focal point institution for the promotion and protection of human rights and duties as well as good governance in Tanzania. It has the mandate to keep a check on the misuse of office and the abuse of power by elected and appointed officials, take action when human rights are not respected and even prosecute the offender when necessary.

Hence we can conclude that there is a significant improvement of the horizontal accountability mechanism, even if there is still some way to go before it could be claimed to be in line with a consolidated democracy.

Corruption. In Tanzania, corruption has permeated all sectors of society, as in most African countries. With a weak justice system, it is possible for resourceful persons, companies or political parties to buy their rights through corrupt practices. Corruption in elections and in legislative bodies reduces accountability and representation in policy-making; corruption in the judiciary undermines the rule of law; and corruption in public administration results in the unequal provision of services. More generally, corruption weakens government institutions by disregarding official procedures, siphoning off the resources needed for development, and selecting or promoting officials without regard to performance. At the same time, corruption undermines the legitimacy of government and democratic values, and trust.

Corruption and the fight against corruption have been on the agenda since the struggle for independence in Tanzania. After liberalisation of the economy in the mid-eighties, corruption increased. Pressure on the government from donors and citizens made the government appoint a commission to investigate corruption in the early nineties. All governments elected since multipartyism was introduced have stated a policy of zero tolerance with corruption. Gradually a comprehensive body of regulations, laws and oversight institutions aimed at preventing, investigating and sanctioning corrupt practices have been established. Despite the strong commitments made by the Tanzanian legislative and executive to enhance the fight against corruption, it is debatable how much has happened in practice. The number of corruption cases taken to court increased to 627 cases, out of which five cases of grand corruption, in May 2010. At the same time, there have only been 21 convictions, up to May 2010.

The figure of corruption cases taken to court could be interpreted in different

ways. The government argues that it is a clear indication on its seriousness on the issue, and the frequent reporting on corruption is an indicator on the freedom of the press. The opposition, on their part, argues that even if it is a step forward that so many and even senior officials can be taken to court on corruption issues, very few cases so far have resulted in a conviction. This might undermine people's confidence in democracy—and put into question whether the government and ruling party is sincere in its claim to fight corruption. The general problem, it has been noted, is not the absence of anti-corruption statements and legislation, but the lack of political will to put them into effect.

Autonomy of the executive and representative vis-à-vis donors Decision-making, governance and ownership are complicated in a country like Tanzania where international development assistance is such an important source of funding, for both the state budget and various projects outside the state budget. One challenge for the Tanzanian government has been the great number of multilateral, bilateral and other actors who have been and are involved in development cooperation. It is a challenge for the government to overview the total available funding, as well as activities. All donors demand contacts, time for negotiations, development of programmes and projects, reports, evaluations and goodwill. Moreover, different donors have different forms and modalities for aid, programming and reporting. This makes many demands on meagre administrative and political resources. It is also a challenge for the democratisation process. To whom is the government accountable, to donors who provide crucial funding or to the citizens, who have few resources to pay taxes? For “the international development partners” it is a delicate balance between the Paris Agenda's objectives to strengthen ownership, and to hold the government, and other actors receiving aid, accountable for using aid according to agreed principles and objectives.

The discussion on the need and appropriate mechanisms for how to coordinate aid and strengthen Tanzanian ownership (re-)started in the mid-nineties. In 2002, the government decided upon a Tanzania Assistance Strategy (TAS), in dialogue with donors. TAS' aim was to strengthen aid coordination, harmonisation and alignment as well as national ownership and government leadership of the development process. In 2006 the follow up Joint Assistance Strategy for Tanzania (JAST), was developed, largely by the government, but in close cooperation with the donors. What we can note is a development of relatively well-developed structures and capacities for coordination, on the donor side and to a lesser extent between the donors and the government. The largest challenge, from a democratisation point of view, is that this structure is highly complex and difficult to access and understand for most actors outside the

process including actors within the ruling party, from MPs to members of the NEC in CCM, and even more so the opposition parties, CSOs and the citizens in villages or townships. The challenge with this complicated structure for the democratisation process, is that it is difficult for various actors, not the least for the opposition, for the parliament, CSOs and media, to get access to information, understand the process, find entry points and get access to space in these complex structures, and to find out when and how it is possible for them to have influence. Linked to that challenge are the prevailing attitudes and culture within the government, that limit access and information for non-government actors.

The policymaking capacity and agenda setting power of the donors should not be underestimated. Apart from providing access to highly needed funds, the number of officials and technical specialist at bi-lateral, multilateral and international NGOs is large, compared with the number of senior officers and technical experts in the government. They work in well-equipped offices, with access to literature and the internet. In addition to the staff employed at various international organisations in Tanzania, there is further resources at respective agency head quarters backstopping the fieldstaff. Even if the Paris-agenda put the government in the drivers seat, it is a challenge for the agenda setting process, and the development of democracy.

9.1.2 Good and democratic governance—the executive strengthened relatively more than the representative

Good governance and democracy are regarded as mutually reinforcing in mainstream democratic theory (Diamond, 1999), as discussed in chapters 2 and 5. In Tanzania good governance reforms have been undertaken and implemented, aiming to restructure the central and local governments, decentralise, improve capacity and good—and democratic—governance at all levels, as discussed in chapter 5. The parliament and the councils have been strengthened, as well as CSOs and media, so they are able to participate in policy formulation and decision-making.

Autonomy of the administration versus the executive. There are tensions between good governance reforms and democracy, as pointed out by for instance Abrahamsen, (2000), Leftwich (2005); (2010) Craig and Porter, (2006). In the first place well intended administrative reforms strengthen the central and local governments' technocratic capabilities, while other reforms have not strengthened the capacity of the parliament and other accountability mechanisms to have an influence over the executive to the same extent. At the local level, the same pattern prevails; the "technocrats" dominate the elected councillors, even if MPs and councillors are members of the ruling party.

For the opposition, the media and civil society organisations it is even more difficult to get information and access in order to hold the government accountable and participate in policy formulation. We have in chapter 5 argued that the good governance reforms have contributed to strengthening an “iron triangle” of decision-making and dialogue between the presidency, the ministry of finance and the donor community, and to undermining other efforts to strengthen a democratic governance, at the same pace, up to around 2004/05.

It appears from our study that the public sector reforms strengthen the executive functions both at national and local level relatively more than the political reforms strengthen the representative side. Hence, the good governance reforms have unintentionally contributed to strengthening an “iron triangle”. In a context that Mkandawire (2001) termed “choiceless democracies”, between the presidency, ministry of finance and the donors around the political process, based on what Haas (1992) termed “an epistemic community”. This makes it very difficult for parliamentarians, NGOs, media or the public to get into the political process. A similar phenomenon occurs at the local level, where the elected councillors in the local government council have difficulties to have an influence on the local government officials.

Senior officers and experts in the government and the in the international agencies share the rationality of being a technocrats, and it might a factor that make it easier for them to relate to concern of other technocrats, rather than parliamentarians or CSOs.

Also the intertwining of party and state structure continues to be a great challenge for the opposition parties and the democratisation process and contributes to the un-level playing field for the political parties. Furthermore the mechanisms to hold Local Government Authorities (LGAs) accountable to the community are largely ineffective—formal democratic procedures are undermined by the limited capacity of elected representatives and the lack of realistic choice. The political commitment to devolution of power seems further to be ambiguous in the central government. As a consequence, the effort to build local accountability might be undermined—who will bother to exert accountability pressure on local government if all important decisions are being made elsewhere?

This strengthens the argument for using a substantive democracy theory approach, rather than the more limited focus on the formal democratic institutions in liberal democratic theory.

Respect for human rights On the mainland, there are relatively few violations of human rights. Civil rights are relatively well respected. Freedom of the press and association has been violated, in a few cases, as has the right to organise demonstrations and public meetings. Police use the pretext that order is disturbed to intervene, and in some cases

with brutality, according to the opposition. In Zanzibar, violations of both human and civil rights occurred relatively frequently during the period of study.

To conclude the discussion on the first sphere, a number of the necessary policies, institutions and legal frameworks for democratic governance are in place, as well as the regulations to give them the mandate to pursue their activities. Still, however, the capacity, and often the political will, to implement the mandates are weak. The challenge is that the capacity of the parliament and the judiciary is still lagging behind the executive. Hence, both the parliament and judiciary need to be further empowered in order to be able to exercise their democratic mandate. We have also noted a strengthening of horizontal accountability mechanisms from 2004/2005—even if many challenges remain. We have also pointed at some of the challenges for a strengthening of national democratic decision-making that international development cooperation brings about.

9.2 The “civil society”

Within the civil society sphere, I analysed three institutions: “Independent media”; “Strengthened NGOs” and “Democratic culture”. The media sphere was analysed with the indicators “Structure of the media sector”; “External constraints for media” and “Internal constraints for media”. The “Strengthened NGOs” sphere was analysed with the indicators “Structure of the NGO sector”; “External constraints for “NGOs” and “Internal constraints for NGOs”. The institution of democratic culture was analysed with the help of two indicators “Democratic values and procedures” and “Citizen, Political Parties and Civil Society access to information”.

9.2.1 Independent media

The capacity, quality, distribution and freedom of the press have improved in Tanzania since the multiparty system was introduced in 1992. The media played an important role as a catalyst for political reforms in the absence of a strong civil and political society. The media now plays a major role as an opposition and helps keep the government in check, providing a voice for the opposition, citizens, and different interest groups. Most of the media are based in Dar es Salaam, the commercial capital. Regional and local newspapers and broadcast media are emerging. However, even if the numbers of papers and media programmes have increased, most have limited capacity and circulation. The outreach of newspapers and other media in rural areas is still very limited.

The freedom of the press has increased substantially since 2005. A number of articles with critical reporting on grand corruption have been published in major media.

On the other hand, there are recent examples of limitation of press freedom. The law(s) regulating media and NGOs is/are still criticised for giving room for the government to control and infringe on the freedom of press and assembly. The laws regulating the media are being reviewed, but have not yet been decided upon. Even if more information is available on what takes place in the public sector laws, practices and attitudes still circumscribe access to information.

It is obvious that the political and economic reforms have created the foundation for much more diverse media—and that the media today play a fundamental role in the democratisation process. At the same time, the media in Tanzania are part of or closely allied to the political society, the economic society or are state owned, which limits their critical functions in the democratisation process in various ways. It is thus difficult to argue that the media as whole by definition are part of a civil society. The press in Tanzania does, however, play a fundamentally important role as a watchdog of the government and the private sector, and hence is an important part of the civil society—and the democratisation process. Yet, we have, however, identified a number of challenges that limit the capacity of the media to play their civil society/democratising role independently: dependence on revenues from advertising; low purchasing power of the public; limited distribution; dominance of yellow journalism; bad working conditions for journalists; low salaries and education among journalists; self-censorship and various types of corruption; close connection between large business interests and ruling party; laws and regulations that infringe on freedom of the press; uneven access to information; and finally attitudes among public servants about not disclosing information.

9.2.2 Are the CSOs strengthened and can hold the government accountable?

The number of CSOs has increased dramatically during the past 20 years. The proliferation of CSOs is a result of a combination of democratisation, weakened state capacity to deliver social services, and a deliberate government policy of allowing larger involvement of CSOs in the provision of different services, in line with the ideology behind the SAPs to limit the role of the state. The majority of the NGOs are based in Dar es Salaam and larger cities, often with limited membership, and they do not necessarily have democratic structures or culture. Very few NGOs have the skills needed to undertake comprehensive policy analysis and formulation, research, advocacy or outreach activities. Few have a clear vision of their mission. Most NGOs are heavily dependent on donors' funding. Very few can be regarded as social movements.

The more participatory processes around the government budget process and the formulation of policies have gradually provided the NGOs with new arenas. A few

developed NGOs have managed to use the new space to put forward their views and participate in the policy formulation processes. This does not always concur with the government's interest or perceptions of what an NGO should or should not do.

The traditional mass based organisations in Tanzania, the labour organisations and peasant cooperatives, have a slightly different history than the NGOs, but experience similar challenges. Trade unions and cooperatives have played an important role in Tanzania's political history, as discussed in chapter 4. With agriculture accounting for 75% of the labour force above the age of 15 in 2006, agriculture based cooperatives have a huge potential for collective actions. The social base of the traditional trade unions is much more limited as only some 11.6% of the workforce has employment in the formal economy.

The *cooperatives* have a considerable potential in the democratisation process. The primary cooperatives give local farmers an opportunity to participate in civil society at the local level. The structure of the cooperatives is supposed to aggregate members' interests to the national level, where the umbrella organisation TFC is supposed to participate and represent members' interests in national dialogues. A process started in 2000 to separate the cooperatives from the state, reform the inefficient, mismanaged and corrupt organisation through a re-democratisation of the cooperatives, re-organisation of the complex structure, and change policies and legal frameworks. The cooperative movement is, however, still characterized by problems, and in similarity with other CSO organisations, has weak capacity of all kinds. Even if the laws and regulatory framework have changed, the cooperatives are still not autonomous from the state/government.

With pressure for democratisation and liberalisation a first step towards autonomous *trade unions* was taken in 1991. In 2006, there were 16 fully recognized and registered trade unions. Even if the legal framework has given more autonomy to the trade unions, a number of the earlier challenges remain. These are the low capacity, not the least research capacity, to formulate alternatives to the government policies and participate in national dialogues, access to information and the union's internal democratic structures. In combination with pressures from the international community on the government to be more inclusive, trade unions were able to participate in various forums, not the least in the formulation of the MKUKUTA. The trade unions perceive that the legislation still has a number of provisions that limit their associational autonomy. The new labour law in 2004 removed some of these constraints, the power of the registrar was reduced and the procedures for legally calling a strike simplified, but the government still directly and indirectly controls the unions. The trade union movement perceives that the government is still suspicious about its activities. Among

the internal weaknesses is lack of coordination and proper channels from the local to the national level. This raises issues on who the national trade unions are representing. The various unions are also competing among themselves over members, which weakens the combined strength of the unions. Another challenge for the trade unions is the changing character of the economy, as a result of liberalisation. Most labour is self-employed or works in the informal sector, rather than in state-run activities. With globalisation and foreign investment, the trade unions meet new challenges, in terms of foreign investors. Trade union rights are hard to exercise in practice due to anti-union attitudes in the private sector and serious restrictions on the right to strike.

9.2.3 *Democratic culture*

Even if there has been a dramatic change towards a more democratic culture since 1992, there is concern that the culture inherited from the single-party era still prevails in parts of the ruling party and the administration. This tension between authoritarian and a substantive democracy is not the least prevalent at the local level. A change is taking place, more people are exposed to democratic ideas, from the changed curriculum in primary and secondary schools, to media, operation of political parties and CSOs, networks at national, regional and international level. Internet, mobile telephones and TV have created new channels for exposure and interaction and exchange of information.

To conclude the discussion on the civil society we can note that there has been a quite dramatic change for the better for the CSOs, in particular since around 2000. The legal framework has been changed, even if a number of problematic provisions remain. Policy making at central level is more inclusive and a number of forums (or for a possibly but not forays which are expeditions) have opened up for participation from CSOs. The CSOs themselves have been strengthened and as a result the last two decades have seen the emergence of a more diversified and active civil society in Tanzania. However, despite these changes, a number of challenges still exist for CSOs to be able to hold the government accountable, as well as influence/participate in policymaking, on local as well as central level. We have pointed at a number of structural constraints in the institutional and legal framework and weaknesses within the CSOs themselves. Not the least the question of who NGOs represent is crucial in that context. There is also the question if there is a political will and culture within the government, the administration and the ruling party to let CSOs continue to expand and to be resourceful enough to hold the government accountable and to give the citizens a channel to voice their concerns.

9.3 The political society

As the focus of the study is on the political society, the analysis of this sphere was subdivided into two chapters. In chapter seven I analysed one major institution: “Institutionalisation of a viable multiparty system”; in chapter eight we brought together the different threads of analysis of the democratisation processes in the analysis of the institution “Free and fair elections”. The indicators I have used when analysing the institution “Institutionalisation of a viable multiparty system” are: “Relationship between the ruling party and the state”; “Balance between the ruling party and the opposition”; “External constraints for the political parties” and “Internal constraints for the political parties” which assessed together will indicate the relative degree of institutionalisation of a multiparty system. This is done in chapter seven. The elections from 1999 to 2005 are analysed in chapter eight. Here we use the three main indicators “Registration and turnout”; “Election campaigns” and “Elections and counting”. The selection of indicators on the political society is theoretically motivated above in section 2.3.2.

9.3.1 Institutionalisation of a viable multiparty system

Tanzania had 18 registered political parties in the elections of 2000, 2005 and 2010. Only five, however, managed to get enough votes to get into parliament.

Relationship between the ruling party and the state. The ruling party Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) has dominated Tanzanian politics since the late 1950s when its predecessor TANU led the independence struggle. It is a good example of a “party continuity” transition, where the party identified with the pre-democratisation era transforms and adapts to a multiparty environment and manages to maintain power. CCM has a well-developed organisation with elaborated procedures and structures for (relatively democratic) decision-making within the party. However, it is also characterised by a strong central authority and personal networks, with close links to the administration at different levels, as well as to various economic elites and power centres outside the party. Although CCM is formally detached from the governmental structures, the old ties between the party and the administration still exist, both formally and informally. As most “political opportunities” arise within the government administration – rather than the political structures or the private sector – incentives exist even for strong leaders from the opposition parties to join CCM. The blurred line between CCM and governmental structures might be largest at the lowest level of administration, the 10-cell structure, which today has an unclear status as both a CCM and an administrative structure within the local government system.

Balance between the ruling party and the opposition - uneven distribution of resources between CCM and the opposition. A multiparty system needs functioning parties, and

there is a large body of literature discussing the role of the opposition in Africa and the challenges they are facing (for instance Basedau et al., 2007; Olukoshi, 1998b; Randall and Svåsand, 2002; Salih, 2003, 2007; Rakner and Walle, 2009). CCM has its own resource base in the form of assets and income generating activities built up from the single party era. CCM has well-established structures all the way down to the household level. CCM has gained the vast majority of the parliamentary seats from the 1995 election and onwards, and thus receives the lion's share of the party subsidies, further adding to its advantage vis-à-vis the opposition.

The combination of an extensive and relatively well working organisational structure, longer history and close cooperation with various elites as well as direct access and control of the major power centres, makes CCM a formidable challenge for newly established opposition parties to compete with. The opposition therefore has limited chances to develop and expand.

Internal constraints for the political parties - weak opposition parties. The opposition parties have very limited resource bases, in terms of personnel, organisational and financial resources. The opposition parties are weak, in terms of both organisational and policy-making capacity, capacity to manage internal conflicts and build up their social base. The degree of institutionalisation of the parties is low. This limits the parties' ability to fulfil the four roles of political parties; interest aggregation; interest articulation; the recruitment, selection and training of politicians; and holding the government accountable, (chapter 7 and the appendix). This is a severe constraint for the creation of an opposition that could match the ruling party, with its historically strong position. The ruling party has its own resource base in the form of assets and income generating activities built up during the mono-party era, and also has access to state resources to a considerable extent. Only two opposition parties had more elaborated political programmes in 2000. The situation improved in the 2005 election, but apart from CUF and CHADEMA and to a certain extent TLP and NCCR-Mageuzi, other opposition parties' programmes were not substantially elaborated. The lack of comprehensive policy alternatives to CCM was also one of CCM's critiques against the opposition in the 1995, 2000 and 2005 elections. The voters might have voted rationally for the party with proven capacity to govern the country. In the election in 2010 CHADEMA and CUF developed comprehensive programmes, were able to organise more efficient organisations and to reach out to voters.

The weakness of the opposition parties also points at the need to improve the leadership and strengthen the organisational structure of the political parties. It is not only a question about increasing the number of members and branches of the different parties. There is a need for developing the constitutions of the parties, the capacity to

analyse and formulate policies, and to improve democracy within the parties in order to facilitate a consolidation of democracy in the society as a whole. Conflicts within and between parties in the opposition also weaken the parties.

External constraints for the political parties. There are a number of formal and informal constraints for the building of a viable multiparty system. Apart from the limited human and financial resources mentioned in the last section, we have the constitution and the opportunity cost for political activism.

The rules of the game: the need for a constitution adapted to multipartyism. The old one-party legislation has not been replaced, but amended to accommodate a multiparty system. The Nyalali commission already recommended in 1992 the writing of a new constitution and the removal of forty laws considered to be anti-democratic and anti-human rights for multipartyism to unfold (Nyalali, 1992). A number of these laws have not been repealed and still restrict activities of the opposition parties, as well as administrative procedures and the media. The opposition has demanded the writing of a new constitution since the inception of multipartyism. In February 2007 the opposition threatened to boycott the 2010 election if comprehensive constitutional reforms had not been undertaken to broaden the democratic space and level the political playing field, which shows how seriously the opposition views the issue.²

Unfair treatment and harassment In almost every interview with different opposition party members, from those of the national leadership to ordinary representatives at village and council level, different examples of harassments and claims of being unfairly treated by different state agencies, were brought forward. It was not possible to verify and cross-check whether all these various accusations were real or imagined. Triangulations with newspaper reports and other reports verify to a certain extent the perception from the opposition members that the opposition was subject to various types of harassment. This is particularly true for Zanzibar. It is unclear to what extent these harassments were an organised activity and sanctioned from district, regional or national leadership, the governmental structure, or CCM leadership. Some of the harassment might be a result of individual local leaders' or officials' initiative. It could also be a misunderstanding by local political leaders, officials or security forces of prevailing rules. In addition, of course it could also be that the opposition party members/aspiring leaders blamed the government at various levels, or the ruling party, rather than their own shortcomings.

Access to media and to information. All opposition parties state that access to media is a challenge for the parties, even if the situation has improved gradually and become

2 Discussion on a new constitution has been on top of the agenda after the election in 2010 and the spring of 2011.

better after the 1995 and 2000 elections. In 2005, the situation had improved further. Yet the opposition perceive that they have difficulties to get access to media. To reach out is even more difficult between the elections. Access to information was a key challenge for all parties. This includes basic knowledge about the structures and processes for decision-making in an aid dependent country like Tanzania.

Opportunity cost for political activism in the opposition. Another constraint for the democratisation process, free and fair elections and a strong opposition is that publicly employed staff at any level or in any branch are not allowed to stand in national elections. If a public servant wants to contest, he/she has to resign. If he/she loses, he/she then has to reapply for his/her job. In a context where economic activities and job opportunities outside the state apparatus are limited, one either needs to be sure of victory or very committed in order to take such a risk.

In addition, most donor funds are channelled through the CCM-controlled state apparatuses, and most economic opportunities are provided through loyalty to the party. As a consequence, the opposition has huge difficulties recruiting qualified candidates. Comparatively few income opportunities still exist outside the public or public controlled sector. In combination with the weak social and economic base of the opposition, this makes it difficult for the opposition to recruit qualified leaders and mobilise public support.

It might not be the role of the government to build the opposition, but there should be a levelling of the playing field in order to create the pre-conditions for healthy opposition. As stated before a multiparty system needs functioning parties.

9.3.2 *Free and fair elections*

The formal conduct of the elections on the mainland has improved from the first multiparty election in 1995, to the 2000 and 2005 elections. In Zanzibar the elections have continued to be strongly contested. Improvements have also been made in laws and institutions regulating the elections. This includes a permanent voters' register, laws regulating election expenses, and elections and vote counting procedures that are more transparent.

In both the 1995 and the 2000 elections the NEC was criticised for mismanagement of the elections by both national and international observers, both in terms of organisation, education and mobilisation. In addition, legal and procedural aspects of the registration and election process constrained the opposition. Among the practical problems were shortage of registration forms and materials; late appointment of election coordinators; inadequate staff; lack of training of the staff; problems with distribution of election materials; returning officers who were not civil servants or local

government officials who did not get necessary cooperation from government officials for transport etc. and lack of funds to pay agreed salary to registration assistants which caused a spiral of logistical problems when they refused to return voters' registers and forms.

CCM increased its share of the votes in the parliamentary elections from 59% in 1995, to 65% in 2000 and 70% in 2005.

Registration and turnout. The registration process had improved in 2005 compared with previous elections. The numbers of registered voters almost doubled between 1995 and 2005. A larger percentage of the population of voting age were mobilised and active in the registration for the 2005 election than the previous ones. The turnout, however, in terms of the proportion of the registered voters that voted, went down from 72% of the registered voters in the parliamentary election in 1995 to 70% in 2005. For the presidential election, the fall was even greater. The paradox of a much higher degree of registration and lower turnout might be explained by that people with less political commitment were mobilised to register, but were not committed enough to vote in the end. The lower turnout in 2005 could possibly also be explained by a prolongation of the election period on the mainland (see above chapter 8). There has also been an argument that the lower turnout in 2005 indicates voters' fatigue with the democratisation process.

The increased participation in combination with population growth resulted in an additional four million voters participating in the election in 2005 compared to 2000. Three million more voted for CCM and around 750 000 more for the opposition. Thus, even if the opposition lost in relative terms in 2005, it gained in absolute terms. This could be of interest as an indicator of that more people actually participated in the political processes and could be engaged in building the political parties and the political society and a culture of democracy. At least an additional almost four million people participated actively in the political process, with registration and voting procedures as the minimum activity, which most likely contributed in some way to increased political awareness and a potential increased interest to create a resource base for building organisations.

Election campaigns. As discussed above a number of formal and informal issues made the playing field between the opposition and the ruling party uneven. Lack of all kinds of resources in the opposition in combination with the ruling parties' extensive organisation and control of the central and most local governments contributed to the unevenness. The unevenness was further increased when it was decided that the outgoing MPs should have their entire pension paid out immediately when they left parliament and just when the election campaigns started. The opposition claim, in ad-

dition, that the ruling party was using informal means to undermine the opposition. Allegations of corrupt practices both in the internal nomination process, the registration process and during the elections campaigns were widespread.

Election and counting The quality of the election process had improved considerably from 1995 to 2005, even if the opposition as well as internal and international observers noted a number of irregularities.

The electoral system: strong government, underrepresented opposition. The electoral system, where the MPs are elected via single-member constituencies with the first-past-the post principle, has been hotly debated since the multiparty system was introduced. The merit of the system is that it creates strong governments, an easy mechanism for appointing MPs and a straightforward link between the constituencies and their representatives. The drawback is that it reduces the number of parliamentary seats the already weak oppositions get. A proportional system would have made it more difficult for the ruling party to get the necessary two-thirds of the votes for constitutional changes. A proportional system would also contribute to dialogue and cooperation between different parties.

To conclude the discussion on the political society, we can note that the formal procedures around the elections are reasonably well-functioning, on the mainland. For Zanzibar there still are many question marks. The playing field continues, however, to be uneven. The elections hence are reasonably free, but not fair. The ruling party has from the outset a better organisation, better capacity to formulate and disseminate policies. The opposition is fragmented and weak, and lacks resources to be able to balance the ruling party election campaigns and to recruit election observers at poll stations. A number of regulations from the single party era remain and limit the opposition in various ways. The division between the ruling party and the state and local government apparatus is still fluid, or at least perceived to be so by the opposition. “Threat to security” according to the regulations, is used by the police to limit opposition parties during election campaigns. Media, in particular the state owned Radio Tanzania, which has the largest audience, still give an un-proportional coverage of CCM during elections.

So, even if a lot of progress has been made, the challenge to build up credible parties based on competing visions still has a long way to go. There are also views from outside the opposition that point at the internal weaknesses of the opposition parties, and that the electorate simply does not support the opposition. According to this view, the deteriorating performance of opposition parties in consecutive elections can be interpreted as an indicator of the weakness or lack of popular support for opposition

parties rather than the capability and expertise of the ruling party and the state to rig elections.

CCM, CUF and CHADEMA are the only parties that have developed into more institutionalized political parties. All three parties have well elaborated structures and procedures for elections to various organs of the respective party, and branches in various parts of the country. The three parties also get substantial support in the elections, and hence command a degree of legitimacy. The three parties' resources, however, are very uneven. NCCR and TLP make up another segment and are two parties that have attracted substantial numbers of votes in the 1995 and 2000 elections, but have since been torn apart by internal conflicts, which indicates a low degree of institutional capacity to manage conflicts. The remaining parties are very small and have an even lower degree of institutionalisation.

The conclusion we can draw in relation to the research question to what extent Tanzania is moving towards a consolidation of democracy, is that even if a multiparty system has been established and three parties are reasonably well developed, there is still a long way to go before the opposition parties will be strong enough to challenge the ruling party and a multiparty system consolidated.

The challenge now is to what extent the democratic processes will have been deepened before the election in 2015.

9.4 The economic society

The last sphere analysed was "economic society", the institution analysed was "Inclusive economic development", where I used the indicators "Economic and sector growth"; "Income distribution", and the trend in "Poverty reduction" in order to assess to what extent an inclusive economic growth has been established. The civil and economic society was analysed in chapter 6.

9.4.1 *The neglected interface between economic and democratic reforms—frustration, legitimacy and people's capabilities hollowed out*

A number of reform programmes and policies have been developed and implemented in order to improve economic and social development, the PRSP and its follow up National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty (NSGRP or MKUKUTA in Kiswahili), the education and the health sector reforms. The interplay between the economic reforms and the democratisation process appears not to have been fully taken into account, when the reforms were designed in the 1990s. The negative "spill over" from some of the economic reforms and the reforms within the public sector have

undermined important aspects of the democratisation process. The economic reforms generate processes of exclusion and marginalisation, but also integration and increased incomes for a few. In combination with rising expectations, this real or relative deprivation can create a platform for widespread discontent. As discussed in chapter 4, poor people in Tanzania have never been so many as today. This might undermine the legitimacy of the democratisation process. In liberal democratic theory, democratisation and economic reforms are considered to be mutually reinforcing. According to the theory, market reforms create the foundation for an entrepreneurial middle-class that creates economic growth and demands democracy, paving the way for poorer segments of the population. It appears, however, that the understanding generated from a substantive democratic theory approach is more fruitful. It is not necessarily so that market reforms create the foundation for a new democratising middle class. Economic reforms have in many cases not created a new economic elite, it is rather the “old” elite that transforms itself and maintains control. If focus remains on the formal, rather than the substantive, outcome of the democratisation process, the elites in control of the state and the economy will continue to be in power, and “reconfigure a predatory autocracy”, according to Mentan (2009). This points at the need to bring in an analysis of the elites and power in the analysis of the democratisation process.

Democracy – and poverty reduction – is about empowerment and increased capabilities for poor people (Sen, 1999, 2005). In Tanzania, the capabilities for resource weak strata to participate in the democratisation process were hollowed out up to the early 21st century, not the least in the form of reduced literacy. This neglect has, however, been overcome during the last few years, even if it still exists. With the expansion of the primary and secondary schools since 2001, this situation might be changed by the elections of 2015 and 2020, when a new generation will reach the voting age. Tanzania has also entered a period of rapid economic growth since 2003, but still little appears to change for the majority, particularly in the rural areas – hence, relative deprivation has increased and risks undermining the legitimacy of the democratisation process.

9.5 Implications for development towards consolidation of democracy

Taken together all the processes described above contributed to that the election in 2005 ended up with almost a 90% dominance of the ruling party Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) in the parliament. Rather than being a step forward for democracy, it became a step forward for “electionalism” – the capacity to arrange and carry out formal multiparty elections. It was rather a step backwards for democracy compared with the expectations after the elections in 1995. Even if e.g. Lindberg (2009) has argued that

elections have a democratising effect it might be that it was that effect that made the elections in 2010 more challenging for the ruling party. On the other hand, the turnout was the lowest ever and might indicate a sign of voter apathy and lack of trust in the democratisation process, as discussed in chapter 8.

This raises a number of issues concerning how democratic processes could be strengthened. As the economic reforms have a direct bearing on the democratisation process, there is a need for greater coherence between different sets of policy interventions and development cooperation. Eventual side effects of economic and administrative reforms on the democratisation process must be analysed. First, support to the economic and administrative reforms must also be designed in a way that they *do not undermine* the room to manoeuvre for the opposition, the parliament, the civil society or other political institutions, in order to build up and maintain a healthy democracy.

Secondly, in order to deepen democracy, ways must be found to enhance democracy far beyond the electoral procedures. Participative structures and the citizens' capabilities to participate must be strengthened and a culture of democracy should be established *on all levels* of the society.

Thirdly, even if the opposition parties have weak organisation, lack democratic structures and have a weak social base, there is a need to strengthen the opposition as a political institution. This does not necessarily mean that the opposition should be voted to power, or that the opposition necessarily would be better executives than the ruling party but for the opposition to be able to hold the government accountable it needs to be a serious challenger. A more competitive opposition will also strengthen the legitimacy of the ruling party, if the elections are free and fair. With the extremely uneven distribution of resources prevailing during this term of office for the parliament, it was difficult for the opposition to create a healthy challenge to CCM in the 2000 and 2005 elections. As a result, the parliament became even more dominated by CCM with almost 90% of the MPs. If there should be a change at any coming election, that process must start early if there is to be any effect. Preparation of donor support to the 2000 election through the basket fund started in 1998, two years before the election, was too late. Despite the fact that this critique was acknowledged, the support to the election in 2005 did not start much earlier than in 2000. It takes time to build capacity and knowledge, particularly on the local level.

Fourthly, the parliament as an institution at national level, and the councils at the local level, need to be considerably strengthened in order to have a political importance that could match the executive branch of the government at different levels.

Fifthly, the participatory elements in the ongoing public service reforms and the local government reforms need to be further strengthened. Tanzania has a great poten-

tial for democratic governance if the local political structures could be strengthened. The electoral system and the size of constituencies appear to be an issue that might be considered for restructuring, as part of the process to create a more inclusive political climate.

Lastly, without a substantial improvement of the economic situation for the majority, it might be difficult to maintain a stable political development. Since 2003, it appears that Tanzania has entered a new phase of economic growth. A number of institutional reforms have been concluded and the institutional framework for a deeper democracy is gradually being established within the public administration, local government, media, education system and reforms of the law. The challenge is to give these formal structures a substantive content in the form of well-informed citizens, parties and CSOs participating and using these frameworks to influence decision-making and hold the government at various levels accountable. For this to be effective, it is difficult to disregard the importance of a reasonably well functioning party system.

The question is, how long can the people endure a situation of little economic progress and poverty for the majority, without losing faith in the democratisation process thus hollowing out the legitimacy of the elected government and risk the political stability of the country? In particular the youth is vulnerable. For many youths the situation is worse than it was for their parents. Even for those who might have gained in absolute terms, the gap between aspirations and what it is possible to realise, the relative deprivation, has most likely increased considerably. With limited economic opportunities in the rural areas, a rapid urbanisation process has taken place in Tanzania but without an economic development that could provide sufficient income opportunities. A large group of un- or underemployed youth, and adults have emerged in urban areas. This context creates a large potential for instability, unless new opportunities emerge for poorer people and institutions that can manage unfolding power struggles in a legitimate way. Hence, a deeper, substantive democracy is necessary for two main reasons: 1) to facilitate the vast majority of poor people's participation and pressure for reforms in a pro-poor direction 2) to create legitimate structures of governance.

9.6 Role of the international community

One reason behind the limping democracy might be that that development and international development cooperation has focused on economic and social development more than political development. The direct and indirect consequences of support to economic development and institutional reform on the democratisation processes have not been assessed in a sufficiently comprehensive way, despite the fact that most aid

agencies, including Sweden's, have had promotion of democracy and good governance as major objectives. Hence, even if democracy has been high on bilateral and multi-lateral actors' agendas the last 20 years, and substantial funds have been earmarked for promotion of democracy through various channels, democracy, in particular a substantive democracy, is still not consolidated in most African countries, including Tanzania.

There are several reasons behind this paradox. The government in the receiving country might have a limited interest in getting strong opposition parties, or perceive that promotion of democracy was used as a foreign policy tool to promote a certain form of western liberal democracy, in the context of the cold war and its aftermath. Two of the major players, the IMF and the World Bank, have not had the mandate to interfere in the political development of cooperating countries, but have focused on the more technical aspects of "good governance". Carothers, one of the leading writers on the field of democracy promotion formulates a similar observation:

Yet the community of governmental and nongovernmental actors most closely engaged in foreign assistance reform tends to come to that task with a primary focus on and knowledge of socioeconomic development and humanitarian assistance. Few are experts in democracy promotion. Consequently, reform debates often neglect that part of the assistance sphere. (Carothers, 2009)

It could also be debated to what extent various donor countries would actually like to promote an open substantive democratisation process that might include a development that would not be in line with the real-politics and interest of the particular donor. In addition actors within the global and local civil society perceive that democratisation entails much more than establishment of formal democracy, and have consequently focused more on issues related to empowerment of resource weak strata and social movements, rather than on the political society.

Another factor is of course time. It takes time to change societies, to build institutions and to change the minds and behaviour of people.

9.7 Conclusion—theoretical and methodological contributions and limitations

This thesis has made an effort to present challenges for the democratic development in Tanzania – a country that by some observers is seen to be well under way towards a consolidated democracy, while others perceive it as an example of hybrid-democracy. I started out with studying eight key institutions, the executive, the representative, and the legal sector; the economic development; the media; civil society organisations; the

democratic culture and the role they play in relation to the consolidation of democracy and the political parties. I noted that in the theory of development of a consolidated democracy, the development of horizontal, vertical and social accountability are key factors in the process. I observed that over the period since the first multiparty election in 1995 horizontal accountability, as discussed in the theoretical chapter, has been strengthened, but that the executive from national to local level still remains comparatively stronger. Vertical accountability has been strengthened as well through the public sector reforms, a relatively more independent and resourceful media, the development of CSOs, and steps towards the development of a culture of democracy. And among the more established political parties, all have developed structures and mechanisms for democratic decision-making. Yet a number of challenges remain for vertical accountability to be fully developed, not the least for the poorer majority to be able to hold the political leaders accountable. We also discussed the need for development of social accountability, including the civil society organisations, as well as political parties.

Consolidation of democracy could be said to have been achieved when the democratic development has become established to an extent that it is unlikely that there will be a backlash. However, as stated and experienced in many contexts, democracy is not static, it is a process that needs to be vitalised, maintained and expanded, again and again. The forms of democracy are important, but it is the content, quality and outcome of the democratic process that is essential. The forms are necessary for democracy to develop, but not sufficient for a democracy to be consolidated. For that to happen participation, change of attitudes and evenly spread capacity for all citizens, CSOs and political parties to participate freely and fairly on a relatively level playing field in an open and transparent process are needed.

One of my major findings is the perception of the opposition that whatever effort is put into making a dent in the political map it is hindered by the ruling party with the help of state resources, both manpower such as police and the legal system and budgetary means, as well as the lack of all kinds of resources to build a strong organisation that could compete with the well organised ruling party. This feeling is a very important limitation for building up long-term and strong opposition parties that can compete for power and thereby act as a check on abuse of power by the ruling party. The prevailing rudimentary infrastructure in combination with the limited resources of the parties makes it more demanding for the opposition to build the required organisation and to campaign. The description of how the opposition is failing in its work for a more level playing field for the political parties in opposition is therefore of utmost importance.

Tanzania has also been one of the larger receivers of development aid, not the least from the Nordic countries. Among the objectives over the last 20 years has been to support a democratic development. Many steps forward have been taken in that direction, but at the same time, the ruling party's grip on the state-apparatus is stronger than in 1995, at the first multiparty election. It might be that unintended side effects of large budget support and public sector reforms have strengthened the executive power, and hence the party controlling the executive, relatively more than other institutions of democracy. It is also a result of that donors have tended to focus more on institutional and economic reforms, as they are less contested, than on democratisation. Support to democracy was for a long time focused on elections, and with a smaller amount to CSOs, media and political parties. Of course support to education, health, infrastructure, well functioning state and local government apparatuses etc., indirectly supports the democratisation process.

The testimonies also confirm most of the points made in the literature referred to in the introduction: the difficulties to campaign, the harassment at all levels of the opposition both in its party organization work and particularly in connection with elections; the asymmetry in information and of financial resources; and most important the non-neutrality of the state when it comes to politics. Here again Tanzania is particularly influenced by the very long period of the one-party state era during which the ruling party and the state became intertwined in a way that takes time to change.

It should however, be pointed out that without proper mechanisms for internal and external accountability to political parties and democratic systems as a whole, it is unlikely that the opposition parties would necessarily be more democratic or development oriented than the current ruling party.

It is a great challenge to maintain and develop democracy in developed countries, and an even greater challenge to do that in a developing country where state, private and individual resources are limited – and unevenly distributed. To build democracy is a long-term process, in all societies. Tanzania has taken a number of important steps towards building democracy, but it is still not enough to draw the conclusion that democracy is consolidated. In a context like Tanzania, it is even more important to be able to distinguish between what is normatively desirable, and what actually is possible, considering the realities on the ground.

9.7.1 *Theoretical contributions*

We started out this thesis in chapters 1 and 2 with the theoretical debates on democracy, democratisation and development. The development in Tanzania, as I have analysed it in this thesis, illustrates that the assumed strong relationship between liberal

economic development and liberal democracy must be problematised. In Tanzania, a relatively liberal economy has been established. At the same time the political system might be characterised as a semi-authoritarian rule under the umbrella of democracy (Ottaway 2003), where the economic elites that have emerged during the liberalisation of the economy, often with ties to the former or current state, use their wealth to influence the political development in a way that undermines democracy. In many states in Southern Africa a similar development of authoritarian rule has been highlighted in the recent research literature (Basedau et al., 2007; Bogaards, 2009; Lynch and Crawford, 2011; Menocal et al., 2008; Rakner et al., 2007; Rakner and van de Walle, 2009). This creates a number of new challenges for how we understand the democratisation – and de-democratisation process (Burnell and Youngs, 2009).

Despite political reforms and an impressive economic development at macro level in Tanzania, poverty remains deep and the number of people in poverty is larger than ever, as discussed in chapters 4 and 6. This raises the question democracy for whom, and on whose terms, and highlights the need to go one step further than the formal or minimalist version of democratic theory, as discussed in the theoretical chapter. Formal or minimalist democracy focuses on the procedural side of democracy, which in itself can be a value or objective. But our study shows that even if the formal and procedural sides of democracy and its institutions are established, it still enables semi-authoritarian forms of democracy, which does not necessarily promote either growth or in particular poverty reduction. Hence, I would argue that if we discuss democracy and democratisation, “democracy” cannot be limited to the *forms* of democracy, but must also be related both to the quality of democracy, and to the *content* (or outcome) of the pursued policies in terms of improved conditions for the majority, and not only for a small elite. This take on democratisation has consequences for the theories of democracy and development, as discussed in chapter 2. I found the theories on substantive democracy appeared to be more useful than the more narrow liberal democracy. In this context substantive refers to both the quality of democracy in terms of participation etc., and to the outcome. In this perspective it is necessary to consider the interface between economic and administrative reforms and democracy. A *transition* to more liberal forms of democratic development is not enough in itself for the promotion of democracy, as the case of Tanzania highlights. Tanzania has now fairly well functioning democratic procedures and institutions, as well as relatively high respect for civil and political rights. But the capacity or capability to use these new freedoms is extremely unevenly distributed, which hollows out the praxis of both horizontal and vertical accountability. This raises a number of issues concerning how democratic processes could be strengthened and substantial democracy consolidated. Here we have shown how the

traditions from development theory, with its foci on poverty reduction, participation and “development from below”, in a constructive way could inform the theories on democratisation. This is also what the rapidly growing literature—and policy work—on “deepening democracy” suggests (Gaventa, 2006; Rakner et al., 2007; UNDP, 2002).

Another outcome of this study is the need to problematize and point out the contradictions with the highly normative and ideological concept of “liberal democracy”. The concept “liberal” is part of a distinct ideological body of theories based on safeguarding individual rights and liberties, first and foremost towards a potentially coercive state, and safeguarding a market economy, as Nef and Reiter (2009: 49) point out, while democracy is a much broader concept linked to majority rule, that does not necessarily need to result in a market economy. Hence we find tensions between “liberal democracy” and “participative or popular democracy”. If we do want to understand why democratisation or de-democratisation appears, it is necessary to theorise and take account of how the interface between various economic, administrative and political reforms interacts with prevailing and future social and economic structures. The quality of democracy is closely intertwined with the structures of social and economic inequality. A high degree of inequality affects political equality (Rueschemeyer, 2004; Greig et al., 2007; Törnquist, 2006). Dominant groups in various elites can use their economic and social power to influence the political sphere. This can be done in a direct way or indirectly through better access to information, better education – and through dominance of media. Hence there needs to be a *transformation* of the society that enables both horizontal, vertical and social accountability, as well as substantive democratic processes that not only empower the poorer segments of the community, but also result in a substantial improvement of the conditions under which the majority lives. Without that, the legitimacy of the democratisation process might be endangered. Democracy and democratisation is, consequently, not a technical process, with certain given norms and administrative mechanisms to be put in place, but indeed a *political process*. It is indeed necessary to *politicise* democratisation and development again, as pointed out by (Leftwich, 2005; 2010).

Several African democracy researchers have pointed this out, e.g., Claude Ake who was a staunch supporter of liberal democracy, which to him was a minimum requirement for creating an inclusive social-democracy, including the whole population (Ake 2002). Tatah Mentan (2009) makes a similar analysis of the predicaments for the democratisation process in Africa. If this does not happen it risks being what Mkandawire calls a “choiceless” democracy or a “democracy of tears”. To conclude with Mkandawire:

But we also know that democracy is not simply a question of rules and institutions, but also of the content and purpose of these institutions and rules and that the failure by democratic institutions to foster democratic politics has produced lifeless institutions that have done little to address serious issues of poverty and inequality, producing instead “democracy with tears” which has in many cases rebounded on itself. The hollowing out of the democratic process would make it rather pointless to use democratic spaces to compete over state resources. Instead it would encourage extra parliamentary struggles including personalism, factionalism and use of other means inimical to a democratic order. We currently run into the danger that the emerging political order, while liberal and democratic, may preside over societies that will be strongly elitist and socially quite regressive (Mkandawire 2007:26).

Another theoretical contribution in this study is to identify the tension between administrative reforms aiming to strengthening the state and local government capacity and reforms aiming to strengthen horizontal as well as vertical accountability. That is the tensions between effective governance, democratic governance and substantive democratisation. An area that needs to be further theorised.

9.7.2 *Methodological limitations, reflections and questions for further research*

The strength of the approach used in this thesis is also its limitations. I have made an argument for the need to make a broad interdisciplinary analysis of the democratisation process in order to better understand how various institutions, actors, processes and policies are interlinked and interact. Choosing such a broad approach also meant a compromise with in-depth analysis of each sphere, as well as stretching one's capacity to be informed and master various complex fields of knowledge and traditions. What one gains in terms of understanding the totality, one loses in precision. I continue in any case to argue for a broad approach as it is necessary to understand, for example, the implication of a certain set of economic reforms on democratisation, and vice versa, and understand what implication a certain political reform could have on economic development. But instead of making an effort to carry out that analysis alone, the better solution would be to work in a larger team with different area specialists, in close collaboration with colleagues from African universities.

The explorative approach was necessary as not enough information was available at the time of the start of this research. And of course one needs to learn and acquire better insights. In the past few years the field has developed rapidly, both theoretically and with well-informed empirical studies. Much more secondary information is today also available via the media. The territory is starting to be mapped out—which opens

up for more theoretically driven research. Despite this developments, I would argue for solid empirical studies based on longer field visits in order to get not the only the information on what happens, but also what type of underlying power structures and processes that could explain why a certain development, or lack thereof, takes place. To understand and acquire knowledge about that, needs extensive time in the field and networks built with enough confidence to be able to validate, as well as know, what the relevant questions are in order to go beyond the surface. Too much of social science research on Africa as well as policy prescription, appears to me to have departed from general theories or ideologies developed in totally different contexts and hence has limited explanatory or prescriptive value in the specific development situations in e.g., Tanzania. This argument is as valid both for the failure of neo-liberal theories as for the Marxist inspired theories to deliver policy prescriptions that brings about the desired change, as we clearly can observe by the results of the last 50 years of development policies in Tanzania. Here area studies apparently have an important role to play with the contribution of deep accumulated knowledge on a particular field/region and bridge to the general social science theories. It is extremely important as well to work with African colleagues, as well as work on “feeding back” the research results to African universities. Too many of us social scientist, including myself, apply an almost “neocolonial raw material extraction” approach, where we “mine” primary data, export them and process them elsewhere. We benefit from the process with academic careers, while the sources get little use of the work.

Another limitation is that the study to large extent is built on how various actors *perceive* what developments has taken place, rather than more objective evidence of what has taken place in reality. The more than 120 interviewees were purposively sampled, but of course were very few compared to the vastness of the country. In that way the conclusions of the study are dependent on both the information/perspectives from the interviewees, and my own interpretations. Claims made by the opposition about irregularities could not most of the time be followed up with interviews with relevant authorities. However as mentioned in the methods chapter 3 I have as far as possible by triangulations to newspaper articles, reports and studies tried to confirm any statements made before drawing my own conclusions. The long time period under which this study was carried out could also be problematic, as information has been gathered on various occasions over the years.

I have focused solely on Tanzania in this study, as it was sufficiently complicated to get the time and information to be able to understand the situation in just one country to the necessary degree. The limitation with the one-country approach is that we do not know to what extent the phenomenon analysed is similar or dissimilar to the de-

velopments in other countries. It would have been interesting and enriching to make a comparative study.

An even more complicated limitation of the approach used is that the international (and regional) level is left out of the study, apart from the sections on the role of international development cooperation. But it is obvious that international actors, structures as well as the globalisation process set important limitations for how political decisions are made at various levels within Tanzania – and what is possible to decide to do.

As in all social science it has been a challenge to distinguish between the normative what ought to be, e.g., in terms of availability of information, democratic and inclusive decision-making, and what is possible in a context like Tanzania considering its history, lack of economic and human resources etc.

Lastly, one of the most important issues that affects the outcome of societal development is not dealt with explicitly in this thesis, and that is how various forms of power are set in play and how that affects the political process.

Despite the limitations I hope that this study has contributed to shedding light on the challenges for the consolidation of the democratisation process in Tanzania, and more particularly on the need to broaden democratic theory to include not only procedural, but also substantive aspects of the process, and its outcome. In that way I claim that this study has been a contribution methodologically, empirically and theoretically to the rapidly expanding field of peace and development studies, and to what Björn Hettne called for, a global social theory.

9.7.3 *Further research*

A number of issues have been brought up in this study on which it could be interesting to do further research, considering the limitations above. Among them are:

- Institutionalisation of the different political parties.
- Social base and interest within and between the political parties.
- How are decisions made within the political parties?
- Relationship between economic and political elites.
- Who owns the media houses and what role do the media play?
- How are decisions made within the government? What actors, arenas and forums?
- What role does the donor community play in decision-making?

9.8 Postscript

We can note a lessening of the tense situation in Zanzibar, where the CCM and CUF agreed to form a government of national unity in the autumn of 2009, which was endorsed in a referendum in July 2010 by 66% of the voters in an election that was the most free and fair election ever on Zanzibar. If this will lead to a consolidation of the democratic process or not in Zanzibar remains to be seen. The election in 2010 was however the first general election considered relatively free on Zanzibar. The opposition candidate got 49.3% and the CCM candidate 50.2% of the votes. The opposition accepted the result and a government of national unity was formed. The mainland election result raises a number of issues. President Kikwete was elected for a second term with 64% of the votes, a much smaller percentage of the votes than in 2005. CHADEMA's presidential candidate Slaa got 26% of the votes, the highest ever for an opposition presidential candidate. CUF candidate Lipumba came third with 8% of the votes. In the parliamentary elections CCM got fewer seats than in 2005, and the opposition a further 30 seats. Hence, the balance between the opposition and the ruling party was improved somewhat, and the balance of power among the opposition parties shifted from CUF to CHADEMA, which formed a shadow cabinet. CHADEMA disputed the presidential election result and claimed that it was rigged. When President Kikwete was sworn in the CHADEMA MPs protested and walked out of the parliament.

However, the most interesting result was that voter participation was the lowest ever in Tanzania's history. Only 43% of the registered number of voters voted. This raises two pertinent questions: Does the low participation reflect a "democracy fatigue", as a result of the majority's lack of faith in a formal, but not substantive, democratisation process? And secondly who were the voters that did not go to the polling stations? Was it mainly citizens that voted for CCM in previous elections, but had now lost faith in CCM and at the same time did not trust the opposition?

Another interesting result was that CHADEMA got the majority of votes in several of the major cities (Moshi, Arusha, Mwanza, Kigoma and in Kawe in Dar es Salaam), while CCM got the majority of the votes in the rural areas.

In the process of forming a new government after the election Kikwete balanced between the various camps in CCM and put together a government where the most corrupt ministers from the former government were excluded, and some of the most vocal anti-corruption fighting MPs were included. The 53 ministers and deputy ministers included for instance Mark Mwandosya, who had left CCM 6 months earlier to form CCJ, and tried to get elected on a CHADEMA ticket, without success. Sitta was moved from the post as Speaker of the Parliament to Minister of East African

Cooperation. It can be debated whether the move to include some of the most outspoken anti-graft crusaders in the new government shows that Kikwete and the new government take corruption issues seriously or if it was a move to silence the criticism from within the party, the society and donors that too little is being done to fight corruption (Mchekadona, 2010:128).

By-elections implemented in August and September 2011 did not show any major change in the ruling party's effort to level the playing field.

The question of how the constitution should be changed, and how the committee for drafting the constitution should be composed was a major subject for debate during the whole of 2011.

I will conclude the argument for a deeper and more substantive democracy with two observations by two well-placed observers in Tanzania. In a speech on the commemoration day for Nyerere in October 2010, the executive secretary of the Media Council of Tanzania, Kajubi Mukajanga, remarked:

Mwalimu left a legacy of humility and dedication to serving the masses, having proved that one did not need to be rich to be respected. Mwalimu believed and demonstrated that leadership was about service; about caring. Today, people seek political positions as a means to make money or protect ill-gotten wealth (The Citizen, 2010:1014).

Karl Lyimo, one of the most senior journalists and political commentators in Tanzania, made the point even more strongly. He analysed the democratisation process and the 2010 election and warned that Tanzania is on its way to becoming a "Moneycracy" or "Chequebook Democracy":

After a little more than 46 years of political stability and national cohesion that's uncharacteristic of many an independent African country, Tanzania is fast approaching a socio-political uncertainty of sorts. (...) Clearly, elections in Tanzania are progressively becoming corruption-driven, with little that's positive to show for it. This is most unfortunate. (...) If, at the end of the day, they produce corrupt or inept legislatures and leaders, we're in danger of losing out to 'Chequebook Moneycracy' instead of genuine representative Democracy! In My Book of Things, 'Moneycracy' is a Government of a few Corrupt-Rich – by even fewer Corrupt-Rich – for the abjectly Poor Majority... Too big a price to pay for a phenomenally resource-rich country that's home to one of the world's poorest populations! (Lyimo, 2010:113).

On the other hand, these issues are now being published and debated – an important step towards democracy, even if neither consolidated nor substantive. Today, nearly 50 years after independence, the people are still shackled by poverty, disease and ignorance, raising questions about the nation's ability to eventually free the people from the three enemies. The reality is that the nation now faces a bigger challenge. It is being called upon to also fight against corruption, embezzlement and mismanagement, all of which if left to thrive, will entrench poverty, disease and ignorance. It therefore needs to carefully plan and execute strategies to establish and enforce accountability, safeguard public property and reinforce good governance, if it is to win the bigger war against the three enemies. For the resources which the nation could use to enhance the campaign to root out poverty, ignorance and disease are being diverted to serve selfish ends, in some cases with impunity. The Controller and Auditor General (CAG) has routinely exposed embezzlements and mismanagement, but action to punish the culprits has been slow and in some cases lacking, holding back the pace of the nation's progress.

That is why in marking 49 years of independence, the nation needs to reflect on the progress recorded and act more decisively in the fight against corruption, embezzlement and mismanagement and in establishing accountability and good governance at all levels (The Citizen, 20101210).

I visited Tanzania for the first time in 1980, not a very long time ago, and I have been able to go back regularly over the years since then. Even if many challenges have been pointed at in this study, very much has happened over these few years. Hard working individuals and groups inside and outside the government have tried to make the best of the situation. Many issues have remained over the years, and new ones have been added. The context of development is very different, with a lot of new challenges – but also a lot of new opportunities. To make best use of the opportunities and limit the negative effects of the constraints, it is necessary to develop political and economic structures that enable a high degree of participation from all Tanzanians on how policies are designed and implemented. And so far, a substantive democracy seems to be the least bad system we know, even if the Tanzanian model would most likely look different from the Swedish model. But that is part of a genuine democratic process...

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Selected list of interviews 2000-2007/2010

National level

Government

Kigunde Ngumbale Mwiru, Minister for Politics and Public Relations (CCM) April and June 2006
 Juma Akukweti, Minister for Parliamentary Affairs, in the Prime Ministers Office, 6 June 2006
 Cleopa Msuya, former Prime Minister and Minister of Finance, (CCM) 5 April 2006
 Rajibu Rubuva Kiravu, Director of Elections, National Election Committee. 2nd of June 2006
 Judica Omary External Aid Unit of Treasury Mars 2007 (...)

Political Parties, national level

(Political parties representatives and candidates interviewed in Kinondoni and Pangani district appears under respective district)

CCM

Juma Penza, (CCM)'s Assistant Secretary General 20 November 2000
 Nape Mnauye, member of (CCM) National Executive Committee May 2006
 George Francis Nangale, Dr. Member of East African Legislative Assembly (CCM) April 2006
 Hulda Kibaha (CCM) MP-East African Legislative Assembly
 Edward J Mpogole, Assistant Secretary, Political Affairs and International Relations, (CCM) 7th June 2006
 Reuben Shigela, Secretary General of CCM youth wing December 2005, May 2006, April 2010 (...)

CUF

Ibrahim Lipumba, National Chairman (CUF), Dec 2000, Jan 2003, 2005 April 2006, April 2007, Feb 2010
 Tabwe Hiza, Publicity Secretary (CUF) October 2000 and as MP Candidate in Temeke 4th June 2006
 Wilfred M Lwakatare, Deputy Secretary General and MP for Bukoba Urban 2000-2005, 21/05 2001, 2005
 Hussein Mmasi, Director of Elections (CUF), Mars 2002, 10 Dec 2005
 Group discussions MPs and Councillor candidates (CUF) 4 June 2006
 Mhe Mokiwa Ilemela – MP, Woman Special seat (CUF), 4 June 2006

CHADEMA

Mrs Maulida Ana Komu Deputy Secretary General (CHADEMA), November 2000
 Erastus Shija Deputy Director of Elections,

(CHADEMA), December 2005, 20th May 2006
 Mr. Shabani Akwilombe, Deputy Secretary General (CHADEMA), May 2006
 Zuberi Zitto Kabwe, (MP) Kigoma North (CHADEMA). Opposition Spokes person for Planning and Economic Affairs, 1st June 2006
 Mr. John Chiligati, Director of Publicity April 2010
 Komo, Director for Finance and administration, Chadema April 2010 (...)

TLP

Harold Jaffu, Secretary General and xx Assistant Secretary General (TLP) 17/10/2000, 2001, 2002
 Leo Lwekamwa, Vice Chairperson (TLP) (Founder and first Chairman of TLP) 8 Dec 2000
 John Komba, Secretary General (TLP), 2 June 2006, Mars 2007
 Sulemani Ng'ango, Deputy Secretary General (TLP), 2 June 2006
 Victor Lema, Economic Secretary (TLP), 2 June 2006
 Jafary Luganga, Youth Wing Secretary General (TLP), 2 June 2006
 Public Janeth E Mashelle, MP Woman Special Seat (TLP) 2 June 2006

NCCR-MAGEUZI

Mr Mnegeta J.B. Bhakome, Secretary general, and Director of Campaign and Election Program Dec 2000, December 2005, June 2006
 Polisya Mwaiseje, Secretary General (NCCR-Mageuzi), 30 June 2006
 Didas Mfupe, Deputy Secretary General, (NCCR-Mageuzi), 30 June 2006
 Richard Mfunne, MP candidate, Iringa Town constituency (NCCR-Mageuzi), 5 June 2006
 Director for Publicity and information NCCR April 2010
 General Secretary NCCR-Youthwing, April 2010

PONA

Secretary General Mr. Feruzi Msambichaka, (PONA) 19 and 20th October 2000

UDP

John Cheyo, Chairman, November 2000.

List of election rallies monitored

CCM regional leaders at Magomeni ground, 9th December 2005
 CCM Public rally at Magomeni, organized by (CCM)

Region to counter the argument of professor Lipumba and Maalim Seif Hamad, 9th December 2005
 TLP Final national rally Presidential candidate Lyatonga Mrema, Manzeze, Dar es Salaam 11th Dec 2005
 CUF rally Jangwani grounds, 12 December 2005 at 2:00 PM
 CCM final national rally, Presidential candidate Jakaya Kikwete, Jangwani grounds, Dar es Salaam 12/12 2005
 TLP Final national campaign rally for Presidential candidate Mrema, MP and Councillor contestants, Jangwani Ground 21/10/2000
 CUF Campaign rally for MPs and Councillor Contestants, Kinondoni Muslim, 18/10/2000.
 CCM Campaign rally for MPs and Councillors Rally in Kinondoni Constituency, Tandale Ward 20/10 2000.
 CCM Campaign rally for MPs and Councillors at Ndugumbi, Magomeni Ward 17/10/2000.

Media

Anthony Ngaiza Executive Secretary, Media Council of Tanzania (MCT), Jan 2000; October 2000; May 2001, 2003, 2004
 Pili Mtambalike, Director, Media Council of Tanzania (MCT), 6 June 2006
 Rose Haji, National Director, Media Institute of Southern Africa (MISA), Tanzania, Dec 2005
 Mohammed Tibanyendera, Advocacy broadcasting officer, Media Institute of Southern Africa (MISA) Tanzanian Chapter, 31 May 2006
 Sebastian Constantine, Journalist/Senior Business Editor, the Citizen, Mwananchi Communication 6 June 2006
 Hussein, journalist senior news editor Financial Times, Guardian Media Group 5 June 2006
 Godfrey Kalagho, Journalist, Tanzania procurement Friday 20 may 2006

NGO/Civil Society

Harod Sungusia, Senior advocacy officer, Tanzania Human and Legal Rights Centre (THLRC), 31 May 2006, April 2010
 Kelvin Mkulila, Legal Officer Tanzania and Human Rights Centre (THLRC), 31 May 2006
 Maria Shaba, Chairperson, Tanzania Association of NGOs (TANGO), 29 May 2006
 Hassan M Raha, Deputy Secretary General, Trade Union Congress of Tanzania (TUCTA), 31 May 2006
 Rajani Rakesh, HakiElimu, (Education Rights) Oktober 2000, Mars 2007
 Mary Rusimbi, Chairperson, Tanzania Gender Network Program (TGNP) May 2006
 Alice Mlowola (TGNP) Mars 2007
 Margareta Sitta, Chairperson, Tanzania Teachers Union 2002

Wilman Kapynyema, FES, May 2006, Mars 2007, April 2010
 (...)

University of Dar es Salaam

Department of Political Science and Administration
 Mwesiga Baregu, Professor, Political Science 19994, 1999, 2000, 2005, 2006, 2007, April 2010
 Andrew Kiondo, Professor, Political Science (late)
 Daudifan Mukangara, Professor, Political Science
 Rwekaza Mukandala Professor, Political Science
 Samuel S Mushi Professor, Political Science
 Lauren Ndumbaro, Lecturer, Political Science
 Max Mmuya, Ass. Professor Political Science
 Mohammed Bakari, Lecturer, Political Science

Law

Chris Maina Peter, Professor in Law, UDSM 31 May 2006
 Issa Shivjii, Professor emeritus, Law, UDSM

Institute for Development Studies

Ibrahim Shao, Professor, Institute for Development Studies
 Haroud Othman, Professor, Institute for Development Studies (late)
 Gardens. P. Mapangala, Professor, Institute for Development Studies
 Marjorie Mbilinye, Professor. Institute for Development Studies (and TGNP)
 Samuel Ngware, ass. Professor, Institute for Development Studies
 Robert Mhamba, senior lecturer, Institute for Development Studies

Department of Sociology and Anthropology

Chachage S.L. Chachage, Professor Department of Sociology (late)
 Abu Mvungi, Professor, Head of Department of Sociology and Anthropology
 Felix Tungaraza, Ass. Professor, Department of Sociology and Anthropology
 Cuthbert K. Omari, Department of Sociology and Anthropology
 Patrick Masanja, Department of Sociology and Anthropology

Department of Economics and Economic Research Bureau

Longenius Rutasitara, Professor, Head of Department, Economics 2006
 Godwin D. Mjema, Professor and Director, Economic Research Bureau 2006
 Lucian A. Msambichaka, Professor, Economic Research Bureau

Kassim Kulindwa, ass. Professor, Economic Research Bureau
Research for Poverty Alleviation (REPOA)
Joseph Semboja, Professor and Executive Director

Economic and Social Research Foundation (ESRF)
H.K.R. Amani, Professor, Executive Director
Samuel. M. Wangwe, Professor, former Executive Director

Tanzania Development Research Group
Brian Cooksey, Dr., co-founder of Transparency International in Tanzania

Donor community

Discussion with the Thorvald Åkesson, Swedish ambassador and Anna second secretary 7TH June 2006
Sten Rylander, Swedish Ambassador,
Bertil Oden, Country Economist, Sida Dar es Salaam
Erik Jonsson, Country Economist, Sida Dar es Salaam
Lena Ingelstam, Human rights and Democracy. Sida Dar es Salaam
Jan Lindström Poverty monitoring and Gender, Sida Dar es Salaam
UNDP
UNICEF
IBRD
(...)

District

Kinondoni District

District officials Kinondoni District
Hussein A. Kattanga, Municipal Director Kinondoni Municipal, Dec 05, April 06
Leite Chuma, Head of Department, Planning and statistics KM 13/12 2005, April and June 2006
E.F.J. Kikonge, Local Government Reform Coordinator, KM, 1 June 2006
Joash E Nyitambe, ICT Manager, KM 1 June 2006
D. S. Boay, Head of Department, Education KM April 2006
P. K. Kasawara Head of Department, Community development, KM April 2006
Jennifer C. Omolo Planning Officer, KM, Wednesday 18/10/2000
Principle Returning Officer and Assistants District Returning Officer KM. 19/10/2000

Ward and street officials, Sinza and Magomeni Ward
Julian Bujigo, Councillor (CCM) Magomeni Ward, Deputy Mayor Kinondoni Municipality, 30 May 2006
Magomeni Ward Staff, at Magomeni WEO Offices, group interview, 1 June 2006
Street Leaders, Suna Street, Magomeni ward, group

interview, 3rd June 2006
Hamis Kulata, Makuti "A" Chairman, Magomeni Ward, 3rd of June 2006
Veronica Igoko Magomeni Ward Executive Officer Nov 2000
Idrisa Street Chairperson 14/10/2000, May 2006
Makuti "A" Street Chairman, 13/10/2000, May 2006
Suna Street Chairman, Saturday 14/10/2000. May 2006

Salim Mwaking'inda – (CCM) Councillor, Sinza 30 May 2006
Mr. Hussein Omary – Sinza Ward Executive Officer 1st June 2006
Fatuma Rajabu, Sinza E Chairperson, 6 June 2006
Paul Konyaki, Sinza C Chairperson, 6 June 2006
Veronica Justine, Sinza Ward Executive Officer 12/10/2000, June 2006
Sinza B Chairman 12/10 Nov 2000, 2003, 2006

Magomeni

Street leaders, Makuti A, Suna, and Idrisa Street November 2000, May 2006
Around 20 household interviews in October/November 2000, May 2006
Focus group Woman, October/November 2000
Focus group Young woman (age 18-25), October/November 2000
Focus group Young men (age 18-25), October/November 2000
Focus group Village/street leaders, October/November 2000, June 2006

Sinza

Street leaders, Sinza A, Sinza C and Sinza E street October 2000, May 2006
Around 20 household interviews in October/November 2000
Focus group Woman, October/November 2000
Focus group Young woman (age 18-25), October/November 2000
Focus group Young men (age 18-25), October/November 2000
Focus group Village/street leaders, October/November 2000

CCM

Peter Kabisa, Member of Parliament, Kinondoni Constituency, 18/10/2000, Dec 2005
Mr. Ndunguru, (CCM) contestant internal nomination for MP candidate in Kinondoni, 2nd June 2006
CCM Kinondoni District Secretary, (CCM) 19/11 2000, June 2006

Opposition parties

Hashim Rungwe MP-candidate, (NCCR-Mageuzi) in Kinondoni District, December 2006 and 5 June 2007 (Presidential Candidate 2010)
 Ramadhani Majeshi, Councillor candidate for (NCCR Mageuzi) in Tandale, Kinondoni District, December 2005
 Hassan Yahya Hussein, Kinondoni MP candidate, (CHADEMA), Dec 2005
 TLP Councillor candidater, Sinza, CUF
 (...)

Pangani District

Region, district officials

Ideje Regional Administrative Secretary (RAO), Tanga Region, 27Th Oct 2000
 Pangani District Commissioner
 Pangani District Executive Director
 Pangani District Economist
 B. A. Chiwinga, Pangani District Assistant Returning Officer (District Manpower Management Officer), 25/10/2000.

Keyinformants

Ali Mohamed Ali, businessman, Dec 1999
 Pastor Of Anglican Church, Pangani Town 13/11 2000.

CCM

Lt. Tausi, (CCM) District Secretary, Pangani, 25/10/2000.
 Mohamed Rished Abdallah, (CCM) MP Contestant, MP 31/10/2000, 13/11/2004

Opposition parties

Kitwana Seif, (CUF) Party District Secretary Pangani, 25/10, 30/10/2000
 Kalonga Mohamed Zuberi Kalonga (CUF) District chairman and MP candidate, 25/10/2000
 Shirikisho Ahamed, Member in (CUF) District Executive council, 25/10/2000
 Azizi Salehe (CUF) councillor of Pangani East ward), 25/10/2000
 Salim Imary (CUF) councillor candidate, Kipumbwe ward), 25/10/2000
 Makata Wanda (CUF) party secretary, Madanga ward), 25/10/2000
 Hasa Shaban (CUF) District Deputy Director Organisation), 25/10/2000
 Mbwana Mzee (CUF) councillor candidate in Pangani West ward), 25/10/2000
 Rafii Kibwna, member in (CUF) organisation committee, Pangani), 25/10/2000

Omari Issa, (TLP) District Chairman, Pangani, 26/10/2000
 Rashid Mohamed Haji, (UDP), MP Contestant, Tanga Urban, 25/10/2000
 Boniface Mwilongo, (TLP), Sange Kijijini 9/11/2000.

Election campaigns and election, Pangani

(CUF)'s Presidential Campaign Rally, Ibrahim Lipumba, Uusagara Grounds, Tanga 24/10 2000
 (CUF) MP and Councillors Rally, Pangani, 28/10/2000
 (UDP) Campaigning Rally, The MP Contestant, Tanga Urban Rashid Mohamed Haji. Tanga Oct 2000.
 (CCM) Campaign Rally, MP and Councillor, Pangani West And Boza Secondary, 28/10/2000.
 (CCM) Campaign Rally, MP and Councillor, Kwa Timilai ground 27/10/2000
 (TLP) Presidential, Mrema, MP and Councillors Campaign Rally, Uhuru Grounds, 26/11/2000.
 Observations of Election Day, Pangani East, Pangani West and Bweni.

Mkwaja/Sange village

Hamza Nguzo, Mkwajda Ward Divisional Secretary, 27/10/2000
 Loita MPonji, Ward Executive Officer, Mkwaja ward 27/10/2000
 Mohamed Jumbe, Village Executive Secretary Mkwaja village 27/10/2000
 Essau Edward, Sange Village Executive Secretary's 27/10/ & 9/11/2000
 Sange Village Chairman 10/11/2000
 Group discussion Sange Village Council Leaders, Sange Primary School 11/11/2000.

Pangani Town

Ward Executive Officer (WEO) Pangani East, and the divisional secretary of Pangani.
 Ward Executive Officer (WEO) Pangani West
 Group interview/discussion Pangani East village leaders including the

Household
 Pangani town
 Village chairman
 Village secretary
 Around 15 household interviews in October/November 2000 and 2002
 Focus group Woman, October/November 2000
 Focus group Young woman (age 18-25), October/November 2000
 Focus group Young men (age 18-25), October/November 2000
 Focus group Village/street leaders, October/November 2000

Mkwaja village

Village chairman

Village secretary

Around 15 household interviews in October/November 2000

Focus group Woman, October/November 2000

Focus group Young woman (age 18-25), October/November 2000

Focus group Young men (age 18-25), October/November 2000

Focus group Village/street leaders, October/November 2000

Kigurusiimba village

Village chairman

Village secretary

Around 12 household interviews in October/November 2000

Focus group Woman, October/November 2000

Focus group Young woman (age 18-25), October/November 2000

Focus group Young men (age 18-25), October/November 2000

Focus group Village/street leaders, October/November 2000

Appendix 1

A profile of the political Parties in Tanzania

In the following chapter in appendix the main political parties in Tanzania will be briefly presented and analysed. The profile of each party consists of a brief section history, organisation; members and social base; policy and ideology; internal power struggles; election result and international affiliations. The aim with this is to highlight the capacity and degree of institutionalisation of each party, as well as illustrate the background and capacity of the leadership in the largest parties.

1.1 Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM)

The *Chama Cha Mapinduzi* (*Party of the Revolution* in Kiswahili) is the ruling political party of Tanzania. As presented in the history chapter, the party has its root in the party that led the independence struggle, Tanganyika African National Union (TANU). TANU/CCM has dominated the politics of Tanzania since the independence of Tanganyika in 1962. In 1977 TANU merged with the revolutionary party in Zanzibar, the Afro Shirazi Party (ASP) and CCM was formed. CCM has since been the ruling party in Zanzibar as well, but the Civic United Front (CUF) has contested its dominance. The way Zanzibar and Tanganyika was merged in 1964, and TANU and ASP in 1977 has been one of the major sources of political tensions, particular in Zanzibar.

CCM has won all elections, presidential and legislative, held both in Tanzania at state level and in Zanzibar at autonomous level under the multiparty system: 1995, 2000 and 2005 (See chapter 9).

1.1.1 *Ideology*

The ideology of the party appears to be quite ambiguous and contradictory, when one read the party program and compare to with the policies implemented by the CCM government. On the one hand the party has been spearheading African socialism, or *Ujamaa* in Kiswahili, and still maintains that the aim of the party is to promote socialism (see below). In an PI: the CCM's deputy General Secretary, in 2000, he stated that the objective of CCM policies was:

The policy of Socialism and Self Reliance. (...) CCM upholds market centred economy, peace and tranquillity, equality, freedom, good neighbourliness, democracy, and a Union Government with a two government structure. (PI: Juma Mpenza 20 November 2000)

Similar statements were made by the party ideologue Kingunge Ngombale-Mwiru in interviews in May 2006 and May 2007. On CCM's (English) homepage, the Arusha declaration has still a prominent position, in July 2010. The party display its ideological continuity through putting up Nyerere's famous program speech *Ujamaa* from 1962, in a prominent position at its homepage. In the speech Nyerere outlines his, and TANU's, understanding of what African socialism, or *Ujamaa*, means:

Socialism—like democracy—is an attitude of mind. In a socialist society it is the socialist attitude of mind, and not the rigid adherence to a standard political pattern, which is needed to ensure that the people care for each other's welfare. The purpose of this paper is to examine that attitude. It is not intended to define the institutions, which may be required to embody it in a modern society.

In the individual, as in the society, it is an attitude of mind, which distinguishes the socialist from the non-socialist. It has nothing to do with the possession or non-possession of wealth. Destitute people can be potential capitalists—exploiters of their fellow human beings. A millionaire can equally well be a socialist; he may value his wealth only because it can be used in the service of his fellow men. But the man who uses wealth for the purpose of dominating any of his fellows is a capitalist. So is the man who would if he could! (<http://www.ccmtzorg/objectives.htm>, assessed 20100712)

Socialism and self-reliance is also the overarching “state ideology” as expressed in the 1977 constitution, still valid in 2010, where the first preamble reads: “The United Republic of Tanzania, Political Parties, The People and the Policy of Socialism and Self Reliance” (URT 1998).

Box 3 Aim and objectives of CCM

The aims and objectives of CCM shall, therefore, be as follows:

- To win central and local government elections in Tanzania Mainland and Zanzibar in order to form and exercise control of both the central and local governments in the United Republic of Tanzania on the one hand and Zanzibar on the other.
- To consolidate and defend the independence of our country and the freedom of its citizens.
- To promote the building of socialism and self-reliance on the basis of the Arusha Declaration.
- To supervise implementation of CCM's policies and to maintain and carry forward the ideological line of the founding fathers of TANU and ASP as enunciated in various writings of the two parties.
- To ensure that every person has the right to receive from society the protection of his or her life and of property held in accordance with the law.
- To ensure that every able-bodied person in our country works; and work means any lawful activity through which a person earns his or her livelihood.
- To oversee and protect the right and development of the peasants, workers and other people engaged in lawful self-reliance activities; and especially to ensure that every person has the right to receive a fair and just return to his labour.
- To ensure that through the use of organs duly established, every citizen enjoys the right to participate fully in decision-making on national affairs and matters affecting him or her; and that he or she has the right to freedom of expression, of movement, of religious belief and of association within the context of the law;
- To ensure that our country is governed in accordance with democratic and socialist principles. To preserve, foster and maintain the creed and revolutionary spirit among Tanzanians and co-operation with fellow revolutionaries wherever they may be.
- To safeguard the inherent dignity of the individual in accordance with the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. To ensure that the State is the custodian of the national economy; To ensure that the Government and all public institutions actively assist in the formation and development of co-operative and socialist ventures, and other lawful self-reliance activities of the people;
- To ensure that the national wealth is utilised for the development of the people, and primarily for the eradication of poverty, ignorance and disease. To ensure that the Government and all public institutions provide equal opportunities to all citizens, women and men alike, irrespective of a person's colour, tribe, religion or status;
- To ensure that our country is free from all forms of injustice, intimidation, discrimination, corruption, oppression and/or favouritism.
- To continue the fight against neo-colonialism, imperialism and all kinds of discrimination. To strengthen fraternal relations with all political parties in other countries with similar ideological orientation and which truly oppose colonialism, neo-colonialism, imperialism and any form of discrimination.

- To co-operate with other parties in Africa for the purpose of bringing about African unity and to ensure that Government promotes and strengthens good neighbourliness. (<http://www.ccmz.org/objectives.htm>, accessed in 20060606 and 20100712)

The ideology of the party also emerge from the presentation CCM makes of it self on its homepage (Box 2 above) where the party clearly states that its objective is “to promote the building of socialism and self-reliance” (paragraph 3), to “preserve, foster and maintain the creed and revolutionary spirit among Tanzanians and co-operation with fellow revolutionaries wherever they may be” (paragraph 9) and in paragraph 10 “To ensure that the Government and all public institutions actively assist in the formation and development of co-operative and socialist ventures, and other lawful self-reliance activities of the people”.

The commitment to socialism and self-reliance came up in most of the xx number of interviews with political leaders in CCM, even if the term socialism was redefined to a form of market based development strategy, but where the market is guided by a strong state with the objective to fight poverty:

We are still implementing *Ujamaa* policy, but it is different from the socialism practiced in former USSR or China. Mwalimu Nyerere one time rejected to interpret *Ujamaa* in English as socialism. The quality of Tanzanian life, in particular for the poor people must improve. The strategy to do improve the situation is through *Ujamaa* policy and self-reliance. Our party is still building *Ujamaa* and self-reliance (interviews with Hulda Kibaha (CCM MP-East African Legislative Assembly); Nape Mnauye (member of CCM NEC) 6th of June 2006 and Edward J Mpogole, Assistant Secretary, Political Affairs and International Relations, at CCM Head quarter, 7th June 2006)

On the other hand Tanzania today can hardly be described as neither socialist nor self-reliant. CCM has gradually since the first SAP in 1986, taken a much more pragmatic approach and from 1995, follows a prudent liberal economic reform program with the objective to accomplish economic modernisation and establish a market economy as strategy to raise the living standards of the citizens of Tanzania. This is a source of divide within the party between a more socialist inclined left, a social-democratic middle, and almost neo-liberal right (interviews with Dr. Lwaitama May 2006, and Reuben Shigela, General Secretary of CCM's youth wing Vijana, May 2006 and April 2010).

The business people own the party. It is very difficult for Kikwete to distance himself from the people that have financed his campaign. A lot of the implemen-

tation of the CCM manifesto will go against the interest of the business people, like e.g. the anti-corruption program. People like Lowassa [the Prime minister] are very corrupt and have business interests with people like Mohammed Enterprise, Rostam Aziz and others. However, an interesting development the last 6-month where it actually appears that Kikwete is taking a much firmer stand on anti corruption, clear up the bureaucracy. He has got the taste for populism. Might be possible to find a new social base in the masses rather than the rich (PI: Dr. Lwaitama 22052006).


The policies implemented has been criticised for rather than building a social-democratic or socialist society, according to the principles in the constitution and the party program, it has led to establishment of an uneven, dependent and capitalist society, where a small elite are benefitting from the new opportunities, while the situation for the majority still is desperate. This might hollow out the legitimacy of CCM in the long run; undermine political stability and development, according to e.g., Lwaitama:

Again, the party cannot pursue a political agenda that benefit the rich and pretend that it is a party for the majority and the poor. Poor people will look through this and see that CCM is betraying them and look for alternatives. CCM will die. The leaders must have visions, not only technocratic policies - visions about creating a nation and equitable society. There must be some small signs of improvements. If CCM is unable, people will go to religious organisations, or extremist groups with vision of a radically different society. CCM still rides on Nyerere's era's successful vision of creating a unified Tanzania, unity, (*Umoja*) and nation building. But to uphold that confidence it must be maintained by leaders with visions...(PI: Dr. Lwaitama 22052006).

1.1.2 Organisation and decision-making

The party has developed over 60 years and gained considerable experience how to organise and run a party. It is a massive organisation with regional organisations in all 26 regions, all 130 districts and in most of the 1200 wards as well as branch organisations in almost all of the more than 10000 villages and streets. In addition there might be 50 000 or more cells (interview Penza). In addition the party has a number of "mass organisations", the branches of the elders (*wazee*), the youth (*vijana*) and the woman (*wanawake*).

Figure 10 CCM organisation, from national to cell level.



The chart is worked out from The constitution of CCM, May 2005 edition and interviews

In CCM's rhetoric it is the conferences at Cell, Branch, Ward, District, Region and National level that are the main fora for a participative "bottom up" democratic process, on the basis of which the executing organs at respective level implement what has been decided in upon. However, in reality the central organs play a pivotal role. The most important power centre in the country is the National Executive Committee, with 180 delegates meeting every four months, and its executive organ the Central Committee, meeting monthly (Shigela, Penza, Baregu). The CCM elections are held in three stages. The first stage elected leaders for ward, district and regional party posts all over the country. Some 1,600 elected delegates then came together for the second stage -elections to the National Executive Committee (NEC). These positions are elected by five different groups: women (20 seats), youths (15), parents (10), Zanzibar (20) and the Mainland of Tanzania (20). The NEC then elects the members of the Central Committee. In figure x these two powerhouses of the party—and the country are highlighted.

The top down character also appears clearly in CCM's constitution, where the cell is supposed to be the primary unit with the following functions:

- 1) To defend and enhance CCM policy at the cell level. (2) To ensure that there is protection and security for the people in its area of jurisdiction. (3) To propagate the CCM ideology and policy in the cell. (4) To implement fully decisions and directives of higher CCM organs and of the Government; (CCM 2005:17)

It is clearly stated that the cell should not only be an agent for central organs in the local setting, but also uphold security and play a policing role, as stated in objective (2).

Box 4 Creed of Chama Cha Mapinduzi

- (1) All human beings are member of my fraternity and Africa is one
- (2) I shall serve my country and all her peoples.
- (3) I shall commit myself to the eradication of poverty, ignorance, disease and oppression.
- (4) Bribery is an enemy of justice, I shall neither receive nor offer bribes.
- (5) A leadership position is a surety, I shall neither use my position nor the position of another person for my personal gains.
- (6) I shall educate myself to the best of my ability and use my education for the benefit of all people.
- (7) I shall co-operate positively with my compatriots to build our Country.
- (8) I shall always tell the truth; to me intrigue is a taboo.
- (9) I shall be a faithful member of CCM and a good citizen of Tanzania and Africa

(CCM 2005:147)

1.1.3 *Staff*

Under the single-party system CCM developed a huge administration, partly fused and financed by governmental structures, from national to 10-cell level. When the multiparty system was introduced in 1992, the administration of CCM was separated from the governmental structures and a large number of salaried staff was reduced at all levels. In a context where very few jobs are available, this of course created at discontent among those who lost their position. A resentment that not seldom was turned against the opposition, or the multiparty system as such (interviews w Baregu, Kiondo, Mukangara, Shigela). The opposition recruited a few of the former CCM staff. But the CCM still has a substantive number of staff at national, regional and district level, in particular if compared with the opposition parties.

1.1.4 *Members and social base*

The party had over 3,500,000 million members in 2000, an increase from the 2,500,000 members in 1977, when CCM was established, according to its own estimates (interview Juma Penza, CCM's Assistant Secretary General).

The social base of the party has changed since the introduction of multipartyism. During the single party era the party was the focal point for all kinds of societal interest. The party was a broad mass party with extensive membership among all categories of people, not the least in poor people in rural and urban areas. At the same time the party was closely interwoven with both the political, administrative and economic structures and come to encompass various elites. Mmuya in his study on the political parties in 1998, describes CCM's power basis before multipartyism as constituted by five different elites; 1) Almost all political office seekers on all levels, 2) The top managers, directors, chairpersons etc. in the state owned companies, 3) The state bureaucrats 4) The cultural elite, 4) Heirs to the revolution in Zanzibar, 5) Personnel of the specialised law enforcements institutions (Mmuya, 1998) p34. With liberalisation of the economy and introduction of multipartyism the old establishment regrouped and broadened its social base to encompass the parts of the new business elite, that not seldom had its roots in the party cadres (interviews Kiondo, Baregu).

1.1.5 *Party finances*

CCM has the most diversified sources of finance of the political parties. Besides the membership fees, and the substantial subsidy the party gets owing to its large share of the votes it gets in the general elections, CCM has a number of different sources of income. CCM owns a number of companies that contribute to the economy of the party. The party also has a number of real estates in prime locations in all major cities.

Estates that have increased dramatically in value as a result of the rapid urbanisation and development of the economy. Office buildings, storehouses and factories are rented out and generate incomes to the party. One example is CCM's youth league. It has offices and a large plot in one of the most attractive areas in downtown Dar es Salaam, along Morogoro Road in one of the busiest areas in the city centre. In a joint venture with a private company, friendly to CCM, one of the highest office buildings in Dar es Salaam is constructed, with 20+ floors. The youth league part of the investment is the plot, the company finance the construction - and Vijana will get 25% of the net rents (PI: Reuben Shigela, Secretary General Vijana 6th April 2010). All major sports arenas, apart from the new national stadium, are owned by CCM and generate a substantial income from rents, but also provide space for public rallies. The party also has its own newspaper, the Kiswahili paper *Uhuru*.

The party also receive substantial backing from prominent business interests, both in the Asian and "Tanzanian" business community.

Last but not least, CCM can take advantage of its position as the ruling party. Elected and appointed office holders get salaries and cars from the government or parliament, which hence indirectly subsidises the party activities. In addition there is a number of informal channels of incomes in the grey zone between state and the ruling party.

1.1.6 Leadership

TANU/CCM has had four chairmen in its history. The first chairman, from 1954 to 1990, was Julius Nyerere (president of Tanganyika 1962-1964 and of Tanzania 1964-1985); the second, from 1990 to 1996, was Ali Hassan Mwinyi (President of the Republic 1985-1995); the third, from 1996 until 2006, was Benjamin Mkapa, president of the Republic in 1995-2005. Tanzania's current president, Jakaya Kikwete, has led the party since 2006. It could be noted that the three first chairmen's of the party, have stepped down voluntarily before the official ending of their terms.

1.1.7 Internal power struggles

In a party with 3,5 million or so members in a vast country, with huge poverty and rapidly increasing inequality, with 120 more or less spoken languages etc., there are of course a number of conflicting interests.

We have pointed at the ideological dimension. Other conflicts dimensions include the conflict of interest between different regions, not the least Zanzibar and the mainland. Another dimension is conflicting interest between what Mmuya 1998 call the *party political elite*, e.g. the elected party officials at various levels, the *party bureaucratic elite* comprising of both elected and appointed officials with secretariat positions and

the *state party elite*, i.e., top civil servants and functionaries in state, regional and local government, and state run economic activities (Mmuya 1998 p 70).

The dominating conflict has, however, as in many parties, been between the “elders” and the “youth” (interviews with Lwaitama, Kiondo, Baregu and Shigela).

In 2000 CCM was divided in three major factions. The basis for the factions was not strongly related to different political vision, policy or ideology but rather to the power struggle involving three charismatic leaders and their factions. All three had been among the major presidential candidates in the election 1995. The first, Benjamin Mkapa the ruling President, chairman of the party and Nyerere’s man in the 1995 election; The second was Jakaya Kikwete, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, representing a new generation and pragmatic policies, considered by Nyerere to be too young (45 years) and inexperienced in the 1995 election; The third challenger was John Malecela (Vice-chairman of CCM, former Prime Minister and not favoured by Nyerere in 1995 and regarded to represent the “old hardliners” and elders in the party). Some political differences were ascribed to the candidates, related to the views on the reforms, where the Malecela fraction criticised the neo-liberal aspects of the reform policies implemented by the Mkapa government and claimed to represent a more socialistic tradition. But in practice the competition between the factions within the party turned out to be limited, as could be expected in an election in-between the first and the second of the two presidential periods allowed by the constitution. In CCM’s internal nomination to the presidential election 2000, Mkapa in the end was the only candidate presented to the party’s national congress for election.

The nomination of a new presidential candidate and MPs in 2005 was a much more open, unpredictable and competitive process.

Mkapa at an early stage announced that he would follow the constitutional rules and not attempt to change the constitution to obtain a third term, unlike the situation in several other African countries, like Museveni in neighbouring Uganda. Jakaya Kikwete was selected as CCM’s presidential candidate at the National Conference in June 2005, after intense power brokering with in front of all the Malecela faction. After Kikwete won the presidential election in December 2005, he has strengthened his position in the party. Mkapa announced that he would resign prematurely from the post of party chairman. At an extra ordinary party congress in June 2006, Kikwete was elected as the new chairman of the Party.

The internal nomination process of Presidential candidates within CCM is well elaborated, institutionalised and fairly democratic. CCM member aspiring to become a presidential candidate would first have to take the forms and then seek 250 “sponsors” in 10 regions including Zanzibar. The CCM Central Committee would then make

five recommendations to the NEC which would choose three of them whose names would then be sent to the National Party Congress, which elects the party's presidential candidate (interviews with CCM assistant Secretary General). But there were widespread allegations that the internal nomination process was more corrupt than the elections process itself, in particular as regards MP candidates (interviews with CCM MP candidates and contestants, journalists and researchers). Even if the party set up teams to monitor the process both at national level and at local levels. This issue was raised in almost all the interviews we conducted with political contestants both from CCM and from the opposition, as well as from outside observers and media. In 2010 the primaries in CCM, again, was marred with allegations of corruption. It was widely reported in both Daily News, the state owned paper, and all other private papers (The Citizen, 20100727; The Citizen, 20100812). In the primaries, 77 of the current, and aspiring, MPs was not re-elected, including 6 of the cabinet members and the former Prime Minister and contender for Presidential candidate post since 1995, John Samuel Malecela (Daily News, 20100804).

After the election in 2005, Kikwete appointed his old friend and comrade Edward Lowassa as Prime Minister. Lowassa has a long history in the Party and have held a number of senior governmental positions, including first vice-president and different ministerial portfolios. In parallel with holding public offices he has developed large-scale business activities and been accused for corrupt behaviour (interviews with Brian Cooksey and Andrew Kiondo 1999, 2000, 2002, 2005). Together with Rostam Aziz, one of the larger businessmen in Tanzania, he has been the symbol of the *fisadis*, the loan sharks, as they are nicknamed in Tanzania (interviews with Baregu 2005, 2006, 2010). Aziz belonged to former President Mkapa's "kitchen cabinet", together with one of the chief ideologist of CCM, Kingunge Ngombale Mwiru, who is regarded as one of the *least* corrupt politicians in the country. Aziz was one of the main financiers of both Mkapa's and Kikwete's election campaigns. He was elected to the post of cashier in CCM in 2006, and was widely accused for shady business transactions that helped to finance the party. From late 2006 and onwards a number of corruption scandals was uncovered and published widely by the press, a few of them implicating Lowassa and two other ministers, as well as Aziz. Kikwete, that had put fight against corruption high on his election agenda, as all previous Presidents, gradually become cornered and for the first time in Tanzania's modern history the Prime minister was asked to leave, and the cabinet reshuffled in February 2008. Aziz was as well demoted from the post as cashier of the party (interviews with Baregu, Mukangara) (See also chapter 7). Only 12 of the 47 Ministers are women, a small increase in percent compared to the former Cabinet.

Kikwete had a wide support within the party. The speaker, Samuel Sitta elected in 2005, informally head a fraction in CCM that urged the party and its leadership to fight against corruption and make further reforms to harness the *fsadis*. Sitta was the campaign leader for Kikwete's 1995 campaign and hence a part of the Kikwete's personal network, the *Mtandao*. Lowassa and Aziz, on the other hand fighting back and are regarded as heading another fraction within CCM with large scale business men/woman that has benefitted from the rapid liberalisation, with legal and illegal means. Among them are party members that fear that the anti-corruption drive not only might cut them off from rewarding opportunities – but also eventually be investigated by the PCB, and taken to court. The Lowassa/Aziz camp has been using several means to undermine the more radical reformist faction. Lowassa and Aziz has bought media houses and started newspapers that criticise the reformist faction (discussed in the media section in chapter x). In 2009 they made effort to remove the Sitta, the Speaker from his position. CCM is struggling with a widening rift between the different factions, illustrating Nyerere's argument that the main opposition in Tanzania would not come from newly started opposition parties, but from within CCM.

After long speculations in the press about the division within CCM a new party was said to be formed, rumoured to be a splinter from CCM by the fraction in CCM that has been most outspoken against corruption, among them the Mark Mwandosya, a charismatic CCM MP, and the former Prime Minister and presidential contender Fredric Sumaye, both refuted the claims. The party applied for temporary registration under the name CCJ (*Chama cha Jamii*) in January 2010, and in April 2010 Mwandosya and a few other prominent CCM members stated in public that they had left CCM and joined CCJ. But the party never managed to get enough support from around the country and was deregistered in June 2010. In the press it has been discussed whether the party was a hoax to divert interest from CCM or and expression of the power struggle within CCM (Mjasiri, 20100920). Mwandosya joined CHADEMA, and was nominated a MP-candidate in the 2010 election, but was not elected.

Lowassa was re-elected in his constituency.

The rift is not only about power struggle, but it is about CCM's ideology and policies. Should it be a party for established business interests, or for the vast majority of the poor people? Should the vision be to build a market economy or socialist society? (interviews with Lwaitama, Baregu, Shigela, and Peters).

CCM is not a formal member of the Socialist international, but maintain contacts with a number of labour parties in Europe.

1.2 The opposition

The opposition parties emerged from a loosely formed and heterogeneous group of critics against the single-party system, starting in early 1980s. It was, however, first in February 1990 Nyerere declared that it was not treasonable to discuss multipartyism (Mmuya and Chaligha, 1992: 6). The limited political space for organised opposition parties made political organisations name themselves as “civil or human rights organisations”. The emerging opposition demanded a constitutional conference and a referendum or a commission to investigate if there was a public support for a change of the political system. In February 1991 a group of 10 people formed the “National Commission for Constitutional Reforms” (NCCR), in order to press the government to take action. The following day President Mwinyi declared that the government had appointed a “Presidential Commission on Single and Multiparty System in Tanzania”, with Chief Justice Nyalali as chairman (Kiondo) (see chapter 3). NCCR held its first convention in June 1991, with the aim to form an opposition. The convention was open for anybody, and 800-1000 people turned up. Instead of forming a united opposition organisation, the power struggle at the convention resulted in the formation of five different political organisations, led by charismatic individuals, some with roots in CCM: The “National Convention for Construction and Reform-Mageuzi”¹ (NCCR-Mageuzi), lead by Mabele Marando; “The Union for Multiparty Democracy” (UMD), lead by Abdallah Fundikira; “Chama Cha Wananchi” (CCW), lead by James Mapalala; The Democratic Party (DP), lead by rev. Christopher Mtikila; and The Zanzibar United Front (KAMAHURU-ZUF), lead by Shabaan Mloo (Mmuya, 1998: 81). The power struggle within and in-between the newly started organisations, as well as outside, led to further splitting up of the first organisations, and a proliferation of embryonic political parties. In July 1992, as many as 43 opposition groups had taken registration forms from the newly started Registrar of Political Parties (Mmuya and Chaligha, 1992: 54). Like in any first phase of formation, most organisations were very small and not all were to be considered as serious political organisations.

Based on the Nyalali commission proposal the government made a proposal to the Parliament on a Political Parties act, which was decided upon in 1992 – and with that the formal introduction of the multiparty system. The act specifies in detail the procedures for registering parties, principles for running the parties and the mechanism for overseeing the act (see chapter 3 and 4).

We will briefly present the main opposition parties below. The top leadership is described in order to give a sense of the capacity and character of the parties, to-

1 Mageuzi have several meanings: change, transformation or revolution (<http://www.kamusiproject.org/en/lookup/sw?Word=Mageuzi>).

gether with a short background of the party, its social/members base, organisation, main sources of finance, ideology/policies, internal power struggles and international affiliations. The two main opposition parties, CUF and CHADEMA, will get more coverage. Two other opposition parties will be discussed as well. NCCR-Mageuzi was among the first - and most prominent - opposition party, but has been devastated by internal conflicts since 1994. TLP was the largest opposition party, in terms of votes for its Presidential candidate in 1995, but has since collapsed. The experience of NCCR and TLP can hence help us to shed light on the one of the key aspects of a consolidation of a multiparty system, how to develop and consolidate political parties. The remaining 10 opposition parties are very small both in terms of members and political impact, but the few that have a certain importance will be briefly mentioned.

1.2.1 *Civic United Front (CUF) (Chama Cha Wananchi)*

CUF was the second largest party in the 2000 and 2005 election. The party has its strongest support in Pemba and Zanzibar, along the coast and in the Lake region, as well as in Dar es Salaam (as will be discussed in chapter 9, see figure x). CUF identifies itself as a social-liberal party, opposing the ruling “revolutionary” party (interviews PHQ 2005/2007/2010). CUF is a member of the Liberal International and the Africa Liberal Network (ALN)². CUF was formed in March 1992 through a merger of KAMAHURU-ZUF, a pressure group for democratization in Zanzibar, led by Shabaan Khaisi Mlozi, and the *Chama Cha Wananchi* (CCW), led by James Mapalala, a human rights oriented political organization based on the mainland. The merger was done in order to fulfil the Political Parties Act regulation that a political party needs to have support from at least 200 members from 10 regions in the country³. James Mapalala was elected the first national chairman, and Mlozi vice chairman.

In similarity with other transitions from one to multiparty system, several of CUF leaders had been prominent leaders of the ruling CCM, some of whom had been expelled over disputes about party and government policy. The CUF was registered on 21 January 1993.

Leadership

Ibrahim Haruna Lipumba (born 1952) has held the position of National Chairman of CUF from 1999, and was re-elected in 2004 and 2009. He has contested in all presidential elections in Tanzania since the country instituted a multiparty system 1992. Lipumba is a respected economist. He made an academic career before starting the

2 http://www.africaliberalnetwork.org/standard.aspx?i_PageID=13136 Accessed 20101009.

3 Political Parties Act 1992 §10.

political one. Lipumba received a PhD in economics from Stanford University, USA in 1983. He returned to the University of Dar es Salaam to teach economics, conduct research and became professor in economics. He took active part in the national policy debates and was appointed as Economic Adviser to President Hassan Mwinyi in 1991. In 1993-1995, Lipumba was a Visiting Professor of Economics at Williams College, Massachusetts, USA and was part of a team evaluating the crisis of aid donors and Tanzania. In 1996-98, Lipumba worked at the United Nations University World Institute of Development Economics Research (UNU WIDER) and was later a guest researcher at the Nordic Africa Institute in Uppsala, Sweden. Between 1995 and 2000, he was a member of the United Nations Committee for Development Policy.

Professor Lipumba is regarded as a skilled orator drawing large crowds for his rallies. He continues his career as a freelance economist albeit on a smaller scale due to political commitments (interviews with Lipumba at various occasions, and CUF HQ)).

Seif Shariff Hamad (b 1943) has been one of CUF's front figures in Zanzibar since the party started (see chapter 3), together with Shabaan Khais Mlool and Ali Haji Pandu. All had a long background history within CCM as well as the government of Zanzibar, before entering the opposition (Bakari, 2001: 168ff). Mlool was a former Regional Commissioner, Pandu the former Chief Justice. Hamad was a member of the Zanzibar Revolutionary Council and Zanzibar Minister of Education 1977 - 1980, member of the Zanzibar House of Representatives 1980 - 1989 and member of Tanzanian Parliament from 1977-1980. Within CCM he has held various posts including Member of the Central Committee and National Executive Committee 1977 - 1987, Head of the Economic and Planning Department (1982 - 1987) and Chief Minister of Zanzibar from 6 February 1984 to 22 January 1988. He was dismissed as Chief Minister after a dispute on the status of Zanzibar within the Union and expelled from CCM later in 1988. He was imprisoned in May 1989 up to November 1991 (PI: CUF Assistant Secretary General). (See the Zanzibar section in chapter 3).

When Tanzania adopted a multiparty political system in 1992, Hamad, Mlool and Pandu along with other former CCM-members founded the *Civic United Front party* (Mmuya and Chaligha, 1994: {Bakari, 2001 #1346}) Hamad has been the CUF's candidate for the Presidency of Zanzibar since the first multiparty election in 1995. Organisation⁴.

4 It should be noted that the fact and figures given for the organisational structure, members, staff, financing etc., is CUF's own statements. The stated number of members appears to be on the high side, in similarity with the members figures stated by other political parties.

Organisation

The **National congress** (NC) meets after every two years, with emergency meeting whenever necessary. NC has the major power in the party. The delegates to the NC are elected at National and District level. Three members and one woman are elected from each District, plus 40% elected at the national level. A minimum of 40% of the NC representatives should be women (PI: Publicity Secretary Mnasi 2006). The Governing Council (GC) is elected at the NC. In election years the NC elect the contestants for Members of Parliament and for the Presidency, as well as decide upon the election manifesto. A National Congress meeting was held in January 2005 where the presidential candidate (mainland) for 2005 election, Prof. Lipumba was appointed to stand for the post, and Seif Shariff Hamad as the Zanzibar presidential candidate. In June 2010 the following National Congress were held, and elected again Lipumba with 97% of the votes as the Union Presidential candidate and Hamad with 97% as the Zanzibar Presidential candidate (Citizen 20100629).

The **Governing Council** (GC). The sixty members are appointed from each branch of the party, that is the women, youth, finance, planning and election, human rights and international relations departments. The GC is supposed to meet every 3 months. Usually the council meet in for CUF “strategically selected areas”. The intention is to reach areas where CUF is weak in order to consolidate the party’s organisation and member base. GC meetings have been held in places like Maswa, Kondoa and Mwanza. The council’s meeting always lasts for two days. In 2005 they met in October and after the Zanzibar Election. (Mnasi and Lipumba)

At **district level** there are an elected District Chairperson and District Secretary, plus a small directorate. At ward level there are the ward chairperson and ward secretary and at the party branch level there are a branch chairperson and a branch secretary. The directors at district levels are not paid but they receive allowances only. In that sense they work on voluntary basis. Ward and branch representatives are not paid.

The **Secretariat of the Central Committee** of the party is organised in eight departments. The departments are: Organization; Finance and Economic Affairs; Information and Publicity; Foreign Affairs; Human Rights; Parliamentary and Legal Affairs; Youths Affairs and Women and Children’s Affairs. Each department is headed by a Director and a Deputy Director.

In 2006 there was 15 people working at the headquarters, excluding drivers. The directors have a small salary, as well as the administrative staff. All other functionaries work on a voluntary basis (PI: CUF Publicity Secretary).

Members and social base

The numbers of members in 2005 was stated to be more than 4m members⁵, before the election campaign started. An additional 1 million membership cards were printed during the election campaign. All cards were bought so CUF estimated that there were more than 5m members in 2005/2006 (PI: CUF Publicity Secretary).

The social base of the party is on Pemba and Unguja, along the coast, in Temeke in Dar es Salaam, and in the lake regions. Even if CUF claims to be a secular party for all of Tanzania, it could be noted that the party is strongest in areas where Islam is relatively stronger.

Party finances

According to CUF there are three main sources of incomes. The membership fee is Tsh. 50 per each member per month and if properly collected should bring in about 250m Tsh annually. Donations from supporters are another source of income. Some supporters donate cash e.g., 1m or 2m Tsh. Other supporters donate in kind, for example providing transport and diesel during campaigns. The largest income is the party subsidy. CUF gets 70m per month, based on the number of representatives in the parliament.

CUF do not run any business or have property or other income generating activities.

The main expenditures include the party headquarters. The party has bought a motorbike for each district in Tanzania and all regional coordinator were being financed to manage and coordinate the election in 2005. Some money spent in collection data on local government. Local government data were collected because the data provided by the concerned ministry cannot be trusted and of course at the end we found some discrepancies.

During elections cost includes printing party programme, sending regional election directors for each region, paying some few shillings for their subsistence and internal transport, organise public rallies, recruiting, training and transport of election monitors to all constituencies.

Elections

The nomination process is fairly elaborated and institutionalised, following a similar procedure as CCM. Aspiring CUF presidential candidates submit application forms to

5 Note that the figures and "facts" that are presented in this section on the different parties, is the different parties own statements. It could be noted that the figures for the number of members appears to be exaggerated for all opposition parties. In 2005 the population was estimated to be 33 million. Members include youth below the voting age. As the age group below voting age is more than half of the population, the number of members could be higher than the number of votes the party gets in the election. On the other hand it is unlikely that it only members that vote for a party in the general election.

the party secretaries in the districts where they have permanent residence. The district executive committees examine the forms and forward them for discussion to the NEC. Finally the party's general congress, selected the party's presidential candidate by a simple majority in a secret ballot. The selected candidate recommends the name of his or her running mate as vice-president to the party's central committee. MP candidates are selected in a similar process.

In the 1995 presidential election, CUF candidate Ibrahim Lipumba placed third (behind Benjamin Mkapa of the CCM and NCCR-Mageuzi candidate Augustine Mrema) winning 6.4% of the vote. In the National Assembly, the party won 24 of 232 elective seats, making it the largest opposition party in the legislature. Seif Shariff Hamad won 49.8% of the vote against 50.2% for the ruling party's Salmin Amour in elections for the presidency of Zanzibar. The CUF also obtained 24 of 50 elective seats in the Zanzibar House of Representatives. International and domestic observers heavily criticized the conduct of the Zanzibar polls. Following the election, the CUF boycotted the House of Representatives and refused to recognize the Zanzibari government as legitimate. In November 1997, eighteen leaders of the CUF were arrested and subsequently charged with treason. These charges were later dropped.

In the 29 October 2000 presidential election, Lipumba placed second to Mkapa, winning 16.3% of the vote. The party maintained its status as the largest opposition party in the National Assembly by winning 17 of 231 elective seats. Seif Shariff Hamad won 33% of the vote against 67 % for the ruling party's Amani Abeid Karume in elections for the presidency of Zanzibar. The CUF won 16 of 50 elective seats in the Zanzibar House of Representatives. The elections were considered largely free and fair on the mainland, but observers noted serious irregularities in the Zanzibar polls, with some calling for a complete re-run of the polls. When the electoral commission nullified the results in only 16 constituencies, the CUF announced that it would boycott the new elections conducted on 5 November 2000.

Elections for the Zanzibar Presidency and House of Representatives took place on 30 October 2005. Seif Shariff Hamad placed second to incumbent Amani Abeid Karume, winning 46.07% of the vote. The party won 19 seats in the House of Representatives. National elections were held on 14 December 2005. Ibrahim Lipumba placed a distant second to CCM candidate Jakaya Kikwete, winning 11.68% of the vote. Out of the 232 National Assembly seats filled through direct election, the CUF won 19.

In the 1995 election Hamad got 49.8% of the votes while CCM candidate Salmin Amour got 50.2%. Observers noted serious irregularities in the poll and the CUF rejected the result as rigged (see chapter 3 and 9). In the 2000 election Hamad got 33 % of the vote and CCM's candidate Amani Abeid Karume 67 %. Observers again condemned the

poll based on observed irregularities and instances of intimidation of opposition supporters by the security forces (interview Chairman of CUF Lipumba, Party Secretary) (Commonwealth Observer Group, 2001). On 26th and 27th January 2001, Tanzanian Security Forces gunned down more than forty-five CUF supporters in peaceful demonstration called to protest against the irregularities in the election (CUF, 2001; Human Rights Watch, 2002). International and domestic actors pressed the CCM and CUF to have a dialogue that resulted in signing *Muafaka* II, a peace accord designed to ensure electoral and constitutional reforms. Most of the planned reforms were not implemented by the government, including, crucially, an agreed credible voter's register prior to the elections of October 2005.

In the 30 October 2005 election Hamad was again defeated by Amani Abeid Karume, winning 46.1% of the vote to Karume's 53.2%, according to the official results. CUF disputed the election, again, and refused to recognise Karume as a legitimate President. International observers, including (Commonwealth Observer Group, 2005), and National Democratic Institute (National Democratic Institute, 2005) again noted serious concerns with the fairness of the poll, and the United States boycotted the swearing-in ceremony of Abeid Karume as President.

After a continued dialogue CUF and CCM agreed to form a coalition government, if so approved by the public. At the referendum in July 2010, the first relatively free and fair election in Zanzibar's history, a majority voted for a coalition government to be formed after the election in 31st October 2010 (The Citizen, 20100208). In the 2010 presidential election Hamad lost with a narrow margin to Dr Ali Mohamed Shein, the CCM candidate, with 49,1% and 50,1% respectively, in an election that was relatively well conducted and free according to internal and international observers (The Citizen, 20101104). Hamad accepted the result and the election. A Government of National Unity was formed 14th of November 2010, with Hamad as a Vice-president (The Citizen, 20101109). Out of the 17 full ministers in the cabinet, nine members came from CCM and seven from CUF (The Citizen, 20101115).

Policy and ideology

CUF claim to be a social-liberal party. The party has a relatively well-elaborated political program and election manifesto. CUF has the capacity to develop party programs and policies, with a professor in economics as chairman and a leadership with experience from senior government positions within the ruling party. The 2005 election manifesto was a 95-page document with policy proposals in major areas, with emphasis on economic growth, promising a more sustainable economic growth with an 8 to 10 percent annual growth in GDP by the year 2010. The manifesto listed 15 main areas

that required further improvement, including the better governance, education, corruption, human rights, and poverty eradication. Poverty should be reduced through a green revolution in the agriculture sector, to achieve increased productivity, self-sufficiency and securing better incomes for peasants. CUF's policy on privatisation appears to be close to that of NCCR-Mageuzi and CHADEMA. The privatisation programme should be reviewed, in particular should the different contracts signed between investors and the Parastatal Sector Reform Commission be scrutinised. Strategic public utilities and core infrastructure should remain state-owned.

If CUF's policies are implemented, the election manifesto promised that an additional 500 000 jobs should be created every year, export incomes increase and royalties from mining companies increase ten-fold and hence reducing dependence on foreign aid. The state budget should be balanced through better management, increase government revenue and stricter controls on government expenditure.

On Zanzibar the first point was to ensure that the *Muafaka* (the peace accord) be implemented, to review the taxation system, and rejuvenate the trade sector. (CUF 2005 Election Manifesto)

As emerged from the short description above of the main points in the election manifesto it is difficult to find a distinct ideological difference compared to the CCM programme.

Internal power struggles

There is a certain tension in the party in-between its Zanzibar branch and the mainland branch. Another challenges for the party is that all MPs are from the small island of Pemba. (PI: Hiza 220506). But the argument that CUF is an "Arab" party and mainly with support from Pemba is dismissed as CCM propaganda, both by the party (PI:) and by e.g., Mohammed Bakari, a Tanzanian political scientist (Bakari 2001:172). The party constitution, however, as pointed out by Bakari, give equal weight to the Zanzibar and the mainland side in the distribution of posts within the party. As Zanzibar is much smaller than the mainland, this gives a bias towards Zanzibar.

CUF in similarity with the other political parties has had a number of internal power struggles. Among them are the conflict the first years of the party's existence between the first National Party Chairman James Mapalala, a veteran in the struggle for democracy and the leader for the mainland based *Chama Cha Wananchi* (CCW) which merged with the Zanzibar based KAMAHURU and formed CUF in 1992. In 1997 the mainland branch of CUF announced that it was prepared to recognise Salmin Amour as President of Zanzibar, something that was totally unacceptable to the Zanzibar branch of the Party. Mapalala left CUF and formed a new political party

the “Justice and Development Party” *Chama cha Haki na Usitawi* (Chausta) that was officially launched in May 1998, but registered first in November 2001. Chausta has so far continued to be a very small party.

CUF is a member of the Africa Liberal Network (ALN). ALN is made up of 17 parties from 15 African countries and is an associated organisation of Liberal International.⁶

1.2.2 *Chama cha Mandela na Demokrasia (Party for Democracy and Development) (CHADEMA)*

CHADEMA define itself as a business oriented political party, for democracy and development.

Edwin Mtei and group of like-minded people formed CHADEMA in 1992. Mtei was elected the first national chairman. Mtei was among the young men and woman that was part of the building up the newly independent country in the 1960s. He made a rocket carrier in the newly independent government, was appointed to the first governor of the Central Bank of Tanzania 1966-1977, the Secretary General of the EAC 1974-1977, and Tanzanian Minister for Finance and Planning from 1977 up to he resigned after failing to persuade Nyerere, and the Party, to accept IMF's proposal for a SAP in 1982. He later become one of the executive director in IMF (Mtei, 2009). Mtei has a large coffee farm. He decided to step down as Chairman after he had been accused of mismanagement of party funds (Mtei 2009:205). Bob Makani, CHADEMA's first General Secretary, was elected Chairman.

Freeman **Aikaeli Mbowe** (born 1961) was elected as chairman of CHADEMA in 2003 and re-elected in 2009. Mbowe was elected to the National Assembly in 2000 representing Hai Constituency (Kilimanjaro Region). He won 64.5% of the vote, which was the highest percentage of votes won among constituencies with opposition MP's. Mbowe is a businessman, owning the up-market night club Bilicanas downtown Dar es Salaam, a hotel in his home area in Kilimanjaro (The Citizen, 20090826). It could be noted that Mbowe is married to Lillian Mtei (daughter of Edwin Mtei, the founder of the party). In 2005, Mr Mbowe was nominated as CHADEMA's first ever-presidential candidate. He came third out of 10 candidates in the Presidential election, winning 5.9% of the votes. In the 2010 election the party changed strategy. Mbowe contested, and won the seat in the Parliament for his home constituency.

General Secretary of the CHADEMA, and the Presidential candidate in 2010 elections, is **Dr. Wilibrod Slaa** (born 1948). He made a PhD in law in 1977-1981, and an advanced diploma in rural development from St Urban University in Rome, Italy. Slaa

⁶ ALN aim to spread Liberal values across the African Continent and to facilitate the development and growth of Liberal parties, organisations and individuals in all African countries.

crossed over from CCM to CHADEMA shortly before the 1995 General Election, when CCM did not elect him as parliamentary candidate for his home constituency Karatu, in Arusha region. He defeated the CCM candidate in the general election and won the seat on a CHADEMA ticket. He was re-elected in 2000 and 2005. Slaa has been a very active MP, questioning on sensitive issues like corruption and hence keeping the ministers in the toes. He is also famous for his bold attacks on the ruling elite even outside the parliament. In 2007, Slaa and his party released what was referred to as a 'list of shame' during a rally at Dar es Salaam. On the list appeared a number of prominent politicians and businessmen and their links to a number of corruption scandals. Some of the accused threatened to take Slaa to court, but so far, no case has been lodged (CIT 20100721). He was elected member of CHADEMA's National Executive Committee in 1995, vice Chairman 1998-2002 and General Secretary in 2003 (www.bunge.tz retrieved 20070814). Both Freeman Mbowe and Wilibrod Slaa were re-elected as Chairman and General Secretary, respectively, at the National Conferences in 2009. Amani Walid Kabourou was elected Vice-Chairman in 2003, a charismatic Member of Parliament and chairman of the Public Account Committee.

Elections

In the 1995 election, CHADEMA supported NCCR's presidential candidate, but won three seats in the Parliament. At the 2000 legislative elections, the party won 4 out of 269 seats in the National Assembly. In the preparation for the 2005 elections, Mbowe was nominated as CHADEMA's presidential candidate. Jumbe Rajab Jumbe (b 1940), a Zanzibari was chosen as his vice-presidential candidate. The election was scheduled for 30 October 2005. Four days before the poll, Jumbe died. Which prompted the National Electoral Commission (NEC) to delay the election until 14 December. CHADEMA selected Anna Komu as Jumbe's replacement. The lengthy postponement followed the Election Acts stipulations, but was difficult for the party to manage to finance extra campaigning. (See below). In the 2005 election, CHADEMA presidential candidate Freeman Mbowe placed third out of ten candidates, winning 5.9% of the vote and the party five seats in National Assembly. In the 2010 Presidential election, Slaa got 27.1% of the votes, the highest number ever for an opposition candidate. CHADEMA has not accepted the result.

Organisation and finances

CHADEMA's organisation is similar to CUF's and CCM's with one important difference; it does not have regional branches.

Membership fees, gifts from supporters in cash and kind and party subsidies are

the major sources of income. The party has started some small business activities, but so far, it has not generated any substantial incomes.

Members and social base

The party started as a business-oriented party, targeting business people. Most of the first generation of CHADEMA members was retired officers, doctors and teachers (interview Komu), mostly with roots in Kilimanjaro and Arusha Region. With the election of the Mbowe in 2003, the party made inroad among younger people. The aim was to reach younger, professionals and business people (interviews with Mnyika 2005 and 2006, Zitto Kabwe May 2006 and May 2007) – a strategy that has been successful. (Party Secretary April 2010) A number of well-educated and outspoken young professionals has joined the party and in turned apparently manage to attract voters, to be the largest opposition party in 2010, with 27% of the votes.

CHADEMA is at times accused for being mainly a party for the *Chagga's*, an ethnic group originating from the slopes of Kilimanjaro. Several of the senior party officials have their background in Kilimanjaro or Arusha region, like Mbowe, Slaa and Mtei. It is also in the region where it got most votes in the elections 1995, 2000 and 2005. In 2010, the party attracted voters in the major cities, and in the Lake Region, which might indicate that the party has widened its social base. In the same way as CUF is accused to be mainly a Muslim party, CHADEMA is accused for being mainly a Christian party - which is strongly denied by the party, of course.

Policy and ideology

The party clearly state that it is a liberal party, even if it is a member of the international conservative alliance. The policies of the party have changed from neo-liberal to a more social-democratic (PI: Zitto Kabwe, MP May 2006, April 2007, Baregu 2010). CHADEMA argue for the need for protecting indigenous entrepreneurs against foreign companies' exploitation. Mining contracts should be reviewed.

Internal power struggles

There have been a number of power struggles in the party, including criticism from members from outside the Kilimanjaro region that the party need to be a party for the whole country (PI: Baregu 2010). In 2009 Zitto Kabwe, the youngest MP elected in Tanzania, tried to challenge Freeman Mbowe chairmanship at the National Conference, but failed.

International affiliations

CHADEMA is a member of the International Democrat Union (IDU)⁷. CHADEMA has played an important role in IDU's regional association for Africa, Democrat Union of Africa (DUA). In 2006, The Secretariat of DUA was transferred from Ghana to Tanzania when CHADEMA's party leader Freeman Mbowe was elected Secretary General. Due's members in Africa includes *Resistencia Nacional de Mozambique* (RENAMO), New Patriotic Party (NPP) Ghana, (the current President John A Kufuor's party); Democratic Turnhalle Alliance of Namibia (DTA), Namibia. Among the observers is Democratic Party (DP) in Uganda.

1.2.3 *NCCR-Mageuzi*⁸

NCCR was the one of the major domestic movements behind the pressure for multi party democracy. It was formed in 1991 as a committee for fighting for political reform in Tanzania, the "National Committee for Constitutional Reforms" (NCCR). It comprised various civil rights movements and individuals. When the constitution was changed in 1992 NCCR committee was registered as a political party with a name of NCCR-Mageuzi. The acronym NCCR was given a new meaning the "National Convention for Construction and Reform". NCCR-Mageuzi was the largest opposition party in the 1995 election. After a split in 1997, the party has successively lost its strength (see below under conflicts).

Mabere Marando, was the first Chairman and later Secretary General and from 1998 Chairman again (see below). Marando is high profile and respected lawyer. In 2000, NCCR's youngest MP, 35-years-old James Mbatia (Vunjo, Kilimanjaro) was elected chairman by 251 votes against 202 for the founder and Secretary General Mabere Marando. Polysia Mwaiseje was elected General Secretary. Dr. Sengondo Mvungi (born 1952), was running as the NCCR-Mageuzi presidential candidate in the 2005 election, with the support of four other political parties, Mvungi placed fifth out of ten candidates, receiving 0.49% of the vote. In 2010 Marando left NCCR-Mageuzi and joined CHADEMA.

The social base of NCCR-Mageuzi is the "*walala hoi*", the poorest people, work-

7 IDU is the association of over 80 Conservative, Christian Democrat and like-minded political parties of the centre and centre right. IDU was formed in 1983. Founder Members included Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, then Vice-President George Bush Sr., Jacques Chirac - now President of France, and German Chancellor Helmut Kohl. Among the members are the Moderate's of Sweden, Conservative & Unionist Party of UK, Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and Christian Social Union (CSU) of Germany and the US Republican Party. <http://www.idu.org/> and <http://www.du-africa.org/>.

8 PI: Mr. Bakome, Secretary general, NCCR-Mageuzi 12 October 2000; follow up discussion in December 2000 after the election and in May 2004, December 2005, and June 2006 and in April 2010.

ers, peasants/farmers fishermen and small traders. But also radical intellectuals and professionals supporting a radical transformation of Tanzania (Bakome, Baregu). “The establishment of this party was the result of persistent efforts from the public in liberating themselves from the dictatorship of a one-party system in Tanzania” (interview Bakome October 2001)

Policy and ideology

NCCR-Mageuzi defines itself as a socialist party. In its manifesto, NCCR-Mageuzi advocates for social, political and economic equal rights to all citizens. NCCR is against all sorts of discriminations, including tribalism, religious discrimination, and gender discriminations.

The party is guided by the philosophy of social democracy, a philosophy that will bring economic and social change and build country, which respects equality, righteousness and peace. The major pillars of social democracy are freedom, unity and equal rights to all citizens. (Interview PI: with Bakome, Secretary General 2001)

NCCR-Mageuzi believes in democratic governance. The power of power of the government, the parliament and the judiciary should clearly be stipulated. The NCCR’s stand is to form a small government, trusted, efficient and responsible to its citizens.

There should be a three-government structure, the government of Tanganyika, the Union government and the Zanzibar government. There should be very clear lines of power distributions between the central government, constituency government and the local government and in the government of Tanganyika, Zanzibar and the Union government. (PI: Bakome, NCCR)

Organisation and financing

The organisation follows a similar pattern as CCM. It has built up branches all over the country. The party has a youth wing, an elder’s wing, a women wing, and parliamentarian caucus.

NCCR-Mageuzi gets its funds from membership contributions and the selling of membership cards. Other funds do come from the contributions of the well-wishers of the party (Bakome). NCCR does not have any person who is employed on salary basis. All people who are working in this party are volunteers, as there are no funds for paying salaries. The government did not provided funds to support political parties in the 2000 election, as was done in the 1995 election. Financial problem is very acute in this time of election compared to the 1995 election. (Bakome)

Internal power struggles

NCCR is one of the parties that most clearly display how internal conflicts weakened political party. NCCR was the most prominent opposition party up the first larger conflict in 1994/95. The party split in two fractions, one headed by the Chairman Mabere Marando, the other by the General Secretary Prince Bagenda, just 8 months before the first multiparty election. The trigger of the conflict was Marando's move to dissolve NCCR and form a new party together with CHADEMA, which the General Secretary faction resisted. Under the surface was an ethnic conflict, between the three dominant groups in Tanzanian politics. The East of Lake Victoria/Musoma/Waluo group, drawing its legacy from Nyerere, represented by Mabere Marando. The West of Lake Victoria group/Kagera/Wahaya with Prince Bagenda and the Kilimanjaro/Wachagga group (Mmuya 1998:85). Prince Bagenda feared that Marando tried to join up with the Kilimanjaro dominated CHADEMA in order to marginalise the Kagera faction. NCCR split in two new parties, both weak and fragmented. With the general election approaching it was obvious that the opposition would be unable to match CCM, and in particular if NCCR had collapsed into two new weak parties.

In this situation, the charismatic first vice president Augustine Mrema did not win CCM's confidence to be its presidential candidate, or even MP candidate. Mrema had become very popular because of his strong critic of corruption and misuse of power, both as Minister of Interior and as first vice president. When he was sacked by the Mwinyi government he became even more popular (Maliyamkono and Kanyongolo, 2003). Mrema negotiated first with CHADEMA, who accepted his condition to be its Presidential candidate, but not its Chairman, as CHADEMA already had concluded its National Conference (Mtei 2009:202). Mrema then turned to the defunct NCCR's, where the two new parties rejoined and accepted Mrema as both Presidential Candidate and Chairman. 1000s of CCM members and from other parties followed with Mrema and joined NCCR. The whole opposition was rejuvenated. The former chairman Marando was demoted to Secretary General. However, Mrema pulled large crowds and mobilised support. In the election 1995 Mrema got 26% of the votes in the Presidential election, and NCCR and 22% of the votes to the National Assembly, making NCCR the by far largest opposition party. Mrema then won a by-election in Temeke in 1996 and became a MP.

The conflicts in the party resurfaced after the election. Mrema personalized power, lining up with the Bagenda fraction against the Marando group. Nevertheless, it was two other issues that lead to the second large conflict in NCCR-Mageuzi. One was that the party had relatively huge number of members and supporters from the academia and professionals that had a vision of building an institutionalised party. Mrema's per-

sonalised leadership style and agenda did clash with that vision. Mrema was considered rough and not enough educated to be the Presidential candidate in the 2000 election. Moreover he was considered to be a tribalist, appointing staff and getting funding from his home region, Kilimanjaro, which he tended to use as his personal support rather than the party's (Mmuya 1998:88). The General Secretary controlled the Party subsidies, according to the constitution of the party, which was a source of an escalating conflict that led to that most of NCCR energy was devoted to internal power struggle among its leaders. Supporters lost faith in the party. In 1999, Mrema left NCCR-Mageuzi and joined another insignificant party, Tanzania Labour Party. With Mrema followed, again, 1000s of supporters and members from NCCR-Mageuzi to TLP.

After the split in 1999, the party more or less collapsed. NCCR did not have a presidential candidate in the election 2000. It managed only to have MP contestants in 40% of the constituencies. The party had very limited capacity and resources to support the campaigns of MP's or councillors, and consequently got much less votes than in 1995. It managed to reorganise, with Mabele Marando again as Chairman. In 2002 James Mbatia, one of the few MPs in NCCR was elected new chairman. But the party has not been able to reorganise itself. In the election in 2005 and 2010 it got only % of the votes, respectively.

1.2.4 *Tanzania Labour Party (TLP)*

TLP was registered in November 1993. The founder and first chairman was Leo H. Lwekamwa. In the 1995 election, the party got 3% of the votes. TLP defined itself as a radical party, criticising CCM from "the left", claiming that CCM had become a party for the rich and wealthy that does not care about the poor people.

Augustine Lyatonga Mrema (born 1945) has been in the Tanzania Government, National Security Organisation and the CCM party since 1966. Mrema's political career started in 1985 when he tried to run for MP in his home district of Kilimanjaro. His candidacy was blocked by the High Court, and first in 1987, he was officially announced as the winner after a lengthy appeals process. He retained his seat in 1990. The president appointed him Minister of Interior 1990-1994, Deputy Prime Minister 1993-1994 and Minister of Labour, Development and Sports 1994-1995.

Mrema moved to TLP on the same conditions that he had moved to NCCR-Mageuzi - that he should become Chairman and Presidential candidate of the party. The chairman of TLP, Leo Lwekamwa, accepted to step down to become the vice chair person. Almost immediately started a similar power struggle as in NCCR over the right to the party and its assets. A struggle that ended with that most of the original leadership had to leave or left the party.

Mrema moved to TLP in 1999 and obtained 7.8% of the votes in the Presidential election 2000. The party won 3 out of 269 seats in the National Assembly. In the 2005 elections, Mrema was fourth out of ten candidates, winning 0.75% of the vote. The party won one seat in National Assembly. At TLP's National Congress 2010, Mrema announced that his intention was to run for Member of Parliament in Vunjo Constituency in Kilimanjaro Region in the 2010 election. The congress elected Muttamwega Mgaywa as its presidential candidate in the 2010 election, after getting 73 votes and defeating Macmillan Lyimo who got 11 votes. Mgaywa is a former MP for Mwibara Constituency in Mara Region. Mrema was re-elected as TLP National Chairman (The Citizen and Daily News 20100712). Mrema won TLP's only seat in the Parliament in the election 2010.

Social base, members and financing

TLP state that it is a party representing all groups of people in Tanzania. Nevertheless, at the same time its major focus is on "the poor and working class people" "*Walalahoi*" or the toilers those who eat one meal a day or sometime no meal at all.

The number of members in the party is stated to have increased from 250 000 in 1995, to over 3,5 million members in 2000 (sic!). PI: TLP in December 2000). In 2005, the number of members was said to have declined to 1,5 million (interviews in May 2006).

The major source of fund is the collection of money from membership cards and other contributions from members and supporters to the party. There is no paid employee in TLP, everyone is a volunteer. Most have another employment outside the party. During the election time, some members do take leave without pay to be able to devote themselves to different party's activities.

The party has a similar organisation and organs as CCM, on the paper. TLP state that it has branches in all districts in Tanzania, even if the strength varies. The party has difficulties to finance national or regional meeting. It had e.g., to post-phone the national congress twice.

Policy and ideology

One of the main policies of TLP's is fight against corruption, which according to TLP, CCM has totally failed to curb. An issue that made Mrema famous already before entering TLP.

For example if someone is convicted of practicing corruption, he is not taken to court. He is just transferred to a different ministry. (...) Even president Mkapa

dared to have a government trips with people who were convicted of corruption in Mwanza Region. We find that to be a very shameful act. Other people could not do like that. Corruption is a deadly disease.

In the election 2000, Mkapa's government amended laws in the constitution just to justify their corruptive acts. For example, entertainments to voters are no longer regarded, as corruption while the same act was corruption in the 1995 general election. The act of entertaining voters by food, drinks, gifts etc. is justified by the Prime Minister Fredrick Sumaye as "Takrima" which means thanks. Corruption is therefore formally institutionalised. There was much more corruption in the election 2000 and 2005 then in the 1995 election (interviews TLP leadership May 2006).

TLP's economic policy focuses on fight against poverty. In order to do that, Tanzania need to put more emphasis on agriculture and better control the natural resources that now is extracted without much benefit for the Tanzanians (TLP leadership). On private investments and employment, the party state that:

In the 1995 election, we had a misconceptions on the whole issues of privatization. We believed that privatization not was good for Tanzanians, because the policy did not emerge from within Tanzania. We were favouring policies that we believed to emanate from the indigenous, and that benefitted indigenous Tanzanians. However, currently, we have come to recognise that rejecting globalization is a segregative attitude. We now encourage investors to come and invest in our country. However, we are not encouraging investors to come and buy our industries but to establish new ones. We also want experienced investors who have the same objective as us to develop our national economy. (interviews TLP leadership May 2006).

TLP also argues for the need to develop income earning opportunities and employment for indigenous Tanzanians. It also calls for an end to "National Service where they are trained how to hold guns. We will instead send the youth to different professional training where they will acquire different skills to start different entrepreneurial projects such as carpentry etc.". TLP is against child labour. We believe that the problem of child labour can only be eradicated by improving the economic life standard of parents.

In the elections in 2005, TLP had 122 contestants for the Parliamentary seats, 7 of them in Dar-es-Salaam. Before the election, they expected to win 50 seats in the whole of Tanzania, but got three. The party had 850 people contesting for the post of councilors in various districts.

The party do not have any international affiliation.

1.2.5 *United Democratic Party (UDP)*

UDP is another small liberal party in Tanzania, led by John Cheyo. The party is an observer at Liberal International. Cheyo was elected as an MP in a by-election in 1995 in his home area, Magu District, without having any previous political experience. He got a key position as Deputy Leader of the opposition and Shadow Finance Minister – through his alliance with the 27 Zanzibar CUF MP's who form the majority of the opposition in the Union parliament (PI: Cheyo Mars 2001). In 2000 he contested as UDP's presidential candidate and won 4.2% of the votes, and the party managed to get 2 seats in the parliament. In the 2005 election UDP decided to support CUF's presidential candidate and to focus on the National Assembly election, in which UDP got one seat: Cheyo won the Bariadi East seat, again.

The social base of the party is limited to the Mwanza region, in particular to Cheyo's home district Magu and the Bariadi East constituency.

One of UDP's main questions is to establish a federal system in Tanzania, with three governments, one for Zanzibar, one for Tanganyika and one for the Union. The Presidents and the MPs of Zanzibar and Tanganyika should be elected only by the citizens of each of the two territories, while the head of the federal government should come out of polls cast across the whole union area (UDP party program.)

Cheyo had been regarded with some respect within the political society for his active role in the Parliament and general political debate in Tanzania (PI: Kiondo, Baregu). He often appeared in media or in the parliament with sharp questioning of government ministers, which increased his popularity. In July 2002, however, UDP's Central Committee suspended Cheyo together with the vice-chairman and other leaders, allegedly for misappropriating million of party funds (IPP Guardian 20020720). An interim Chairman was installed. Cheyo insisted that he was still chairman and had expelled seven leaders from the party including its MP for Kisese, Erasto Tumbo, and the person installed by the Central Committee as the interim Chairman. The case was taken to the registrar of political parties. After examining UDP's constitution the registrar decided to accept the decision of the Central Committee to expel its Chairman and to choose a new acting Chairman. The party was instructed to hold fresh party elections as soon as possible. The new UDP leadership filed a suit against Cheyo for misusing 137 million Tsh of state subsidy and for the return of five vehicles and party documents. Cheyo, however, got support from the Mwanza branch of the UDP, and was re-elected as Chairman.

1.2.6 *Union for Multiparty Democracy (UMD)*

UMD is one of the "one man" parties, started and run by one charismatic leader, Chief Abdullah Fundikira with supporters, but without an elaborated party structure and

with very little support outside the leaders home region. Nevertheless, Chief Fundikira played an active role in the political process in Tanzania until his death in 2007. His life story was also illustrative for the trajectory of the life of an opposition party leader in Tanzania. Fundikira was among the first Taganyikan's to get university education. In 1957, was appointed chief of the Wanyamwezi in the Nyanyembe chiefdom, a title that was removed the first year of independence after President Julius Nyerere dissolved the chiefdoms. "Tribal" leaders were instead incorporated in the Government system in order to build national unity. In 1961, Fundikira was appointed as minister for water. In 1962, he became the first Minister of Justice when Tanganyika became an independent republic in 1962. In 1961, he became president of the East African Muslim Welfare Society. Fundikira resigned from the civil service in 1964 and started a business. In 1967 to 1972, he was the board chairman of the East African Airways. He continued running private business until 1990 (PI: Chief Abdullah Fundikira in October 2000).

Fundikira played a pivotal role in the debate on multipartyism in Tanzania, together with other politicians such as the late Kassanga Tumbo, Prince Bagenda, Mabere Marando, Ndimara Tegambwage. He started UMD in 1990 as an underground movement for multiparty Democracy in Tanzania. He participated in organising the opposition by chairing the first interim structure of the opposition umbrella body "National Committee for Constitutional Reforms" (NCCR). The party got full registration in November 1993 and took part in the 1995 presidential election. He held the party's top leadership post until 1999 when he crossed over to CCM. After the 2000 general elections, President Mkapa appointed him a nominated MP until 2005. He remained a CCM member until his death in August 2007.

A number of the leaders in the opposition were first members of UMD, like John Cheyo of UDP, Mabere Marando who formed NCCR-Mageuzi, Kabourou of CHADEMA and Makaidi of NLD (PI: Chief Abdullah Fundikira in October 2000).

Despite the fact that the UMD started as a very strong party among the pioneers of Multipartyism in Tanzania, it faced very strong conflicts, which lead to a split. The first internal conflict occurred in 1995, when the chairman insisted to participate in the election, while the vice chairman of the party insisted that the party should boycott the first multiparty general election until the national constitution was changed. The conflict created two blocs in the party, and to some members moving out of the party starting new political parties. Most members moved to ruling party CCM.

The party claimed to have 1.5 million members during its first years, dropped down to 200 000 members in 2000. The reason behind the drop was the internal conflict,

strategies of other political parties, and CCM planting their agents in the opposition parties, who stay for a while in the opposition parties and some of them even acquire top leadership positions in the opposition parties. At the end of the day, they move back to CCM with number of members from the respective opposition political parties (PI: Fundikira Oct 2000).

The party has no salaried employee, due to lack of funds.

The major party policy of UMD is Federalism or *sera ya majimbo* (*majimboism*), which includes; a Federal type of Administration; Supremacy of the parliament in making various decision which affect the public and Separation of powers between the three branches of the government: the Executive, judiciary and the parliament. In addition the party program argues for respect of customary laws; Freedom of the press and de-politicisation of the Army. That is to say, the people in the arm should not involve themselves in politics (PI: Fundikira Oct 2000).

1.2.7 Democratic Party (DP)

The DP is another “one-man party”, led by Christopher Mtikila, a Reverend in the Full Salvation Church, started in 1992. The general secretary of the DP is the wife of the chairman. Mtikila has since the debate started on multiparty democracy been one of the most “visible” opposition party politicians, through his highly polemic and controversial statements on various political issues. The party became registered first in June 2002, because it failed to present the requisite number of party members from Zanzibar first at that time.

The DP/Mtikila call himself a spokes person for the “ordinary Christian people of the main land”. He plays on “mainland nationalism” and argues for the dissolution of the Union Government of Tanzania and the separation of Zanzibar and Pemba from the mainland. The DP also supports the expulsion of minorities from the mainland, in a struggle against the *Gabocholis* (a derogatory term used to describe Tanzanians of Asian origin) (PI: Lwaitama and Baregu). Mtikila has publicize his political views through his church and through lawsuits he has filed against the Government. He and his supporters have been detained a number of times, e.g., in 2007 after he was convicted for branding President Kikwete a terrorist (the Guardian 20071012). He has lunched verbal attacks against Islam at several occasions. In April 2010 he was arrested for spreading a party programme arguing that “Kikwete has completely destroyed Christianity, if Christians fail to unite and install a Christian at State House”, as it is prohibited to mobilise political support based on religion, Mtikila was arrested. Mtikila accused the police for “sabotaging his project to sensitise Tanzanians on important matters” (The Citizen 20100416).

In 2005 election, Mtikila obtained 0.27% of the votes and no seat in the National Assembly. In the elections in Zanzibar 2005, the DP presidential candidate won 0.11% of the vote, and no seat in House of Assembly.

1.2.8 Popular National Party (PONA)

PONA was established in 1992, and got its full registration April 1993. The founder of the party was Wilfred Robert Mwakitwange a former mayor of Tanga Region. Omary Juma Shaame was elected chairman in 1999. The party claimed to have 1,5 million members in 2000, an increase from 15 000 members in 1995 (PI: Omary Juma Shaame, chairman Feruz Msambichaka Secretary General of the Party and Ramadhan Sinde Deputy Secretary General of the party, October 2000 and February 2001). In the election, however, the support was limited to 0,7%, so the figure of 1,5 million members appears to be grossly overstated. The party has a radical worldview and criticises CCM from the “left”. The party was deregistered in 2005.

1.2.9 The 10 smallest parties

Table 13 List of smaller political parties in Tanzania

(Chairman, year of registration, votes (1) in the presidential election 2005)

Name of Party	Chairman (in 2005)	Registered	% votes in Pres. elections 2005
Tanzania Democratic Alliance (TADEA)	John Lifa Chipaka	1993	
National League for Democracy (NLD)	Emmanuel Makaidi	1993	0.19
United People's Democratic Party (UPDP)	Y. Nassoro Dovutwa	1993	
National Reconstruction Alliance (NRA)	Rashid Mtuta	1993	
Chama cha Haki na Usitawi (CHAUSTA)			
Justice and Development Party	James Mapalala	1998	
Demokrasia Makini (MAKINI)	Leonard Shayo	2001	0,15
Forum for Restoration of Democracy (FORD)	Ramadhani Mzee	2002	
Progressive Party of Tanzania (PPT-Maendeleo)	Peter Mziray Kuga	2003	0,17
Jahazi Asilia	K. Bakari Ally	2004	
Sauti ya Umma (SAU) People's Voice	Paul Henry Kyara	2005	0,14


Source: Registrar of Political Parties for year of registration, and Chairman. NEC for election results.

1) Votes above 0,1% and below 0,2% of total votes. All parties did not field candidates or got above 0,1 of the votes.

There are 10 additional parties registered. The parties are listed in Table 12 below. All are very small, and most are to be regarded as “one-man” parties, with followers. Four of the parties were started in the first phase of the democratisation process, often by former senior public servants or ministers that had left CCM after power struggles

or ideological dissent within the ruling party. Among the most well known was the former Minister of Foreign Affairs and business man Oscar Kambona, who was one of the foremost critics of Nyerere and the socialist ideology underpinning the Arusha declaration adopted after stormy debates within and outside the party in 1967. Kambona went into a more or less self-imposed exile in 1967 and was allowed to return first in 1992, when he started TADEA (Mwakikagile). Kambona passed away in 1997, at the age of 70. The current chairman of TADEA is a close relative to Kambona. NRA had a short flare in connection with the elections in 1995, when the current Minister of Finance, Kigoma Malima, was forced to resign after he was implicated in a corruption case. He attempted to get nominated to CCM's presidential candidate but failed, and left CCM. A few days later he joined NRA, was nominated its Presidential candidate. He gained massive publicity for his call for greater Muslim representation in the higher organs of the state, and for a policy of "indigenisation" of major economic activities. He died prematurely at the age of 57, three months before the election. (Tanzania). Other parties have developed from rivalry within the opposition. One example is CHAUSTA. The party was started by James Mapalala in 1998, the first national chairman of the Civic United Front (CUF). Mapalala left CUF after a power struggle in 1997, as discussed in the section on CUF. A third category of parties are those who are started, and run by, charismatic individuals that like to enter politics and start a new party rather than join the existing parties. The late Leonards Shayo is one example. He was a prominent professor of mathematics at the university of Dar es Salaam. He claiming that none of the existing parties was capable of moving Tanzania out of poverty and started *Chama Cha Demokrasia Makini* (the Party for Serious Democracy) in 2001. He was the Chairman and Presidential candidate, but got only 0,15% of the votes in the 2005 election. After his death in 2008 the party became even weaker and did not field any candidate in the presidential elections in 2010.

Map 2 Tanzania Administrative Divisions



Sammanfattning på svenska

Tanzania firar 2011 50 års jubileum sedan det blev självständigt 1961. Tanzania är ett land som genomgått snabba politiska och ekonomiska reformer och ändå, till skillnad från det stora flertalet grannländer, lyckats undgå uppsplitande inbördeskrig. Därför är landet också intressant för freds och utvecklingsforskning.

Ekonomi liberaliserades från 1986 och ett flerpartisystem infördes från 1992. Den fråga som belyses i avhandlingen är i vilken grad demokratiseringsprocessen i Tanzania kan sägas utvecklas mot konsolidering, med fokus kring valen 2000 och 2005. Frågan belyses genom en analys av nio olika institutioner av betydelse för demokratins konsolidering, uppdelade i fyra olika "sfärer"; Staten och dess administrativa kapacitet; det politiska-; civila-; och ekonomiska samhället. Utifrån teorier om den liberala demokratin valdes inom den "statliga sfären" institutionerna "balans mellan exekutiv, lagstiftande och dömande makt" och "gott och demokratiskt styrelseskick". Det politiska samhället studerades med hjälp av institutionerna "livskraftigt flerpartisystem" och "fria och rättvisa val". Det civila samhället studerades med hjälp av institutionerna "oberoende media"; stärkta civila samhällsorganisationer samt "demokratisk kultur". Den ekonomiska sfären studerades med hjälp av institutionen "en inkluderande ekonomisk utveckling". Varje institution analyserades i sin tur med hjälp av två till fyra ytterligare "indikatorer".

Det teoretiska ramverket i avhandlingen tar sin utgångspunkt i skärningspunkten mellan kritiken mot den "minimalistiska" demokratiteori och dess bredare efterföljare den liberala demokratiteorin och den substantiva demokratiteorin. Argumentet som drivs i avhandlingen är att den liberala demokratins institutioner är *nödvändiga* för en konsolidering av demokratin, men inte *tillräckliga*. För att demokratin skall konsolideras behövs en substantiell demokratisk utveckling.

Med hjälp av substantiv teori identifieras en spänning mellan de tre stora reformprocesserna i Tanzania; de ekonomiska, de politiska och reformerna av stat och kommunalförvaltning. Tesen som avhandlingen driver är att det tvärt emot den förväntade positiva samverkan mellan liberalisering av ekonomin och införande av flerpartisystem och "gott styrelseskicksreformer" att de finns en spänning mellan förvaltningsreformer och demokratiseringsprocessen, där den exekutiva makten stärks relativt mer än den representativa makten på nationell och lokal nivå. Detta i sin tur försvagar fundamentala aspekter av demokratireformerna efter som det stärker det statsbärande partiet och därmed underminerar en livskraftig opposition. Detta avspeglade sig i valresultaten i valen 1995, 2000 och 2005 där det statsbärande partiet gradvis stärkte sin ledande position och slutligen erhöll 92 % av alla platser i parlamentet. Den andra

tesen som drivs är att även om den liberala demokratins institutioner nu är etablerade i Tanzania, så har det inte skett någon avgörande substantiell demokratisering. Relativt fria, men inte rättvisa val har genomförts, med gradvis ökande kvalitet. Media är relativt fria och får stort genomslag och det finns ett antal civilsamhällesorganisationer, men med begränsad räckvidd. Visserligen sker en snabb ekonomisk tillväxt, men samtidigt har inte fattigdomen minskat nämnvärt. Tvärtom, mätt i absoluta tal så har antalet fattiga människor aldrig varit större än vad det är idag i Tanzania och klyftorna ökar snabbt. De ekonomiska reformerna kan på så sätt underminera viktiga aspekter av demokratireformerna. Ökade klyftor och frustration kan också bidra till ökad politisk instabilitet, såsom utvecklingen i grannländerna visat. Avhandlingen argumenterar därför för att den substantiva demokratiteorin, innebärande att hänsyn tas både till faktiska möjligheten för majoriteten av fattiga människor att delta och påverka den politiska utvecklingen, och att utfallet av den politiska processen i termer av ekonomisk politik som skapar en inkluderande bred ekonomisk utveckling, förefaller mer fruktbar än den liberala demokratiteorin.

Den metod som använts för att samla in empiri har bestått av intervjuer med nyckelaktörer inom de fyra sfärerna 1999/2001 och 2005/2007, med uppföljning i april 2010; sekundärmaterial samt observationer av valrörelser och valprocesser.

Tanzania has been independent in 2011 for 50 years. While most neighbouring states have gone through violent conflicts, Tanzania has managed to implement extensive reforms without armed political conflicts. Hence, Tanzania is an interesting case for Peace and Development research.

This dissertation analyses the political development in Tanzania since the introduction of the multiparty system in 1992, with a focus on the challenges for the democratisation process in connection with the 2000 and 2005 elections. The question of to what extent Tanzania has moved towards a consolidation of democracy, is analysed through an analysis of nine different institutions of importance for democratisation, grouped in four spheres, the state, the political, civil and economic society. Focus is on the development of the political society, and the role of the opposition in particular. The analysis is based on secondary and primary material collected in the period September 2000 to April 2010.

The main conclusion is that even if the institutions of liberal democracy have gradually developed, in practice single-party rule has continued, manifested in the 2005 election when the CCM won 92% of the seats in the parliament. Despite an impressive economic growth, poverty remains deep and has not been substantially reduced. On a theoretical level this brings the old debate between liberal and substantive democracy back to the fore. Neither the economic nor the political reforms have apparently brought about a transformation of the political and economic system resulting in the poor majority gaining substantially more political influence and improved economic conditions. Hence, it is argued that the interface between the economic, political and administrative reforms has not been sufficiently considered in the liberal democratic tradition. Liberal democracy is necessary for a democratic development, but not sufficient for democracy to be consolidated. For that a substantive democratic development is necessary.



Jonas Ewald is lecturer and researcher in Peace and Development Studies. His main research areas are democratisation and its linkages to development, conflicts and post-conflict management, with a focus on East Africa/Great Lakes Region—and Tanzania and Rwanda in particular. A second research area is international political economy and its implication for conflicts, conflict-management and development.

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